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COMPARATIVE LAW
This innovative, refreshing, and reader-friendly book is aimed at enabling stu-
dents to familiarise themselves with the challenges and controversies found in 
comparative law. At present there is no book which clearly explains the contempo-
rary debates and methodological innovations found in modern comparative law. 
This book fills that gap in teaching at undergraduate level, and for post-graduates 
will be a starting point for further reading and discussion.  
Among the topics covered are: globalisation, legal culture, comparative law 
and diversity, economic approaches, competition between legal systems, legal 
families and mixed systems, beyond Europe, convergence and a new ius commune, 
comparative commercial law, comparative family law, the ‘common core’ and the 
‘better law’ approaches, comparative administrative law, comparative studies in 
constitutional contexts, comparative law for international criminal justice, judi-
cial comparativism in human rights, comparative law in law reform, comparative 
law in the courts and a comparative law research project.
The individual chapters can also be read as stand-alone contributions and 
are written by experts such as Masha Antokolskaia, John Bell, Roger Cotterrell, 
Sjef van Erp, Nicholas Foster, Patrick Glenn, Andrew Harding, Peter Leyland, 
Christopher McCrudden, Werner Menski, David Nelken, Anthony Ogus, Esin 
Örücü, Paul Roberts, Jan Smits and William Twining. Each chapter begins with 
a description of key concepts and includes questions for discussion and reading 
lists to aid further study.
Traditional topics of private law, such as contracts, obligations and unjusti-
fied enrichment are omitted as they are amply covered in other comparative law 
books, but developments in other areas of private law, such as family law, are 
included as being of current interest.
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Preface
Comparative law has often been criticised for lacking in theory, Euro- centric, 
and black-letter-law and private law oriented. The purpose of this Handbook is 
to familiarise students with both classical and new material, and with the cur-
rent and controversial issues of comparative law and comparative legal studies. 
At present, there is no textbook in the English language on contemporary issues 
of comparative law or comparative legal studies. Traditional introductory books 
first cover the aims, purposes, uses and methodology of comparative law, after 
which students are introduced to the major legal systems and prominent ‘legal 
families’. The substantive law dealt with is private law; the traditional area in 
which comparatists have hitherto worked. Times have changed. Other topics are 
of crucial importance today.
Our purpose is to fill this gap in comparative law teaching and study. The 
Handbook is envisaged for use by undergraduates but will also be of use to post-
graduate students for whom it will provide starting points for further discussion. 
At a basic level it will encourage readers to ask questions and at a later stage, when 
they have covered the essential groundwork, lead them on to question what they 
have learnt. Students are introduced to each topic through the work of experts in 
their fields.
Commencing with a general introduction to comparative law and comparative 
legal studies, and a critical overview with a detailed signalling system binding 
the book together, the Handbook moves on to contemporary and burgeoning 
areas of comparative law. This treatment enables the reader to discuss current 
relevant debates and issues such as convergence/non-convergence, law in context 
(culture and economics), cultural distinctiveness, globalism versus localism, 
systems in transition, the use of comparative law by judges and the role of com-
parative law in law reform activities and harmonisation, public law comparisons 
in both constitutional law and administrative law, a new common law in human 
rights, the ‘common core’ and the ‘better law’ approaches, comparative criminal 
law, commercial law and family law, and comparative law looking beyond the 
Western world.
Other topics such as comparative environmental law, e-commerce, Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, bio-ethics or food safety could have been included, but 
choices had to be made. We selected some topics which have been either hitherto 
neglected or which do not appear in any standard comparative law textbook. 
Traditional topics of private law, such as contracts, obligations, unjustified enrich-
ment and tort (delict) are deliberately omitted as these have been amply covered 
in comparative law textbooks. No direct information is given concerning different 
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jurisdictions either. Since a number of books are readily available covering such 
jurisdictions, it is more appropriate to leave the choice to individual lecturers. 
By using this innovative Handbook, which is reader-friendly both in the topics 
covered and the way the topics are treated, readers will be placed firmly in the 
contemporary picture. They will be able both to discuss critically the traditional 
areas and to access current issues presented by experts.
Each chapter starts with a paragraph on key concepts (glossary) and ends 
with a list of questions for discussion. There are suggestions for further reading 
attached to each chapter for those who may wish to write essays on a particular 
topic. There are diagrams and tables wherever necessary. Each chapter highlights 
website connections. Links to university web pages, course outlines and reading 
lists, Comparative Law Forums, such as that of the University of Oxford, and elec-
tronic journals, such as the Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, are included.
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IComparative Law at a Cross-roads

1Comparative Law and Comparative 
Legal Studies
DAVID NELKEN
KEY CONCEPTS
Aims of comparative law; First order and second order enquiries; Multi-
disciplinary and interdisciplinary study; Law in context; Context in law; 
Similarities and differences; Practices.
I.  INTRODUCTION
What is happening to comparative law? Not so long ago it could be said that
colleagues are not interested in foreign law; students are ethnocentric boors; the bar 
consists of monolingual hicks; deans won’t finance foreign travel, nobody will take 
Comparative Law (Örücü 2004: 215).
But, amidst the current processes of borrowing, imitation and imposition of law 
and increasing global interdependence (both desired and undesired), comparative 
law is truly coming into its own. There are still scholars who see the main purpose of 
the subject as ultimately a practical one, for example as a way of encouraging judges 
to learn about solutions found in other jurisdictions to problems in tort, contract or 
other legal areas. Similarly, with an eye on the legislator, there are important collec-
tive projects looking for a ‘common core’ of private law, or seeking to promote legal 
harmonisation in the European Union. On the other hand, other scholars argue 
that we need to go beyond such traditional pursuits and reach towards what has 
been called comparative legal studies (Legrand and Munday, 2003). New journals 
are being founded (for example, in the United Kingdom, the International Journal 
of Law in Context and the Journal of Comparative Law), and path-breaking mono-
graphs, such as Patrick Glenn’s ambitious study of seven different legal traditions 
(Glenn, 2000/2004), are stimulating interest and controversy.1 So the subject finds 
itself at something of a cross-roads. Jaakko Husa puts it this way:
1 For pedagogic reasons we have had to limit the handbook to work published in English. However, 
it is important to say in a book about comparative law that foreign legal and academic cultures and 
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as regards the future of the discipline, we seem to have many incompatible directions 
and goals instead of one. Professional comparative law and academic comparative law 
are living together in an uneasy relationship buried under the European integration 
debate (Husa, 2005:1).
The main point of this Handbook is therefore to offer some signposts for students 
coming to this important and fascinating but also difficult subject. To this end 
the volume contains discussions of both theory and substantive areas, and the 
contributors include distinguished legal and social theorists as well as leading spe-
cialists in comparative law. A wide variety of theoretical positions are represented, 
and some of the standpoints which we have not managed to include, such as the 
‘neo-romantic turn’ (Whitman, 2003a), or post-modern theorising (Frankenberg, 
2006a), are discussed by other contributors in their chapters, and referred to in 
this introduction. But we make no pretence to have covered everything,2 and there 
is no substitute for reading writers in their own words. As regards substantive top-
ics, we have succeeded in providing coverage not only of traditional private law 
topics3 but also of public law matters, including comparative constitutionalism, 
and of the increasingly important types of transnational legal processes such as 
international criminal law and human rights law. But illustrations of more social 
or socio-technical types of problem-oriented law, such as labour law, immigra-
tion law, telecommunications law and environmental law, would also have been 
instructive. There are also no chapters dealing with the growing role of lawyers 
and other professionals in forging international standards and mediating transna-
tional disputes. On the other hand, no one book could do justice to the full range 
of recent contributions to this exploding discipline. Indeed, part of the reason for 
having a review such as this is to unsettle the normal contents of what would be 
thought appropriate for a handbook of comparative law.
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE HANDBOOK
The first part of this volume contains introductory chapters by each of the co-
editors of the Handbook. In the first chapter I shall try to bring out some of the 
common themes that are illuminated when the various contributions to the book 
are put together. After offering a summary of the other chapters, I then seek to 
traditions all have distinctive contributions which have often not been translated (and are sometimes 
not easy to translate). In Italy, for example, whilst many of the scholars in the major comparative law 
‘school’ founded by Rudolfo Sacco publish also in English, some of the most brilliant discussions of 
transnational legal processes are only be found in still untranslated works such as those by Natalino 
Irti and Maria Rosaria Ferrarese. 
2 The authors were recruited through the excellent networks of Esin Örücü, who conceived the 
idea for this Handbook.
3 This is not to deny that studying private law in Europe still has great potential for producing intel-
lectual surprises. Apart from the regular rewriting of the overlapping history of the common and civil 
law worlds, European scholars are particularly well placed to bring out differences in these contrasting 
systems which they can get to know in some depth. See, eg Van Hoecke, 2002, or the prolific work of 
Pierre Legrand. 
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show their relevance to understanding the relationship between ‘comparative law’ 
and ‘comparative legal studies’. In a section called ‘Going beyond’, I discuss the 
different directions opening up for comparative law, and then go on to comment 
on what is involved by seeking to add ‘context’. I follow this with a consideration 
of the vexed problem of similarities and differences, and end with a discussion of 
comparative law in practice. As will be seen, although these issues are considered 
separately for clarity of exposition they are also closely intertwined with each 
other. This chapter is probably best read first lightly as a preface, and again, more 
carefully, as an afterword, once the later chapters have been studied. The ques-
tions at the end are intended to assist in generating discussion of the different 
approaches and topics dealt with in this Handbook as a whole.
The second of our two introductory chapters, entitled ‘Developing Comparative 
Law’, is contributed by Esin Örücü. It sets out to provide a brief survey of the ‘state 
of the art’ of the discipline similar to that found in the introductory parts of 
comparative law courses. Örücü highlights the changing nature of comparative 
law and discusses issues related to ‘intra-cultural and cross-cultural comparison’, 
the definition, uses and purposes of comparative law, macro and micro compari-
sons and other aspects of its methodology. She reflects on the questions ‘What 
to compare?’ and ‘How to compare? the two starting points of comparative law 
and reviews functional, factual and ‘law in context’ approaches. She also offers 
an outline of recent debates over the role of comparative law, which she sees as 
encompassing objectives as varied as aiding law reform and policy developments, 
providing a tool of research to reach a universal theory of law, giving a critical 
perspective to students, aiding international law practice, facilitating international 
unification and harmonisation of laws, helping courts to fill gaps in the law and 
even working towards the furthering of world peace and tolerance. 
The second section of the handbook, entitled ‘New Directions for Comparative 
Research’, is that which groups together those chapters dealing with some of the 
theoretical challenges that are currently facing comparative law. The first chap-
ter, ‘Globalisation and Comparative Law’ by William Twining, provides a vivid 
picture of what is probably the most significant of these challenges, namely, how 
to understand the role of law in the trends, processes and interactions which are 
making different parts of the world more interdependent in so many complex 
ways. Twining puts forward a forthright manifesto for moving to a broader 
agenda of comparative legal studies rather than continuing with ‘business as 
usual’. Comparative law, he argues, lacks adequate analytic concepts and reliable 
data for giving general accounts of law in the world that comprehend the transna-
tionalisation of law and legal relations which, to a greater or lesser extent, by-pass 
the state. Whilst warning that the term globalisation can be misused, Twining 
nonetheless recommends a global perspective capable of doing justice to the 
diversity of forms of normative and legal ordering, such as the Internet, religious 
diasporas, networks of NGOs, or the many internal and external relations of large 
corporations that co-exist in the same time-space context. As well as criticising 
the narrow focus on European private law of much comparative law, the chapter 
also raises a series of questions about the relationship between comparative law 
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and other research traditions such as that represented by subject area experts 
or scholars studying the ‘bottom-up’ activities of counter-hegemonic social 
movements.
In his chapter called ‘Com-paring’, Patrick Glenn argues that Western legal 
theory has been founded on an epistemology of conflict, based on the twin ideas 
of separation and reification of human groups. As against this he suggests that 
thinking in terms of legal traditions allows for an epistemology of conciliation 
based on multivalent logic and the tolerance of diversity. Legal systems are:
best conceptualised as instantiations of a particular legal tradition. As such, they are 
conceptually equal to, and on a par with, other legal traditions, which all exist as self-
conscious bodies of legal information, sustained over considerable periods of time.
As the source of normative information, traditions do not have clear boundaries 
but instead overlap. Rather than presuming a radical separation between laws 
we should look for a ‘logic of fuzziness’ because in the real world boundaries are 
never sharp. He suggests that transnational lawyering and international com-
mercial law provide evidence that legal systems are not separate. He also argues 
that his approach is one well suited to recognising the continuing importance of 
religious laws and to reminding us of the lost history of the relationship between 
‘common laws’ and local laws.
The chapter on ‘Defining and Using Legal Culture’ by David Nelken deals with 
the ways in which the term ‘legal culture’ is defined by comparatists and employed 
in their research projects. He focuses in particular on the way this key concept 
allows us to bring out the interconnections between law, society and culture. After 
distinguishing between legal and social scientific uses of the term, Nelken com-
ments on criticisms of the idea of legal culture and of the polysemic concept of 
culture itself. He then examines some of the main difficulties of using this term 
in explanatory enquiries: What ‘units’ of legal culture other than national juris-
dictions need to be borne in mind? What gives coherence to the different units? 
Must such units exist for social actors themselves or is it enough for them to be 
present for the observer? In using culture or legal culture as an explanation how 
can the risk of circular and tautological arguments be avoided? Nelken ends by 
considering the possibility of cultural bias in the ways in which we think about 
legal culture. 
In the subsequent chapter, ‘Is it so Bad to be Different: Comparative Law and 
the Appreciation of Diversity’, Roger Cotterrell explores the general conceptual 
issue of looking for similarities and differences between laws and legal systems. 
He notes that the concern with harmonisation and convergence can be seen as the 
continuation of a project of seeking underlying universal principles in law, whilst 
the concern for difference can be linked to the valuing of diversity. He counter-
poises functional and cultural approaches to law and argues that it may be unsafe 
to identify functions without asking whether local values, traditions or sentiments 
‘differently colour the definition of those functions, the importance attached to 
them and the tests of their successful fulfilment’. Cotterrell then introduces an 
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analogy between the concern for difference in comparative law and debates about 
assimilation and multi-culturalism. He ends by praising recent work which takes 
a broad approach to explaining cross-cultural differences in values.
The contribution from Anthony Ogus is called ‘The Economic Approach: 
Competition between Legal Systems’. Ogus argues that legal frameworks have an 
enormous impact on economies and the pursuit of economic growth can also 
help to explain legal developments and the relationship between developments in 
different legal systems. He suggests that comparative lawyers could find it useful 
to think in terms of allocative efficiency and to reason in terms of costs and ben-
efits. The chapter seeks to substantiate the following propositions: Common law 
systems may have features which have been particularly conducive to economic 
growth; competition between legal systems occurs particularly where there is 
freedom of choice as to the applicable legal regime; competition between legal 
systems tends to influence a convergence of legal principles in areas of facilitative 
law; practising lawyers may be expected to oppose reforms including proposals for 
convergence of legal systems which will reduce the demand for their services; and, 
finally, an economic interpretation of ‘legal culture’ suggests that it is a ‘network’ 
which may reduce the costs of communication between those using the legal sys-
tem, but, on the other hand, its characteristics may also be exploited by practising 
lawyers to resist competition. Ogus also suggests that ‘hybrid’ legal systems may 
benefit from the competition of legal cultures inherent within one jurisdiction. 
He ends by indicating the features of English common law which may have been 
particularly favourable to economic growth.
The starting point of chapter eight, ‘A General View of Legal Families and of 
Mixing Systems’ by Esin Örücü, is that the current approach to classification of 
legal systems is too Euro-centric and is too much shaped by thinking only about 
legal rules, especially those of private law. She argues that all legal systems are 
overlaps and, to a greater or lesser degree, mixed. Legal systems of places such as 
Malta, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey are given as examples of certain 
types of mixes. But the author also challenges the view that the classical ‘mixed 
jurisdictions’ are the only mixed systems that should be given pride of place. It 
is important also to study ongoing mixes that result from encounters, overlaps 
and combinations. These processes account for the birth of legal systems just as 
‘contamination’ accounts for legal change. These assumptions lead the author 
to challenge the established classification of legal families and suggest that legal 
systems should rather be seen as lying along a spectrum. A number of theories are 
put forward to explain the similarities and differences between legal systems such 
as the ‘tree model’, the ‘wave theory’, and ‘transposition’. For Örücü, the point of 
looking for new metaphors is to deconstruct the conventionally labelled pattern 
of legal systems and to reconstruct them with regard to origins, relationships, 
overlaps and inter-relationships, and diverse ‘fertilisers’ such as the social and 
cultural context, and the ‘grafting’ and ‘pruning’ used in their development.
Towards the end of chapter eight Örücü quotes approvingly the assertion by 
Andrew Harding that the idea of 
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legal families tells us nothing about legal systems except as to their general style and 
method, and the idea makes no sense whatsoever amid the nomic din of South East Asia.
The same point is well illustrated in Werner Menski’s contribution, ‘Beyond 
Europe’ (chapter nine). Menski argues that, for historical reasons, Asian, African 
and other non-Western legal systems are inherently more attuned than Western 
legal systems to the intellectual and practical challenges of comparative law and 
legal pluralism. Practitioners and scholars in these places are acutely conscious 
of the dynamic nature of legal systems as constantly renegotiated entities that 
can be manipulated in many ways to achieve desired outcomes. They are likewise 
more aware of the continuing importance of religion and custom even in modern 
conditions. Menski shows how Hindu law, Islamic law and other legal systems co-
exist within a national legal regime, and all contribute to a culture-specific, com-
posite national identity unique to a particular country. He ends by providing an 
extended description of how the Indian Supreme court was able to bring Muslim 
personal law into line with the majority law and the secular ‘lead model’ in India. 
The way this was achieved, he suggests, may serve as a model for other nations in 
terms of coping with diversity and difference. 
The third and longest section of the Handbook provides illustrations of 
more substantive discussions of comparative law.4 Though it includes relatively 
uncharted topics it begins by re-examining that most mainstream of issues, the 
degree of actual or ideal convergence of private law in Europe. In his chapter 
‘Convergence of Private Law in Europe: Towards a new ius commune?’ Jan Smits 
asks: Is there a need for unification of private law in Europe? How does it take 
place? Is it possible? What methods can be used to make private law more uni-
form? Smits notes that across Europe there are four types of civil code and that 
these are interpreted differently in all its many different jurisdictions. He com-
ments critically on current processes towards greater harmonisation through 
international conventions and European Union Directives saying that these do not 
make a coherent whole, are difficult to monitor and have unpredictable effects. 
He then asks how it might be possible to do better. As positive reasons for moving 
towards unification Smits points to the development of the common market and 
the need for a symbol of European unity. But he also acknowledges that there are 
virtues in diversity, as this may be a reflection of economic or cultural preferences 
and can stimulate competition and innovation. He therefore proposes what he 
calls a ‘bottom up’ approach to harmonisation, which involves the enhancement 
of European legal science and education, the drafting of principles of European 
law and encouraging competition amongst legal systems.
The theme of harmonisation is taken up again in the subsequent chapter 
‘Comparative Family Law: Moving with the Times?’ (chapter eleven) by Masha 
4 While such a division is useful for expository purposes we are not proposing that a hard and 
fast line can or should be drawn between the more theoretical and more substantive parts of the 
Handbook. 
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Antokolskaia. Unlike that of Smits, this chapter reflects the conviction that, at 
least in this field, some form of top-down harmonisation is both necessary, and 
is already succeeding. Antokolskaia shows us that traditional norms in Western 
Europe have been undergoing similar transformations due in part to changes 
in the economy, especially those leading to more women working and the later 
socialisation of youth, and also due to pressures of political action in favour of 
women’s rights. She details the general trends in family law in Europe in the last 
decades, such as the acceptance of the right to marry as a fundament human right, 
the diminishment of marriage impediments, the lowering of the age of capacity to 
marry, and the granting of equal legal rights to spouses. She also describes the role 
played in these developments both by the European Court of Human rights and 
by groups of family law scholars. While acknowledging that differences remain, 
she argues in favour of comparative lawyers seeking to produce ‘better law’-type 
recommendations to legislators. 
Antokolskaia’s account of common trends and principles in family law provides 
evidence against the common claim that family law is particularly unsuited to 
harmonisation because it is so linked to historical and cultural specificities. In his 
chapter on ‘Comparative Commercial Law: Rules or Context?’ (chapter twelve) 
on the other hand, Nicholas Foster seeks to make the opposite argument. He 
emphasises the importance of legal culture, which allows us to move beyond what 
he calls the common ‘instrumentalist’ view of commercial law that assumes it to 
be a culturally neutral technical subject. In a wide-ranging chapter he first sets the 
background to current developments in commercial law in a globalising world. 
He goes on to stress how historically-shaped differences in attitudes to commerce 
still affect legal decision-making even in countries which otherwise have a good 
deal else in common such as France, the UK and Denmark. Foster also discusses 
the extent to which differences in legal culture prevent the successful transplant-
ing of commercial law, and reminds us that legal agreements and conventions 
may often be applied differently in practice from place to place. He does concede, 
however, that
where the group of people practising and using the law is quite homogenous (as in inter-
national financial law), the broader context may not be of great importance.
The two chapters that follow both have to do with public law. In his chapter on 
‘Administrative Law in a Comparative Context’ (chapter thirteen) John Bell offers 
a careful comparison of English, French and German law so as to explore the 
differences within and between common law and civil law approaches. He asks: 
What does each system include within its conception of ‘administrative law’? Who 
is governed by ‘administrative law’? In particular, how are the rules of public law 
separated from those of private law? What powers does ‘the administration’ have? 
What procedures does the administration need to adopt when making decisions? 
Who provides remedies against the administration? What judicial control is exer-
cised over misuse of powers? When is the administration liable for its actions and 
how is this liability different from that of a private individual? In responding to 
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these questions Bell describes the different but overlapping understandings of the 
idea of the ‘rule of law’, discretionary decisions, the liability of the administration, 
and the difference between explicit or assumed powers. He also offers illustrations 
of the practical consequences implied by different answers to these questions with 
respect, for example, to the way the welfare state mission affects the use of govern-
ment powers or explaining why either nationalised railways or a national health 
service can be more or less difficult to privatise in different jurisdictions.
The next chapter by Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland, ‘Comparative Law 
in Constitutional Contexts’ (chapter fourteen), focuses on comparing consti-
tutions around the world. It begins by pointing out that constitutions, which 
seem similar in form, can have different functions, and that what is important 
in comparing constitutions is to see how they are interpreted, lived with and 
changed over time. The authors make a distinction between constitutions and 
‘the culture of constitutionalism’; it is the latter, by shaping political behaviour, 
that makes effective constitutions possible, rather than vice versa. They therefore 
warn against thinking that good constitutional design can be a substitute for the 
exercise of political power with integrity and self-imposed restraint. Harding 
and Leyland set out an analysis of the functions that constitutions are usually 
intended to perform as regards the definition of institutional powers, and how 
they establish lines and schemes of accountability. They also offer a short histori-
cal account of four different waves of constitution-making, from the American 
Declaration of Independence to the constitution-making of former communist 
states. They underline the contribution that comparative lawyers can make to 
the drafting of international treaties, and argue that the move towards ‘world 
constitutionalism’ must embrace the increasingly important role of international 
organisations.
Harding and Leyland make some reference to the role of constitutional litiga-
tion in human rights cases. But the protection of rights is absolutely central to the 
two subsequent chapters by Paul Roberts and Christopher McCrudden (chapters 
fifteen and sixteen). In ‘Comparative Law for International Criminal Justice’ Paul 
Roberts argues that comparative law has an indispensable contribution to make 
to the study of this fast-changing subject. He proposes that we think of it in terms 
of seven concentric circles. These encompass topics that range from the legal rules 
and procedures that define international crimes to the institutions which imple-
ment and develop such rules, and from the role of international tribunals today 
as compared to the past, to the difference between permanent and ad hoc hybrid 
tribunals. He suggests that transnational criminal law, broadly conceived, includes 
scholars’ and researchers’ contributions to this interdisciplinary project. Roberts 
then sets out six ways in which comparative law is relevant to the subject as he has 
charted it. He concludes that
[w]ith mounting pressures for closer legal co-operation between Member States to com-
bat fraud, illegal immigration, people trafficking, drug smuggling, cross-border arms 
running, and—above all—international terrorism, the impetus towards integration and 
harmonisation of Member States’ domestic laws is bound to intensify.
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McCrudden’s chapter, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human rights’ (chapter seven-
teen), also has to do with studying the spread of types of law and legal institutions 
that inherently transcend borders. If human rights law is essentially universalistic 
in its purported reach, comparative law can be useful to human rights theorists 
in showing how far values are in fact universally shared in practice. McCrudden 
argues that courts play an impressive role in the creation of a common law of 
human rights. In an effort to clarify the appropriate relationship between human 
rights interpretation and comparative legal methods, he offers a discussion of how 
courts analyse human rights, how they think about the role and function of the 
comparative method, and the continuing debate about the legitimacy of judicial 
decision-making.
McCrudden points to tensions in the relationship between comparative law 
and human rights such as the competition between relativism and universalism, 
functionalism and interpretavism, the need for judicial review and the counter-
majoritarian objection. As an illustration of the issues that arise in the use by 
judges of comparisons in human rights, he offers a detailed account of recent dis-
cussions in the United States Supreme Court of the constitutionality of aspects of 
the death penalty and the criminalisation of sodomy between consenting adults. 
Describing the different arguments of the Supreme Court justices he concludes 
that reference to foreign judgments may be more justified in the area of human 
rights than in many other areas of law because their development can be seen as 
part of an ongoing conversation that transcends national jurisprudence. 
The final chapters all deal squarely with practical aspects of comparative 
law. In his chapter, ‘Comparative Private Law in Practice: The Process of Law 
Reform’ (chapter seventeen), Sjef van Erp offers us valuable insights from the 
perspective of an academic who is also a practitioner engaged in giving advice 
in foreign jurisdictions. He stresses above all the need for a pragmatic attitude. 
A law reform project, he argues, demands a different approach from that of an 
in-depth academic article. One has to be realistic and recognise that advice given 
will not always function well in practice or even be applied at all in the receiv-
ing country. It helps if the expert really is an expert, if she has socio-cultural, 
economic and political awareness as well as legal competence, if she comes from 
a similar legal tradition and if reference can also be made to wider developments 
such as the working out of common principles of contract law. Personal integrity 
is vital, so that the advice is seen as objective information rather than reflecting 
national interest (so it can be useful if one is from a smaller country such as The 
Netherlands). Conversely, there can be problems if the funder of a project is 
tempted to interfere, for example when an institution from a common law coun-
try funds a civil law expert. Van Erp mentions some of the situations in which 
comparative lawyers may be asked to provide advice. He suggests that one has to 
accept that there are times when one has to step back and leave it to the receiving 
country to make its own political decisions. 
The next chapter, Esin Örücü’s ‘Comparative Law in Practice: The Court and 
the Legislator’ (chapter eighteen) deals with the subject of when references are 
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made to other legal systems, (a question that is also discussed in McCrudden’s 
comments on courts and van Erp’s on legislative reform). Örücü argues that even 
when judges are convinced that applying their own national laws would offend 
their sense of justice they nonetheless are reluctant to give the impression that they 
have used foreign law to plug gaps in their own systems. On the basis of research 
projects studying the citation of foreign judgments in the UK over the last 30 
years, the author shows that regular resort to foreign law occurs mainly in cases 
where foreign law is itself involved in the legal dispute as well as those that involve 
international conventions and transnational regulations. She explains some of the 
different ways in which foreign materials may be (and should be) used, and dis-
tinguishes between ‘functional’ and ‘ornamental’ citations. She ends by explaining 
some of the outstanding issues facing judges who wish to use foreign materials. 
The final chapter, ‘A Project: Comparative Law in Action’ (chapter nineteen), 
by the same author, is directed to those who are new to comparative law and who 
would like to carry out empirical research but are worried by their lack of social 
scientific qualifications. Örücü’s message is that even relatively unsophisticated 
methods of gathering data represent an essential supplement to relying on court 
reports and other documents. She first discusses the central role played by ques-
tionnaires about real or hypothetical cases in gathering information about foreign 
law. She then goes on to describe an early interdisciplinary effort to find out about 
the level of use of European law by Scottish and Dutch lawyers and their attitudes 
towards using it. The hypothesis of the research project that Dutch lawyers were 
more likely than Scottish ones to engage in European litigation and that this was 
linked to their more favourable attitudes to European lawwere both supported. 
Örücü suggests that even a basic research exercise of this kind could prove its 
worth as a way of exploring what use lawyers in the new accession countries will 
likely make of European Union law.
III.  GETTING BEYOND
What idea of comparative law emerges from these chapters? Does it have a proper 
subject-matter, or is it no more than a method? As we would expect, the aims of 
the subject will shape the way it is conceived. It will vary depending on whether 
the goal is that of finding out relevant legal rules in another jurisdiction, under-
standing another society (and, by contrast, one’s own society) through its law, 
searching for commonalities, or showing the difficulty of translating the texts and 
experience of other people’s law. But, as suggested at the outset of this chapter, 
much current controversy surrounds the priority that comparative law should 
give to practical tasks. In a recent overview of the subject,  which she characterised 
as enigmatic, Örücü suggested that its identity can best be understood as pulled 
between two alternatives. One approach treats comparative law as ‘an autonomous 
branch of social science or science of legal knowledge’, as ‘a high level analytical 
subject’ and ‘an end in itself ’. The second is more sceptical about comparison as 
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an activity in its own right and more interested in comparing rules and institu-
tions for the practical purposes of adjudication and law reform. (Örücü, 2004; 
and Nelken, 2006d). These competing perspectives can be loosely linked, as we 
shall see, to other contrasts such as that between marginal and mainstream work, 
liberal and critical stances, and modernist and post-modernist epistemologies. It 
is over this terrain that a territorial war between comparative law and comparative 
legal studies is being fought.
We can point to examples in this Handbook of both the approaches that Örücü 
distinguishes. To these we could add a further approach, however, in which com-
parative law is seen as a ‘second-order’ type of investigation (an enquiry into the 
way other people make their enquiries). The point of comparative law is taken 
to be to make the best sense possible of the comparative work undertaken by 
other social actors such as judges, legislators, lawyers and others. Arguably, this 
approach could also help us to bring out the best in the other two approaches by 
inviting us to develop theories about other people’s practices, exposing the variation 
amongst different groups of actors, in different places—and at different times—as 
they identify the salient features of other people’s legal systems. This approach also 
extends reflexively to analysing the way comparative law evolves as a discipline, as 
well as the actions and writings of single authors, as these change over time. 
This last approach to comparative law should not be assumed to be in competi-
tion with the others. In this volume, for example, many of the authors, whatever 
else they discuss, also engage in analyses of how judges or other comparative law 
scholars carry out their exercises in comparison. There is even, though to a lesser 
extent, some consideration given to the important question of how different role 
requirements and social conditions help to condition such exercises. It follows 
that the readers of these essays will also be doing comparative law when seeking 
to interpret the approach to comparative enquiry represented by the various con-
tributions to this Handbook.
But where will all this get us? Certainly there is no lack of ambition in claims 
being made for what it is that comparative law can achieve. And this contrasts 
strangely with the more modest claims currently being made for their work by 
the social scientists or humanist scholars, who are seen as the potential allies of 
those who advocate a move from comparative law to comparative legal stud-
ies. The introduction to the Utrecht Congress of the International Academy of 
Comparative Law in 2006, for example, announced:
[W]e look over the fence of our neighbour in pursuit of the common fate: to identify 
and grasp the human nature; indeed, to share the human destiny and to unite the 
human forces.5
Many of the authors in this volume also aim high—even if not quite so high. 
According to Patrick Glenn, ‘the com-paring of laws is fundamental in the 
5 Opening address at the XVIIIth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, 
16–22 July 2006 at Utrecht by Professor Konstantinos Kerameus, President.
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process of globalisation and in the pursuit of peaceful relations between peoples’ 
(Glenn: 93). Likewise, Paul Roberts argues that comparative law can be used to 
demonstrate
that there is something that can be done by the international community in response 
to genocide, crimes against humanity and other massive, state-sponsored violations 
of fundamental human rights during civil wars or by tyrannical governments abusing 
their own people. Almost irrespective of the merits and generalisability of the Tribunals’ 
activities, the practical enforcement of international criminal law can no longer be dis-
missed peremptorily, as the fantasy of idealists (Roberts: 346). 
According to Harding and Leyland,
comparative law offers the law student a whole new dimension: from it he can learn to 
respect the special legal cultures of other people, he will understand his own law better, 
he can develop critical standards which might lead to its improvement, and he will learn 
how rules of law are conditioned by social facts and what different forms they can take 
(Harding and Leyland: 332).
As far as their own chapter is specifically concerned, they argue that comparative 
study of constitutions can help bring about ‘good governance and global jus-
tice, [and] go some way towards correcting the often oppressive and sometimes 
incompetent behaviour of governments.’ The alternative does not bear thinking 
about; ‘the price of failure is an increased chance of conflict, poverty and fragmen-
tation affecting everyone.’ But could we be asking too much of comparative law? 
Even Harding and Leyland admit, regarding comparative constitutionalism, that 
‘this subject has little history, less theory and relatively few pieces of outstanding 
literature’. As far as seeking to bring about ‘global justice’ is concerned, recent 
attempts to do so have made it even harder to tell when indifference or interfer-
ence is the greater evil. 
Manifestos apart, the papers actually delivered at the recent Conference in 
Utrecht reveal the familiar bias towards more modest policy-oriented type of work. 
A few theoretical papers dealt with what is involved in doing comparative law; 
some contributions described developments in the law itself, as seen in titles such 
as ‘pure economic loss’ or ‘new developments in succession law’. There were a good 
number of presentations comparing legal institutions, such as ‘the constitutional 
guarantees of the judiciary’; ‘the civil, criminal and disciplinary liability of judges’; 
‘plea-bargaining, negotiating confessions and consensual resolution of criminal 
cases’; ‘new experiences of international arbitration with special emphasis on legal 
debates between parties from Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe’; 
and ‘the constitutional referendum’. The large majority of papers, however, focused 
on legal-policy issues with cross-national implications: these included ‘the digi-
tisation of literary and musical realisations’; ‘cross-border mergers in Europe’; 
‘tensions between legal, biological and social conceptions of parentage’; ‘legal 
limitations on genetic research and the commercialisation of its results’; ‘the fight 
against organised crime’; the “polluter pays” principle’; ‘abusive advertising on the 
internet’; ‘euthanasia control’; and ‘the responsibility of rating agencies’. 
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There is no doubt that at least some of these topics have to do with serious 
(even global?) social problems. But it remains uncertain how far comparative 
law will help us find the ‘solution’ to such problems any more than domestic 
law does for similar domestic problems. Not a few of these ‘problems’ are closely 
intertwined with otherwise valued features of national or international society 
rather than being a simple matter of a conflict between the forces of good and 
evil. And the answers which would find favour in richer, secular Western countries 
may often not be the same as those that would be acceptable or appropriate in 
poorer and more religion-centred societies. Most importantly, it cannot be taken 
for granted that (more) law is always the answer to such problems. At the least we 
may suspect that the lack of theoretical papers at the conference meant that these 
issues were not fully addressed.
Can this volume help us do better? Is the way forward to develop a compara-
tive legal studies—so as to be in a better position to fulfil such projects of socio-
legal engineering or alternatively learn to reduce our ambitions? Or could there 
be something lost as well as gained in going in such a direction—not so much 
because it makes comparative law less ‘practical’ but because the subject risks 
 losing its sense of coherence? It is fair to say that all the chapters in this handbook 
do try to go ‘beyond’ the existing literature so as to move us in new directions and 
towards new territories. But our authors do not all speak with one voice about this 
or other matters. Nor did we expect them too. Hence, they do not all recommend 
going in the same direction. For example, for some, such as Masha Antokolskaia 
and Nicholas Foster, the way forward involves looking ‘beyond’ legal rules so as to 
encompass the background of social and economic trends. For others, the focus 
of scholarly work must be more to overcome what Esin Örücü refers to as ‘the 
myth of legal centralism’ and in general go ‘beyond’ models based on centralised 
European systems. 
Twining, for instance, proposes that we rethink the state so as to recognise that 
‘law itself is a huge field of multiple contests, and an internally plural phenom-
enon’. And Werner Menski argues that his Indian case-study can help us rethink 
our ideas about law so as to see it as
interconnected, linked from the macrocosmic spheres of natural law right through to 
the personal sphere of the socio-legal domain. All along, it also contains elements of the 
religious and the secular, the social and the psychological, and virtually anything else. The 
boundaries between what is legal and what is not become really fuzzy (Menski: 194).
Esin Örücü, too, insists on the importance of legal and cultural pluralism and 
invites us to give attention to ‘the mysteries of the interaction of social norms and 
legal values’ (Örücü: 58) and Patrick Glenn writes of lex mercatoria ‘being legiti-
mated by their classification within a body of commercial normativity which has 
prevailed and been recognised for centuries’(Glenn: 105). 
The authors of the more substantive chapters in the Handbook do not neces-
sarily endorse these or other recommendations put forward in the theoretical 
part of the Handbook. As compared to the radical proposals to change direction 
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announced in the chapters by Werner Menski and William Twining, for example, 
both private law and the search for ‘better law’ remain important concerns for 
some of our authors. Few of our authors try to de-centre law in favour of examin-
ing other sources of social order—and only Menski himself has much to say about 
religion. On the other hand, the desire that some of our authors have to colonise 
new territories does involve some stretching of existing disciplines. Roberts speaks 
of transnational criminal law breaking the boundaries of international criminal 
law and taking criminology beyond its ‘comfort zone’. Twining, too, claims that 
broadening our conception of comparative law may bring about a reintegration 
of ‘closely related enclaves of enquiry, such as ‘law and development’, that have 
become artificially separated. For him an ‘adequate account of law today’ has 
to give some attention to the significance of transnational non-governmental 
organisations (Amnesty International, Greenpeace, the Catholic Church, interna-
tional women’s movements, international trade union organisations), to peoples 
that are nations without states (the Maoris, the Scots, Gypsies, the native peoples 
of North America and Australia), to organised crime, liberation movements, 
multi-national companies, trans-national legal practices, and significant classes 
such as the vast herds of ‘people on the move’ (including migrants, refugees and 
the internally displaced) (Twining: 75).
If comparative law is to meet these and similar challenges it will need to develop 
or borrow new concepts. In particular this applies to the idea of ‘families of law’ 
but also more generally to the many other metaphors on which comparative 
lawyers often rely in place of developing theory. In studying the variety of forms 
legal systems can take and the dynamics of their internal and external relation-
ships, it can be difficult not to think in terms of analogies and metaphors. Nor 
will language allow us to make arguments without using these forms of speech. 
But metaphors can sometimes mislead—and, in a sense, are bound to mislead. So 
they should not be taken too seriously. Much of the effort given to discussing ‘legal 
transplants’ as if they should be expected to correspond to botanical or medical 
transplants thus seems wasted (Nelken, 2002). When Anthony Ogus, in chapter 
seven, ends by comparing different legal cultures to differently sized railway 
gauges, this comes in as an attempt to illustrate points he has made in other ways; 
it does not serve as a substitute for argument itself.
To go from classification to theoretical understanding and explanation requires 
greater engagement with other disciplines. Comparative law cannot do its work 
alone. But it might be more exact to say that it never did. What is at stake in moving 
towards comparative legal studies is the possible replacement or supplementation of 
legal, historical and philosophical scholarship with concepts and methods taken, for 
example, from economics, political science, sociology,6 or anthropology (the latter 
being especially relevant given its central focus on comparison and the problems of 
understanding ‘the other’). Increasingly, business studies, geography, literary theory 
or psychology are also being brought into play, and the list could go on. 
6 I come to the subject from a background in sociology of law. 
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A number of difficult issues need to be faced in such opening out to other dis-
ciplines. How do we know which is the appropriate discipline for our purposes? 
Is studying law more like doing physics or more like interpreting art or literature? 
Social scientists are themselves divided as to whether society and culture should 
be taken as shorthand for a series of forces and variables or as invitations to read 
events as if they were texts. Post-modernist writers in both law and the social sci-
ences are suspicious of many of the pretensions to explanation of the behavioural 
social sciences. Are different academic disciplines appropriate for given legal 
topics? It may seem obvious that economics has an affinity with private law, and 
that political science will be most relevant to the sphere of administrative and 
constitutional law, whilst psychology has more to offer for family law. But the 
process of understanding the differences between family law regimes in different 
countries also benefits greatly by a consideration of political factors, for example, 
in explaining the role of religion or the importance of individualism (Bradley, 
1996; see also Antokolskaia in chapter eleven).7 Even so, it is not possible to go in 
all directions simultaneously. And as Foster notes in his chapter, we are likely to 
discover that even the discipline we wish to follow is internally riven and therefore 
find we need to take sides.
A number of our authors do make reference to the possible gains from looking 
to other disciplines. Thus, Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland argue that ‘com-
parative constitutional law has to take account of political science to the extent 
that it explains, in part at least, the context in which the constitution operates’. 
Esin Örücü talks of the value of sociology of law for comparative lawyers. And 
John Bell, too, at one point of his discussion concedes that ‘the answers to such 
questions require some legal sociology’. Most of the authors included in the sub-
stantive part of the handbook do seem interested in at least some form of multi-
disciplinary collaboration with those working in other disciplines.
But recognising the importance of other disciplines will not necessarily lead to 
comparative law becoming an interdisciplinary pursuit. What is, as Twining puts 
it, ‘an adequate account of the law today’ will depend on our aims in producing 
such an account. 
On the basis of the sample represented here, we could say that many com-
parative law scholars still prefer a division of labour in which their role is more 
to evaluate the implications of contemporary developments for law rather than 
explain why they are taking place. Perhaps as a result of the stress in legal training 
on prescription rather than description, they tend to have a rather instrumental 
interest in the wider matters that make up comparative legal studies. Some of 
the chapters which say most about social trends refer to them mainly as part 
of an attempt to justify particular legal proposals or solutions. Antokolskaia’s 
description of what has shaped family law allows her to argue that social change 
7 Disciplines are not easily demarcated in terms of subject matter. Because they emphasise different 
matters, using different conceptions, disciplines are above all, ‘ways of seeing’. And every way of seeing 
is also a way of not seeing.
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is flowing in a certain direction and so—by some functionalist alchemy of ‘is’ and 
‘ought’—must be right. On the other hand, Menski’s claim that ‘culture-specific 
legal realism prevailed in Indian law over globalising ideology’ encourages him to 
argue that such general trends should be resisted.
In his chapter, exceptionally, Paul Roberts sets out a broad conception of inter-
national criminal law which involves the sort of wide-ranging study of legal and 
social change proposed by William Twining. His approach here comes closest 
to that of an interdisciplinary enquiry where the object is to draw on different 
disciplines in order to get at the various dimensions of a given topic. Admittedly, 
interdisciplinary work is difficult;8 few can master a second discipline, never mind 
a range of disciplines.9 But with the help of Google Scholar and other Internet 
search engines, it should at least be possible to keep an eye on leading studies in 
one or other of these disciplines which are taken to be most relevant. Given the 
extent of overlap between disciplines, interdisciplinary work may also be easier to 
do than it is sometimes made to seem.10 Social scientists who study legal culture 
may discover, to their surprise, that their work may be considered (also) a contri-
bution to comparative law. With their curiosity aroused they may then start on a 
course of reading to see whether comparative lawyers have all along been doing 
sociology of law! 
It is understandable that many comparative lawyers will want to stick to what 
they think they do best, whether this is identified as cross-cultural legal compe-
tence, historical scholarship, expertise in given geographical areas, or practical 
‘savvy’. They are willing to leave other approaches to others, as in the way Basil 
Markesinis seeks to delimit ‘the legal’ from matters which are not the proper sphere 
of the comparative lawyer, or van Erp (in chapter seventeen) recommends leaving 
‘political questions’ to the politicians. But even to achieve a division of labour it 
is necessary to decide how to circumscribe the study of legal rules and legal insti-
tutions from other enquiries. We should not assume that other disciplines will 
resolve our problems for us. In particular we must beware of the tendency to think 
that others will provide the answers to our problems without the need to re-frame 
the questions. Comparative lawyers are likely to be disappointed, for example, if 
they ask sociologists of law for a ‘theory’ that can ‘predict’ the outcome of legal 
transplants. In addition, other disciplines may themselves be undergoing rapid 
change, as in the way international law and international relations are currently 
being transformed by having to deal with the way transnational legal processes 
are displacing or complicating relations between nation-states (Berman, 2005; 
8 Just as not everyone has the experience or desire to be an ‘intellectual nomad’ like many of its 
leading writers were (Curran, 1998: 657 at 661).
9 Some reviews of Legrand and Munday’s book on Comparative Legal Studies complained that it 
would be too difficult for many students of comparative law.
10 It is important to note that interdisciplinary collaboration can take different forms. A discipline 
such as economics finds itself in symbiosis with law even, or especially when, its techniques are dif-
ferent. Literary theory, on the other hand, offers close parallels to the interpretative task of the judge 
or the comparatist herself.
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Nelken, 2006a). And, in the absence of any overarching intellectual scheme, some 
issues may just simply fall between disciplines.
Those who favour a restricted role for comparative law cannot afford to take 
their information or concepts uncritically from elsewhere; they need to see what 
is at stake in talking about ‘legal pluralism’ instead of ‘hybridity’, or the ‘diffusion’ 
rather than the ‘harmonisation’ of law. So this means that they will have to be able 
to read other disciplines with at least some level of understanding. Glenn, in his 
chapter, ‘Com-paring’, for example, is willing to leave it to sociology to discover 
how law actually ‘works’. But at the same time he is cautious about taking its idea 
of ‘culture’ arguing that ‘the social science disciplines of sociology and anthropol-
ogy have themselves become victims of the process of reification’ (Glenn: 97). As 
I suggest in my own chapter (chapter five), however, this perception of how the 
social sciences talk about culture is partial and somewhat outdated, and illustrates 
the difficulties of practising too rigid a division of labour between legal and social 
science scholarship. In general, comparative lawyers also need to understand why 
other scholars do not focus on law in terms of statutes and judicial decisions as 
such, but seek rather to understand its changing role and significance using terms 
such as ‘regulation’, ‘discipline’, ‘governance’, ‘governmentality’, ‘legal fields’, and 
‘legal autopoiesis’. 
IV.  CONTEXTS
Assuming that we do want to make use of social scientific or other insights, how 
should we do so? The most common move to get ‘beyond legal rules’ is to argue 
for placing ‘law in its context’. As Nicholas Foster writes,
a contextual approach leads to a consciousness of difference in the formulation, prac-
tice, interpretation and enforcement of the law, [and] a better understanding of law and 
lawyers from other jurisdictions (Foster: 279–80).
Looking to context is also an invitation to see how law is used and experienced by 
those to whom it is addressed. As William Twining argues in chapter three,
in order to understand law in the world today it is more than ever important to pen-
etrate beyond the surface of official legal doctrine to reach the realities of all forms of 
law as social practices (Twining: 77).
Using this approach, it is claimed, can both help us explain law and—perhaps 
also reform it. 
But what is meant by law’s context? How does law relate to ‘its context’? How 
is it best studied? The term context is used by our authors in many ways—and 
rightly so—because there are indeed many contexts and ways of grasping them. 
At a minimum, a given legal rule is itself part of a wider context of other related 
legal rules, and a branch of law is affected by (and affects) other aspects of law. As 
Foster argues in his chapter this means that commercial law, for example, cannot 
be treated as a case apart. Even if we were to concede, for argument’s sake, that its 
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rules were less influenced by ‘culture’ than by other branches of law, it nonetheless 
uses concepts that belong to and draw on a wider set of legal rules and practices. 
But, in looking for this sort of context, the relevant rules and practices are not 
limited to those usually studied in legal curricula. It is crucial, as taught by the 
Legal Realists long ago, to include studies of the ‘law in action’ if we want to try to 
explain or predict the actions of legal actors and others using the law. Only with 
such knowledge can we develop persuasive comparisons of law in the USA and 
Europe (Kagan, 2001 and 2007), or bring out the importance of ‘infra-structural’ 
aspects of dispute resolution which can account for telling differences even within 
civil law jurisdictions (Blankenburg, 1997).
Roberts speaks of ‘the informal “working rules” of their occupational culture, 
police officers or cooperation between prosecution and defence’. As he explains,
frontline professionals’ decision-making and conduct is typically motivated by ‘third-
tier’ directives, such as police force orders, prosecutorial codes or military training 
manuals (which are not necessarily publicly available), rather than by primary legal 
rules or secondary delegated legislation. Sometimes ‘policy’ is not even written down; 
occasionally not written down on purpose. Unwritten operational policies occupy the 
shadowlands of informal agreements, institutionalised routines, shared professional 
understandings, and taken-for-granted cultural assumptions (Roberts: 359).
John Bell likewise tells us that empirical research is required to know what such 
rights as the right to a hearing, the right to make representations, to be given rea-
sons or to provide access to documents, really amount to in different jurisdictions. 
Context is the realm of effects, side-effects and lack of effects. Andrew Harding 
and Peter Leyland warn of the need, when it comes to evaluating the recent trend 
toward constitution-making, to examine how constitutional provisions are actu-
ally put in practice (or, as often, not put into practice). And Foster tells us that any 
study of the effects of legal transplants must be alert to ‘technical incompetence, 
lack of enforcement, sidelining, adaptation, isolation and refusal’.
Context is seen as relevant both in studying the way law is shaped by other fac-
tors and the way it shapes society itself. As Esin Örücü puts it,
most of the differences that cannot be explained in terms of the legal system can more eas-
ily be explained in terms of the societal, political or economic systems. Social systems may 
determine the content of the corresponding legal systems and vice versa (Glenn: 57).
Regarding the first of these links, Esin Örücü tells us, with respect to what really 
influences judicial decisions:
[T]his discovery of the raison d’être for the differences and similarities, also neces-
sitates moving from the domain of pure legal reasoning to that of contextual factors 
(Örücü: 49).
On the other hand, with respect to the significance of statutory rules and judicial 
decisions, Masha Antokolskaia emphasises that ‘we need to look behind legal cat-
egories to see how provisions of family law are actually used’. She illustrates this 
with evidence of how many divorcing couples ignore the possibility of no-fault 
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divorce provisions if fault-based divorce provides the quicker route. And Werner 
Menski, too, notes, as a worrying possible side effect of an otherwise admirable 
decision by the Indian Supreme Court: ‘There is also some concern that more 
women may be killed in India by their ex-husbands in such circumstances’. 
But the contextual approach, or at least this way of understanding context, is 
not without its detractors. Borrowing from developments in the sociology of law 
and critical legal scholarship in the United States it may be helpful to contrast 
two different ways of relating law and context (Nelken, 1986). The first—‘putting 
law in context’—uses context to explain the form and effects of law. The sec-
ond—‘finding the context in law’—seeks to show how law helps to construct and 
communicate the social context. The first of these approaches points to aspects 
of the wider society that help explain or make sense of law. Those who seek to 
expose the ‘context in law’, however, are usually not that interested in showing how 
law responds to external conditions, or in demonstrating the differences on the 
ground between legal rules and actual practices. For them law is to be examined as 
a ‘cultural artefact’ (Frankenberg, 2006b) which succeeds in giving the impression 
of legal certainty and rule governedness despite so much evidence to the contrary.
The Handbook, as we have already had occasion to note, is rich in illustrations 
of the first approach, that of ‘putting law in context’. Clues to law are found in 
wider society. Thus Nicholas Foster points out that the contrasting status of finan-
cial careers in France and the UK tells us much about the roles of commercial law 
in each society. And wider social developments are taken to explain changes in the 
law. Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland tell us that
‘since the end of the cold war, however, there has been an enormous increase in democ-
ratisation, and although there are still great differences in political systems and cultures, 
the main objectives of constitutional law have become more broadly similar than previ-
ously, due to the dominant international agendas of ‘good governance’, ‘human rights’, 
‘international trade’, and ‘sustainable development’, all of which have had significant 
impacts on constitutions. In addition, the same process has tended to blur the distinc-
tion between the public and private sectors and therefore between constitutional and 
private law (Harding and Leyland: 324–5).
Likewise, Masha Antokolskaia’s chapter (chapter eleven) makes extensive use of back-
ground trends so as to explain the recent evolution of family law. As she sees it,
‘[t]he society dominated by traditional values gave way to a pluralistic society, one 
in which different forms and sets of family values co-exist[ed] alongside each other. 
Divorce and serial monogamy began to be considered normal. Extramarital sex, non-
marital cohabitation, and birth outside wedlock lost their stigmatic character. Same-sex 
relationships became first decriminalised, then legalised, and then, in some countries, 
even equated with marriage. Due to the fact that more and more children were born 
outside marriage, it became increasingly unacceptable for the legal status of these chil-
dren to differ from that of children born in a marriage (Antokolskaia: 241).
In addition to movements in ideas and culture, and in part as a factor shaping 
them, attention is given to larger contexts of social, political and economic change 
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such as population movements, globalisation and so on. Hence Antokolskaia, in 
seeking to explain ‘an attitudinal shift from marriage based on economic necessity 
and duty to marriage based on affection and free commitment’, speaks of the role 
of women’s emancipation and the women’s rights movement, as well as increas-
ing female employment and the progress of social welfare which diminished 
the function of the family as provider of financial means and security. Once we 
extend our gaze also to cover such disparate international influences, however, it 
then becomes difficult to speak of law being ‘embedded’ in a given national or 
local context (Nelken, 2007). As a good example we could take the Sabine Oxley 
reforms, which were recently passed in the United States as a response to major 
financial scandals there such as the collapse of Enron. Similar principles of cor-
porate governance have been quickly adopted in other countries such as Japan, 
(and also applied to American companies doing business there), while, back in the 
United States, the complaint that these reforms make American business uncom-
petitive means that their repeal or amendment is very much on the agenda.
Putting ‘law in context’ is often allied to a functional approach in which it is 
assumed that law is there to solve ‘social problems’ and otherwise meet the social 
needs of society. Zweigert and Kötz’s influential textbook is framed in terms of 
seeing how different legal systems deal with similar types of challenges in the con-
text of their own societies. As illustrated by Esin Örücü in chapter two,
if an institution called divorce is under survey in system A, the comparative lawyer looks 
for an institution in system B performing an equivalent function, that of freeing an 
individual from an unsatisfactory marital relationship within which he or she does not 
wish to remain (Örücü: 51).
For example, in the course of explaining the social trends that led to legal change, 
Masha Antokolskaia argues that once 30 percent of couples in Europe were cohab-
iting ‘something’ had to be done to change family law. Werner Menski likewise 
uses a functionalist type argument to explain why in India it would not be pos-
sible to have irretrievable breakdown as a ground for divorce when he remarks 
that, ‘India is not America, and that country cannot afford a scenario in which 
millions of women and children are suffering as a result of liberalised divorce 
laws’(Menski: 201).
But while functionalist arguments of this kind often direct us to worthwhile 
hypotheses for investigation, the approach can also be a source of errors (see 
also the discussions in chapter two by Esin Örücü and in chapter six by Roger 
Cotterrell). These weaknesses include slighting the role of historical explanation, 
confusing purposes with effects, and begging questions about the ‘equivalence’ 
of what is being compared. ‘Problems’ do not just produce ‘solutions’; these have 
to be fought for by competing interests and groups. It is also always important 
to bear in mind the extent to which ‘social problems’ are culturally constructed 
rather than given. To appreciate how problems are constructed requires grasping 
different mentalities, not presupposing a common instrumentalist viewpoint. 
We should not assume that societies being compared will necessarily face the 
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same ‘problems’ and use law in some way to respond to them. We need to realise 
the extent to which cultures ‘socially construct’ what they treat as problems, or 
the need to deal with them by using the law. While there was a time when social 
science explanation was virtually co-terminous with functionalism, this is an 
approach that has now been on the retreat for some time. And even comparative 
lawyers are learning to rely on it less (Graziadei, 2003).
Those comparatists such as Gunter Frankenberg, who choose rather to study the 
‘context in law’, now even speak of ‘the functionalist fallacy’, complaining that
the vague concept of function operates like a magic carpet with which the comparatist 
shuttles from social problems to legal solutions and from one legal system to another—
way above the ‘enigma of translation’ (Frankenberg, 2006b: 445).
For these writers what often should become salient is precisely what we have called 
the ‘second-order’ enquiry into how others grasp foreign law. As Frankenberg goes 
on to say, once the comparatist recognises that law is a way of seeing,
she will soon discard the fact/law and law-in-the-books/law-in-action distinctions and 
deal instead with how she represents in her scholarly work the legal representations of 
local conflicts, contexts and visions (Frankenberg 2006b: 442). 
But this does not imply that law is without social ‘effects’. In his recent discussion 
of constitutions, Frankenberg explains that
‘in the world of signs and symbols the ‘sacred texts’ are decanonized and placed in 
the context of the everyday world: Not only cases and norms and juridical writings 
appear on the radar screen but also ideas and actions of ordinary people, program-
matic visions of social movements, group interests etc. Informed by a constitutive 
theory the comparatist regards constitutions as reflecting and shaping the everyday, 
in particular as reflecting and shaping the imagination of political unity and collec-
tive identity as well as offering a framework for ideology. Within this perspective it 
is crucial to view constitutions as not merely and passively sitting ‘at the receiving 
end’ and operating like receptacles or reflectors of culture, but to consider that they 
actively intervene and, under certain circumstances, shape or transform culture 
(ibid: 449).
While there are no worked-through examples of this type of approach in this 
handbook, Roger Cotterrell, in his theoretical chapter (chapter six), does show 
sympathy with this sort of enquiry, and both John Bell and Nicholas Foster in 
their substantive chapters are in different ways attentive to variations in the way 
different jurisdictions use legal categories. It is fair to say, however, that many 
mainstream comparative lawyers feel uneasy with this approach and are suspi-
cious of its practical implications (or fear it does not have any). But this is to 
underestimate its potential. It is interesting, for example, to see how Frankenberg’s 
discussion of constitutions could contribute to the agenda set out by Andrew 
Harding and Peter Leyland in chapter fourteen. For Frankenberg,
‘once comparatists move on to the constitution as culture, they transgress the borders of 
an instrumental understanding and begin to grasp the symbolic dimension (ibid).
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‘Most commonly’, he says,
constitutions present variations of theme of self-government and fantasies of a kind of 
domination where the subjective factor is magically neutralized—within a ‘government 
of laws and not of men’. Comparative constitutional law can tell fascinating stories about 
how the self is first elevated as popular sovereign and then reduced and fragmented 
within schemes of representation, delegation and transfer of power away from the collec-
tive self, whose consent to being governed is always implied or invoked. And stories about 
how conflicts between citizens and their governors, and among citizens, are removed 
from where they arise, the public arenas, and transformed into controversies under con-
stitutional law to be settled by constitutional or supreme courts (ibid: 449–50).
In some respects post-modern comparativists have more in common with their 
mainstream legal colleagues than with practitioners of social science (as is true 
of critical legal scholars generally)—and this competition may itself explain the 
resistance they face. For example, true to the comparative lawyer’s penchant for 
classification, Frankenberg, too, seeks to distinguish different types of constitu-
tion. He contrasts for instance, the constitution as ‘contract’ (as in Europe), as 
‘manifesto’ (as in the American Declaration of Independence), as ‘program’ (eg in 
socialist regimes), and as ‘law’ (evoking the imaginary collective). He claims that 
constitutions variously provide answers to questions of justice, questions of good 
life, political wisdom and political risk-management, as well as more familiar prob-
lems of constitutional validity, amendment and change. His analysis also offers 
interesting interpretations of the architecture of constitutions, distinguishing lev-
els of rules, and explaining that within and through meta-rules constitutions talk 
about themselves, and ‘establish the narcissism of the small (national) difference’: 
They stress or even exaggerate insignificant details to others which then become 
of major importance and thus establish the otherness of others. Furthermore, 
meta-rules are designed to defend a constitution’s dignity as ‘supreme law’ against 
ordinary law-interpreting (Frankenberg, 2006b: 439 at 457).
On the other hand, Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland are more interested in 
studying the ‘law in context’ as they are in undertaking semiotic interpretations of the 
‘context in law’. Even though there is probably little in Frankenberg’s approach with 
which they would want to disagree, they could justifiably argue that there is no reason 
why attention should not also be given to social and economic developments and 
aspects of the law in action (or inaction). Making sense of constitutional texts as vehi-
cles of communication could be misleading if we do not also investigate channels of 
communication. For example, it is certainly relevant if we discover that copies of the 
constitution in some countries may be virtually unobtainable, while, in others, such 
as the new South Africa, it is on sale in every newsagent. Drawing on both approaches 
could help to explain the recent failure of the referendums on the envisaged European 
constitution; something which certainly needs to be understood not only as a result 
of the way those debating the constitution tried (or failed) to communicate certain 
messages but also in terms of the larger socio-economic context.
Any choice to base our contextual explanations on one time or space rather 
than another carries implications and is rarely ‘innocent’. For example, is the 
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current explosion of incarceration in the United States to be explained in terms 
of the last 30, or the last 300 years of its history? (Whitman, 2003b; and Nelken, 
2006b). The problem, of course, is how to justify the choice of any given context in 
‘putting law in context’. This is an issue not only for those attracted by a multi- or 
interdisciplinary agenda for comparative legal studies, but also for second-order 
approaches to comparative law. An important branch of contemporary social the-
ory inspired by the work of Niklas Luhmann claims that there is a high degree of 
social differentiation between the legal and other sub-systems that make up mod-
ern society (and that this is necessary). In the light of this and other approaches, 
theorists debate whether there are intrinsic limits to how much of its context law 
can get to see (or express) if it is to reproduce itself successfully (Cotterrell, 1998; 
and Nelken, 1998).
If such limits exist, all students of comparative legal studies, and not only those 
who seek to launch critical or ‘pessimistic’ attacks on the mainstream, may have 
to take them into account when they seek to shape the working logics of legally-
oriented actors. Such approaches suggest that the task of comparative law might 
consist in studying social and cultural variation in how legal actors frame their 
context. For example, as we have seen, Anthony Ogus claims that law in common-
law countries is closer to the demands that come from society than it is in civil 
law countries. This may also be reflected in the way law is conceived and taught 
in different places. In the Anglo-American world the battle for ‘law in context’ 
in legal education is considered to have been won (as seen in the expression ‘we 
are all Realists now’). But this is less true of Continental Europe and many other 
places. Thus the question about how (and how far) legal actors are interested in 
incorporating information about social context into their decision-making can 
itself be made the subject of comparative investigation.
V.  SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
As in any comparative exercise, with comparative law the study of similarities 
and differences is the heart of the endeavour. However, in this field the descrip-
tive question of whether law is similar or different is often subordinated to the 
prescriptive issue of whether or not it should be made more similar (and how this 
should be achieved). In this Handbook Masha Antokolskaia describes—but also 
applauds—the emergence of more similar regimes of family law across Europe. 
And Jan Smits offers a new approach to how such harmonisation in private law 
can be achieved. But other comparatists seek to defend the virtues of diversity. 
They claim that the functionalist approach is itself part of an agenda of sameness 
and a fear of ‘the other’ (see Roger Cotterrell’s contrast in chapter six between the 
functional and cultural approaches). 
The defenders of diversity worry that the pressures of globalisation are leading 
towards the homogenisation of legal rules and the uniformisation of valuably 
distinctive ways of conceiving of law. Amongst our contributors, Patrick Glenn 
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reminds us of his thesis that there are seven important, if overlapping, legal tradi-
tions. And Werner Menski asks:
To what extent do we accept that Hindu law, Chinese law, Islamic laws and the myriad of 
African laws have a future in this globalising world? Will there be a universal concept of law?
He fears that this can succeed ‘only at the expense of enlarging the non-cultural 
domain’. Others, such as Pierre Legrand (discussed in Roger Cotterrell’s chapter) 
provide brilliant and repeated criticism of the harmonisation of national laws 
being decreed or encouraged by the European Union. This ‘contrarian challenge’ 
rejects the attempt to bring together common and civil law traditions on the basis 
that such different ways of thinking about law cannot be, and therefore should 
not be, overcome. But both sides to this debate can overplay their hands (Nottage, 
2004). The advocates of harmonisation do not deal satisfactorily with the likeli-
hood of their projects producing new differences. And those who claim that dif-
ference should be taken as a presupposition do not explain why their concern for 
difference is restricted to only certain levels or types of difference (Nelken, 2003b). 
Werner Menski, for example, seems to be happy with the effort to achieve greater 
harmonisation within India, provided that this is brought about in ways that show 
skill and tact in respecting other local legal orders.
It is immensely valuable to explore unfamiliar legal sensibilities and legal 
worlds, even if this is a journey without end. However, for some purposes, instead 
of taking a position a priori in favour of similarity or difference, it may be more 
productive to ask why we expect to find one or the other. It can be instructive to 
find differences in legally-oriented practices when comparing similar societies—as 
where we find large differences in resort to litigation in societies which are oth-
erwise said to be similar socio-economically and culturally (Blankenburg, 1997). 
But it can be as valuable to find similarities in law in societies which are in other 
respects very different. Obviously, these expectations should be based not only 
on common sense but also informed by the state of the art in relevant scholarly 
research. Too many studies continue to try to persuade us that the Japanese do 
after all make use of law, even though this point is by now well-established. 
The same applies when it comes to the prospects for legal transfers. It is easier to 
imagine borrowing and learning from places which are similar and face similar prob-
lems. But, pace the transplant metaphor, some societies make the effort to borrow 
from legal systems which are different to them, hoping in this way to become more 
like them. The same applies to learning from other societies. In chapter nine Werner 
Menski makes much of the differences between Indian and Western conceptions of 
law and society, saying, for example, that in India there is an emphasis on
economic responsibilities between members of social groups and families, and also 
across gender boundaries. Such methods clash with Western-led assumptions about 
state centricity, individual autonomy and rights-based approaches. Beyond Europe, 
however, the notion that one’s rights depend on other people’s duties remains a strong 
legal foundation (Menski: 193).
But, on the other hand, he also claims that despite (or because of) these differences 
the West has much to learn from the way family law was harmonised in India.
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Typically, however, comparative lawyers tend to focus on subtle differences 
between places which are rather similar, showing us for example, that branches 
of law such as contract, tort and crime can have different boundaries in different 
places. The ever-present difficulties in such comparisons of knowing exactly when 
like is like, become the very point of the exercise. In his contribution to the hand-
book, for example, John Bell asks what is meant by administrative law, and how 
discretion is defined and structured in Germany, France and UK. After examining 
ideas concerning the rule of law, he says:
The divergence in uses of the terminology and the absence of an exact equivalent in the 
different languages provides much potential for confusion. All the same, these different 
terms convey some common liberal messages—that the administration is not free to act 
as it deems to be right in terms of efficiency or to achieve political goals (Bell: 301).
For him, the advantage of comparison is that it allows us to see how similar dilem-
mas play themselves out in different contexts. He explains that the values of pro-
tection of subjects, accountability and efficiency may cut in different directions 
with different jurisdictions giving different weight to these principles.11 But he 
also suggests that in each of these societies the protection of fundamental rights 
can be trumped by considerations of national security and public order.
Comparison presupposes some similarity. Claims of irreducible difference 
are seen as bordering on relativism and (therefore?) implausible. Christopher 
McCrudden asks:
‘[W]hat, exactly, do we mean by ‘torture’? When, exactly, is ‘discrimination’ invidious? 
. . . When the principle comes to be applied, the appearance of commonality disappears, 
and human rights are exposed as culturally relative, deeply contingent on local politics 
and values. (McCrudden: 372–3) 
This has to be resisted because comparison would be pointless—‘a different prin-
ciple would be being applied (McCrudden: 373).
It is true that some societies are described or may describe themselves as 
exceptional. Even Esin Örücü has talked of ‘extraordinary places’. But it is hard to 
sustain the case that any given place is ‘ordinary’. The United States has a strong 
claim to be exceptional in its degree of adversarial legalism (Kagan, 2001; Nelken, 
2003a) or its level of incarceration rates. Japan has long seen itself as different; 
Scandinavians see their laws as somewhat exceptional in the European context. 
Some commentators on law and politics in Italy worry about the ‘normality’ of 
their way of doing things, and so on.
How are we to find out in what ways places are different? Our results can only 
be as good as the reliability of our methods allows. It is certainly not enough 
to rely on law in the books, some effort must be made to talk to those in touch 
with the ‘law in action’ (see Esin Örücü’s chapter nineteen). Andrew Harding 
and Peter Leyland rightly recommend that we engage in dialogue with foreign 
11 Those following a more culturalist approach might object that we cannot be sure that these 
societies do share these common dilemmas, or even how far the idea of having to trade-off amongst 
different values is common across different societies.
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scholars, officials and politicians. But we should not take it for granted that people 
in other societies always know the answers to our questions about the differences 
between our ways and theirs. For some purposes outsiders may see more than 
insiders. What is more, the role—the requirements of our informants, including 
whether they are practitioners or experts, can vary from society to society: We 
may need to make allowance for the possibility that in many societies political 
engagements and commitments mean that those we rely on are more interested in 
presenting a good face, or pursuing the goals of a given political project, than they 
are in providing a disinterested description of their system (Nelken, 2000). 
If we are to compare successfully, we are also in need of reasonably clear con-
cepts which can be used to guide research. The debate over the concept of legal 
culture—a possible substitute for the tired idea of families of law12—provides a 
good illustration of the difficulties in finding and working with such concepts. 
Whilst few doubt that there is some connection between law and culture there 
is little agreement on how to determine this. Menski for example tells us that 
‘law is culture-specific and immensely diverse’, but van Erp insists that judges 
from different legal cultures often have a lot in common on account of their 
role-requirements and social backgrounds (an argument also deployed by Basil 
Markesinis against those who think legal epistemologies are very different). 
This term is discussed at some length in David Nelken’s chapter, but also makes 
its appearance in many of the other chapters of this handbook, such as those 
by Roger Cotterrell, Anthony Ogus, Nicholas Foster, Patrick Glenn and Masha 
Antokolskaia. 
A series of issues need to be faced in using the concept of legal culture. An 
often-raised problem is the danger of treating culture as fixed or impervious to 
outside influences (see Patrick Glenn, in chapter four). Culture and legal culture 
should rather be seen as something that changes and is changeable, and is shaped 
both by the past and oriented towards the future (Nelken, 1995). In his contribu-
tion, John Bell notes that German administrative law is less willing than that in 
France or the United Kingdom to accept that certain powers belong inherently to 
government in the absence of special authorisation. He links this to that country’s 
recent experience of dictatorial government.13 Legal culture, like other aspects of 
culture, may also rest on an imaginary past and invented traditions. Likewise, law 
imposed by others quite recently may nonetheless be felt as authentically indig-
enous (Jettinghoff, 2001). 
The units of legal culture range from supranational categories such as 
‘Asian values’ or ‘European legal culture’ through more familiar national legal 
12 Our contributors suggest other pretenders to this role such as, for Patrick Glenn, ‘legal traditions’ 
or, for Esin Örücü, the ‘tree’ metaphor.
13 Interestingly, a similar historical explanation is used by Lacey and Zedner, 1998, to explain the 
distrust in Germany of relying on communal and informal justice because of memories of the misuse 
of informers in the Nazi regime.
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cultures, down to regional, local, organisational and professional ones. As shown 
in William Twining’s discussion of the diffusion of law, it is especially important 
to be open to transnational legal processes and the so-called ‘third cultures’ not 
rooted in the state. The increasing need to examine legal culture beyond national 
boundaries is seen most obviously in the contributions to this Handbook that 
deal with international criminal law and human rights law. But the chapters on 
private, public and family law make much the same point. John Bell, for instance, 
notes that ideas for new ways of running the public sector frequently come from 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and that ideas 
for common standards of administrative law are developed by the Council of 
Europe or the European Union. Masha Antokolskaia describes the develop-
ment of family law as a collective international project. Legal cultures are thus 
overlapping and inter-related and may come together in unexpected ways. The 
method of law-making by Directive of the Commission of the European Union 
is closer to civil than it is to common law traditions, but much of the substance 
of such laws has to with common law influenced ideas of liberalism and the free 
market.
For purposes of explanation we will often also need to distinguish what we 
mean by culture from other factors such as social structure or group interests. 
Most authors in fact counterpoise culture—as something bound up with the cre-
ation and sharing of symbolic meaning—to more instrumental aspects of social 
life. But, in chapter seven, Anthony Ogus, whilst starting from a classical defini-
tion of legal culture as ‘a shared way of thinking and acting’, then goes on to offer 
an economic interpretation of the term. He suggests that ‘it is a “network” that 
may reduce the costs of communication between those using the legal system’, but 
adds that these same characteristics mean that it may also ‘be exploited by practis-
ing lawyers to resist competition’. Free market competition between legal cultures, 
in his view, provides the opportunity for the economic interests of law consumers 
to prevail over the special interests of the law providers. 
The issue of legal culture is also crucial to what is one of the most interesting 
(if serendipitous) contrasts that emerge from the contributions to this collection 
taken as a whole. It is conventional wisdom, even for sophisticated commentators, 
that family law is one of those branches of law which is most linked to culture 
and therefore least easy to copy. By contrast, commercial law is seen as the least 
‘cultural’ type of law and hence that which is easiest to transfer or borrow. This 
is explained in terms of the relative intimacy and privacy of the relationships or 
‘communities’ being regulated by each type of law (Roger Cotterrell 2006). Yet, 
surprisingly, the relevant contributions to our Handbook seem to go against these 
assumptions. Masha Antokolskaia does not tell us a story about the distinctive-
ness of national family law regimes throughout Europe (though such a story 
could no doubt be told). On the contrary, she seeks to persuade us that reaching 
a high degree of consensus in this area of legal regulation is both necessary and 
possible. 
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By contrast, Nicholas Foster devotes much of his chapter (chapter twelve) to 
showing that commercial law also reflects and helps shape local culture. He rejects 
the assumption, as he summarises it, that
[c]ommerce, though, is not ‘close to peoples’ lives’, and is therefore not affected by cultural 
attitudes. Business people everywhere just wants to make money. So commercial law is not 
affected by culture either, it is just lawyer’s law, a mere instrument (Foster: 267).14 
He argues instead that commerce is in fact ‘close to peoples’ lives’, because it relates 
to such ‘rules of the game of economic struggle’ as the distribution of property 
among social groups, the concentration of power in society, the ‘set of prior choices 
about the role of the state and the private sector in responding to change’ and the 
morality of interactions between people. Therefore it is affected by cultural attitudes. 
Business people everywhere may just want to make money, but they are still people 
who function in a culturally determined mentality. Since commercial law concerns 
the facilitation and regulation of commerce, it too may be affected by cultural atti-
tudes (so long as the law reflects those attitudes)’. Foster claims as a result that
‘variations in commercial law which reflect those differences are not mere accidents, and 
will be difficult to change effectively. In particular it may be difficult to change them so 
as to make the law uniform across various types of society (Foster: 278). 
These unusual claims go together with different ways of employing comparative 
law in argument. Masha Antokolskaia thinks that she can best show the relevance 
of comparison for family law by describing what has emerged in common as a 
result of convergence of ways of living and thinking. Foster, on the other hand, 
uses comparative evidence of difference to prove that commercial law is (also) 
culturally shaped. But we should be careful not to be too carried away by these 
emphases. It is one thing to show that certain values in family law are widely 
shared or that commercial law is also cultural. It is another to sustain the view that 
commercial law is more culturally rooted than family law. Much more research 
would be needed to document such an unlikely proposition.
Will difference survive? It is often said that there are forces, linked to glo-
balisation, which are leading to greater convergence in law across the board. Our 
contributors are cautious about this, and William Twining is almost tempted to 
ban the use of the word globalisation. Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland offer a 
balanced assessment:
while certain contemporary global trends do in fact encourage elements of convergence, 
and there is plenty of evidence of this taking place, it does not follow that constitutions 
will all eventually look the same.
For them,
strong divergences do remain in the implementation of human rights principles and 
other constitutional features. Moreover, globalisation has within it tendencies which 
are both conducive and non-conducive to the promotion of constitutional government 
(Harding and Leyland: 333).
14 But, as Anthony Ogus argues, culture can also be used instrumentally.
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We should remember that globalisation can bring about difference as well as 
similarity. The development of the international economy often uses, emphasises 
or exacerbates differences in the places which produce goods and services even as 
it spreads homogenous appetites for such goods. 
Convergence can also be pursued as part of a deliberate political project such 
as harmonisation of law in the European Union. Because this is something in 
which comparative lawyers play an important part it has led to heated debate 
about whether harmonisation leads to the sacrifice of diversity and whether this 
is something to be resisted. Is difference in culture and legal culture itself a value, 
as with the maintenance of biodiversity? What about objectionable differences? 
When is ‘culturalism’ progressive? These are questions to which it is difficult 
to find conclusive responses. Esin Örücü argues in favour of providing similar 
answers across the world in cases such as those dealing with workers and others 
who have contracted diseases from exposure to asbestos (Örücü, 2005). In this 
way we meet the threat that multi-national companies will otherwise forum-shop 
or move where worker security is least protected. The same, she thinks, should 
apply to liability for defective products. What of the granting of rights to illegiti-
mate children? Masha Antokolskaia would say yes. But these three examples give 
some illustration of the need to decide where to draw the line.
In his chapter (chapter six) Roger Cotterrell sees the attempt to identify ‘better 
law’ as part of the old search for universal principles. By contrast, he offers a care-
ful argument in favour of diversity. Cotterell asks us to draw an analogy between 
valuing differences in legal arrangements and the celebration of difference in 
critical race theory and some forms of feminism. It could be said, on the other 
hand, that the analogy begs the question. Even if sometimes respecting difference 
can help defend weaker groups from enforced assimilation, in other circum-
stances insisting on similarity can be useful in warding off ethnic nationalism. 
Unfortunately, minorities themselves can often be intolerant of other minorities 
or deviants in their midst. Paradoxically, the European Union has been trying for 
some time to impose respect for difference across Europe and uses this as a key 
measure to decide on the eligibility for membership of candidate nations. So here 
we have a project of harmonisation designed to produce more toleration of dif-
ference. (Who said life was simple?)
The perception and evaluation of difference is highly contingent on the observ-
er’s starting point. American authors tend to assume that ‘external legal culture’ 
(the demands and pressure-group politics of civil society) is what moves the law. 
But this may itself reflect how law is shaped in the USA rather than representing 
a more general truth. John Bell’s starting questions in examining administrative 
law cross-culturally presuppose that they are salient in each of the jurisdictions 
considered, something that his enviable inside knowledge of more than one juris-
diction allows him to assert.15 However, when he comments that on the continent 
15 But Bell’s discussion of the relationship between proportionality and reasonableness can be 
usefully contrasted with Legrand’s recent argument that the terms belong within different worlds of 
thought (Legrand, 2006).
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some expansion of judicial review is motivated more by concerns of ‘social soli-
darity’ than holding administrations ‘responsible’, we may begin to wonder if the 
British jurist is showing through just a little. Likewise, when Masha Antokolskaia 
tell us that the trend towards the ‘de-ideologisation of marriage’ shows the ‘rec-
ognition that law is unable to regulate feelings and moral sentiments’ we may 
wonder whether this is a mere description or at least as much the expression of a 
particular ideology. 
This overlap between objects of study and ways of thinking about it reminds 
us once again that comparative law can be pursued as both a first or second-order 
enquiry. As part of a first-order enquiry what judges do and say will be treated as 
evidence of legal culture. But a central part of their role is itself that of identifying 
their and other peoples’ legal culture. As Christopher McCrudden points out, dif-
ferences in how this role is understood can lead to considerable national variations 
in when they consider it appropriate to refer to judicial decisions handed down in 
other societies. Changes in the aims of comparative law over time also affect the 
significance of searching for similarities and difference. Goldstein and Marcus, in 
their classic work in the 1970s on criminal justice decision-making in the United 
States and Europe (Goldstein and Marcus, 1977), thought it essential to show 
that European practices were less different than was being claimed by other com-
paratists. They argued that because the Europeans also faced, but were unable to 
resolve, similar dilemmas of low-visibility decision-making to those faced in the 
United States, there was therefore little to be learned from them.16 Nowadays, on 
the other hand, demonstrating similarity is used to provide useful justification for 
harmonisation: while those who wish to resist the relevance of comparisons tend 
to point to unbridgeable differences so as to support their cause. 
VI.  PRACTICES
We are now ready to return to Esin Örücü’s distinction between those who see 
comparative law as an end in itself and those who advocate its use as a tool for var-
ious practical purposes. Many comparative lawyers express a certain impatience 
with merely theoretical enquiries. The sensible comparative lawyer, we are told, 
knows when and where to stop theorising (Palmer, 2004). Lawyers and other users 
of the law expect no less. As Patrick Glenn tells us in his chapter (chapter four),
the transnational commercial world is one of free-flowing normative information where 
the question is never what the best possible rule is (which would be an impractical 
enquiry) but which solution is preferable to other solutions (Glenn: 100).
Should it be comparative law’s goal to be as useful as possible? On the one hand, 
for some people comparative law can never be practical enough. Students can be 
amongst its most demanding critics. Nicholas Foster mentions one ‘belligerent 
enquirer’ who questioned the value of learning about other peoples’ laws and 
16 For a recent study which takes their work further, see Hodgson, 2005.
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never came back to learn more, probably assuming that if it ever became neces-
sary to work on a case which had to be heard in a foreign jurisdiction he could 
just rely on a local lawyer.17 Law may be practical in some respects and not others. 
Anthony Ogus argues that the common law is inherently more practically useful 
as compared to civil law because the administration of justice is relatively decen-
tralised and thus removed from ‘the heavy hand of government’. In this way law 
‘accepts, indeed reinforces, what individuals and firms want and protects expecta-
tions by rending the desired outcomes legally enforceable’ (Ogus: 161). As scholars 
working in the broader area of comparative legal studies have shown, however, 
when it comes to providing remedies for tort and other harms the methods of 
the common law have their own severe drawbacks and there is much to be said in 
favour of state-organised regulation by bureaucrats and experts (Kagan, 2003).
Many of the post-modernist critics of the mainstream, on the other hand, see 
the use of comparison for instrumental purposes as what needs to be fought 
against. For van Erp (in chapter seventeen) such ‘post-modern theory is trumped 
by practice’ because of our everyday experience of the import and export of legal 
ideas and institutions. But of course everything depends on one’s evaluation of 
what is achieved by such efforts at legal transfers. In any case it is clear that even 
post-modernists do not maintain a sharp separation between theory and prac-
tice. Although Pierre Legrand is scathing about the practical concerns of some 
comparative lawyers (Legrand, 2006), his ‘contrarian challenge’ (as discussed in 
chapter six by Roger Cotterrell), is linked to a mission to protect diversity as much 
as it is to theoretical enquiry for its own sake.18
The arguments of the post-modernists should not be identified with that 
of all proponents of comparative legal studies (they form only one of its 
strands).19 Those who engage in multi- or interdisciplinary empirical enquiries 
not only agree on the need to offer practical benefits, they often argue that only 
their more ‘realistic’ approach will bring us to any destination worth reaching. 
For them, it is only by employing the resources of other disciplines that we 
can produce reliable findings. It can make all the difference to understanding 
other people’s legal rules and institutions (never mind borrowing from them 
or seeking to harmonise them) to discover that the time taken on average for 
civil cases in Europe can be from 1 to 8 years. The same applies when we come 
17 As I told one belligerent enquirer, even for his pragmatic purposes it would still be useful to know 
something about how long court cases would take, judges’ behaviour and, not least, lawyers’ training, 
in the jurisdiction concerned.
18 He also does not hesitate to enrol Teubner (see Teubner, 2001) in support of his arguments about 
the difficulties of transplanting law, despite the gulf between their theoretical approaches. 
19 A common mistake is to assume that an interpretative approach to social life, one that attempts 
to understand the meaning of actions or texts rather than ‘explain’ them using the cause and effect 
language of the hard sciences, is somehow post-modernist (Peters and Schwenke, 2000). On the con-
trary, such an approach is central to much of the best ‘modern’ empirical work in the social sciences. 
Still less does an interpretative approach have to go together with the alleged relativism attributed to 
the post-modernists (a relativism, if it existed, that would be difficult to reconcile with their strongly 
held political positions). 
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to recognise that high-sounding values can work out differently in practice in 
ways that contrast with the story law tells about itself. The ‘due process’ type 
of procedural guarantees of the criminal processes do not necessarily stand in 
opposition to ‘crime control’ priorities. Empirical research suggests that they 
typically serve to facilitate ‘crime control’ (McBarnett, 1981).20 
These wider aspects of legal process are invariably indices of more profound 
features concerning the role and rule of law. Court delays are not just a sign 
of inefficiency but (also) of well-established and well-defended forms of social 
ordering outside state law (Nelken, 2004). By contrast, expeditiousness in legal 
proceedings, especially on the criminal side, may be an indication that those with 
power and money are hardly ever likely to be subject to the rigours of the law. The 
contribution of comparative legal studies should not be limited—as it is some-
times—to advising lawyers or politicians whether a particular institution or law 
will ‘work’ or has worked. It can also help uncover the different values pursued 
by different legal systems. Only careful comparison using interviews and other 
research methods can help to decide what values a system is actually trying to 
pursue, and the likely competing internal views about this (Nelken, 2006c).
Comparative law may be used for various purposes and we should not neces-
sarily expect to find these all to be compatible. Most obviously, seeking to copy 
best practices from elsewhere is certainly different from showing the ineliminabil-
ity of difference. The aims canvassed by the contributors to this volume are not 
limited to mainstream exercises in harmonising private law, discovering commo-
nalities or agreeing on ‘better law’. Indeed, when they discuss existing projects in 
private law they tend to be somewhat critical of them.21 Even Jan Smits devotes 
his chapter on the topic of harmonisation to finding a way to avoid this being 
imposed from the top-down. Nicholas Foster tells us that the conventional idea 
that private law is easily harmonised because it represents no more than ‘lawyers’ 
law’ is much exaggerated because the relevant lawyers and wider legal culture may 
well vary from place to place. The chapter by Anthony Ogus (chapter seven) could 
be used to make the same point, though he looks to competition between systems 
to exploit and perhaps overcome these differences. 
It is important, our authors argue, not to engage in exercises of harmonisation 
without finding out as much as possible about the legal systems being compared. 
As Paul Roberts puts it,
Comparative inquiry might ascertain not only points of convergence in national crimi-
nal laws, suggestive of international ‘best practice’ in criminalisation, but also distinctive 
domestic innovations potentially worthy of emulation at the international level.
20 It is still appropriate to mandate principles and seek to hold authorities to them even if they 
will try to get round them where they think it necessary. But, as Goldstein and Marcus (1977) rightly 
insisted, only an account of a system which includes information about the likelihood of such depar-
tures is useful for comparative purposes.
21 Masha Antokolskaia is an exception, but she is dealing with schemes to develop better law rather 
than harmonisation as such.
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Similar legal concepts can mean different things in different contexts. The 
 lesson for human rights lawyers is that they ignore the different institutional 
 contexts in which interpretation takes place and the different power relations in 
these jurisdictions at their peril.
Learning from elsewhere is important for purposes of co-operation in dealing 
with common problems. As Roberts explains:
If international norms are partly derived from the legislation, jurisprudence and legal 
commentary produced by a diversity of national legal cultures and traditions,
then
working knowledge of these domestic origins must surely be advantageous for any 
government lawyer or judge attempting to interpret international legal instruments 
(Roberts: 356).
But, again, to be really useful such enquiries must be well informed about actual 
practice. If this is attained then,
local variations in occupational culture virtually guarantee that comparative under-
standing will be a significant operational asset in coordinating transborder co-operation
and international policing networks. Similar considerations apply to international co-
operation between prosecutors, defence lawyers, judges, penal administrators, and mili-
tary personnel, and in every sphere of informal operational policy-making and mutual 
judicial assistance (Roberts: 360).
Most of the comparative law and other literature about transferring law focuses 
on exports to countries of the developing world and/or former communist 
regimes. Sjef van Erp, writing as someone engaged in such transfers, tells us that 
typical situations are those where a state wants to change its law to reduce ‘trans-
action costs of different legal regimes, to help organise economic change over’, or 
to come into line with the legal practices of a political or economic grouping that 
the state in question wishes to join.
It is less common to find examples of learning that go in the opposite direction, 
where we try to learn from what is called ‘the South’ (Santos, 2002; and Santos 
and Rodriguez, 2005). 
In his chapter (chapter nine), however, Werner Menski sets out to show us that the 
West has something to learn from India. After describing some difficult challenges 
that the legislature and courts have had to deal with in family law, he tells us that,
[w]hile emphasising modern-looking individual property rights, also of women, the 
post-modern Indian state also re-employs traditional concepts of interlinkedness, spe-
cifically traditional family obligations, as a social welfare mechanism. This dual strategy 
also protects the state from expectations that it should be directly responsible for social 
welfare (Menski: 210–11).
He concludes:
Post-modern India, therefore, seems to have found an exciting solution to the conun-
drum of legal uniformity which may be a suitable model for many countries … it 
employed carefully planned minor surgeries over a long period of time, leaving the body 
of personal status laws intact (Menski: 203).
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On the other hand what is to be learnt from practices elsewhere, in the North or in 
the South, is rarely self-evident. Menski tells us that the Supreme Court decision 
that he so admires ‘was done almost secretly, in record time, and there has been 
hardly any debate of this important development so far’. It could well be argued 
that this detracts from the achievement. We could also ask how far this decision 
(which had been delayed for many years) was only made possible by the fortuitous 
post-9/11 political climate. 
What is or should be our criterion of success in deciding what has been 
achieved in the course of any alleged transfer of legal practices or ideas? As Esin 
Örücü explains,
neither can ‘success’ be defined from a single standpoint. Pre-determined economic, 
social, cultural, religious or ideological ends are all factors by which success is measured. 
Efficiency, internalisation, cultural shift, and the actual use of the new legal structures 
can all be criteria for measurement’ (Örücü: 178; see also Nelken, 2001).
Success is not only a matter of means but also of ends. For Sjef van Erp the means 
are technical ones: problems of language; the skills of interpreters; the methods for 
gaining credibility and inducing changes in mentalities. But means can also some-
times be ends in themselves. As Patrick Glenn argues in his chapter (chapter four), 
comparison must itself be carried out in a way that is respectful of difference. A key 
question is how to encourage cultures to draw on those aspects of their own tradi-
tions which are more in line with universalistic aspirations (Al-Naim, 1991/1996). 
This applies not only between, but even within, legal cultures, especially where there 
are obviously competing normative orders. As Werner Menski argues, an important 
part of the strategy used by the Indian Supreme Court to defeat attempts by mem-
bers of the Muslim minority to get around women-friendly legal decisions was to 
appeal to the obligation in the Koran to maintain divorced wives.
Questions about practice are ones that are well suited to an approach which 
treats comparative law as a second-order enquiry into the practical task of com-
paring laws. We need to bear in mind who is doing the comparison, and we need 
to ask who is their imagined audience—for example, judges, lawyers, policy-
makers or scholars. Finally, and not least, attention needs to be given to the 
intended beneficiaries, whether they be businessmen, consumers, victims of crime 
or war, social movements, parties to an actual or possible court case, or those 
involved in lobbying legislatures or regulatory agencies. Some comparative schol-
ars hope that their work will be of interest for as many groups as possible; others 
feel the need to respond to the question: ‘Who’s side are you on?’ 
What is considered sufficient understanding of other people’s law will therefore 
depend on what that understanding is for. A legislator has one role, the judge 
or the lawyer another, and the ethnographer yet another (though each can try 
to use the other’s knowledge for their own purposes). With respect to lawyers, 
Christopher McCrudden tells us that
Lawyers in the human rights context use comparison to legitimate their argument that 
a particular interpretation of an existing human rights norm should be adopted, or as 
part of the process of generating further norms (McCrudden: 376).
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It is always instructive to locate the actors behind given comparative projects 
and the way they draw on and create their ‘symbolic capital’ (Dezalay and Garth, 
1996). The processes of competition between legal systems described by Anthony 
Ogus and others do not simply measure the response of a ‘market’ of rational 
individuals seeking their self-interest. Lawyers are involved in ‘selling packages’ 
or giving advice in the setting up of offices. American lawyers, many of them 
students of distinguished comparatists in the United States, helped develop strat-
egies by which common law would become the law of choice for business in the 
European Union. In Latin America, economists and lawyers trained in the United 
States vie for high office.
It is a matter of some controversy how far judges’ comparisons are or should be 
linked to what is needed to resolve single disputes or whether they form part of a 
search for something more transcendent. For Esin Örücü,
comparativism must be at the heart of all judicial activity if law is to embody principles 
that are universal rather than purely domestic or even ‘European’.
But Christopher McCrudden has quite a different view. For him, the way judges 
do comparisons is extremely patchy, and insofar as they look for universal prin-
ciples this is part of the problem not the solution, As he says:
[n]ot only is the methodology weak (cherry picking, weak evidence, overly formalis-
tic assessment of what the law is), but several of these functions of comparison tend 
towards the older universalistic tendencies of comparative law scholarship that are now 
viewed critically by many modern comparative law scholars (McCrudden: 376).
But he also admits that, as far as judges are concerned, ‘incompletely theorised 
agreements’ are all you can have, and all you should want.
Both Christopher McCrudden’s description in his chapter (chapter sixteen) of 
the work of US Supreme Court judges and Esin Örücü’s statistical investigation 
of English and Scottish judges (in chapter eighteen) show that even leading judges 
are reluctant to use foreign decisions as authorities and that judges’ references to 
other jurisdictions are often, in their words, no more than ‘ornamental’, ‘decora-
tive’ or ‘rhetorical’. Discussing the same cases as McCrudden, Pierre Legrand has 
recently stigmatised the way judges use comparative materials as ‘comparison-lite’ 
(Legrand, 2006). But how far this is something to be criticised, and how we criti-
cise it, depends on how we (and the judges) interpret the institutional and con-
stitutional role requirements of judges. In developing their own legal traditions 
they are certainly subject to more constraints than free-wheeling policy-makers or 
legal scholars. In some cases it could be that judges may even need to make their 
references to other systems appear to be no more than ornamental, even when 
they are actually taking them as models. 
What of the practices of comparative law scholars themselves? When John Bell 
talks of ‘successful’ comparison he means that the scholars concerned have pro-
vided persuasive interpretations according to the professional standards of techni-
cal skill in interpreting law, and crafting policy recommendations. Comparative 
law scholars may also be more or less committed to larger projects. In the Indian 
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context, Werner Menski talks of what he calls Anglo-Saxons and other harmonis-
ers. Masha Antokolskaia describes and praises the role of comparative lawyers in 
permanent networks of national experts to advise on matters of family law. The 
alleged purpose of such projects should not always be taken at face value. Those 
who try to provide restatements of law may, intentionally or otherwise, be chang-
ing it, and the search for common principles may be a disguised way to move to 
‘better laws’—or vice versa.
Scholarly claims can have effects in the world of legal and political practice even 
when they rest on false or weak premises. Whatever harmonisers of law assert, it 
is unclear how far consumers really are put off making purchases in foreign juris-
dictions because of the difficulties of bringing court cases in a foreign court.22 
More to the point, even if reducing transaction costs may benefit producers and 
consumers, the extension of the neo-liberal market place may add to the costs to 
be paid by others such as workers. Criticising the mainstream approach, Werner 
Menski argues that
the Euro-centric perspective that privileged the state (legocentrism) and territoriality 
(nationalist concerns) is not only quite parochial, but an idiom based on lost memory 
which does not lead towards a globally acceptable method of understanding law and its 
many pluralities, mixed manifestations, and commonalities (Menski: 198).
Moreover, he adds:
This kind of monocultural myopic thinking leads, however, directly to African and other 
despots, who appear to be top-ranking students of legocentric axioms, and corrupt 
regimes anywhere in the world (Menski: 194).
For Menski,
comparative lawyers must learn to harmonise local influences with emerging global 
patterns of thought, avoiding the current mental cul de sacs that dismiss local cultures 
as obstacles to the implementation of international laws and globally uniform human 
rights principles. In the age of localised globalisation, a new phase of diversity-conscious 
identity construction has become necessary (Menski: 210).
Legrand, for his part, attacks what he sees as the ‘totalitarian rationality which 
privileges regulation, technological standardisation of law and the kind of epi-
grammatic answers from foreign laws’ (Legrand, 2006). For better or worse, 
standardised ways of thinking can be talked (or written) into existence as terms 
like ‘economic loss’, or ‘discretion’, which help create a meta-language and meta-
perception of legal problems. 
As an academic discipline comparative law is itself also a practice. As David 
Kennedy has shown in many of his writings, the subject has been characterised 
over time by a series of intellectual ‘moves’ which exemplify the way individual 
22 Goode, 2003 alleges that there is no empirical evidence that shows this to be true. But, more 
recently, Hondius, 2004 has claimed that there is indeed such evidence.
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scholars pursue their agenda. The absence of open discussion of politics by many 
of the current generation of comparative lawyers can itself be seen as a political 
position (Kennedy, 2003). The issues discussed in this introduction—‘getting 
beyond’, placing in context, and finding similarities and differences—may all be 
seen in these terms. Masha Antokolskaia’s invocation of ‘trends’, as we have noted, 
mobilises teleological certainty in the face of what might otherwise be seen as 
contingent value choices being made by politically-engaged social actors. Some of 
the developments towards safeguarding individual choice that she sees as crystal-
lising what should be considered as better law in Europe are highly controversial 
as viewed by many in Catholic Italy. She herself recognises that social trends are 
only half the picture when she describes the European Court of Human Rights 
as involved in a ‘dynamic interpretation’ of the European Convention on Human 
Rights regarding divorce, the rights of extra-marital children, and the right of 
transsexuals to marry. 
As we have seen, many critics claim that mainstream work is dominated by the 
desire to produce similarity (as a poor simulacrum of universality) rather than to 
appreciate differences. However, classifying a ‘move’ as more concerned to safe-
guard difference or more to encourage similarity will rarely be sufficient in itself 
to resolve the politics of given choices. Interestingly, Christopher McCrudden 
points out in chapter sixteen what he calls a ‘tension’ between the practice of 
comparative law and the practice of human rights lawyers. While the former are 
often focused on significant differences, the latter have a universalistic perspective 
and mission. But this is not reported by Paul Roberts in his account of the devel-
opment of international criminal law. Renaming ‘female circumcision’ as ‘female 
genital mutilation’ is part of an effort to introduce a more universal language so 
as to reduce the power of local culture (Merry, 2006). On the other hand, talk-
ing up the importance of ‘culture’ can discourage efforts to change things for the 
better whether it is treated as part of a general trend affecting all modern societ-
ies (Zedner, 2002), or used to explain why some countries will always lag behind 
(Krygier, 1997). Either way, insofar as they have power to help shape events schol-
ars too must reflect on their responsibilities. 
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
 1.  Contrast the theoretical and substantive chapters in this collection. Are some 
theoretical ideas used more in some substantive areas than others? Why? 
 2.  Are some chapters more contextual than others? Are there good reasons 
for this?
 3.  Imagine that you had to rewrite one of the substantive chapters by focus-
ing on the issue of legal tradition or legal culture or hybridity. How might 
the focus of the chapter change? What other data would you need to create 
or draw on?
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 4.  Do the chapters on given legal topics show full awareness of the methods 
and findings of those studying other topics? Are the same issues necessarily 
relevant? What links could you suggest between the substantive chapters?
 5.  What is the difference between putting the ‘law in context’ and seeking the 
‘context in law’?
 6.  What are ‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’ approaches to comparative law? 
Is this distinction helpful?
 7.  Do Anthony Ogus and Nicholas Foster agree about the way commercial 
law evolves?
 8.  Is the search for ‘better law’, described in Masha Antokolskaia’s chapter on 
family law, the fulfilment of the overlapping traditions that Patrick Glenn 
is calling for—or is it its antithesis?
 9.  What similarities and differences can you detect in the way John Bell, 
on the one hand, and Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland, on the other, 
approach the comparative study of public law?
10.  Do Paul Roberts and Christopher McCrudden see the spread of human 
rights in the same way?
11.  Are Esin Örücü and Werner Menski making the same points about mixed 
and hybrid legal systems?
12.  Does harmonisation of law have the same implications and the same 
justifications in the areas of commercial law, family law and human 
rights law? 
13.  What practical implications would you draw from each of the substantive 
chapters in this Handbook?
14.  Who are the main audiences targeted by the various contributions to the 
Handbook? (How far is Anthony Ogus thinking mainly of lawyers, John 
Bell, of judges, Masha Antokolskaia and Sjef van Erp, of legislators, and so 
on?) Whom do you think the authors have in mind as the ultimate benefi-
ciaries of their comparisons?
15.  Do you think comparative law is the same as comparative legal studies? If 
not, what are the arguments for and against going more in the latter direc-
tion? What would it involve?
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KEY CONCEPTS
Comparative law, Comparative legal studies, Comparability, Purposes of 
comparative law, Common core, Methodology of comparative law, Normative 
inquiry, Tertium comparitionis, Presumption of similarity, De lege ferenda stud-
ies, ‘Functional equivalence’, The ‘factual approach’, ‘Law in context’, Legal fam-
ilies, Legal culture, Legal tradition, Macro comparison—micro comparison 
I.  PRELIMINARIES
T
his chapter considers the traditional topics dealt with in the introduc-
tory part of comparative law classes such as the definition, uses and pur-
poses of comparative law, its place in harmonisation and its methodology. 
It indicates the changing nature of comparative law, the process of comparison 
and problems connected to intra-cultural and cross-cultural comparisons. 
During the past decade we have witnessed increasing interest in all forms of 
comparative law, international law and transnational law. The character, quality and 
quantity of work have increased and changed, but the basic problems have remained 
the same. There is no one definition of what comparative law and comparative 
method are. While there is now less concern with ‘justifying the practical utility of 
comparative law’, ‘making its subject matter manageable’ and ‘avoiding superfi ciality’ 
(Twining, 2000b: 51), the emphasis has shifted to regarding comparative law as 
‘a big tent, encompassing lots of different types of scholarship’ (Kennedy, 2002: 345). 
Comparative law, as we know it today, can be regarded as a child of the 19th 
 century that has reached adolescence in the 20th.1 During this period, the subject 
seems to have given comparative lawyers total freedom and provided them with the 
seemingly endless pastime of discussing its true meaning, historical development, 
dangers, virtues, scope, functions, aims and purposes, uses and misuses, and the 
method. 
1 The history of comparative law is not to be discussed in this work, but see Zweigert and Kötz, 
1998, and the bibliography provided there, at 48–62.
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In the 21st century comparative law will reach maturity. Though our century 
has been heralded as ‘the age of comparative law’, amazingly, it is still open to 
question whether comparative law is indeed an independent discipline at all 
(Samuel, 1998; Gordley, 1998). Not only have comparative lawyers been called 
upon to re-think their subject (Markesinis, 1990), but it has also been suggested 
that the best path for comparative law to secure its future is to penetrate other 
subjects.
Objectives as varied as aiding law reform and policy development, providing a 
tool of research to reach a universal theory of law, giving a critical perspective to 
students and an aid to international law practice, facilitating international unifi-
cation and harmonisation of laws, helping courts to fill gaps in the law and even 
working towards the furthering of world peace and tolerance have been attributed 
to comparative law. These objectives can be grouped as practical, sociological, 
political and pedagogical. 
In addition, we see such terms as ‘traditional comparative law’, ‘mainstream 
comparative law’, ‘conventional comparative law’, ‘critical comparative law’, and 
‘post-modern comparative law’ being used. 
One thing is certain: there is a growing interest in comparative law. There are a 
number of new journals with ‘Comparative Law’ in their titles; the number of articles 
with a comparative element published in these journals has quadrupled within 
the past 10 years (see Monateri, 1998). It has become indispensable for all doctoral 
researchers, judges and legislators to consult foreign material as a matter of routine. 
For a long time it looked as though comparative law was a matter for academic 
research, difficult and, surely, very interesting, beautiful to know something about, but 
not immediately relevant to the daily life of the law. Over the last ten or fifteen years the 
legal climate seems to be changing. This evolution may be influenced by the process of 
European integration; it may also result from the fact that we are living closer together 
(the ‘global village’ situation); it may finally be an autonomous process, occasioned 
by the lawyer’s search for fresh perspectives, in particular when completely new legal 
problems are to be solved (Koopmans, 1996: 545). 
Although Harold Gutteridge once observed that, ‘the essential problem is not: 
What is comparative law? The question of real importance is: What is its purpose?’ 
(Gutteridge, 1949/1974: 5), most works on comparative law start with the ques-
tion: ‘What is comparative law?’ and then attempt to define it. One rather circular, 
vague and open-ended definition tells us for instance that ‘the words suggest an 
intellectual activity with law as its object and comparison as its process’ (Zweigert 
and Kötz, 1998: 2). 
Comparative law, sometimes referred to as an ‘incomplete theme’, is the 
juxtaposing, contrasting and comparing of legal systems or parts thereof with 
the aim of finding similarities and differences. However, the definition can 
be much wider than that: Comparative law is a science of knowledge with its 
own separate sphere; an independent science, producing theoretical distillate. 
Comparative law can be regarded as the ‘critical method of legal science’. 
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Indeed comparative law is a very broad field and the fruits of comparative study 
can be put to many uses. Yet, it cannot be justified by its uses or objectives alone. 
As Rodolfo Sacco points out,
the use to which scientific ideas are put effects neither the definition of a science nor the 
validity of its conclusions (Sacco, 1991a). 
We know that the everyday process of thinking involves the making of a series 
of comparisons, that is, a process of contrasting and comparing, juxtaposing the 
unknown and the known, and we comprehend the phenomena around us by 
observing differences and similarities:
Just as the qualities of a yellow, its hue, brilliance and tone are perceived and sharpened 
most truly by placing it first on or beside another yellow and secondly by placing it in 
contrast to purple, so we explore the world around us (Örücü, 1986: 57). 
So, we see that comparison is involved in all methods of scholarly investigation, 
‘whose purpose is the discovery of sameness and difference’ (Hall, 1963: 20). It is 
also in this way that we understand the legal world around us. 
Looking at the world of law and the environment in which it lives, comparative 
law can provide knowledge about ‘law as rules’, ‘law in context’ and ‘law as culture’, 
thus enabling us to have comprehensive and in-depth knowledge of the legal phe-
nomena and their interactions in society. Comparative law draws from the pool of 
models to illustrate the general points it is making. Like legal theory, legal history 
and legal sociology, it brings additional perspectives, although it is said that ‘tra-
ditional comparative law’ has failed by paying insufficient attention to context and 
ignoring the context of ideas (Ewald, 1995). Traditional legal doctrine engages in 
comparative law through the ‘law as rules’ approach. This bears the prejudices of 
positivism and of national legal cultures. It is important to regard comparative law 
‘as an indispensable international component of a “culture juridique”’ (Zweigert 
and Kötz, 1998: 54). Comparative law gives us a tool of communication. 
It has also been said that comparative law ‘has by common consent the some-
what unusual characteristic that it does not exist’ (Kahn-Freund, 1966: 40–1), and 
that comparative law is not another branch of law; it certainly is not independent 
of the subject area it is investigating. As Harold Gutteridge observed:
The process of comparing rules of law taken from different systems does not result in 
the formulation of any independent rules … Not only are there no ‘comparative’ rules of 
law but there are no transactions or relationships which can be described as comparative 
(Gutteridge, 1949: 1). 
In this view one could at best talk of a comparative family law, a comparative 
constitutional law or a comparative contract law. Here the comparison is not the 
central element of the comparative work, the focus being on fields of law that are 
inquired into comparatively for specific purposes such as law reform, harmoni-
sation or offering solutions to problems of domestic law. There must always be 
specificity and purpose in comparative law research. One should, in fact, talk of 
‘applied’ comparative law.
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William Twining puts forward three reasons for questioning the idea that ‘com-
parative law is an autonomous discipline or sub-discipline’. According to him, the 
first reason is that such an idea is philosophically dubious; the second that since all 
legal scholarship involves comparison, ‘it is misleading, indeed dangerous’ to set 
comparative law apart; and the third that comparative law has no defined subject-
matter (Twining, 2000a: 45). 
It has been said that comparative law is simply a method of looking at law. As 
a technique, comparative law is used to collect information on foreign law—an 
entire legal system, an institution or a rule—to juxtapose and contrast the find-
ings and make comparisons, that is, to identify similarities and differences. The 
purposes or objectives of this method are what give comparative law meaning. As 
a facilitative method, comparative law could be applied to domestic problems or 
transactions across international boundaries. In this sense it has close connections 
with international private law. 
But for the academic comparative lawyer the prime function of comparative 
law, sometimes called ‘scholarly comparative law’, is to provide access to legal 
knowledge which can be used not only for the purposes of law reform, or as a 
research tool, or to promote international understanding, but to fulfil its essential 
task of furthering the universal knowledge and understanding of the phenom-
enon of law. A succinct view formulated by Richard Tur summarises the ultimate 
position:
The unity of general jurisprudence and comparative law consists in the unity of form 
and content; they are essential moments of legal knowledge, different sides of the same 
coin. General jurisprudence without comparative law is empty and formal: comparative 
law without general jurisprudence is blind and non-discriminating. General jurispru-
dence with comparative law is real and actual: comparative law with general jurispru-
dence is selective and clear-sighted (Tur, 1977: 238 at 249). 
CM Campbell wrote:
The term ‘comparative law’ can mean so much or so little that it is only by examining 
particular methods, aims, approaches and the consequent utilisation that we can glean 
from ‘comparative law’ substance and purpose (Campbell, 1966). 
In addition to the question: ‘What is comparative law?’, a second concern is with 
the name of the subject itself. This concern is voiced mostly in the English-
speaking world. Is the term comparative law appropriate? It has been said that 
the term ‘comparative law’ is misleading in the English version of the name. In 
some other languages, as translated, the subject is either called ‘Comparison 
of Laws’ or ‘Legal Comparison’ (Rechtsvergleichung, Rechtsverkelijking) or ‘Law 
Compared’ or ‘Compared Law’ (droit comparé). For some, ‘Legal Comparison’, as 
used in Germany, may be the most appropriate term to be used here, since ‘Legal 
Comparison’ indicates clearly that there is no interest in the extrinsic factors in 
the comparisons to be undertaken, which should remain normative. Others today 
find the terms ‘comparative analysis of law’ or ‘comparative study of law’ more 
suitable. However, it has also been stated that, 
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[b]ecause law is not only a reference but is the very field of our study, the traditional 
term of comparative law is fully justified and suitably reflects the field of our scholarly 
endeavours (Karameus, 2001: 859 at 867).
Not only law, but comparison, are the central elements. 
Though the more recently coined and widely used title ‘Comparative Legal 
Studies’, has a confusing aspect in that it indicates studies beyond the law as conven-
tionally understood, this has a generality beyond the normative approach dominant 
among black-letter-law comparatists, and implies a wider approach to law. In a 
recent work, for example, carrying the title ‘Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions 
and Transitions’, it is stated that the term ‘Comparative Legal Studies’ in the title was 
chosen deliberately to avoid ‘this academic quagmire’ (Munday, 2002: 20). 
II.  METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
This part considers the methodology, language and problems of comparative law. 
‘Functional equivalence’ and some problems connected to it are discussed and the 
issue of ‘context’ is introduced. 
The first concern is what is meant by comparability. Is an element of similarity 
necessary for comparability? What is the so-called ‘meaningful’ comparison? We 
have seen that the term ‘comparative law’ itself is by no means free from ambigu-
ity; the factor of ‘comparability’ is even less so.
The fact that any one thing can be compared with any other thing has not pre-
vented wide and varied discussion of the concept of ‘comparability’ by comparative 
lawyers. The discussion hails from the common belief that ‘things to be compared 
must be comparable’, and usually revolves around the words ‘like’ and ‘similar’. It is 
stressed that ‘like must be compared with like’ and ‘similia similibus’—these being 
two well-established maxims of comparative law. What is ‘like’ in law? How ‘like’ 
do things have to be to be ‘comparable’? May we not compare diverse legal systems, 
legal institutions or legal rules and come to the conclusion that they are not ‘like’? 
Can we not, for example, compare a divorce case with an eviction case if our 
intention is to find out how courts deal with cases in general and to develop an 
understanding of how long cases take in court or how decisions are written? 
Could we not compare, for instance, an English statute on taxation, town and 
country planning or matrimonial causes with three pieces of German legislation 
on entirely different topics if we were trying to establish how such documents are 
prepared and how long or detailed they are, in order to develop an understanding 
of such a source of law? The examples could be infinite (see Bogdan, 1994: 58).
It is claimed that ‘comparison is possible only if the instances are comparable 
and the results interpretable’.2 It is further claimed that, ‘comparisons can be 
2 Merryman, 1974:   92, and also in Merryman, 1999: 489, where he discusses  Zelditch’s views on 
comparability, referring to Zelditch, ‘Intelligible Comparisons’ in Vallier (ed), Comparative Methods in 
Sociology (1971) at 267–307.  
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 useful only if the legal institutions under investigation are naturally or function-
ally comparable’. Comparative law is said to be a comparison of ‘comparable’ 
legal institutions or of the solutions to ‘comparable’ legal problems in different 
systems (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998: 34). Is the approach we want to take today 
one that says that only ‘similar’ things could be compared? In many languages the 
word ‘comparable’ ‘can also mean “approximately similar” or “not too different”’ 
(Bogdan, 1994). Thus to talk of ‘comparability’ may evoke an intellectual activity 
of juxtaposing somewhat similar systems, institutions or rules. 
Comparative law scholars use the term tertium comparationis, a common 
comparative denominator which could be the third unit besides the two legal 
comparanda, that is, the elements to be compared—the comparatum and the 
comparandum. Here, comparability is seen to depend on the presence of common 
elements that render juridical phenomena ‘meaningfully comparable’. What the 
comparative lawyer looks at as tertium comparationis could the ‘common func-
tion’ between institutions and rules, the ‘common goal’ they set out to achieve, 
the ‘problem’, the ‘factual situations’ they are created to solve or the solutions 
offered.
Another concern is which methods can and should be used by comparative 
lawyers. Is there a standard comparative law methodology? Apart from regarding 
comparison itself as a method, the problems of comparative legal methodology 
are very varied and have been discussed in different ways by many comparative 
lawyers.3 ‘Functional equivalence’ and the ‘problem-oriented’ approach, ‘model-
building’ and ‘common core’ studies, the ‘factual’ approach and ‘method in action’ 
are just some approaches to the question: ‘How to compare?’ put forward in the 
last century. ‘How to compare now’ is actually the title of an article by Pierre 
Legrand, one of the more controversial comparatists of our times (Legrand, 1996; 
Legrand, 1999: 1). 
‘Comparison’ clearly is a method used in all fields of study, be they social sci-
ences or natural sciences, such as governance, economics, linguistics, architecture 
and so on. ‘It is a way of looking, it is a mode of approaching material, a method 
in the process of cognition’ (Örücü, 1986: 57). In this sense ‘comparative method’ 
is an empirical, descriptive research design using ‘comparison’ as a technique 
to cognise. However, when the term ‘comparative’ is included in the name of a 
sub-division of a field such as comparative architecture, comparative linguistics 
or comparative law, it denotes an area of study and in that context, the word 
‘comparative’ in the title no longer depicts only a method, but an independent 
branch of that science. The subject, then, develops its own methods. Comparative 
law is more closely related to social sciences, from where it borrowed its methods, 
than to ‘pure’ normative inquiry, which seems to characterise other types of legal 
research. 
Although comparative law research is open ended—the methodology being 
dictated by the strategy of the comparative lawyer—and there is no standard 
3 See Roberts, 1972; and see also a number of chapters in Legrand and Munday (eds), 2003.
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methodology, the possibility of comparison is dependent upon the existence and 
availability of data. Data can best be obtained by employing social science meth-
odology. The first stage, the inquiry, is also related to concept building, where 
concepts that are neither so broad as to be meaningless nor too narrow to cover 
more than one instance, have to be devised. Umbrella concepts may have to be 
created. 
The classical technique of legal methodology of reading texts of all kinds and 
hoping for insight has serious limitations for collecting data to serve comparative 
inquiry adequately. Unless there is collaboration between legal and social sci-
ence researchers, comparative law falls short of its function, not only as a way of 
enhancing understanding and knowledge of law in context, but also as a source of 
models and of empirical information and knowledge. 
Following the inquiry, a comparative lawyer is expected to describe, juxtapose, 
identify similarities and differences and then venture into the field of explanation. 
It is here that hypotheses are needed and it is here that real comparison starts. This 
explanation, this discovery of the raison d’être for the differences and similari-
ties, also necessitates moving from the domain of pure legal reasoning to that of 
contextual factors. 
Black-letter-law oriented traditional comparative law research is normative, 
structural, institutional and positivistic. The empirical school suggests that the 
appropriate method should begin with the facts rather than hypotheses, and end 
in description. This is said to be a realistic approach, since the present-day lawyer 
is well equipped to use this method. 
Explanation of the differences and similarities identified is an accounting for 
these findings. It is at this stage that context becomes indispensable for under-
standing. John Merryman says that ‘the explanatory approach represents one 
attempt to choose error over confusion’ (Merryman, 1974: 100). An explanation 
of findings, of exceptional and typical cases, an accounting for differences and 
similarities, is thus not just a necessary step in comparative research but is its 
essence. Some of the hypotheses may also serve as explanations, but for some 
findings new explanations have to be found. When the comparative law researcher 
examines these explanations in order to understand why the legal systems have 
produced the institutions they have, the explanations may not be legal ones, and 
the texts themselves will show the differences but not offer explanations. Yet 
explanation is not the final step in a piece of comparative research. Findings must 
be verified and confirmed, and only then is the work deemed to be complete. This 
is the theory-testing stage for the tentative hypotheses.
Creative comparative law research may also be interested in suggesting ‘core 
concepts’ and point the way to ‘ideal systems’, or at least to the ‘better law’ 
approach. William Twining has remarked that comparative lawyers are concerned 
‘with description, analysis and explanation, rather than evaluation and prescrip-
tion’ (Twining, 2000a; Twining, 2000b: 34). In relation to the search for ‘better 
law’, there is scope for evaluation and prescription. However, the legitimacy of this 
activity remains questionable.
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We must remember that a comparative lawyer faces a number of additional 
problems. These include the choice of systems, appreciation of cross-cultural sys-
tems, language, terminology, translations, both participant and non-participant 
observer effect, access to material beyond the legal, the absurdity of explanations 
offered, the reliability of secondary sources, the existence of historical accidents 
and anachronism of predictions. 
In order to fulfil the requirements of scholarly comparative research, both 
similarities and differences must be considered, keeping in mind, however, that 
the purpose is not to search particularly for similarity or difference but to observe 
what is actually there. When there is similarity, this cannot be ignored just because 
the researcher is keen to follow the ‘contrarian challenge’, nor can a difference be 
glossed over because some other policy consideration such as European integra-
tion or globalisation dictates that only similarities should be highlighted. 
When the comparison is of legal rules, provisions and institutions only, the 
comparative lawyer starts with rules whose functions are equivalent and collects 
relevant data that lead to a succinct description. Here, contrasting is the first step 
of comparing. As suggested by the empirical school, the method begins with the 
facts, ‘the problem’, and ends in description. Similarities and differences brought 
to light by this contrasting and comparing are then identified. 
If for instance, a comparative lawyer were asked, say, by the English Law 
Commission, to look into ‘do-it-yourself divorces’ in the laws of the Member 
States of the European Union with a view to facilitating divorce in England, 
all she would have to do is report on the different schemes, describe them, and 
identify the differences and similarities between them and also between them 
and the domestic law. She would not evaluate the findings, this being the task 
of the Law Commission and to be determined in keeping with the policy deci-
sions made there. In such cases, the comparative lawyer is purely a facilitator, a 
lawyer looking at laws comparatively. It is for others to build with these bricks. 
She would not enter the arena of prescription of a ‘better law’ consequent to an 
evaluation. 
Blueprints have been suggested that could be employed in comparative law 
research. For example, Peter de Cruz suggests an eight-step method: an outline 
plan of action identifying the problem; identifying the foreign jurisdiction and 
the parent legal family; deciding on primary sources of law that will be relevant; 
gathering and assembling the relevant material (and here he offers a normative 
checklist); organising the material in accordance with headings; tentatively map-
ping out the possible answers to the problem (here bearing cultural differences in 
mind); critically analysing the legal principles according to their intrinsic mean-
ing; and finally, setting out the conclusions within a comparative framework with 
caveats if necessary (de Cruz, 1999: 235–239). 
It is time now to look at ‘functional equivalence’ and its problems, and at 
other approaches. At the level of micro-comparison, it has been widely argued 
that the true basis of comparative law is functional equivalence. According 
to Michele Graziadei, functionalism represents two distinct currents: the
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 ‘functionalist method’ which is ‘one of the best-known working tools in com-
parative legal studies’, and ‘functionalism’ in the sense ‘that law responds to 
society’s needs’ (Graziadei, 2003: 100).4 Though the ‘functionalist method’ is 
not ‘the sole or even the dominant approach’ in comparative law research, and 
is being challenged today, it has gained new life ‘under the flag’ of ‘common 
core studies’ in Europe.
When ‘law’ is regarded as a body of rules only and comparison at the micro-
level is directed at these rules, then the functional approach is useful, since a 
body of rules is created for the purpose of solving human problems, most of 
which are shared. Thus, in the context of the European Union for example, 
where comparative law is a driving force and has a decisive role in the har-
monisation process, the ‘functional comparative analysis method’ provides 
the potential for convergence of both the legal systems and the legal methods 
of the Member States, leading to gradual and eventual legal integration. In 
this, to build on similarities is desirable. 
In fact the one effective method in comparative law research in relation to 
European ‘common core’ projects, is functionalism. This comes from the univer-
salist approach to human needs. Social problems are universal; laws respond to 
these needs in various ways but the end results are comparable; hence, a ‘concrete 
problem’ is the starting block. ‘It is possible to compare the incomparable pro-
vided that the focus is on the same facts’ (Graziadei, 2003: 105); hence the ‘factual 
approach’. If facts are not the same there is no comparability. In the universalist 
approach the similarity of solutions is paramount. If this were not so there would 
be no place for comparisons. Functional inquiry also suits the utilitarian approach 
to comparative law. So, comparative lawyers should seek out institutions that have 
the same role, that is, those which have functional comparability or solve the same 
problem, that is, similarity of solutions. Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz regard 
this issue as finite and say:
the basic methodological principle of all comparative law is that of functionality … 
Incomparables cannot be usefully compared and in law the only things which are com-
parable are those which fulfil the same function (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998: 34). 
The question is: ‘Which institution in system B performs an equivalent func-
tion to the one under survey in system A?’ From the answer to this question, 
the concept of ‘functional equivalence’ emerges. For example, if an institution 
called divorce is under survey in system A, the comparative lawyer looks for an 
institution in system B performing an equivalent function; that of freeing an 
individual from an unsatisfactory marital relationship within which he or she 
does not wish to remain. Again, if the institution of ‘solicitor’ is under survey in 
Scotland, the comparative private lawyer looks for an institution performing an 
equivalent function—that of preparing documents for litigation, dealing with 
4 See also, for a useful discussion of functionalism with a capital (F) and a small (f), Twining , 2003: 
213–17 and 238–43.
52  Esin Örücü
non-contentious matters, representing the client, and so on—in another system, 
for example, The Netherlands.
An alternative to the functional-institutional approach, or a variation of it, 
is the problem-solving, the sociological approach. This problem-solving basis 
seeks an answer to the question: ‘How is a specific social or legal problem 
encountered both in society A and society B resolved by their respective (legal 
or other) systems?’ In other words, ‘What legal or other institutions have devel-
oped to cope with it?’ This approach, similar to the ‘functionalist’ approach, 
springs from the belief that similar problems have similar solutions across legal 
systems, though reached by different routes. For example, how is the problem 
of supporting a wife who would otherwise be destitute after the termination of 
marriage, resolved in societies A and B? Again, how is an individual represented 
in court in Scotland and The Netherlands respectively? This matter may be 
tackled differently and handled by different bodies in the two societies. In this 
connection it is said that, ‘the fact that the problem is one and the same warrants 
the comparability’.5 
However, the functional-institutional approach does not solve the issue of 
comparability as between a Western legal system and a religious system or a 
developing legal system. In addition, if a problem arises in one legal system 
but has no counterpart in another, this approach faces another dilemma. Legal 
systems pertaining to societies that are socio-culturally and legal-culturally dif-
ferent from each other can also be compared even if for the purpose of estab-
lishing diversity, and in this case the functional-institutional approach cannot 
be the basis. The functional-institutional approach has also been challenged as 
not working between capitalist and socialist legal systems, in spite of the fact 
that the very basic human needs are universal. There are other fundamental 
criticisms of this approach on grounds such as the limited number of subject 
areas that can be compared by using this method and the fact that many areas 
of law are left out of the scope of comparison since they are regarded as ‘not 
lending themselves to comparison’, determined as they are by specific histories, 
ethical values, political ideologies, cultural differences or religious beliefs. Not 
only that, but the question of whether each rule or each institution has only one 
function—‘one institution or rule with many functions’—has not been satisfac-
torily addressed. In addition, although law can be seen as ‘a body of rules’, it is 
much wider than that. 
It would be odd to allow comparative law research but one methodology, 
‘functional inquiry’, which has only a technical perspective. Therefore, although 
employing ‘functional equivalence’ as a tool of comparability at the micro-
level for specific projects is appropriate, comparatists opt for a multiplicity of 
approaches, compare differents and contexts, and extend comparison beyond 
functionally equivalent rules.
5 Schmitthoff, 1939: 96, where he refers to M Salomon’s work, Grundlegung zur Rechtsphilosophie 
(1925).
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In fact, recently, many other bases have been presented as being more appropri-
ate. As Michele Graziadei notes: 
no one could have foreseen the plurality of methods which are currently being practised 
when comparative law was thought to be a method in itself (Graziadei, 2003: 101; and 
Husa, 2003). 
‘Comparison’ itself could be viewed as the method but this would be reductivist 
since there are indeed a number of methodological options. Most of these are 
contextual approaches such as analysis of existing rules and institutions in ‘his-
torical context’, ‘economic context’, ‘political context’ or in ‘social or cultural con-
text’. Some of these approaches are now dubbed as post-modernist, intermingled 
with legal realism. However, the functional method was built to do away with ‘the 
local dimensions’ of rules and to reduce the rules to their operative description 
‘freed from the context’ of their own systems; whereas, the contextual approaches 
specifically stress the ‘local dimension’. 
In any case, even the so-called functionally equivalent institutions are what 
they are because they reflect the structure of the legal and social system within 
which they exist. Thus, legal, social, cultural, economic, religious and political 
backgrounds cannot be neglected. Indeed, in the explanation of results this back-
ground is vital. Legal systems and legal institutions in countries socio-culturally 
and legal-culturally different from one another must be comparable for a com-
parative lawyer who wants to leave the shores of Euro-centrisism and to investi-
gate ‘localisms’ in our ‘globalising’ world. 
III.  THE PURPOSES OF COMPARATIVE LAW RESEARCH
We have also seen that there is not one simple answer to the question: What is 
the purpose of carrying out comparative legal research? A distinction has to be 
drawn between scholarly activities and the activities of the legislatures, the practi-
tioners of the law and the judiciary. In other words, as there is no one identifiable 
method, there is no one identifiable purpose, there is a multiplicity of purposes. 
Comparative law research has moved in a number of distinct directions. If one 
surveys the bulk of work undertaken to date the following objectives are clear: law 
reform and policy development by the legislature, aid to the international practice 
of law, international harmonisation and unification, common core research, and a 
gap-filling device in law courts. The findings of comparative lawyers can be utilised 
for any of these. There are also other purposes such as ‘giving students perspec-
tive’, ‘being a tool of research to reach a universal theory of law’ and ‘aiding world 
peace’. 
Let us now consider some of these purposes. First, let us start with the general 
purpose. 
Comparative law research is undertaken to improve and consolidate knowledge 
of the law and understanding of the law in context. As mentioned in the previous 
discussion on the nature of comparative law, this branch of legal science gives 
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us insight into law and legal texture as no other branch can. We understand the 
legal world around us by juxtaposing the unknown to the known. The aim is to 
sharpen awareness and cognition of the legal, social and cultural environments 
in which we live. This is best done not just by discovering resemblances between 
the ‘similar’ or even similarities between the ‘different’, but more fundamentally 
by finding and explaining similarities between the ‘different’, and differences and 
divergences between the ‘similar’. Comparative law thrives on differences (see, eg 
Legrand, 2003: 240). Scholarly comparative law research, by increasing detailed 
understanding of legal phenomena points towards diverse systems; the more 
diverse the systems, the more rewarding the findings. 
The aim is not to create one law for the whole world. Neither is it utopian—
to form a dictionary of legal terms in all languages. Far from it. The aim is to dis-
cover and understand differences between legal systems and legal institutions and 
explain the reasons for these in order to enhance knowledge and, at the same time, 
to discover similarities between different and diverse legal systems and find explana-
tions for these. 
As early as 1938 it was said by Harold Gutteridge that
[t]he isolation of legal thought in national watertight compartments has always seemed 
to me to be one of the factors which is most prolific in producing that frame of mind 
which leads to a spirit of national egotism. We have much to learn from one another in 
legal as well as other departments of human activities, and it is, in a sense, a reproach to 
the lawyers of all nations that they have been unable, up to the present, to arrive at the 
free interchange of knowledge and ideas which has been attained in other branches of 
learning (Gutteridge, 1938: 401 at 410).
Let us look now at the second general purpose: the grouping of legal systems. 
This objective can even be the starting line of all comparative law activity. 
Legal systems, legal cultures and legal traditions are classified for the purpose 
of comparison. In recent years, as legal systems shift even more quickly, there 
have been many developments in this area.6 Where scholarly comparative law 
research is also concerned in tracing relationships, legal systems historically 
related by colonisation, imposition and borrowing, and systems related in other 
ways must be studied. In order to understand the changes that take place dur-
ing the moving of institutions, the emphasis must be placed on the institutions 
that have moved. 
Thirdly, comparative law serves the purpose of broadening the mind of the 
law student and helps in the development of tolerance. In this context, the most 
valuable course to be offered to undergraduates is not comparative family law, 
comparative contract law, comparative civil procedure or even comparative pri-
vate law or comparative public law, but an autonomous general comparative law 
course providing the breadth necessary for the development of critical minds. 
One very important role of comparative law studies is to put an objective distance 
6 See ch 8.
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between the student and her own legal system and to encourage that critical ques-
tioning mind in assessing domestic law. 
Another purpose that can justify the use of comparative law research is in leg-
islative law reform, when the comparative lawyer works de lege ferenda, in which 
case to aid the legislature, comparative law research can provide a pool of models 
from which to choose. The purpose will dictate the choice of models: legal systems 
preferably in socio-cultural and legal-cultural affinity, systems which share the 
same problem and systems which deal with the same problem in different ways, 
better ways or more efficient ways, from whose solutions the reformer can learn 
and derive answers.
Fifthly, comparative law research can also provide a tool of interpretation for 
judges by making them aware of foreign solutions to similar problems when 
there are none at home. In other words, it acts as a gap-filling device, de lege lata. 
Judges may have to refer to foreign law out of necessity when the case they are 
dealing with involves a foreign element, such as where private international law 
rules apply or cases involve the application of, for example, European Directives 
or Regulations, where a knowledge of cases from Luxembourg is required or the 
decisions of the courts of other Member States related to that instrument must be 
looked at. Recently there has been increasing interest in comparative law among 
the judiciary; an active search for a universal language.7 It may soon become pos-
sible to talk of a ‘common law or a ius commune of human rights’ for instance.8 
This ‘common law’ is now being developed by domestic judges in conversation 
with judges from other jurisdictions and from the European Court of Human 
Rights. This search for ‘commonality’ can be seen as connected to ‘common core’ 
research, comparative law being geared towards discovering ‘common cores’, and 
further, creating ‘better law’. 
Yet another area where comparative law is of use is in the drawing up of 
international conventions and agreements. The terminology to be used in 
international documents must be distilled from the laws of the legal systems of 
the target audience. Additionally, comparative law is indispensable in the inter-
pretation of international instruments. Comparative lawyers’ work is essential 
in discovering the ‘general principles of law recognised by civilised nations’ or 
by ‘member states’, and in determining the customary rules of public interna-
tional law.
A seventh purpose is the use of comparative law research in the harmonisation 
of law. The activity envisaged might either be harm onisation only or unification 
with prior harmonisation. Here the choice of the legal systems and subjects to be 
comparatively researched is pre-determined by political considerations. Systems 
to be studied will be those whose laws will be harmonised or unified. The com-
parative law researcher’s work is to provide ideas for the necessary changes to the 
legal systems or institutions to be harmonised, to smooth the process or suggest 
7 See chs 16 and 18 of this Handbook.
8 See contributions in Örücü (ed), 2003. See also see ch 16 of this Handbook.
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the creation of a model law or a unified law. A thorough knowledge of all the 
systems involved in the process is required before an approximation is suggested. 
More problems will be encountered if the two or more systems involved are socio-
culturally and/or legal-culturally diverse.
We see today that in the context of the European Union, a number of 
Commissions are working on projects to produce ‘General European Principles’ 
in a number of fields. Most of these are ‘common core’ based principles. General 
principles could be drafted ‘with a low level modernity and innovation using the 
common core methodology’, or such principles could be drafted ‘based upon the 
highest standard or modernity … using the “better law” method’ (Antokolskaia, 
2003: 160). Though harmonisation suggests that the new rules should be ‘derived 
from existing laws rather than invented by the drafters’, in practice what is done is 
to ‘make use of a rule that is common for all or most of the relevant jurisdictions’, 
or a rule selected ‘that represents a minority or even one jurisdiction’ (ibid). 
Obviously the ‘common core’ approach is the easiest to use, as it makes justifi-
cation more straightforward by restating what represents the majority. However, 
as one tries to move closer to the majority of the jurisdictions, the value of the 
exercise may diminish. Also, gathering the rules that achieve the same end may 
prove to be difficult in practice. Even when a ‘common core’ is found, this may not 
correspond to a ‘satisfactory’ solution. Another problem concerns similar legal 
concepts that conceal fundamentally different understandings. Therefore a move 
towards the ‘better law’ approach may become attractive.
However, in the selection of the ‘better law’, justification of the choice made can 
be taxing as it is difficult to decide what is ‘modernity’ and what is ‘progressive’. 
Also the ‘better law’ approach entails a comparative evaluation of all the legal sys-
tems or legal solutions involved. This could prove to be impossible. Inevitably by 
making choices, drafters take up positions and express value judgements. Even if 
a quantitative measurement were possible, the ‘data’ relied on would not answer 
the question: ‘Why?’ It may have to be admitted that
no objective criteria can be found in order to justify the choice as to why the drafters 
consider the rule they have selected to be the ‘better’ one (Antokolskaia, 2003: 181).
Especially in areas politically and ideologically coloured, justification would have 
to be subjective ‘depending on the conviction of the drafters’ (ibid). When courts 
adopt this approach in search of commonality, then the same considerations must 
be faced. It is also difficult to secure total agreement on the necessity and desir-
ability of the ‘better law’ in all localisms involved. 
IV.  UNITS OF COMPARISON: MACRO-COMPARISON AND MICRO-
COMPARISON
 ‘What is to be to compared?’ is usually dealt with at two levels: the macro-
 comparative and the micro-comparative. These levels are complementary, since 
the second presupposes the first. Let us consider these respectively. 
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Comparability at the level of macro-comparison, or macro-comparability, 
materialises at the level of legal systems. Therefore, the definition of a legal system 
may be the first task to tackle. For one comparative lawyer, John Merryman, a legal 
system means
the complex of legal institutions, actors and processes in the context of a legal culture 
and the secondary legal rules (Merryman, 1974: 101).
Furthermore, a legal system 
has a vocabulary used to express concepts, its rules are arranged into categories, it has 
techniques for expressing rules and interpreting them, it is linked to a view of the social 
order itself which determines the way in which the law is applied and shapes the very 
function of law in that society (David and Brierley, 1985: 193). 
Although it is difficult to assess how far any legal system is linked to a specific 
social order, it can be said that laws are imbedded in political and social cultures. 
It is essential, for the purpose of later attempts at explaining differences and 
similarities encountered in the legal systems under comparison, that the notion 
of a system as a macro-unit combines the legal system with the societal, cultural, 
political and economic systems. Most of the differences that cannot be explained 
in terms of the legal system can more easily be explained in terms of the societal, 
political or economic systems. Social systems may determine the content of the 
corresponding legal systems and vice versa. The same could be said of the eco-
nomic systems. 
At the level of macro-comparison, many comparative lawyers argue that the 
comparison must extend to the same evolutionary stage of different legal systems 
under comparison. For example, Harold Gutteridge understands from ‘compare 
like with like’, that ‘concepts, rules or institutions under comparison must relate 
to the same stage of legal, political and economic development’ (Gutteridge, 
1949: 73). This means that at the macro-level, the legal systems under compari-
son should be at the same stage of development, economic, social and legal.
However, it could be argued that at the macro-level, ‘comparability’ may be 
relative to the interests and the purpose of the comparative lawyer and that it is 
the aims of the specific comparative study that should determine the choice of 
legal systems to be compared. Whether the preferred systems have reached the 
same degree of development, legal or otherwise, may be a secondary consider-
ation (Kamba, 1976: 494 at 507–8). Nor need one carry out comparative research 
only in groups of legal systems with broadly shared attributes. Even if one were 
to think the reverse, history shows otherwise, and the overlapping and mixed 
systems expand the scope of the comparative field to legal systems grouped in 
different ways and at different levels of development.9
Ideally, macro-comparison and micro-comparison should merge, since the 
micro-comparative topic must be placed within the entire legal system. Hence, 
9 See ch 8.
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the macro-comparative unit, that is, the totality of the legal system in context, 
is the frame within which all is contained and evaluated. Within the context of 
a supra-legal system, such as the European Union for example, the comparative 
lawyer has an even wider frame within which to evaluate her findings. From such 
analysis it is possible to venture into suggesting common denominators, be they 
at the level of the lowest, the average or the highest. ‘Common core’ studies also 
can be pursued after such exploration. 
Traditionally, as stated, at the macro-level, comparative law has been concerned 
with comparing ‘the legal systems of different nations’. This is the starting point 
for writers such as René David and John Brierley, and Konrad Zweigert and 
Hein Kötz. William Twining indicates that ‘mainstream’ comparative law has 
two approaches. At the macro-level, the approach is what he calls the very broad 
‘Grands Systèmes’ approach, and at the micro-level, the ‘Country and Western’ 
tradition, concentrating on some aspects of private law (Twining, 2000a: 32). 
Today, logic necessitates moving the focus from legal system and legal family to 
legal culture or legal tradition.10 What a legal culture is may be more difficult to 
determine than determining what a legal system is, however. It has been said that
the center of gravity of legal development lies not in legislation, nor in jurisdic science, 
nor in judicial decisions, but in society itself (Ehrlich, 1912/1939: xv).
This observation takes us into the mysteries of the interaction of social norms 
and legal rules. For instance, Henry Ehrmann looks at legal culture as a link and 
says that
the attitudes, beliefs, and emotions of the operators as well as of the users (and victims) of 
the legal system have much to do with the way in which it functions (Ehrmann, 1976: 9).
Is it this link that should be studied? Are comparative lawyers then to look into 
what is called by Henry Ehrmann ‘legal culture’, but by John Merryman, ‘legal 
tradition’, the two definitions given being the same? Then we see Patrick Glenn, 
who challenges the very notion of culture and insists on the word ‘tradition’, the 
term ‘tradition’ taking on a different meaning (the presence of the past) from that 
used by John Merryman (see Glenn, 2000). 
So, how do comparative lawyers align themselves? In a broader approach, the 
comparative lawyer must understand the relationship between legal systems, legal 
cultures and legal traditions as well as find rules that are not necessarily within 
the formal framework of the legal system but are held by the people to be valid. 
Both the ‘bottom-up’ and the ‘top-down’ models of law must be understood and 
appreciated. In addition, her approach must be broad and inclusive. 
This broad approach to comparative law would certainly move us away from 
‘legal systems’ and the ‘law as rules’ attitude, as law cannot be understood or re-
presented unless it is regarded within broad historical, political, socio-economic 
and psychological contexts. For John Merryman for instance, a legal system is 
10 See chs 5 and 6.
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‘an operating set of legal institutions, procedures and rules’, legal systems being 
frequently classified into groups or families (Merryman, 1985: 1). He hastens to 
add, however, that being grouped together does not suggest that the legal systems 
within a group ‘have identical legal institutions, processes and rules’. In fact ‘there 
is great diversity among them’(ibid). That they are grouped together signifies that 
they have something else in common. This ‘something else’ is what distinguishes 
them from legal systems differently classified; this is legal tradition which relates 
the legal system to the ‘culture of which it is a partial expression ... and puts the 
legal system into cultural perspective’ (Merryman, 1985: 2). A legal tradition is: 
a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, about 
the role of law in the society and the polity, about the proper organisation and opera-
tion of a legal system, and about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied, 
perfected, and taught (ibid). 
Indeed, many contemporary comparative lawyers abide by his definition. For 
instance, John Bell gives his definition of legal culture as
a specific way in which values, practices, and concepts are integrated into the operation 
of legal institutions and the interpretation of legal texts (Bell, 1995: 70).
He thus presents ‘legal culture’ as a configuration of values, concepts, practices 
and institutions through which individuals interpret and apply legal norms; legal 
culture being rooted in general culture. Mark van Hoecke and Mark Warrington 
go on to say that ‘understanding law implies a knowledge and an understanding of 
the social practice of its legal community’ (van Hoecke and Warrington, 1998: 495 
at 498), which presupposes an understanding of the general culture of that society, 
since the legal community is embedded in that society. Therefore, to distinguish 
legal systems one must locate them and their cultures ‘within the broader context 
of the societal culture to which they belong’ (ibid). These cannot be understood 
by merely comparing rules, legal institutions or even processes. It must be remem-
bered though that culture is never a homogenous whole—neither is the law.
Where should we go to look for legal culture and, how should we investigate it?11 
Comparative lawyers see the need for such understanding and yet require the help 
of others such as economists, political scientists, sociologists and psychologists in 
order to grasp true meanings, even when looking at their own legal system. They 
find it difficult to answer whether differences between legal systems can be explained 
by ‘national character’. Further, can legal cultures faithfully mirror national charac-
ter and overall culture? Can two legal cultures be more alike but the overall cultures 
more divergent? Is national character the effect or the cause of differences? 
The above shows us two things. The first is that we cannot talk of legal systems 
as the sole units of macro-comparative inquiry. The second is that there is no 
clear-cut definition of legal culture and legal tradition or any obvious reasons for 
preferring one concept to the other. 
11 See ch 5 in this Handbook.
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A narrower approach regards comparative law as being involved only in the 
‘top-down’ model, that is, the legal system as laid down by the formal law-maker, 
and elaborated upon by the appropriate high courts. Accordingly, comparative 
lawyers rely on normative inquiry. Thus, legal systems, together with the legal 
families in which they sit, are treated as the starting points of macro comparison. 
A legal system is made up of a set of inter-related parts, each with a specific func-
tion. The comparative lawyer analyses the working of these parts. However, Konrad 
Zweigert and Hein Kötz state that in studying legal systems, we should ‘grasp their 
legal styles’ (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998: 67). Yet, the concept of ‘legal style’ does not 
go beyond history, mode of thought, institutions and legal sources. The ‘last factor’ 
ideology is often discarded today as all five factors need not be used cumulatively. 
The comparative lawyer finds, describes, juxtaposes and identifies the differences 
and similarities between statutes, judicial decisions and related material, but often 
ignores context when it is not of a legal nature. What we have here is a technical 
perspective, shared with traditional legal doctrine applicable to domestic law. 
In Europe, most comparisons are limited to civil law/common law. Interest in 
other regions of the world, unless seen as extensions of the two families by com-
parative lawyers, is satisfied by regionalists or anthropologists but not compara-
tive lawyers. As Rodolfo Sacco puts it:
If one asks what students of comparative law compare, the most obvious answer would 
be, ‘the rules of different legal systems’ (Sacco, 1991a: 21).
What, then, is meant by a ‘rule’? This question must be addressed at the micro-
comparative level. The traditional approach is of a positivist: statutory rules, 
that is, law as created by the state, case law and pertinent legal documents. Yet, 
in the context of ‘legal pluralism’, law goes far beyond the so-called ‘official 
law’, and extends to multi-layers of systems. Thus, today, ‘law’ spans the range 
of positive law and then moves to non-state law, rules, custom and tradition. 
What is a comparative lawyer to look at? As seen above, a broad approach to 
comparative law moves us away from legal systems as macro-units of inquiry 
and the ‘law as rules’ approach. The question ‘What is law?’ must be approached 
in the same manner.
At the micro-comparative level therefore, comparative law presupposes the 
existence of rules and legal institutions, and their plurality, but statutory rules 
alone cannot be the object of comparative inquiry. The first step is to regard judi-
cial decisions as law. Even a monolithic legal system built on a Kelsenian hierarchy 
may regard both statutory law and judicial law as part of the legal system. Thus, 
judicial precedents must be considered by the comparative lawyer. In addition, the 
decisions of lower courts and not only those of the highest courts must be referred 
to. It is also commonplace today to talk of ‘state legal pluralism’, a weak version of 
normative legal pluralism.12
12 See, for a discussion of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ versions of legal pluralism, Griffith, 1986.
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That said, it must be added that this is not the whole picture. Rodolfo Sacco, for 
instance, is on a quest to discover the ‘formants’ of the law and therefore refutes 
the existence of a ‘single rule’ and, looking at the ‘living law’, sees many elements 
in the search for ‘one rule’. Having stated that one needs to recognise the diversity 
of the ‘legal formants’, he says that
within a given legal system with multiple ‘legal formants’ there is no guarantee that they 
will be in harmony rather than in conflict (Sacco, 1991b: 343 at 384–5).
The legal formants cited by him are constitutional and legislative rules, case law, 
operational rules and scholarly writings, although no list is compiled to include 
all possible ‘legal formants’. Rodolfo Sacco goes so far as to say that some ‘legal 
formants’ are ‘explicitly formulated’ and others are not. He calls these ‘crypto-
types’, representing ‘non-verbalized’ rules and ‘implied patterns’ (ibid). We may 
ask ourselves: ‘What about “formants” other than the legal’? These are also to be 
taken into account. The comparative lawyer must look at all the elements at work 
in a given legal system in context. She must remember that rules, institutions and 
processes must be studied in context and that ‘legal formants’ themselves develop 
under the influence of ‘contextual formants’, such as ideology and religion. 
‘Official rules’ are only one type of rules. Law however, is made at a number of 
‘layers’. For instance, according to Boaventura de Sousa Santos’s broad conception 
of law,
modern societies are regulated by a plurality of legal orders, interrelated and socially 
distributed in the social field in different ways’, rather than ‘being ordered by a single 
legal system (Santos, 2002: 89).
This is the idea of legal pluralism, indicating that ‘more than one legal system 
operates in a single political unit’, that is, ‘non-state law’ has equal place with 
‘official law’. However, he also observes that ‘the better choice is to regard this 
phenomena as given and speak of ‘a plurality of legal orders’ rather than ‘legal 
pluralism’ (ibid). He also introduces the concept of ‘interlegality’ to capture the 
complex relationships of superimposition, interpenetration and mixing between 
legal orders and semi-autonomous legal fields. Whenever possible, comparative 
law studies should extend to norms of non-state law, folk law and customary law, 
remembering that the law is global, national and local.
In the narrower approach, law is seen as a creation of the nation state. As we 
have seen at the macro-level, the units of inquiry are the legal systems, and law is 
what is laid down by formal law-makers and elaborated upon by the appropriate 
high courts. Normative inquiry is not involved in empirical field studies to find 
out how things actually are, but confines itself to the study of law in the books. 
However, if the primary sources of law include court decisions, these are also 
included in the inquiry. Thus, a degree of ‘law in action’ is present here too.
Moreover, there is no special way of dealing with foreign law. Whether one 
is investigating the rules of foreign law or of domestic law makes no difference. 
Since the comparative process starts with the juxtaposition of the unknown to the 
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known, the rules of the domestic system must be studied first and then ‘functional 
equivalents’ sought. In this view, the core of research in micro-comparisons is 
the ‘law as rules’ approach. This narrow approach regards comparative law as a 
practical pursuit not a theoretical one. Most of the comparatists involved here also 
happen to be private law comparatists.
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are comparative lawyers who see comparative law as a science with its own 
separate sphere. Others call comparative law merely a method of study and research 
or even a technique. Some regard it both as a comparative method and a compara-
tive science of law, or see in comparative law more than one of these aspects. It is 
immediately obvious that those who see comparative law as a method only do not 
tell us what that method is, leaving this issue unanswered or very vaguely covered, 
and those who think or feel that comparative law must be more than a mere method 
do not seem to agree on what this subject-matter is. We have seen that the answers 
to the questions: ‘What to compare?’ and ‘How to compare?’, for example, can be 
extremely varied. Are we then to conclude that comparative law will depend entirely 
on what is to be compared and that the purpose of the comparison, and the purpose 
for which comparative law is studied or taught, will determine the form which the 
study or instruction should take? Is this a satisfactory position to assume? 
It is not fanciful to predict that the 21st century will be ‘the age of comparative 
law’ (see Örücü, 2002). There is decidedly a renewed and growing interest in the 
subject. Academic study, law reform, policy development, research and teaching, 
international practice of law and law courts all avail themselves of it, in various 
ways. There are practical, sociological, political and pedagogical objectives in the 
above activities. 
Though the prime objective is the provision of wider access to legal knowledge, 
comparative law research has a number of practical purposes. There is a place for 
the generalist comparative lawyer with a curious mind who is fascinated by legal 
phenomena shaped by extra-legal factors, by movements of the law and the tuning 
that has to take place to make these movements successful in the new surroundings, 
and with an interest in theoretical aspects of the subject. However, the comparative 
lawyer working for a specific purpose may be satisfied by simply seeking answers 
to problems either at the legislative or judicial level in foreign jurisdictions. It may 
even be that these two positions may be held by the very same comparative lawyer 
who at times works for the furtherance of knowledge satisfying the social science 
objective of comparative law as well as for her own interest, and at times, for exam-
ple, as a General Rapporteur for one of the topics in the four-yearly Comparative 
Law Congresses, setting out lengthy specific questionnaires for the National 
Rapporteurs to answer and then drawing the threads together in the preparation of 
her General Rapport in that specific topic, or using the ‘functional equivalence’ or 
the ‘factual approach’ in one of the European ‘common core’ projects.
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QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
 1. What is comparative law? What are its purposes?
 2.  What are the subject’s particular aims, approaches, methods and how is it 
used?
 3. What trends do we observe today in comparative law studies?
 4. What do we mean by ‘the identity of the function of the norm’?
 5.  Why does one engage in comparative law studies? What is the role of 
comparative law related to academic studies, legal research, legislation and 
law reform? What is its role in the judicial process, in the filling of gaps, 
in law-making and interpretation? What is the value of comparison as a 
source of law? How can comparative law be utilised in harmonisation and 
unification?
 6. Is there one correct method to apply?
 7. What is meant by a macro-unit and micro-unit of inquiry?
 8. Differentiate between a legal system, a legal culture and a legal tradition.
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WILLIAM TWINING
KEY CONCEPTS
Globalisation; Interdependence; G-words; A global perspective; Levels of rela-
tions; Levels of ordering; The Westphalian Duo; Non-state law; Normative 
and legal pluralism; Total pictures; Spatial metaphors; Boundaries; Changing 
significance of boundaries; Ideal types; The Grands Systèmes approach; The 
Country and Western Tradition; Legal families; Ethnocentrism; Comparative 
common law; Diffusion of law; Law as institutionalised social practice.
I.  GLOBALISATION
T
he idea of ‘globalisation’ has been in fashion since the late 1980s. It 
has stimulated a massive, excited, and somewhat repetitive literature.1 
Ironically, that literature is quite narrow in that it focuses on a limited 
range of issues. This is especially the case where ‘globalisation’ is restricted to eco-
nomic matters and is associated with extreme laissez faire ideology and increasing 
American and western hegemony. In this narrow sense of economic globalisation, 
the term has highly controversial, largely negative associations, as is illustrated 
by the ‘Anti-Globalisation Movement’. In this chapter, I shall use the term more 
broadly to refer to those trends, processes and interactions which are making the 
world more interdependent in many complex ways, in respect of ecology, com-
munications, cultures, language, politics, disease, and so on, not just the alleged 
development of a single world economy. 
* This chapter is a condensation and synthesis of themes developed at length in several papers 
(for which see full details in the bibliography at the end of this chapter), especially Twining, 2000a 
Globalisation and Legal Theory: chs 2, 6 and 7; Twining, 2000b ‘Comparative Law and Legal Theory: 
The Country and Western Tradition’ : 21–76; Twining, 1999 Globalization and Comparative Law; 
Twining, 2005a ‘General Jurisprudence’ (World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 
Granada); Twining, 2005b ‘Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective’; and Twining, 2006a ‘Diffusion of 
Law and Globalization Discourse’.
1 Two of the best introductions are still Featherstone, 1990 and Featherstone, Lash and Robertson, 
1995. On law, see Likosky, 2002.
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Anthony Giddens characterises the processes as
the intensification of world-wide social relations which link distant localities in such 
a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice 
versa (Giddens, 1990a: 64; cf Giddens 1990b: chapter 16).
Even in this broader usage, ‘globalisation’ is surrounded by controversy and relates 
to a quite narrow band of issues that are genuinely world-wide.
I teach a course called ‘Globalisation and Law’. I encourage students to adopt a 
global perspective; to think in terms of humankind and our planet as a whole; and 
to try to construct total pictures of law in the world and to ponder the difficulties 
involved. However, at the start of the course I ban the unjustified use of ‘g-words’ 
from the classroom—‘global’, ‘globalisation’, ‘globalising’ and other forms of 
globa-babble and globa-hype. 
I do this for several reasons. The first is obvious: not only is the term ambigu-
ous, but the currency of ‘g-talk’ is debased. It too often involves exaggerated, 
misleading, meaningless, superficial, ethno-centric, or just plain false statements 
about processes and phenomena that are better discussed in less hyperbolic terms 
(see Twining, 2001). This is clearly illustrated in loose talk about global law, global 
governance, global law firms, and global lawyers. There is a standard joke that 
makes the main point: it might be pedantic to cavil at talk of a World Cup at soc-
cer; it is stretching things to talk of a World Cup at cricket involving 16 countries; 
but talk of a World Series at baseball is just hype.2
The second reason is especially important for lawyers: there is a tendency in the 
literature on globalisation to move from the very local or the national straight to 
the global, leaving out all intermediate levels. It is also tempting to assume that 
different levels of relations and of ordering are neatly nested in a hierarchy of con-
centric circles ranging from the very local, through sub-state, regional, continen-
tal, North/South, global, and beyond to outer space. However, the picture is much 
more complicated than that: it includes empires, spheres of influence, alliances, 
coalitions, religious diasporas, networks, trade routes, migration flows, and social 
movements. It also includes ‘sub-worlds’ such as the common law world, the Arab 
world, the Islamic world and Christendom, as well as special groupings of power 
such as the G7, the G8, NATO, OPEC, the European Union, the Commonwealth, 
the Catholic Church, multi-national corporations, crime syndicates, cartels, social 
movements, and non-governmental organisations and networks. All of these cut 
across any simple vertical hierarchy and overlap and interact with each other in 
complex ways. 
These complexities are reflected in the diversity of forms of normative and legal 
ordering. Nearly all mainstream Western legal theory and legal scholarship in the 
20th century focused on the domestic law of municipal legal systems, sometimes 
2 In fact, the American ‘World Series’ at baseball took its name from a newspaper, The New York 
World, but few people recall that fact. Recently, a baseball competition involving 16 countries was 
inaugurated in the United States. It was called the ‘World Classic’, thereby doubling the hype. 
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extending to public international law in the narrow sense of law governing rela-
tions between states (‘The Westphalian Duo’) (Buchanan, 2000).3 But if one views 
law from a global perspective, both geographically and historically, focusing solely 
on the municipal law of nation states (and classical public international law) this 
leaves out too much that should be the proper concern of legal scholarship. A 
reasonably inclusive cosmopolitan discipline of law needs to encompass all levels 
of relations and of ordering, relations between these levels, and all important 
forms of law including supra-state (eg international, regional) and non-state law 
(eg religious law, transnational law, chthonic law, ie tradition/custom) and various 
forms of ‘soft law’ (see Appendix I).4 A picture of law in the world that focuses 
only on the municipal law of nation states and public international law would be 
much too narrow for many purposes. For example, it is difficult to justify omitting 
Islamic law or other major traditions of religious law from such a picture. Yet, to 
include only those examples of religious law or custom officially recognised by 
sovereign states (state legal pluralism) would be seriously misleading.5 To try to 
subsume European Union law, lex mercatoria, international commercial arbitra-
tion or all examples of ‘human rights law’ under public international law similarly 
stretches that concept to breaking point.6 
It is especially important for lawyers to be sensitive to the significance of 
boundaries, borders, jurisdictions, treaty relations, and legal traditions. These 
messy overlapping patterns make mapping law in the world difficult. They place 
ideas of normative and legal pluralism at the centre of understanding law from 
a global perspective. That is to say, we have to acknowledge that normative and 
legal orders can co-exist in the same time-space context. That, in turn, greatly 
complicates the tasks of comparative law.
 A third reason for lawyers to be sceptical of ‘g-talk’ in relation to law is our 
collective ignorance of other traditions and cultures. The Anglo-American, and 
more broadly the Western, intellectual traditions in law have tended to be quite 
parochial and inward-looking. Most legal scholarship is particular and most legal 
concepts are culture-bound. So on the whole we lack adequate analytic concepts 
3 Hart, Rawls, Kelsen, Dworkin, and Raz are all examples of this perspective. The main exceptions 
have been legal anthropologists and other scholars who have emphasised the importance of legal 
pluralism and non-state law.
4 On the conceptual difficulties of constructing a conception of law that is broad enough to include 
important forms of ‘non-state law’, but not so broad as to include all social institutions and rules, see 
Tamanaha, 2001, discussed in Twining, 2003. 
5 It is hardly controversial to say that to recognise Islamic or other religious law only insofar as it 
is recognised by sovereign states involves crude distortion. It would also be odd to accept the idea of a 
Jewish, Islamic or Gypsy legal tradition, but to refuse to talk about Jewish and Islamic or Gypsy law as 
‘law’—but that is a corollary of thinking in terms of law as a system of rules.
6 A theory of state law such as Hart’s provides an inadequate theoretical framework for ground-
ing our discipline as it becomes more cosmopolitan and more concerned with multiple levels of 
legal relations and legal ordering. Hart’s concept of state law cannot easily fit European Union law, 
contemporary public international law, religious law, canon law, medieval and modern lex mercatoria, 
let alone other forms of traditional and customary law that are candidates for our attention as legal 
scholars and jurists. 
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and reliable data for giving general accounts of law in the world that include and 
transcend different legal traditions and cultures. One of the main tasks of com-
parative law is to make us aware of legal systems other than our own; in future 
comparative law must extend this de-parochialising role to reducing our igno-
rance of non-Western legal cultures and traditions. 
Even with these crude geographical categorisations, and even without reference 
to history, a ban on ‘g-words’ sends a simple message of complexity. It also empha-
sises the point that in regard to the complex processes that are making people, 
groups and peoples more interdependent, much of the transnationalisation of law 
and legal relations is taking place at sub-global levels. Furthermore, there are also 
local and transnational relations and processes that to a greater or lesser extent by-
pass the state, such as the Internet, religious diasporas, networks of NGOs, many 
of the internal and external relations of large corporations, and so on.
Terms like ‘global’ have their uses. However, in a given context, when con-
fronted with a word such as ‘global’, ‘globalism’, ‘globalisation’, or ‘globalising’, it 
is sensible to ask: Is it precise (genuinely referring to all humankind or the world 
as a whole)? Is it exaggerated (eg a substitute for ‘transnational’ or ‘widespread’)? 
Is it misleading (obscuring levels of law in between the genuinely global and the 
quite local)? Is it superficially global (like Holiday Inns or the Internet)? Or is it 
ethnocentric (projecting one’s own culture onto the whole world)?
The purpose of this ban on ‘g-words’ is not to suggest that the processes that 
are loosely subsumed under ‘globalisation’ are unimportant. To be sure a single 
world economy, the global eco-system, and a world atlas can be useful constructs 
in some contexts. There are genuinely world-wide issues such as climate control, 
nuclear proliferation, global justice and world poverty. Despite the pitfalls, there 
are good reasons for thinking globally. But too often ‘g-words’ are loosely extended 
to cover topics that belong to one or more less extensive spheres of ordering. It 
is inappropriate to treat as ‘global’ issues concerning competition and monopoly 
within the European Union, or debates within Islam on banking or the status of 
women, or anti-corruption measures in Eastern Europe, yet they should be of as 
much concern to us today as genuinely global issues. 
There are two exceptions to my ban on ‘g-words’. First, a student may employ a 
‘g-word’ provided she can justify its use in that particular context and show that it is 
being used with clarity and precision. Secondly, I encourage students to adopt a global 
perspective as a starting-point for considering particular topics. This is quite differ-
ent from talking about ‘global law’ or ‘global lawyers’. It does not involve making any 
strong assumptions about uniformities. Nor does it need to be reductionist. Indeed, it 
can reinforce the message of complexity. A global perspective involves looking at the 
world and humankind as a whole and setting accounts of particular phenomena in the 
context of broad geographical pictures and long historical time-frames. Constructing 
‘total pictures’ is an important aspect of contextual thinking. The world is becoming 
more interdependent and one needs to adopt a global perspective to understand these 
processes in relation to law. Our world still has relatively finite boundaries in a way 
that societies and nation states, increasingly, do not. 
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Thinking in terms of total pictures is mainly useful for setting a context for 
more particular studies. Grand synthesising theories, such as Patrick Glenn’s 
account of legal traditions, or organising theories, such as Brian Tamanaha’s 
attempt to construct a broad and inclusive general concept of law, also have 
their uses (Glenn, 2004; Tamanaha, 2001). They are examples of the synthesis-
ing function of legal theory. There may even be value in trying to construct a 
historical atlas of law in the world as a whole—although my own efforts in this 
direction have done little more than illustrate some of the obstacles in the way 
of such an enterprise. Among these are the multiplicity of levels of human rela-
tions and ordering, the problems of individuating normative and legal orders, the 
complexity and the variety of the phenomena that are the subject-matters of our 
discipline, and the relatively undeveloped state of the stock of concepts and data 
that would be needed to produce such an overview.7 Adopting a global perspective 
also helps to map the extent of our collective ignorance of other legal traditions. 
However, even if our discipline becomes genuinely cosmopolitan, the great bulk 
of its attention will inevitably be focused on particular inquiries. 
There is a danger of thinking too much in geographical terms (Westbrook, 
2006). It is important to recognise that talk of maps and levels of law is a spatial 
metaphor that is not always appropriate. Gordon Woodman has argued that state 
law is typically defined in terms of relatively determinate territory, but many laws 
and legal orders are not.8 In the standard situation of legal pluralism, ‘in which a 
population observes more than one body of law’, there may not be settled ‘choice 
of law’ rules, the population may be dispersed, membership of the population 
may be ambiguous, there may be variations and inconsistencies within a single 
‘system’ or body of law, and an individual may observe different laws for dif-
ferent purposes, even in relation to a single transaction or relationship.9 This 
is especially the case with personal and religious laws. The point is well taken. 
However, if we conceive of law as a form of institutionalised social practice and if 
we are concerned with the law in action, then we are dealing with actual behav-
iour, which does take place at particular times in particular places. For example, 
if we agree that shari’a travels with every devout Muslim, a good map of Islamic 
diasporas can at least give a general indication of where Islamic law is likely to 
exist at a given time as an institutionalised social practice (Freeman-Grenville and 
Munro-Hay, 2002).10 We need to guard against overusing spatial metaphors, but 
there is still scope for legal geography (see eg Blomley, 1994; Economides, 1996; 
and Holder and Harrison, 2003).
7 See Twining, 2000a: ch 6—‘Mapping Law’. 
8 Woodman, 2003 ‘Why There Can be no Map of Law’. The practice of relating laws to countries, 
societies, fields, or localities is, he suggests, a hangover from ‘legal centralism’, which treats state law 
as the paradigm.
9 Woodman (ibid) illustrates these points by reference to the Luo on the Kenya/Tanzania border. 
10 On Islamic law in England as a form of custom that has both slowly influenced English munici-
pal law and developed as a form of anglicised custom (angerezi shar’iat), see Pearl and Menski, 1998, 
especially ch 3.
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The literature on ‘globalisation’ is extensive and often controversial. In addition 
to ideological disagreements, there are debates about such matters as the continu-
ing significance of sovereignty, about the relative importance of the nation-state 
as an actor on the world stage, whether we are heading for a clash of civilisations, 
and whether human rights are ‘counter hegemonic’.11 There are, however, some 
relatively clear themes that are directly relevant to this chapter.
First, it is widely agreed that the processes of globalisation are not new; in many 
respects they antedate the rise of the modern nation state and can be traced back 
at least to the 16th century.12 What has changed recently is the pace and complex-
ity of the processes, especially in such areas as communications. 
Secondly, there has been a good deal of self-criticism within disciplines about 
the extent to which they have over-emphasised the importance of boundaries 
and have treated societies, states and tribes as self-contained, de-contextualised 
units. For example, in the mid-1980s several distinguished anthropologists 
admitted to having erred in treating small-scale societies in which they had 
done their fieldwork as if they were timeless, self-contained units, isolated from 
the outside world. Their fault had been that they had ignored the wider contexts 
of time and space. They reaffirmed the idea that the core focus of anthropology 
must still be small societies and communities, but in future the study of the 
local must be seen in the context of history and of ever-widening geographical 
spheres—relations with neighbours, colonial boundaries, Western colonisa-
tion generally, and the world economy (see Collier and Starr, 1989). Similarly, 
Anthony Giddens and others have criticised orthodox sociology for giving far 
too much weight to the idea of ‘society’ as a bounded system (Giddens, 1990).13 
Again, moral philosophers have been criticised for failing to face up to the ethi-
cal implications of interdependence. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the 
criticisms of the treatment of international relations in John Rawls’s theory of 
justice and its assumption that any theory of justice today can treat a society 
as a ‘hypothetically closed and self-sufficient’ unit.14 The general theme is clear 
across disciplines: the processes of globalisation are fundamentally changing the 
11 See eg, Baxi, 2006 (arguing, inter alia, that human rights discourse is in danger of being hijacked 
by a market-friendly, trade-related paradigm of human rights favouring big business interests); 
and Santos, 2002 (viewing the world as an arena for a long-term struggle between ‘hegemonic’ and 
 ‘counter-hegemonic’ forces).
12 Halliday states: ‘One can indeed argue that far from the “international” arising from the national, 
and from a gradual expansion of links between discrete entities, the real process has been the other 
way around: the history of the modern system is both of the internationalisation and the breakdown 
of pre-existing flows of peoples, religion, trade into separate entities: the precondition for the forma-
tion of the modern nation-state was the development of an international economy and culture within 
which these distinct states then coalesced.’ (Halliday, 1994: 2; cf. 20).
13 Tamanaha, goes so far as to say that ‘society’ is no longer a useful concept for the sociology of law 
and substitutes the more flexible ‘social arena’ (Tamanaha, 2001: 206–8). 
14 Rawls, 1993:41 at 44, criticised by Pogge, 1989, cf Twining, 2000a: 69–75. Rawls did not signifi-
cantly change his position on this in his book, The Law of Peoples (Rawls, 1999), criticised (inter alios) 
by A Buchanan (Buchanan, 2000).
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significance of national and societal boundaries and generally, but not inevita-
bly, making them less important. 
A third theme from the interdisciplinary literature on globalisation is the 
variety of significant actors who are relevant to analysis of patterns of legal rela-
tions in the modern world (see eg Alston, 2005). Despite disagreements about 
the relative importance of particular kinds of actor and their long-term pros-
pects—for example, about the long-term political significance of multi-national 
corporations, the United Nations and small states—it seems reasonable to pro-
ceed on a number of assumptions. First, nation states will continue to be among 
the most powerful kind of actors for a long time to come, and that some major 
powers will be more equal than others; conversely, anything approaching world 
government is not likely to be on the agenda for the foreseeable future. Secondly, 
in analysing law in the contemporary world, it is not enough to focus on the 
traditional small cast of actors: sovereign states, official international organisa-
tions, and individuals. Can one, for example, give an adequate account of law 
today which does not give some attention to the significance of transnational, 
non-governmental organisations (Amnesty International, Greenpeace, the 
Catholic Church, international women’s movements, international trade union 
organisations), to peoples that are nations without states (the Maoris, Gypsies, 
the native peoples of North America and Australia), to organised crime, lib-
eration movements, multi-national companies, transnational law firms, and 
to significant classes such as the vast herds of ‘people on the move’ (including 
migrants, refugees and the internally displaced)?15 
II.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW
Western Traditions of Academic Law
What are the implications of globalisation for the discipline of law in general and 
for the sub-discipline of comparative law? If one adopts a global perspective and 
a long time scale, at the risk of over-simplification, one can discern some general 
tendencies and biases in Western academic legal culture that are in the process of 
coming under sustained challenge in the context of ‘globalisation’. In crude form, 
these can be expressed as a series of assumptions that are constituent propositions 
of an ideal type: 
(a)  That law consists of two principal kinds of ordering: municipal state law 
and public international law (classically conceived as ordering the rela-
tions between states) (‘the Westphalian duo’);
(b)  That nation-states, societies, and legal systems are very largely closed, self-
contained entities that can be studied in isolation;
15 The sharp distinction between international refugees and internally displaced persons (an even 
more numerous category) is rapidly breaking down (Deng, 1993). 
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(c)  That modern law and modern jurisprudence are secular, and now largely 
independent of their historical-cultural roots in the Judaeo-Christian 
traditions;
(d)  That modern state law is primarily rational-bureaucratic and instrumental—
performing certain functions and serving as a means for achieving particular 
social ends (Tamanaha, 2006);
(e)  That law is best understood through ‘top-down’ perspectives (rulers, 
officials, legislators, elites) with the points of view of users, consumers, 
victims and other subjects being at best marginal; 
(f)  That the main subject-matters of the discipline of law are ideas and norms 
rather than the empirical study of social facts; 
(g)  That modern state law is almost exclusively a Northern (European/Anglo-
American) creation, diffused through most of the world via colonialism, 
imperialism, trade, and latter-day post-colonial influences;
(h)  That the study of non-Western legal traditions is a marginal and unim-
portant part of Western academic law;
(i)  That the fundamental values underlying modern law are universal, 
although the philosophical foundations are diverse.
Of course, all of these general propositions are crude indications of tendencies, 
subject to many exceptions; none has gone unchallenged within the Western legal 
tradition; and issues surrounding nearly all of them constitute a high proportion of 
the contested agenda of modern Western jurisprudence. However, at a general level 
this bald ‘ideal type’ highlights some crucial points at which such ideas and assump-
tions are being increasingly challenged. For example it has been contended that:
(a)  from a global perspective a reasonably inclusive picture of law in the world 
would encompass various forms of non-state law, especially different kinds 
of religious and customary law that fall outside the ‘Westphalian duo’;
(b)  sharp territorial boundaries and ideas of exclusive state sovereignty are 
under regular challenge;
(c)  we may be living in ‘a secular age’ in the West, but much of the rest of the 
world is experiencing a religious revival;16
(d)  while nearly all members of the United Nations and many international 
and transnational organisations are institutionalised in accordance with 
some model of bureaucracy, large parts of the world’s population live in 
societies and communities that are differently organised;
(e)  ‘top-down’ perspectives are being more persistently challenged by bottom-
up perspectives that range from Holmes’ Bad Man, to user theory, to vari-
ous forms of post-colonial subaltern perspectives (Nader, 1984; Tamanaha, 
2001: 239–40; Twining, 2000a: chapter 5; and Baxi, 2006: xxii);
16 Misztal and Shup, 1992. On Islam, see Moosa, 2000; On Christianity, see Jenkins, 2002; on the 
Yoruba religion, see Abimbola and Abimbola, to be published 2007. 
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(f)  in order to understand law in the world today it is more than ever 
important to penetrate beyond the surface of official legal doctrine to 
reach the reali ties of all forms of law as social practices (Twining (2007) 
forthcoming);
(g)  until the mid-20th century imperialism and colonialism were probably the 
main, but not the only, engines of diffusion of law, but in the post-colonial 
era the processes of diffusion are more varied and there is a growing reali-
sation that diffusion of law does not necessarily lead to harmonisation or 
unification of laws (eg Twining, 2005b; Legrand, 1997);
(h)  the study of non-Western religious and other legal traditions is increas-
ingly important (eg Glenn, 2004) and our juristic canon needs to be 
extended to include ‘southern’ jurists (Twining, 2006c);
(i)  the world today is characterised by a diversity of deep-rooted, perhaps 
incommensurable, belief systems; and one of the main challenges facing 
the human race in a situation of increasing interdependence is how to 
construct institutions and processes that promote co-existence and co-
operation between peoples with very different cosmologies and values. 
Insofar as belief pluralism is a fact, it is foolish to hope for achieving 
a consensus on values by imposition, persuasion or rational dialogue 
(Hampshire, 1989).
Viewed from a global perspective, during the 20th century and before, Western 
academic legal culture has tended to be state-oriented, secular, positivist, ‘top-
down’, North-centric, unempirical, and universalist in respect of morals. In 
short, it has been rather parochial in respect of focus, audience, sources, and 
perspectives.17 Of course, it is hardly surprising that the main focus of the Anglo-
American tradition of academic law has been on detailed particular study of the 
concepts and doctrine of local municipal law of particular jurisdictions, such as 
England and Wales, or of countries, such as the United States or Australia. More 
broadly, the main Western traditions of legal scholarship have concentrated very 
largely on domestic law of modern nation states. 
Again, viewed from a global perspective, Western comparative law has shared 
many of the tendencies of the institutionalised discipline of law. To be sure, 
within our tradition, the subject has had a de-parochialising role. In some 
respects it has served as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, establishing contacts and 
developing relations with legal scholarship from other countries and cultures. 
But it has not fostered sustained relations between many countries. With two 
major exceptions, the study of Roman law and the Grands Systèmes approach, 
nearly all comparative law has been concerned with the study and comparison 
of modern foreign state legal systems within the Western legal tradition. By and 
large it has not succeeded in reducing our collective ignorance of most of the 
major legal traditions.
17 On different forms of parochialism see Twining, 2000a: 128–9.
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Two Traditions of Western Comparative Law
Comparative legal studies have a long and complex history. But modern com-
parative law did not become institutionalised or attain critical mass until after 
the Second World War in the common law world, somewhat earlier in conti-
nental Europe. Standard secondary writings about comparative law distinguish 
between two main approaches: macro-comparative studies exemplified by the 
Grands Systèmes approach of René David and others, and micro-comparative 
studies, which are usually depicted as approximating to an ideal type that I have 
mischievously called ‘the Country and Western Tradition’ (Twining, 2000b).
 
The 
distinction is recognised not to be sharp, for macro- and micro-studies are inter-
dependent, but this is a convenient way of labelling two rather different kinds of 
enterprise strongly influenced by a particular conception of academic law at a 
formative period in their history. 
After the Second World War there developed the practice in some European 
countries of presenting overviews of ‘Les Grands Systèmes de droit contemporain’. 
This led to some modest textbooks (David and Brierley, 1968/1985; Arminjon, Nolde 
and Wolff, 1950–51; Zweigert and Kötz, 1971) and to the revival of a long-running 
and unsatisfactory debate about how major systems, traditions, or families of law 
should be classified. It is not necessary here to repeat the details of this debate, but it 
may be useful to consider the least unsatisfactory of these attempts. Konrad Zweigert 
and Hein Kötz’s An Introduction to Comparative Law was, for a generation, the lead-
ing student textbook on the subject. Rejecting single criteria such as race, ideology, 
geographical location, stages of economic development, or relations of economic 
production, they focused on the ‘styles of legal thought’ of contemporary living legal 
systems and suggested multiple criteria for classifying them into families:
(1) its historical background and development; (2) its predominant and characteristic 
mode of thought in legal matters; (3) especially distinctive legal institutions; (4) the kind 
of legal sources it acknowledges and the way it handles them; (5) its ideology. (Zweigert 
and Kötz, 1998: 69–75).
These multiple criteria led them to adopt a seven-fold classification of ‘legal fami-
lies’ (ie groups of legal systems) as follows: 
(1) Romanistic family; (2) Germanic family; (3) Nordic family; (4) Common law family; 
(5) Socialist family; (6) Far Eastern systems; (7) Islamic systems; (8) Hindu law (ibid). 
Although this scheme has attracted a lot of criticism, it was probably adequate for 
an introductory student text and it had the merit of identifying some of the main 
difficulties underlying this problem of classification. For present purposes, it is 
enough to identify two main weaknesses: First, the eight categories do not refer 
to species of a single genus: the first five ‘families’ refer to state legal systems (but 
some have historic roots preceding the rise of the nation state); the sixth is more 
a rag-bag than a family, joined together only by geographical location; the seventh 
and eighth open the way for recognition of non-state law, for Zweigert and Kötz 
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recognised that it would be a distortion to limit their account of Islamic law to 
Islamic states or even to those aspects recognised as a source of law in plural state 
legal systems. But this meant a shift of meaning of ‘system’ from existing state legal 
system to a system of thought. However, the label ‘system’ is dropped in respect 
of Hindu law, perhaps because there is no modern Hindu state. Analytically, this 
scheme is more like a muddle than a systemic classification, but, of course, that 
may not matter if not much depends on the classification anyway. 
A second criticism of Zweigert and Kötz’s approach is that by focussing on 
contemporary ‘living’ systems, they downplay the importance of history. The 
best hope for developing a coherent overview of law in the world, it has been 
suggested, is to adopt an historical perspective. This is the approach adopted 
by Patrick Glenn in his path-breaking book, Legal Traditions of the World 
(Glenn, 2004).
Anglo-American commentators have generally been dismissive of the Grands 
Systèmes tradition: the more outspoken ones, such as Alan Watson, have criti-
cised it as too broad and superficial to deserve the name of scholarship (Watson, 
1974: chapter 1). The majority have voted with their feet by concentrating on 
micro-comparative work. I believe that such dismissiveness was mistaken. It is 
admirable to give novice law students a broad overview of their field, not least 
because it can help them to set more particular studies in a broad geographical 
and historical context. It can also provide them with an initial framework for 
organising their understandings of law. An elementary Cook’s Tour need not 
be intellectually ambitious or even particularly rigorous, but laying a sound 
theoretical foundation for the study of law needs to aim higher. If the main 
objective of the discipline of law is to advance knowledge and understanding of 
its subject-matter, then surely one aspect of this must be the aspiration to build 
up an accurate and sophisticated total picture (or series of pictures) of law in 
the world. 
During the 1990s, partly in response to the challenges of globalisation, a num-
ber of jurists have attempted to construct broad overviews of law in the world 
that are quite different from the Grands Systèmes approach. Three in particular 
deserve mention. First, Boaventura de Sousa Santos (Santos, 1995; 2002) advanced 
a bold interpretation of law in a globalising era in terms of an emerging struggle 
between ‘hegemonic’ forces (mainly associated with capitalism) and ‘counter-
hegemonic’ forces (exemplified by human rights, some social movements and 
the World Social Forum). From the perspective of world history, Patrick Glenn 
interprets the heritage of law in terms of continuously interacting traditions that 
are sufficiently different and sufficiently stable to underpin a vision of ‘sustain-
able diversity’ (Glenn, 2004). Glenn’s concept of tradition, though controversial, 
is more sophisticated and more coherent than attempts to paint a picture in 
terms of families of legal systems or legal cultures and it avoids the narrowing 
assumptions of the ‘Country and Western Tradition’. Brian Tamanaha has sought 
to construct a broad conception of law as the basis for a positivist, socio-legal 
general jurisprudence (Tamanaha, 2001). Although Tamanaha’s specific criterion 
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of identification of law18 has been criticised, his systematic deconstruction and 
filleting of Hart’s concept of state law opens the way for a broadened and more 
coherent conception of law as an organising concept within the tradition of legal 
positivism. I have commented at length on each of these three important works en 
route to developing a rather different conception of general jurisprudence as an 
activity that might provide some useful theoretical underpinnings for a genuinely 
cosmopolitan discipline of law.19
Micro-comparative Studies: The ‘Country and Western Tradition’ 
Let us now turn to micro-comparative studies. In taking stock of modern com-
parative law scholarship it is important to distinguish between the vast heritage of 
particular studies of foreign and comparative law that have been published since 
the Second World War and the way the field has been conceptualised in general 
terms by its more influential figures. The former is rich and very diverse; the latter 
is remarkably monolithic. It is my contention that the praxis of comparative law is 
much richer and more diverse than the predominant theory allows. 
From the accounts of leading comparatists, especially in the formative 
period after the Second World War until about 1990, we can construct an 
ideal type of a conception of mainstream comparative law with the following 
characteristics: 
 (i)  The primary subject-matter is the positive laws and ‘official’ legal systems 
of nation states (municipal legal systems); 
 (ii)  It focuses almost exclusively on Western capitalist societies in Europe and 
the United States, with little or no detailed consideration of ‘the East’ 
(former and surviving socialist countries, including China), the ‘South’ 
(poorer countries), Latin America, and richer countries of the Pacific 
Basin.20 
(iii)  It is concerned mainly with the similarities and differences between 
common law and civil law, as exemplified by ‘parent’ traditions or sys-
tems, notably France and Germany for civil law, and England and the 
United States for common law; 
(iv) It focuses almost entirely on legal doctrine; 
18 ‘Law is whatever people identify and treat through their social practices as “law” (or “droit” or “recht” 
etc.)’ (Tamanaha, 2001: 166–71, 194).
19 Twining, 2005a. On Santos, see Twining, 2000a: ch 8; on Glenn, see Twining 2005c; and on 
Tamanaha, see Twining, 2003. Unlike Tamanaha, I am not convinced of the value of constructing 
a general definition of law outside any particular context, but in the context of constructing total 
pictures of law in the world, I use variations on the following formulation: law as a form of institu-
tionalised social practice is oriented towards ordering relations between subjects at different levels of 
relations and of ordering. This is quite close to MacCormick, 2007. 
20 During the period of the Cold War, a major exception was Soviet or Socialist law, which was 
treated as belonging to ‘Comparative Law’ in a way in which African, Indian, Islamic and Hindu law 
were not.
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 (v)  It focuses in practice largely on private law, especially the law of obliga-
tions, which is often treated as representing ‘the core’ of a legal system or 
tradition;
 
(vi)  The concern is with description and analysis rather than evaluation and 
prescription, except that one of the main uses of ‘legislative comparative 
law’ is typically claimed to be the lessons to be learned from foreign solu-
tions to ‘shared problems’—a claim that is theoretically problematic.
This set of propositions is not a ‘paradigm’, nor is it intended as a caricature 
of actual practice.
 
Rather it is an ideal type to which most explicit second-
ary accounts of the nature and scope of comparative law and many implicit 
assumptions in the discourse approximate more or less closely. I suggest that 
this is a fair reconstruction of a recognisable set of ideas that have influenced the 
development of Western comparative law since the Second World War. Insofar 
as this is correct, it is relevant to make a number of points in relation to it. 
First, between about 1945 and 1990 this set of assumptions was very influen-
tial in respect of the conceptualisation of the sub-discipline and its institutionali-
sation in journals, textbooks, courses, projects, and above all, ways of thought. It 
is still influential today. Just to take two examples. Most historical surveys of the 
field, including that of Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, do not include Western 
scholars of the stature of Duncan Derrett on Hindu Law, Joseph Schacht and 
Norman Anderson on Islamic law and Antony Allott and James Read on African 
law, even when they deal with these fields as part of macro-comparative law. 
Hardly any non-Western scholars feature in these histories. Perhaps even more 
remarkable is the fact that internal critics of the tradition, such as William Ewald, 
Pierre Legrand, Basil Markesenis, and—perhaps less clearly—Alan Watson by 
and large do not challenge the main assumptions. Ewald, for example, in his 
fascinating philosophical critique of the tradition (‘What was it like to try a 
rat?’),
 
assumes throughout that comparative law is concerned with analysis of 
doctrine (especially private law) of ‘parent’ common law and civil law systems 
(Ewald, 1995).
Thus insofar as it has been influential, the model has served to exclude from 
the concept of ‘comparative law’ vast tracts of work, including the specialised 
study by Western scholars of non-Western law, studies of foreign law that were 
not explicitly comparative,21 and cross-jurisdictional studies within the com-
mon law world— what may be termed comparative common law (Twining, 
2000a: 145–8). This exclusive concept did not prevent scholarly work from 
being undertaken; in recent years comparative legal studies have diversified 
21 Comparatists sometimes insist on a quite sharp distinction between foreign and comparative 
law. This distinction is not sustainable for several reasons. Comparison covers a variety of activities 
and foreignness is a relative matter. At a theoretical level nearly all description involves comparison, 
which can be more or less implicit or explicit. We make loose comparisons in everyday life, explicitly 
or implicitly, using analogies, models, metaphors, ideal types and a variety of other devices. So, too, 
do comparatists.
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in many directions—look, for example, at the contents of the leading jour-
nals—but its  conceptualisation may have marginalised some areas of work and 
held back theoretical development. 
The ‘Country and Western’ model is restricted in respect of each of its ele-
ments: municipal law of Western nation states; doctrine, especially private law; 
and contrasts between so-called ‘parent’ civil and common law systems as the 
central focus. Each of these elements can be challenged as narrow. In some con-
texts such narrowing had pragmatic justifications: ie manageability, relevance 
to other subjects in the curriculum, academic respectability, and sharpness 
of focus. The comparative study of the French, German, and English law of 
obligations, for example, has attained a very high degree of sophistication and 
specificity. But the price has been a heavy one. Apart from the exclusions already 
mentioned, the label ‘comparative law’ has been appropriated by practitioners 
and critics of one particular tradition in ways that artificially isolate it from 
very similar work, especially in respect of shared problems of methodology. The 
result is that much of the secondary literature about comparative law as a field 
is narrowly focused, overlooks some examples of best practice, and underesti-
mates the richness, diversity and unevenness of transnational and cosmopolitan 
legal studies. It neither draws on nor illuminates these neglected areas.
The ‘Country and Western’ model is now out of date, but it has not been 
replaced by any coherent theory or theories. This is not to suggest that one should 
replace one reductionist theory by another, but rather that central issues relating 
to scope, method, comparability, explicit and implicit comparison and the rela-
tionship to other enquiries need to be addressed rigorously.
 
This critique of the ‘Country and Western’ model should not be taken as an 
all-out attack. Indeed, I think that it is a heritage to be valued and built on. First, 
there were good reasons for narrowing the focus, especially at the pioneering 
stage. This pragmatically motivated ideal type usefully guided development of 
a fragile new subject in a potentially hostile environment at a particular stage 
of its development. In England the pioneers such as H Gutteridge, FH Lawson 
and CJ Hamson had to emphasise the relevance, the respectability and the 
practical value of their field as part of their struggle for acceptance in the acad-
emy. Basil Markesenis, building on them, plays on similar themes in arguing 
for a more central place for comparative law in our legal culture (Markesinis, 
1997). Secondly, as I have already noted, there were benefits as well as costs, not 
least in the quality of some of the work done within the ‘Country and Western’ 
framework. We should not just dismiss this part of our heritage. In my view, 
work done within the ‘Country and Western Tradition’ stands to comparative 
law as classical music stands to music: It is the best we have. 
However, the model no longer fits what is being done in the name of com-
parative law, let alone work that has been excluded from the label. From a global 
perspective, the ‘Country and Western’ model has four main weaknesses: it is nar-
rowly conceived; it has been artificially isolated from cognate fields; it is out of date; 
and it is under-theorised. What is lacking is a coherent view of the enterprise and 
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above all sustained discussion of shared issues of comparability, method, levels and 
objectives across a broader range of enquiries. One result of this is that those who 
do comparative work—that is, most of us—do not get sufficient help and guidance 
from theory by way of synthesis, conceptual clarification, middle-order theorising, 
critical evaluation of assumptions and presuppositions and so on. In short, the jobs 
of jurisprudence are not being adequately performed for comparative or cosmo-
politan legal studies. So the time is ripe for a quite radical rethink, not least in the 
light of globalisation and the need for a revived general jurisprudence.
A Naive Model of Diffusion
Some implications of adopting a global perspective and a broadened conception 
of law are illustrated by the topic of diffusion of law—sometimes referred to as 
reception, transplants, or transposition. Diffusion (under different labels) has 
been the subject of much attention, notably in long-running debates between 
Alan Watson and a number of leading scholars, including Otto Kahn-Freund, 
Lawrence Friedman, Pierre Legrand, and Esin Örücü. However, nearly all of these 
debates have focused on the diffusion of state law. Adopting a genuinely global 
perspective radically alters the landscape of diffusion, not only, or even mainly, by 
extending the ambit to include non-state law. 
From some of my own early attempts to give an account of ‘reception’, I 
have constructed ‘a naive model of reception’ that has 12 elements, none of 
which are necessary and some of which are not even characteristic of most 
processes of diffusion.22 The assumptions of the model can be briefly restated 
as follows:
[A] bipolar relationship between two countries involving a direct one-way transfer of 
legal rules or institutions through the agency of governments involving formal enactment 
or adoption at a particular moment of time (a reception date) without major change … 
[I]t is commonly assumed that the standard case involves transfer from an advanced 
(parent) civil or common law system to a less developed one, in order to bring about tech-
nological change (‘to modernise’) by filling in gaps or replacing prior local law (Twining, 
2005b: 2–3).
Each of these assumptions can be shown not to be a necessary element of the 
processes of diffusion of law and several are almost certainly not typical. For 
example, governments are not the only, or even the main agents of diffusion; the 
pathways of diffusion are often indirect and influences are reciprocal; imported 
law rarely fills a vacuum or wholly replaces prior local law; and cross-level 
diffusion can be as significant as the more familiar horizontal (eg country-to-
country) diffusion.23 
22 The model is introduced and discussed in Twining, 2005b. 
23 For further examples, see Twining, 2005b.
84  William Twining
24 A striking exception is Patrick Glenn, who seems to treat none of these features as necessary 
or even characteristic of the processes of interaction between legal traditions. (Glenn, 2004, passim, 
discussed in Twining, 2005c).
25 Because it is so difficult, few comparatists indulge in explicit comparison in the sense of careful 
sustained analysis of similarities and differences between discrete, comparable phenomena. But, as 
Charles Taylor reminds us, nearly all description and interpretation involves at least implicit compari-
son, ‘Comparison, History, Truth’ (Taylor, 1995).
If we view this model as an ideal type of accounts of reception/transplantation 
in the legal literature, we find that some of the deviations are recognised by some 
commentators, but overall some such model is widely assumed to represent a 
paradigm case.24 Appendix II illustrates just some of the possible variants/devia-
tions from each element in the model. This is just one example of how adopting 
a global perspective can radically alter perceptions of a topic.
III.  CONCLUSION
As the discipline of law is becoming more cosmopolitan in response to the pro-
cesses loosely labelled ‘globalisation’, so comparative law as a sub-discipline has 
been moving from a relatively marginal role, dealing with foreign relations, to 
a much more central role at the hub of the subject. Serious comparative work 
is extremely difficult and, in the view of scholars like Max Rheinstein, requires 
a long apprenticeship—perhaps a minimum of 10 years (Rheinstein, 1968).25 
However, today nearly all legal studies are cosmopolitan in that legal scholars, and 
indeed law students, regularly have to use sources, materials and ideas developed 
in more than one jurisdiction and increasingly in more than one legal culture. In 
that sense, we are all comparatists now and we need help from more experienced 
scholars, especially in respect of methodology. We need to be equipped with at 
least the rudiments of coping with such material. So comparative method needs 
to be treated as a central element of ‘legal method’.
Broadening our conception of comparative law may bring about a reintegra-
tion of closely related enclaves of enquiry that have become artificially separated. 
I find it bizarre that most standard accounts of the history of ‘comparative law’ 
make virtually no mention of ‘law and development’, or ‘comparative human 
rights’ or of the fields for which the School of Oriental and African Studies has 
been almost solely responsible in Britain, such as Islamic, Hindu, African, Indian, 
Chinese and, more recently, Buddhist law (Huxley, 1997). Apart from the intel-
lectual gains, such a reintegration would further the practical cause of persuading 
colleagues that these fields should be treated as part of the mainstream rather than 
as exotic out-posts in our discipline. 
Adopting a global perspective shows up some of the limitations of what is in 
many respects a rich tradition of Western comparative law. It should also alert 
us to the extent of our collective ignorance and warn against unfounded, often 
ethnocentric, generalisation about matters legal. Such a perspective reminds us of 
the diversity and complexity of legal phenomena, but it is mainly useful in setting 
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a broad context for more particular studies. Most of the processes of ‘globalisa-
tion’ occur at sub-global levels. Even in an interdependent world, the comparative 
study of law needs to focus mainly on detailed particulars that are local, practical, 
and embedded in specific cultural contexts.
APPENDIX I 
Levels of Law26
If law is conceived of as a form of social practice concerned with ordering rela-
tions between subjects or persons (human, legal, unincorporated and otherwise) 
at a variety of levels of relations and of ordering, not just relations within a 
single nation state or society, one way of characterising such levels is essentially 
 geographical: 
•  global (as with some environmental issues, a possible ius humanitatis) 
(eg mineral rights on the moon) and, by extension, space law; 
•  international (in the classic sense of relations between sovereign states and 
more broadly relations governed, eg by human rights or refugee law or 
international criminal law); 
•  regional (eg the European Union, European Convention on Human Rights, 
and the Organisation of African Unity); 
•  transnational (eg Islamic, Hindu, Jewish law, Gypsy law, transnational arbi-
tration, a putative lex mercatoria, Internet law and, more controversially, the 
internal governance of multi-national corporations, the Catholic Church, 
or institutions of organised crime); 
•  inter-communal (as in relations between religious communities, Christian 
Churches, or different ethnic groups); 
•  territorial state (including the legal systems of nation states, and sub-
national jurisdictions, such as Florida, Greenland, Quebec, Northern 
Ireland, and Zanzibar); 
•  sub-state (eg subordinate legislation, such as bye-laws of the Borough of 
Camden) or religious law officially recognised for limited purposes in a plural 
legal system; and 
•  non-state (including laws of subordinated peoples, such as native North 
Americans, Maoris, Gypsies, or illegal legal orders such as Santos’s Pasagarda 
law, the Southern People’s Liberation Army’s legal regime in Southern 
Sudan, and the ‘Common Law Movement’ of militias in the United States) 
Which of these should be classified as ‘law’ or ‘legal’ is essentially contested 
within legal theory and also depends on the context and purposes of the 
discourse.
26 Adapted from Twining, 2000a:139. Recent studies of Gypsy law have been pioneered by Walter 
Weyrauch. See especially, Weyrauch and Bell, 1993 and Symposium on Gypsy Law (Romaniya) 45(2) 
AJCL (Spring, 1997). The Southern Peoples’ Liberation Army operated a system of courts dealing 
with both civil and criminal cases in areas which they occupied in the civil war in the Southern Sudan 
(Kuol, 1997). On the Common Law Movement, see Koniak, 1996 and 1997.
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APPENDIX II
Diffusion of Law: A Standard Case and Some Variants27
Standard Case Some Variants
a. Source-destination Bipolar: single exporter 
to single importer
Single exporter to multiple 
 destinations. Single importer 
from multiple sources. 
Multiple sources to multiple 
 destinations etc.
b. Levels Municipal legal
system-municipal 
legal system
Cross-level transfers.
Horizontal transfers at other 
levels (eg regional, sub-state,  
non-state transnational)
c. Pathways Direct one-way transfer Complex paths. 
Reciprocal influence. 
Re-export
d. Formal / informal Formal enactment or 
adoption
Informal, semi-formal or 
mixed
e. Objects Legal rules and 
concepts;
Institutions
Any legal phenomena or ideas, 
including ideology, theories, 
personnel, ‘mentality’, methods, 
structures, practices (official, 
private practitioners’, edu-
cational etc), literary genres, 
documentary forms, symbols, 
rituals etc etc. 
f. Agency Government- 
government
Commercial and other non-
 governmental organisations. 
Armies. Individuals and 
groups: eg colonists, mer-
chants, missionaries, slaves, ref-
ugees, believers etc who ‘bring 
their law with them’. Writers, 
teachers, activists,  lobbyists etc. 
g. Timing One or more specific 
reception dates
Continuing, typically lengthy 
process
h. Power and prestige Parent civil or common 
law >> less developed
Reciprocal interaction 
i. Change in object Unchanged 
Minor adjustments
‘No transportation without 
 transformation’
j.  Relation to 
pre-existing law
Blank slate.
Fill vacuum or gaps.
Replace entirely.
Struggle, resistance.
Layering. Assimilation.
Surface law
27 From Twining, 2005b: 16.
(continued on next page)
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Standard Case Some Variants
k.  Technical/ideological/
cultural
Technical Ideology, culture, technology
l. Impact ‘It works’ Performance measures.
Empirical research.
Monitoring. Enforcement 
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
 1.  Why should we be suspicious of such phrases as ‘global law’, ‘global law-
yers’, ‘a global law school’? Can you think of any genuine examples of any 
of these categories?
 2.  In what ways are the processes of globalisation changing the significance 
of national boundaries?
 3.  ‘Most processes of “globalisation” take place at sub-global levels.’ Do you 
agree? Give examples.
 4.  What kinds of legal orders would you include in a reasonably comprehen-
sive map (or series of maps) of law in the world? What kinds of institu-
tionalised normative orders could you reasonably exclude?
 5.  ‘Western academic legal culture has tended to be state-oriented, secular, 
positivist, “top down”, North-centric, unempirical, and universalist in 
respect of morals.’ To what extent has your legal education to date fitted 
this description?
 6.  This chapter includes three ‘ideal types’ of approaches to academic law—
in respect of Western academic legal culture generally: the ‘Country and 
Western Tradition’ of comparative law, and a naïve model of diffusion of 
law. Are these unfair caricatures of scholarly legal practices?
 7.  ‘We are all comparatists now’. Discuss.
 8.  Is it true that we are approaching a time when we will live in ‘a border-
less world’, experience ‘the end of sovereignty’, and live under a World 
Government? Or are these ideas just ‘hype’?
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4Com-paring
H PATRICK GLENN
KEY CONCEPTS
Comparison; Epistemology of conflict; Epistemology of conciliation; Binary 
logic; Multivalent logic; Separation; Reification; Legal system; Culture; 
Common law; Legal tradition.
I.  INTRODUCTION
W
hy was comparative law a distinct, marginal and boring  discipline for 
the 19th and 20th centuries? It was distinct because it was  constructed 
as separate from law itself, and as something which followed it (like 
the cigarette after sex, in the old movies). It was marginal because people are 
more interested in the real action than in that which follows it. It was boring for 
all of the above. Yet there appear to be symptoms (this book is one of them) of a 
major change in attitude towards the comparing of laws and towards the people 
who should be doing the comparing. This is linked to what is said to be a decline 
in the normative authority of states, so large forces appear to be at work, and 
we appear obliged to think more extensively about what comparison is, what 
concepts are used in comparing (or in refusing to compare) laws, and why it 
 matters. The first problem is the idea of comparing.
Most of us think we know what comparing is. It involves determining whether 
two things or concepts or laws are similar or different. That’s it. There the two are, 
similar or different. What can we do now to fill up the rest of the hour, or day, or 
year? Comparison here is empirical in character, inert, the way foreign law is often 
taught in many courses entitled ‘comparative law’, in which the effort appears to be 
one of understanding what the foreign law somehow is, with very little or no place 
for discussion of why it might be the way it appears to be, and what consequences 
that might have for the law we have already learned in other courses (but which is 
not on the exam for this one). Comparison here has all of the characteristics which 
it has been given by the intellectual constructions of the last two centuries (includ-
ing those of legal education) and since that is all that comparison appears to be, then 
comparative law had to be (even more) distinct, marginal and boring.
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This is not necessarily the way comparison has to be, however, and many of 
the lawyers of the world have understood this. Where does the word come from? 
It is not a construction of recent, ‘modern’ thought. It comes (you have already 
guessed) from Latin, and is a composite of two words: ‘com’, a version of ‘cum’ 
or ‘with’; and ‘pare’ or peer. So com-paring is bringing together with a peer, with 
that which is prima facie equal for purposes of consideration. There is nothing 
in the word, moreover, that suggests that the result of the process is somehow 
terminal, in ensuing uniformity, or ensuing disastrous conflict. Com-paring 
thus would involve bringing together, and keeping together, of equals, which 
are presumed to endure, throughout and beyond the process of com-paring. 
Some have spoken of convivencia1 or living together in harmony and in a way 
respectful of difference, which is usually far from boring, as you know if you have 
ever lived with someone different (and almost everyone is). Com-paring thus 
involves an enduring process of peaceful co-existence (in spite of difference, in 
spite of potential conflict), in a way which ensures not uniformity but ongoing 
diversity.
Living with different people in a spirit of mutual respect is not a distinct, 
marginal and boring process. Many would say it is the greatest challenge there 
is, particularly in times of so-called ‘globalisation’. So what happened to the 
 underlying idea of com-paring, to turn it from an essential and vital idea into 
a non-essential one? This is a very large question, involving some very large 
intellectual constructions, some having their origins in law itself, others lying 
outside of law but having enormous influence within it. But if large forces are at 
work in today’s world, then large questions have to be asked. We are interested 
in how the idea of non-com-paring, or of rejecting equals, or of separation, 
came to prevail over ideas of com-paring. Where does the idea come from that 
people, or concepts, or things, can be kept apart, and that the idea of com- paring 
is  simply a banal one of noting their separate characteristics? What are the legal 
and  intellectual equivalents of the Berlin wall (now down, so it can happen) and 
the Israel-Palestine wall (now going up)? These walls are meant to eliminate 
contact, but in themselves do nothing to eliminate underlying ideas of conflict, 
and may even be seen as the final and most visible elements in a long process of 
 separation or refusal of convivencia. So separation seems related to conflict and 
we are  perhaps therefore looking for intellectual constructions, or an epistemol-
ogy, of conflict or separation, as opposed to an epistemology of conciliation or 
com-paring. How do we think about human relations and the relations between 
laws, and what are the basic ideas we use in this process?
1 Note the lack of italics, a typographical device of separation meant to signal formally that which 
is considered foreign. Yet languages have always been entirely open to one another, as English received 
a layer of French following the Norman Conquest, as a means of enrichment and not  replacement 
(will/testament, ask/demand, wish/desire, room/chamber, start/commence, bit/morsel, etc), as to 
which see Bragg, 2004: 58–9. 
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II.  AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF CONFLICT
It might be thought that if two groups are separated from one another, the 
 separation itself will prevent conflict. There is an old English adage ‘Love your 
neighbour, yet pull not down your hedge’ and a poet, Robert Frost, had his 
neighbour famously saying ‘good fences make good neighbours’ while himself 
wondering:
Why do they make good neighbours? …... 
Before I built a wall I’d ask to know 
what I was walling in or walling out.
Some say rather that ‘bad neighbours make good fences’. There could, though, be 
a good—or at least arguable—case for both fences and private property. Yet this 
does not seem conclusive for larger questions of the relations between peoples and 
their laws. Their separation means there is necessarily no convivencia, no peaceful 
intermingling of equals and no need for each to understand the other. They would 
rather exist as separate blocks, whose relations in case of contact could only be 
conflictual, each attempting to displace the other. Non-com-paring thus would 
result from a logic of separation, as well as a construction of opposing collective 
identities, or reification of human groups into distinct and irreconcilable entities, 
in a way that would be hostile to the process of com-paring.
The Logic of Separation
Much time is spent in law schools in teaching people to ‘think like a lawyer’, 
though there is usually little explanation of what this means. If one looks at the 
way law is usually taught, however, thinking like a lawyer would involve rigorous 
intellectual constructions, where conclusions follow irresistibly from prior prem-
ises or givens. Being a lawyer would involve being logical and consistent, as well 
as being unflappable, cool and elegant in execution. The cool part would involve 
personal characteristics, the logical part would be simply … logic; here applied to 
human affairs as opposed to maths or the physical sciences. This is at least how 
things are often made to appear.
Logic, however, does not admit of a single or simple definition. The most 
famous definition was that of Aristotle, who early on formulated what has ever 
since been known as the rule of the excluded middle, sometimes (slightly)  re-for-
mulated as the law of non-contradiction (which thus requires consistency). What 
does the law of the excluded middle tell us? It involves what otherwise would 
appear to be an extraordinarily depressing proposition for lawyers and others 
involved in dispute resolution, that there is no middle ground between opposing 
concepts. If you take A and its negation, not-A, they each exclude one another and 
together exclude all the ground which might exist between them. The  opposition 
is total, and so you must choose between them, A or not-A. Asserting at the same 
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time A and not-A would be asserting a contradiction, not being logical (in the 
Aristotelian sense). It would be asserting that opposites can co-exist and that 
their co-existence implies a middle ground between them. Early on we are taught, 
however, of the excluded middle as an irrefutable fact of life. You cannot have your 
cake and eat it too, though you might as a child have wondered, rightly, why not.
Ideas of radical separation are here made to appear inherent in the nature of 
(correct) human thought. Consistency would be found in following a logic of 
separation, though it is never explained why A and not-A are taken as radically 
separate from one another, as opposed to being the simple ends of a continuum 
running between them, where there is more middle ground than anything else. 
This latter view would represent another type of logic, which of course has its 
own logic, not of separation but of gradation, and which consists of challeng-
ing the underlying (but never justified) assumption of Aristotelian logic, that of 
separation. It is now known in English, perhaps unfortunately, as ‘fuzzy logic’, 
but it should be understood not as a logic which is imprecise (it is very precise 
indeed), but as a logic of fuzziness.2 The fuzziness is that of the real world, where 
 boundaries are never sharp (in spite of what our limited means of physical 
 perception tell us) and where the physical sciences now recognise the possibil-
ity of infinite gradations of measurement. Fuzzy logic (or multivalent logic as 
it is sometimes called—admitting many values) admits the complexity and 
imprecision (lack of separation) of the real world and attempts to expand our 
base of information so we can comprehend it. Com-paring would be necessarily 
 multivalent, in bringing together and keeping together very different people and 
very different laws, with no necessity of choosing definitively between them. It 
implies an ever-present, included middle.
The logic of separation is profoundly implanted, however, in intellectual 
and popular life (remember the cake) and in ways of thinking about laws, 
peoples and underlying values. One manifestation is found in the idea of ‘incom-
mensurability’, by which is meant not (simply) that two ideas or concepts are 
incompatible with one another (A or not-A again, which is bad enough), but that 
it is simply not possible to comprehend A and not-A and their relations with one 
another. They would be incapable of common measure (hence incommensu-
rable) and thus incapable of mutual understanding. The popular version is that of 
not being able to compare apples and oranges, an outrageously false proposition 
but repeated endlessly by people who consider themselves rational. The original 
idea of incommensurability would have come from mathematics, where the 
Greeks found that some geometrical lengths could not be measured with whole 
numbers or integers (which is all they then worked with), but has now been 
extended to moral philosophy (eg, friends are incommensurable with money) and 
law (Soviet law would have been incommensurable with bourgeois, western law; 
2 For references, see Glenn, 2004a: 350–52, and for how the legal traditions of the world are all built 
on notions of multivalent, as opposed to Aristotelian, or bivalent, logic, see below.
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even the common law, though bourgeois, would be incommensurable with the 
civil law). The notion of incommensurability is derived from Aristotelian ideas of 
 separation and logic, and is incompatible with multivalent forms of logic, where A 
and not-A would be simple elements (though at the extremities) of a continuum 
of  meaning. It may be said that Chicago is incommensurable with the number 
nine, but how do we even make such an assertion if we have not made some 
(preliminary) evaluation of them both? The com-paring need be done not with 
a numerical or other measure common and external to both of them (a so-called 
tertium comparationis), but in terms of the characteristics which each possesses, 
or does not possess. Chicago is thus spatially-defined, whereas the number nine 
is not; Chicago has freight-yards, but the number nine does not. This may not 
be very helpful information, but if com-paring is possible here can it really be 
excluded elsewhere, notably in law?
One major field of law, however, where there might just as well be profound 
incommensurability, is the field of legal education. Since the 11th or 12th 
 centuries, when law schools were begun in Europe, in both England and on the 
continent, only one law has been taught. There is here a ‘primordial’ idea of there 
being only one true legal model, the ius unum. In Oxford and Cambridge, and 
in the great Universities of the continent, that law, known as the ius commune, 
was a then-current adaptation of still older Roman law, which in its (Aristotelian) 
rationality was seen as an effective means of combating the unwritten or local laws 
which were such an obstacle to centralised church and state authority. Why was a 
single, intellectualised law taught, which in almost all cases had little or nothing to 
do with the lives of people (which were governed by feudal and customary law)? 
The Holy Roman Empire had much to do with it on the continent, since emperors 
prefer uniformity—their uniformity—and the Church was not opposed since the 
Empire was, after all, Holy. It has been written lately that there was a great fear of 
‘contamination’ from the teaching of other forms of normativity (Thunis, 2004: 
6). When the reaction against this enforced uniformity of high-level instruction 
came about, as it inevitably did, another law, the law of the state, came to be 
taught, not in addition to the ius commune, but in its place. So the idea of a ius 
unum, uncontaminated, continued to prevail into the present century; a constant 
theme of over a millennium’s duration, of separating laws and teaching only one 
of them—that considered fit to be taught—in pure form. This allowed, moreover, 
demonstration of the (Aristotelian) logic of the only law allowed to be taught. 
Comparative law could exist in this intellectual environment, strongly influenced 
even today by imperial and canonical ideas, only as a distinct, marginal and 
 boring topic, if it was allowed at all.
Mention of the church of course brings to mind another famous separation 
of the western world, that between church and state. There are relatively few 
jurisdictions which actually have a constitutional principle of separation of 
church and state, but the idea of a separation between an earthly city and the 
city of God is built into christian thinking (‘Give unto Caesar …’, etc), so most 
people in western jurisdictions actually think there is a constitutional principle 
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of separation even when their own country (say, England or Canada) has no 
such principle. Still, the principle of separation would be the main reason for 
thinking of some jurisdictions as ‘secular’, even though such jurisdictions appear 
as very christian to much of the rest of the world, because of their ‘secularity’. 
Where there is a clear constitutional principle of separation of church and state, 
as in the United States of America, the separation has clearly not given rise to an 
absence of conflict, though much of the litigation now turns on what a separa-
tion of church and state could possibly mean, where many people live religious 
lives. Separation has not been possible, and litigation over it has itself become a 
means of conciliation. 
These underlying ideas of separation, profoundly rooted in ways of thought 
and institutional structures, have had a profound effect on the possibility of 
com-paring. Where comparative law has existed it may be seen as almost miracu-
lous, so the fact that it has been distinct, marginal and boring becomes much less 
severe a judgement than it may have initially appeared. Yet there have been other 
major obstacles to com-paring, mostly in the form of an amazing tendency to 
objectify or reify human groupings, such that they appear almost certain to be 
constantly colliding with one another. War is the obvious example, but we are now 
finding ways of colliding, and killing, short of actually declaring war.
The Process of Reification 
In the (beautiful) Indian dance of Kuchi-pudi, from the village of that name, all 
is done with mime, largely through movements of hands and eyes. The mime 
for conflict is two hands clenched into fists, not striking one another but simply 
pushing one another for the same space. There is no convivencia of large, dense 
objects. The mime for conciliation is again two hands, this time with the fingers 
outstretched towards those of the other hand, and the fingers of both hands 
becoming interlaced as the two hands are brought together. The hands here are 
not reified into fists, but allowed to exist as many points of contact and even 
cohesion, though the two hands remain readily identifiable. This form of dance 
was not meant as just another form of rap, but as a means of teaching important 
things in a non-literate society, such that conflict could be largely avoided through 
notions of mutual support and understanding. This type of teaching, however, is 
abandoned with the contemporary process of social reification.
The most obvious form of social reification is found in the contemporary state 
or national legal system. Contemporary states have claimed to be the exclusive 
source of law on their territories, though this has been compared with Baron 
Münchhausen pulling himself out of the swamp by his own hair. For much of the 
19th and 20th centuries, however, legal theory accepted and developed the idea of 
a national legal system. A national legal system, according to leading explanations, 
could be seen as a simple, positive fact, based on the reality of obedience to it (at 
least where this existed, which is less and less frequent in the world, with notions 
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of failed or failing states). The system need not, therefore, be normatively justified, 
but could be simply explained, notably by Herbert Hart in terms of primary rules 
of conduct and secondary rules which would allow for change and articulation of 
the primary rules (Hart, 1994). Why was the national legal system an obstacle to 
com-paring? Because each legal system was incompatible with every other legal 
system, and each legal system could tolerate only laws valid according to its own 
secondary rules. This is quite consistent with general systems theory, which directs 
our attention to the interaction of the elements of the system within the cadre of 
the boundaries fixed by the system. There is therefore no need for com-paring of 
different laws, since there could be none, on the same territory. Moreover, since a 
legal system existed as simple fact, it could have nothing normative to say about 
whether it should leave room, say, for the law of a religious minority or for the 
law of an international tribunal of some kind (unless it formally enacted such a 
rule). So the separation of legal systems from one another was largely complete, 
at least in legal theory. The result was a notion of conflict of laws (the heart of the 
major discipline of private international law) according to which any transborder 
activity could be conceived only in terms of conflict, triggering a choice-of-law 
rule based largely on geographic contacts. The worst manifestation of this highly 
conflictual and non-com-parative view of the relations of laws is found in the 
present law of some continental jurisdictions, which says that rules of private 
international law are of obligatory application by the court. Accordingly, every 
transborder case requires an initial decision on what law is applicable to it, with-
out even any enquiry as to whether there is a real difference or conflict between 
the laws. Here, reification of the system creates enormous trouble and expense, 
the justification of which appears more and more impossible in current circum-
stances of communication and trade. Should there really be a presumption of 
conflict amongst the laws of the European Union?
The formal nature of state law and the state legal system is now being 
 challenged by many developments of a transnational character, but there have 
been challenges also by the valuable work of many sociologists, who have been 
able to determine whether state law, in particular circumstances, works or does 
not work. This is highly salutary and involves a type of comparison between 
formal texts and the situation on the ground. Sociology and anthropology of 
law are open to much more information than are legal systems, and so much can 
be expected of them in terms of meaningful comparison of laws. Much has also 
been delivered. Yet a major caveat is in order, to the extent that the social  science 
disciplines of sociology and anthropology have themselves become victims of 
the process of reification, notably in the development of the idea of culture. 
Everyone talks about culture these days, though no-one knows what it really is. 
There have been hundreds of definitions offered, none in any way successful. This 
is not, however, the problem for com-paring. The problem is that the notion of 
culture has itself been reified, in spite of its ambiguity, and attached to particular 
groups of people as a defining element of them. In the 19th and 20th centuries 
there were many definitions of culture which sounded very close to definitions of 
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legal systems, in terms of their being a ‘complex whole’, a ‘total system’, or even a 
‘totality’ (see Glenn, 2007: 7). Since a culture had to be internally consistent to be 
recognisable as a culture, diversity within one’s own culture became inherently 
problematical, and diversity within other cultures (of which less was necessarily 
known) became essentially inconceivable. This is now known as essentialism, and 
is criticised, yet it was inevitable, given the large and homogenising concept of 
culture which was deployed. The same method of reification has been used by the 
US political scientist Samuel Huntington in speaking of a ‘clash of civilizations’, in 
which civilisations are defined as ‘entities’, such that com-paring is impossible and 
the only relations that can possibly exist are conflictual in character (Huntington, 
1996: 28, 41 and 43).3
The 19th and 20th century concepts of culture are now recognised as major 
liabilities by many sociologists and anthropologists and major efforts of 
re-conceptualisation are taking place. The notion of the ‘multi-cultural’ (many 
conflicting entities) is now being sought to be replaced by a notion of the 
‘inter-cultural’ which would be more compatible with com-paring. This involves, 
however, re-educating the general public, which now thinks in terms of culture 
wars, so it is impossible to predict the effect of present efforts of refinement.4 
There is, moreover, an underlying conceptual problem of whether it is even 
 possible to retain a notion of culture which would not be seen as a ‘complex 
whole’ or as a ‘totality’. This is what culture has been, and if it is not that, then it 
may well dissolve into its component parts, whatever they may be.5 Stay tuned.
The reification process has thus manifested itself in terms of systems,  cultures, 
civilisations, and further even in terms of ‘mentalités’. These have all been 
 boundary-tracing endeavours which both homogenise (within) and differentiate 
(without), in a way incompatible with com-paring or convivencia. The situation 
is not as bleak, however, as this discussion indicates. Theory, which has been the 
object of the discussion, often does not control the world, and theory tends to 
become dated as the world moves on, as it is rapidly doing. There is room for 
discussion of another type of epistemology.
III.  AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF CONCILIATION
To find an epistemology of conciliation it appears, from all of the efforts of 
 separation we have seen, that we must look elsewhere, and notably away from 
legal and social theory of the major western jurisdictions. If you are already 
3 See also (ibid: 21): ‘We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when 
we know whom we are against’ and (ibid: 42): ‘A civilization is a “totality”’. Huntington’s book was 
translated into German with the title Kampf der Kulturen.
4 For the notion of a ‘culturally unitary group … tied to “its” territory’ as ‘difficult to shake 
because … so deeply ingrained in the modern consciousness’, see Berman, 2005:485 at 513, with refs; 
but for concept of culture being ‘misused’ as weapon in cultural wars, see Nelken, 2001: 26. 
5 For this process of dissolution, see Cotterell, 2004: 1 at 9 ‘the concept of culture should be broken 
down into distinct components and its vagueness and indeterminacy thereby reduced’.
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well-versed in such theory, and inclined to defend it, please withhold judge-
ment for a bit, as an immediate exercise of com-paring. There may be things 
worth knowing about out there, and you may even run into them in your future, 
fantastic, galactic legal practice. Where has an epistemology of conciliation 
developed amongst lawyers, allowing for widespread and active processes of 
com-paring?
A Multivalent Logic of Legal Practice
Can practice be possible without high theory, notably of the legal system? Well, a 
major and important book has just been written about Jewish law, which would 
have existed for a least a couple of millenia without any western-style theory 
(though it would have something called faith to help it along) (Rynhold, 2005). 
Here there would be a ‘Priority of Practice’ which would take precedence over a 
‘Priority of Theory’, and the practice would be highly specific, alive to individual 
particularities and nuances (think of the common law, perhaps even today), such 
that ideas of boundaries or general systems somehow fade away in the challenge 
of the immediate case. Cases would be decided in comparing them with other 
cases, with no closureof information or general boundaries impeding the process. 
There would be here something similar to the way in which the unwritten law of 
chthonic or native peoples would have been recognised by Crown negotiators in 
North America, not through their imposition of categories of theory but through 
having ‘simply listened’ to what they were being told. Wittgenstein would have 
approved of the process, having criticised the ‘craving for generality’ and argued 
for understanding a general term only through the practical activity of using it in 
various circumstances.6 
So practice may actually be more conducive to com-paring than either legal 
or social theory of the last centuries. Are there any other indications of this? 
There may well be in the emerging process of practising law in a transnational 
manner. Something is going on here, though it does not appear to be reflected 
in any  theoretical work, anywhere. What is happening is that legal practitioners 
are beginning to enjoy a vantage point above and beyond that of state law. Since 
legal practice was highly local for much of legal history, knowledge of foreign law 
was very hard to come by. Experts had to be called upon, and there was (is) that 
continental rule that if a case has any foreign element it is immediately whisked 
away from the practitioners while a court decides what law is applicable to it 
and foreign content of the law can then be officially obtained (usually through 
a university or government research institute). Not much com-paring could go 
on, and not much place was left for a ‘priority of practice’ or principle of mutual 
recognition.
6 For the combination of Wittgenstein and aboriginal negotiations, themselves based on a principle 
of ‘mutual recognition’ and therefore of com-paring, see Tully, 1995: 105–19. 
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Today, however, law firms exist in transnational form (true or linked partner-
ships) and are able to sit in judgement upon, choosing, state law, both for choice 
of jurisdiction and for choice of substantive law.7 Lawyers also sit on arbitration 
panels, largely prohibited by state law in the 19th century, and may call upon many 
models of state law in reaching their decision. They also sit on arbitration panels 
in free-trade dispute-resolution processes, even engaging in comparative debates 
on whether national, public (administrative) law rules have been violated and 
according to what criteria. They seek ‘best practices’, and the transnational com-
mercial world is one of free-flowing normative information where the question is 
never what the best possible rule is (which would be an impractical enquiry), but 
which solution is preferable to other solutions. 
Comparative legal practice is not limited, however, to the corner offices of the 
large transnational firms. Given the level of population mobility in the world, 
family law practice has become transnational and comparative in character, and 
courts in all jurisdictions are occupying themselves with the reconciliation of 
state norms and those of non-western legal traditions.8 The same phenomenon 
is evident in what was previously seen as internal commercial practice (eg, the 
‘islamic mortgage’, or bond).9 Even in criminal law that which is, unfortunately, 
known as the ‘cultural’ defence has emerged, in the form of reliance on specific 
principles or rules of non-western traditions as a means of defence against 
criminal charges; defences which are usually rejected except to the extent they 
may bear on the mental element of the crime—and hence they must be consid-
ered at least for this purpose (Renteln, 2004). Nor is the practice of comparison 
limited to the private, practising, professions. Judges are now actively engaged in 
consideration of extra-national (even ‘foreign’) law and even in matters of public 
law. In the 1970s Otto Kahn-Freund spoke of the latter in particular as a misuse 
of comparative law (since it related to local structures of power) (Kahn-Freund, 
1974), but now judges engage in round-table discussions of how and why to 
engage in the process.10 Difficult human rights cases in particular appear to call 
for consideration of (comparable) other cases. The United States Supreme Court 
is now actively debating the extent to which it should engage in citation of foreign 
cases in interpretation of the United States Constitution. To the extent it does 
so it would be returning to an open position which prevailed in the 18th and 
19th centuries, before notions of national systems and closure began to take 
effect.
7 For the process, see Glenn, 2001 (and also on new mobility of lawyers, and the need for com-
parison of different ethical rules).
8 For recent United States practice, see Estin, 2004: notably 540 at 541–2 (US judges developing 
multi-cultural family law, making ‘space for traditions to flourish’).
9 In the United States, see Shepherd, 2000.
10 Roundtable, 2005. For the House of Lords in England relying extensively on civilian and 
Anglo-American common law authority, see Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 
32 (HL).
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These transnational forms of practice and com-paring may appear disparate 
and even incoherent, particularly in the face of an epistemology of conflict and 
the logic of separation and reification, discussed above. They represent, however, 
an epistemology of conciliation which is as coherent and justifiable as its opposite. 
It may even be articulated in long-standing legal concepts which predate the idea 
of the national legal system and which have continued to be operative even during 
the period of legal nationalism. The most important of these long-standing legal 
concepts is that of common law. Most lawyers today think of common law as the 
legal tradition developed by the courts of England, subsequently transported to 
many parts of the world. Coincidentally, there would have been another common 
law in the form of the ius commune, discussed above in relation to legal education, 
which would have differed fundamentally from the common law in being based 
on Roman law and being essentially doctrinal in character as opposed to judge-
made. This view of common law does not fully reflect, however, the widespread 
character of the notion of common law in European and world legal history. 
There was also a French common law (‘droit commun’), a Spanish common law 
(‘derecho commún’), a German common law (‘gemeine Recht’) and so on (Glenn, 
2005). What was common to all of these common laws, including ‘the’ common 
law and ‘the’ ius commune, was that they co-existed alongside non-common , par-
ticular laws (as with the local customs of England), and law which was common 
had to be designated as such to distinguish it from the law which was not. The 
English common law was thus known as common law not because it was case law, 
which had nothing to do with its name, but because it was capable of application 
(though not necessarily applied) throughout an entire territory, in contrast to the 
local laws that were limited to particular territories. Whether the English, French, 
German or Spanish common law actually did apply, in a given case, was the result 
of a process of reconciliation of the claims of the common and particular laws. 
It resulted from com-paring the two, and it was generally accepted that common 
laws would yield to local particularity where the local law claimed its own applica-
tion with sufficient vigour. Still today, local custom prevails over the common law 
(of England) when it is proven according to satisfactory standards. 
Did these common laws survive the period of legal nationalism, the process of 
codification on the continent and the development in the 19th century of stare 
decisis in the common law? The usual response to this question is negative, since 
national legal systems in Europe were seen as abolishing sources of law other than 
those of state authority. This is the logic of separation and reification at work 
and it has been very influential. Consider the nature, however, of these common 
laws and their territorial application. They were not limited to the territory of 
a particular nation state in Europe. Indeed, these states were not even recogni-
sable (well, England perhaps, because of the shoreline) in the 15th century when 
their law began to be exported abroad in the process of colonialism. The com-
mon laws of England, France and Spain, notably, became the common laws of 
empires, potentially applicable far beyond the mère patrie. They were not always 
applied, and the legal history of colonialism is very similar to the expansion of the 
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 common laws within their original territories. The common laws yielded to local 
particularity when local particularity so required (though criminal law had its 
own requirements). In this they remained true to their character as common laws, 
and the process of their application was the same process of reconciliation and 
comparison. In the Commonwealth, the test for the application of English (com-
mon) law was its ‘suitability’, and this involved an extensive, com-parative exercise 
with English and local law being brought together as equals and interrogated on 
their claims and suitability for application. The English law did not always win; 
indeed it often lost. Quebec law is what it is today because the common law, then 
still in the form of writs, could not displace the written, substantive law of French 
origin that was already in place. 
Lawyers in the colonised world (almost all of the world), thus engaged in an 
active process of reconciliation of law from the 15th century. Did this change 
with the advent of the idea of the national legal system? Did the European states 
which gave rise to common laws succeed in abolishing them wherever they had 
taken root in the world? This was impossible, since nation states are sovereign (so 
it is taught) only on their own territory. The result has been an ongoing process 
all over the world, of consultation of both local law and the relevant common 
law (English, French, Spanish, German, Dutch, etc) in the decision-making 
process in individual cases and certainly also in any legislative processes. This 
massive phenomenon of the ongoing influence of common laws in the world, 
and the comparative process which it implies, has been completely by-passed 
(necessarily so) by theories of national legal systems and exclusivity of national 
laws. State laws, however—including those of the states having originated com-
mon laws—exist today within a broad cadre of ongoing common law which can 
always be called upon as a means of remedying the deficiencies of local law, in the 
historical manner of common laws. Commonwealth lawyers know this well, and 
the Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal is the latest manifestation of 
the phenomenon, but the process is replicated in much of the rest of the world as 
well. The notion of common law thus provides, and has provided for centuries, 
an ongoing justification for the process of com-paring and reconciliation of laws. 
There is a further conceptual instrument available for this purposes, however, in 
the concept of legal tradition.
Legal Traditions
The notion of tradition has been the object of great vilification in the western 
world. Edward Shils concluded that it was not only the tradition of the ancien 
régime which the ‘enlightenment’ sought to eliminate, but the concept of tradi-
tion itself (Shils, 1981: 6). This would leave the field free to contemporary ratio-
nality, to modernity, and then to post-modernity. This is still how the popular, 
western world largely conceives of itself, but there are now indications of growing, 
theoretical recognition that the western tradition is one of many, and that there is 
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need for reconciliation of them all. The western tradition is one which calls itself 
modernity. It is a tradition which denies its historical past and valorises pres-
ent rationality, but there is no escaping the historical past of that which has led 
to notions of modernity and the valorisation of present rationality. Most other 
people of the world do not think this way, and it took many millennia for western 
people to come to think this way, so we are essentially dealing with highly devel-
oped bodies of normative information, of long standing, which tell us how to live 
and how to solve our disputes.
Tradition, including legal tradition, is thus best thought of as a body of ‘highly 
self-conscious’ information (Philips and Schochet, 2004: ix), necessarily norma-
tive in character because of its long duration, which would constitute the essential 
subject-matter of today’s ‘information society’. The ‘new orality’ of the electronic 
world, for example, would thus be providing new vitality to oral traditions of 
previously limited geographical reach. It is true that much of the information 
that the world generates is simply noise, but the operation of the techniques of 
tradition, in effecting the necessary capture and transmission of the information 
of the tradition, eventually eliminates the noise and makes the past readable, and 
understandable, for those of the present. 
As a long-standing body of normative information, tradition has also been 
castigated in western thought as inherently conservative in character. It is that 
which must be struggled against, in the name of many desirable reforms. This is a 
very particularised and inaccurate view of the real force of tradition. It is particu-
larised because it derives from the European struggle against the ancien régime, 
a tradition well-worthy of being overthrown in many of its characteristics (social 
classes, privilege, corruption, etc). It is inaccurate because the tradition was over-
thrown not on the basis simply of present rationality, whatever that might be, but 
because the reformers of the enlightenment justified their conduct by appealing 
to sources of rationality recognised to have originated with the Greeks. Hence we 
have the word ‘revolution’, which involves a return, or re-volving to an original, 
earlier position. In astronomy, this meant for Copernicus11 the return of a planet 
or moon to the point of origin of its orbit. In revolutionary politics it meant resort 
to an alternative tradition of rationality as a means of reform. The word ‘revolu-
tion’ thus acknowledges the ancienneté of the rationalist tradition, as well as the 
disruptive and legitimising force of alternate traditions. 
How can the concept of tradition, however, faced with the silent fact of large 
and dense legal systems, contribute to a process of reconciliation and convivencia? 
From within a legal system the view is limited, since the system is exclusive, irrec-
oncilable with other laws, and conflictual in character. Tradition, however, would 
allow you to step outside of the system, still remaining within (traditional) law, 
and require it to justify itself, to provide the means of com-paring and grounds 
for reconciliation. How is this so? There are three avenues to explore. They all have 
the effect of surrounding legal systems and requiring them to justify themselves.
11 Copernicus, De Revolutionibus, 1543.
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The first avenue is through the history, and even pre-history, of legal sys-
tems themselves. Positive legal thought grounds legal systems on contemporary 
social facts of obedience (Herbert Hart) or efficiency in operation (the view of 
the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen). But, one may well ask, where did these ideas 
come from? In philosophy, the idea of a ‘fact’ is now questioned, as it is in legal 
traditions other than western ones, so it can be demonstrated that the standard 
definitions of a legal system are historically grounded.12 Legal systems would not 
be grounded on what positivists say they are grounded on, since that is a defini-
tion internal to the systemic manner of thought. Legal systems would rather be 
grounded on the thought, or tradition, which enabled positivist legal theorists to 
reach these conclusions. Legal systems are thus best conceptualised themselves as 
instantiations of a particular legal tradition. As such, they are conceptually equal 
to, and on a par with, other legal traditions, which all exist as self-conscious bod-
ies of legal information, sustained over considerable periods of time. So one can 
stand outside western legal systems, as a western lawyer, but still stand within law, 
by placing oneself within a western legal tradition, and even a western tradition 
of positive law and legal systems (now cognisant of its traditional character). 
There would thus be underlying common law (and we are back to it here), or 
ius publicum universale, as it used to be ambitiously called, justifying the range 
of distinct states which emerged in Europe and the world. This tradition is not 
dumb; it speaks to the need and justification for legal systems, and is capable 
both of recognising their weaknesses, their need for reinforcement, and degrees 
of effectiveness in their implementation. Western legal tradition is normative; it 
speaks to questions which legal systems, as purported facts, are unable to speak 
to. This is why Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union speaks of Europe’s 
‘common constitutional traditions’, since it is necessary to resort to such underly-
ing common tradition as a means of critiquing, com- paring, and going beyond, 
the national systems of Europe.
The second avenue of exploration is through the juxtaposition of the national 
legal system with other legal traditions within the national territory. This cannot 
be done by legal theorists posing abstract questions, and probably cannot be done 
at all by theorists of national legal systems. There is a large and important empiri-
cal requirement, which is that of a population which adheres to non-state norma-
tivity, and an equally important procedural requirement of accessibility to formal 
institutions of adjudication on the part of this population. These requirements 
are now met in many of the jurisdictions where the idea of a legal system has been 
12 Putnam, 2002: 3 and 63: ‘the terms one uses even in description in history and sociology and the 
other social sciences are invariably ethically coloured’; and for the history, or tradition of the concept 
of ‘fact’see Shapiro, 1994: 245; and Shapiro, 2000: 3, 9, 11, 60, 107 and 110 (the notion of fact in medi-
eval common law procedure was drawn from romano-canonical tradition and then adopted by other 
disciplines, though ‘fact’ in law was only an issue placed before a jury, either fictional or real, and came 
to be an ‘established truth’ only under the influence, notably, of Bacon, Hobbes, and contemporary 
scientific thought).
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well received, such that the concept of an exclusive system is now challenged from 
within. Once this happens, once it is recognised that there is challenge by lawyers, 
raising justiciable issues, to the exclusivity of the system, the system can be made 
to respond, to argue back, and even to yield to other forms of normativity which 
thus come to be recognised as law. In Canada, until the 1970s, the Canadian gov-
ernment rejected negotiation of claims of aboriginal or chthonic peoples as being 
too ‘vague’ for legal recognition (a very systemic view). This position changed 
once the Supreme Court recognised the justiciability of these claims.13 A tradition 
of unwritten law was thus recognised as a legal tradition; and as a legal tradition it 
required a response from the state legal system, now more clearly recognisable as 
an alternative tradition and no longer as a large, silent, and immovable object. In 
Australia as well, the lex non scripta of the Australian aborigines is now explicitly 
designated as ‘traditional law’. The concept of tradition is thus a roomy one. It 
encompasses many different types of law, including that of the state. And since 
tradition is defined in terms of information, the information of each tradition 
is accessible to the others, so the possibilities of dialogue and conciliation are 
enhanced. 
The concept of tradition thus allows a better understanding of state law, and 
a better understanding of other laws which may be raised within its territory. 
Tradition is also the best explanation of much transnational law (a third avenue of 
exploration), which exists in diverse and variable form, but in all instances as nor-
mative information, the force of which increases to the extent that it is recognised 
as a traditional source of law. This is why very sophisticated and contemporary 
forms of international commercial legal practice are designated as lex mercatoria. 
They would be legitimated by their classification within a body of commercial 
normativity that has prevailed and been recognised for centuries. Tradition is 
also the only conceptual means of recognition of religious laws (without doing 
violence to revelation) which consider themselves incompatible with western 
notions of system or culture.
As normative information, tradition simply goes with the flow. There are no 
inherent boundaries to tradition, as is the case with systems, though particular 
traditions such as that of the nation state may construct boundaries for them-
selves. Traditions function according to multivalent forms of logic and tolerate 
diversity (see Glenn, 2007).They have large and roomy middle grounds. The tra-
dition of the Anglo-American and Commonwealth common law is a good exam-
ple of this, existing as it does in various, often contradictory forms throughout 
the world while maintaining a recognisable identity as a common law. Traditions 
thus do not conflict and compete for space (though nothing prevents people from 
doing so), but rather influence, through a process of com-paring. It has been said 
recently that the concept of tradition has become, in the last quarter of a century, 
the ‘dominant paradigm’ in understanding the world’s laws, and that this is so 
13 Calder v British Columbia [1973] SCR 313, 34 DLR (3d) 145.
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because the concept of tradition would look ‘beyond … legal systems and fami-
lies as static and isolated entities’ (Reimann, 2002.:677; and see Merryman, 1985; 
Glendon, Gordon and Osakwe, 1994; Zimmermann, 1996; and Glenn, 2004a). 
Traditions thus allow for convivencia, and the study of legal traditions and their 
ongoing relations with one another should therefore not be a distinct, marginal 
and boring process, but an integrated, vital and challenging part of what is known 
as globalisation.
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
 1.  Why would the notion of exclusive state law have developed in the par-
ticular circumstances of Europe and nowhere else in the world? Why 
does this question challenge positivist explanations of legal  systems?
 2.  Would tradition be too vague in its definition of law to allow legal practice 
to continue? Would it be the case that a particular tradition, such as that of 
a legal system, would allow for formal identification of law where this was 
thought necessary? To what extent do you think legal practice, as practice, 
is systemic in character?
 3.  Is the reason why different legal traditions are not taught because most law 
professors don’t know anything about them? Why would this be so? Is it a 
justification?
 4.  To what extent is the study of different legal traditions encumbered by 
problems of language? Is it necessary to learn about a law in its original 
language? Can a law exist and be effectively applied only in unilingual 
form? What is the linguistic history of ‘the’ common law?
 5.  If account must increasingly be taken in the world of different legal tradi-
tions, will this be an obstacle to development and commercial efficiency? 
If so, is this a good thing or a bad thing?
 6.  Why is the discipline of private international law not compatible with a 
process of com-paring of laws?
 7.   Why is a comparative law process of classifying the different laws of the 
world into different legal families (civil law, common law, islamic law, etc) 
not compatible with a process of com-paring of laws?
 8.  Why is a course in comparative law not compatible with a generalised pro-
cess of com-paring of laws? Is public international law part of the solution 
or part of the problem?
 9.  How can an argument be made (it is now being made) that, say, the com-
mon law is more efficient than the civil law? What criteria of comparison 
could be used? Is there such an entity as the common law or the civil law 
(as opposed to particular manifestations of them) the efficiency of which 
can be judged in the abstract? 
10. Why do legal exchange programmes not involve any com-paring of laws? 
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5Defining and Using the Concept of Legal 
Culture
DAVID NELKEN
KEY CONCEPTS
Internal legal culture; External legal culture; Coherence; Units; Explanation 
and interpretation; Circular argument; Relational legal culture; Reflexivity.
I.  INTRODUCTION
T
he term legal culture is both widely used and as regularly criticised in 
academic works which try to bring together socio-legal studies and com-
parative law. One author who had previously named his book Dutch Legal 
Culture has preferred to replace it with the less question-begging ‘Dutch law in 
action’ (Blankenberg and Bruinsma, 1995; and Bruinsma, 2000). Even Lawrence 
Friedman, responsible for introducing the concept into the sociology of law, has 
recently described it as ‘an abstraction and a slippery one’, and now says that he 
is not sure he would want to reinvent it (Friedman, 2006). Yet the term, like the 
word culture itself, seems to be one that we cannot do without. As a recent World 
Bank study reported: 1
Legal culture is often considered as a given feature of the local environment to which 
proposed legal reform projects must adapt; many argue that legal and judicial reform 
programs must be tailored to fit local legal culture or they will fail. Other times, the pre-
vailing legal culture itself may be the object of reform, rather than merely a constraint. 
Thus, understanding the arguments related to the concept of legal culture will become 
increasingly important for aspiring legal reformers. Does the legal system not work well 
because people distrust the courts, or do people distrust the courts because the legal 
1 World Bank:
Http://72.14.221.104/search? q=cache:YebgTjDewqAJ:www1.
worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/ruleoflawandevelopment
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system doesn’t work well? Is the introduction of a new contract law unlikely to have 
an effect because the business culture prefers informal deals with family and friends, 
or does the preference for informal dealing exist only because no one has yet passed an 
efficient contract law? These sorts of problems are not easy to resolve, especially because 
the causality clearly runs in both directions, and the interactions between beliefs and 
actions are extraordinarily complex.
As this use of the term suggests, the promise of the concept of the legal culture 
for many comparative lawyers is the part it can play in specific efforts at  socio-
legal engineering stimulated by the current round of legal transplantation. But it 
is relevant more generally to any enquiry in comparative law that seeks to explore 
similarities and differences in legal practices and legal worlds. How far are legal 
systems trying to do the same thing (and how could we tell)? What are the deeper 
sources of rules and procedures? What, if anything, sets the limits of variation 
within and between given systems? Unlike the tired categories of ‘families of law’, 
a focus on legal culture directs us to examine the interconnections between law, 
society and culture as they are manifested also in the ‘law in action’ and the  ‘living 
law’.
The best work using the idea of legal culture typically starts from some puzzle 
about the relationship between the role and the rule of law within given societies.2 
Why do the United Kingdom and Denmark complain most about the imposi-
tion of European Union law but then turn out to be the countries which have 
the best records of obedience? Why does The Netherlands, otherwise so similar, 
have such a low litigation rate compared to neighbouring Germany? Why in the 
United States and the United Kingdom does it often take a sex scandal to create 
official interest in doing something about corruption, whereas in Latin countries 
it takes a major corruption scandal to excite interest in marital unfaithfulness!? 
Why have constitutional courts managed to consolidate themselves in some post-
communist societies but not in others—and why are they emerging now in East 
Asia? Why are the higher courts in Latin American countries such as Chile or 
Columbia currently seeking to guarantee minimum social security rights despite 
the ‘formalistic legal culture’ that is alleged to characterise their role? How does 
this connect, if at all, with the neo-liberal policies being pursued on the advice of 
the Chicago-educated technocrats in government? 
On the other hand, the concept of legal culture will be of little assistance to 
us in investigating these and other similar questions if we cannot achieve some 
degree of agreement on what it means and how it should be used. Hence the 
task of this chapter. I shall first discuss debates about legal culture and consider 
some of the alternative terms on offer. I shall then go on to examine some of the 
difficulties in using the concept. I shall consider in particular how to demarcate 
2 There is insufficent space to provide references to the many case studies relevant to the theme of 
legal culture. For examples, see Blankenburg, 1997 and Ginsburg, 2003. 
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units of legal culture, how to imagine what gives them their coherence, and how 
to avoid the problem of circular argument when using the term in explanations 
of legally-related behaviour. 
II.  DEFINING LEGAL CULTURE
What is the point in calling a particular pattern of behaviour, opinions or 
ideas an instance of legal culture, and what follows from this? As with 
descriptions such as ‘legal system’ or ‘legal process’, many of those who adopt 
the term do so at a minimum so as to alert prospective readers (or librarians) 
to expect their work to include some discussion of the behaviour or ideas of 
legal professions or courts in a given place or time. The term also suggests, 
explicitly or implicitly, the existence of some larger historically or geographically 
defined entity that gives law some commonalities (see, eg Gessner, Hoeland and 
Varga, 1996; and Varga, 1992). If we are to develop legal culture as a ‘term of art’ 
we will need to think more carefully about what exactly we are talking about. 
Taken generally, the terms ‘law’ and ‘culture’ when brought together cover a large 
range of possible permutations of law in culture or culture in law (Fizpatrick, 
2005). These meanings can include law seen as a cultural artefact, rather 
than merely as a form of social engineering (Kahn, 1999); law as it becomes 
present in every-day life experience, or as filtered through the media (Sarat 
and Kearns, 1993; Sarat and Kearns, 1998), or even the significance of law in 
accommodating cultural defences or protecting cultural treasures (Cotterrell, 
2004). In one common use (outside of English language jurisdictions) the 
term signifies the aspiration towards the ‘culture of legality’, the nearest, though 
not perfect equivalent, to which in English is ‘the rule of law’. This meaning is 
particularly common in those jurisdictions, or parts of jurisdictions (for example 
in the former Soviet Union, Latin America or the south of Italy) where state 
rules are systematically avoided or evaded. In such cases talk of ‘legal culture’ 
is intended to underline the normative goal of getting ‘legality’ into the culture 
of everyday social and political life, so as to re-orient the behaviour of such 
populations towards (state) law.
As this shows, legal culture is a term that can be used prescriptively as well as 
descriptively. What is meant by the ‘legal’ in the term legal culture? Legal and 
social scientific answers may not be the same. Both law and culture are words 
whose interpretation and definition have illocutionary effects (‘this is the law’, 
‘that behaviour is inconsistent with our culture’). Likewise the term legal culture 
can be used by judges or others within the legal system or the culture so as to 
make claims about what is, or is not, consonant with a given body of law, prac-
tices or ideals. This use, prescriptive even as it purports to be descriptive, helps 
‘make’ the facts it purports to describe or explain. So, one interesting way, espe-
cially for jurists (Rebuffa and Blankenburg, 1992) to study legal culture would 
be as an attempt to understand such actors’ attempts to describe, ascribe, or 
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produce coherence in the course of their decision-making.3 As argued by Jeremy 
Webber,
[t]he concept of culture is not so much a way of identifying highly specified and tightly 
bounded units of analysis, than, as a heuristic device for suggesting how individual 
decision-making is conditioned by the language of normative discussion, the set of 
historical reference points, the range of solutions proposed in the past, the institutional 
norms taken for granted, given a particular context of repeated social interaction. The 
integrity of cultural explanations does not depend upon the “units” being exclusive, fully 
autonomous, or strictly bounded. Rather, it depends upon there being sufficient density 
of interaction to generate distinctive terms of evaluation and debate. When there is that 
density, any examination of decision-making in that context will want to take account 
of those terms (Webber, 2004: 32). 
On the other hand, the classical starting point for those aiming to use the term 
for explanatory purposes is the work of Lawrence Friedman. Friedman first intro-
duced his version of the concept in the late 1960s, modelling it on the idea of 
political culture seen as the key to understanding voting patterns and other factors 
which shape political systems. He still chooses to define it as
what people think about law, lawyers and the legal order, it means ideas, attitudes, 
 opinions and expectations with regard to the legal system (Friedman 2006: 189).
In more elaborated discussions, however, he helpfully distinguishes ‘internal’ legal 
culture—which acknowledges the special role in the law of judges and other legal 
professionals and scholars—from what he calls ‘external’ legal culture which refers 
especially to those individuals or groups who bring pressure to bear on the law to 
produce social change. Friedman has argued that internal legal culture as a factor 
in explaining socio-legal change has tended to be exaggerated, usually by those 
who have an investment in doing so. He prefers to concentrate on the impor-
tance of external legal culture, for example giving attention to increasing public 
demand for legal remedies—what he calls the drive to ‘Total Justice’ (Friedman, 
1985; Friedman, 1990)—as the predominant force for producing legal and social 
change. 
Friedman has no monopoly over the definition of legal culture. For example, 
Erhard Blankenburg (a leading European sociologist of law) defines legal culture 
to include four components: law in the books; law in action as channelled by 
the institutional infrastructure; patterns of legally relevant behaviour; and legal 
consciousness, particularly, a distinctive attitude toward the law among legal pro-
fessionals (Blankenburg and Bruinsma, 1995). In the United States, on the other 
hand, most socio-legal scholars following on from Friedman have placed their 
main focus on exploring the legal consciousness of those subject to the law. In 
3 Philosophers of law have sought to understand the activities of the various legal professionals and 
jurists who bear the responsibility of (re)producing such purported coherence, by making reference to 
the ‘rule of recognition’ or to the ideal of ‘law as integrity’, but the sort of coherence at issue for them 
is, above all, normative consistency.
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adapting Friedman’s approach for comparative enquiries, a broad definition that 
best alerts us to the range of possibly different features of foreign systems may be 
helpful. As I have proposed,
[l]egal culture, in its most general sense, should be seen as one way of describing rela-
tively stable patterns of legally-oriented social behaviour and attitudes. The identifying 
elements of legal culture range from facts about institutions such as the number and role 
of lawyers or the ways judges are appointed and controlled, to various forms of behav-
iour such as litigation or prison rates, and, at the other extreme, more nebulous aspects 
of ideas, values, aspirations and mentalities. Like culture itself, legal culture is about who 
we are, not just what we do (Nelken, 2004: 1).
Debates around legal culture may be confusing because authors can disagree 
not only over the question of what is true of a given legal culture (which should 
presuppose agreement about what they mean by the term itself), but also about 
how best to think about and study legal culture as such. An important example of 
the first kind of disagreement (involving both inside observers and outside com-
mentators) is the variety of answers offered to the question of why the Japanese, 
despite living in the world’s second most successful economy, make relatively little 
use of the courts. In the 1950s it was conventional to adopt ‘harmony culture’ 
explanations, which treated Japan’s legal culture as an expression of the influ-
ence of Confucian shaped-culture that emphasised harmonious and hierarchical 
relationships. But by the 1970s and 1980s this approach had fallen out of favour 
relative to more structural explanations that argued that the limited numbers of 
legal professionals and courts represented institutional barriers maintained by 
government bureaucracies and business elites, to protect their corporatist agree-
ments from the unpredictability of court interventions. Discussion continues, 
with some authors suggesting that Japan sometimes makes more use of courts 
than other places (Feldman, 1997; Feldman, 2001; Feldman, 2006), and others 
arguing that Japan offers an example of non-legally obsessed communitarianism 
that has special merits (Nottage, 2006 ).
Are litigation rates the key to understanding legal culture? Some  contributors 
to the Japanese debate questioned this (Hamilton and Sanders, 1992). But they 
are central to the work of Blankenburg (Blankenburg, 2003). In one of his 
best known studies he set out to explain the much lower use of courts in The 
Netherlands as compared to adjoining parts of West Germany, two places which 
otherwise had so much in common (Blankenburg, 1997). The answer provided 
by Blankenburg was that these rates depended less on what people want from 
law than on the availability of other institutional possibilities for dealing with 
their disputes and claims. The Netherlands, he argued, possessed a much wider 
range of ‘infrastructural’ avenues for disposing of cases in ways that did not 
require court litigation as compared to Germany. In opposition to Friedman, 
Blankenburg stresses the importance of the ‘supply’ rather than the ‘demand’ for 
law. He claims that his ‘natural experiment’ showed the overriding explanatory 
role that should be attributed to institutional ‘infrastructures’. He concluded, 
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perhaps over-confidently ‘there is no legal culture outside existing legal institu-
tions’: the influence of ‘folk’ or general cultural mentalities may therefore be safely 
ignored.
III.  THE QUESTION OF CULTURE
For some writers however, the issue is not just what is true of a given legal culture, 
or even whether it is more shaped by demand or supply, but whether the term is 
one worth holding on to at all. The objections have to do with the use of the term 
‘culture’ in legal culture. What is involved in describing a given set of ideas and 
behaviour as ‘culture’? For many critics culture has too wide a variety of meanings 
for it to be a serviceable concept. Is culture a determining source of behaviour or 
only a ‘tool kit’ that can be drawn on selectively? Which option is intended can 
make all the difference to what is being claimed in using the term. Though the 
term has become increasingly important in many disciplines, strangely, anthro-
pologists, who originally developed the term, have found its common meanings 
less and less illuminating for the purpose of explanation (Kuper, 1999). 
‘Over the last two decades’, writes Sally Merry, 
anthropology has elaborated a conception of culture as unbounded, contested, and 
connected to relations of power. It does not consist only of beliefs and values but also 
practices, habits, and common-sensical ways of doing things. The contemporary anthro-
pological understanding of culture envisions a far more fluid, contested, and changing 
set of values and practices than that provided by the idea of culture as tradition. Culture 
is the product of historical influences rather than evolutionary change. Its boundaries 
are fluid, meanings are contested, and meaning is produced by institutional arrange-
ments and political economy. Culture is marked by hybridity and creolization rather 
than uniformity or consistency. Local systems are analysed in the context of national 
and transnational processes and are understood as the result of particular historical 
trajectories. This is a more dynamic, agentic, and historicised way of understanding 
culture (Merry, 2003: 55 at 69). 
Certainly, great care must be taken in employing any concept which makes ref-
erence to culture. We shall need to avoid reifying national or other stereotypes, 
and recognise that much that goes under the name of culture is no more than 
‘imagined communities’ or ‘invented traditions’. It is easy to fall into the opposed 
vices of ‘Occidentalism’ or ‘Orientalism’, making other cultures seem either neces-
sarily similar or intrinsically ‘other’ (Cain, 2000). If culture is, to a large extent, 
a matter of struggle and disagreement, the purported uniformity, coherence or 
stability of given national or other cultures will often be no more than a rhetori-
cal claim projected by outside observers or manipulated by elements within the 
culture concerned. Any assumption that long-standing historical patterns cannot 
be altered can be ‘dystopic’ and may block possible reforms (Krygier, 1997). Legal 
culture, like all culture, is a product of the contingencies of history and is always 
undergoing change (Nelken, 1995). For our purposes it can be salutary to recall 
Defining and Using the Concept of Legal Culture  115
the rapid transformations in attitudes towards ‘law and order’ in the short period 
that elapsed from Weimar to Hitlerian Germany. But, on the other hand, we 
should note that Merry herself still uses the term. Even invented traditions may of 
course be real in their effects. Whilst talk of ‘culture wars’ is often exaggerated, it 
would be equally mistaken to assume that cultural differences do not exist—of all 
kinds and at many levels—or deny that some of these may indeed clash.
Critics of legal culture see it as inevitably carrying the inconsistent or misleading 
referents that come with the term culture. Patrick Glenn reminds us that cultures 
should not be treated as ‘super organic’, or ‘substantive, bounded entities’, but rather 
seen as ‘shreds and patches remaking themselves’ (Glenn, 2004). But, whilst legal 
actors do (perhaps must?) work with some such ideas of culture as normative pre-
suppositions, few sociologists of law actually make such assumptions. At this time of 
export and import of legal institutions and ideas it would be implausible indeed to 
see cultures as closed and self-referential. Friedman, on the contrary, argues that law 
is necessarily converging, and has written about the development of global culture 
(Friedman, 1994), again, if anything, underestimating the continuing importance 
of national boundaries, or the persistence of alternative ways of dealing with poten-
tially law related troubles (see, eg Engel, 2005). But it is a fair criticism of Friedman’s 
approach to legal culture to say that it does not seem to have been influenced by 
the ‘interpretive turn’ in the social sciences. He seems unconcerned as Glenn puts it, 
that ‘culture may be an effect of our descriptions, not its precondition’. The need to 
treat attempts to interpret culture as part of the object itself is certainly one key way 
in which notions of culture have changed since Friedman borrowed his term from 
discussions of political culture. 
Those who think that there is no way of avoiding the pit-falls if we talk of cul-
ture, suggest that it would be better to use other terms than legal culture to do the 
same job. There is no shortage of such alternatives: these include living law, the 
law in action; epistemes, mentalities, and formants; legal traditions, legal ideology, 
legal fields, legal or regulatory styles, and even path dependency. Insofar as the 
underlying issue is what (if anything) holds a legal and social system together, a 
challenge to the whole ‘law and society’ paradigm comes from Niklas Luhmann’s 
autopoiesis theory (see, eg Teubner, 1998; and Nelken, 2001). Those who prefer 
other terms will point to their virtues as compared to legal culture (and say less 
about their own drawbacks). Patrick Glenn, himself an advocate of the term legal 
tradition, argues that it is more natural to speak of non-traditional behaviour and 
innovation than to make the same point when using the term culture. Talking 
about traditions, he adds, suggests overlap rather than closure because within a 
given tradition there is always a range of creative possibilities. The very existence 
of a tradition is necessarily a result of persuasive argument and interpretation. For 
Glenn, because tradition is a matter of ‘information’ it is hard to reify it as some-
thing ‘beyond us’. He also suggests that all societies have a notion of tradition, 
but not all use the term culture. As against this, however, others might argue that 
tradition can also be a confusing term, and it has often been said to be one that 
tends too easily to distract attention from questions of power and interest. 
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The choice between terms will also be influenced by wider theoretical assump-
tions about the role of law in society. Roger Cotterrell, who favours legal ideology, 
claims that such a term offers us a focus on the ideas of legal professionals and 
jurists and their influence over popular consciousness. One of the main questions 
that interests him is how law succeeds in being at the same time both fragmented 
and abstract; how it pretends to be a gapless system while filling in the gaps. For 
Cotterrell this provides us with a well-defined topic suitable for empirical investi-
gation. But of course it is only one such topic. As opposed to Friedman’s interest 
in the permeability of law to social demands, the concept of ideology draws our 
attention to the way rules and values of law resist modification and thrive on their 
inconsistencies. As this suggests, there is no easy way to choose a priori which 
concept to employ. What is important is to be clear what we mean by whatever 
term we adopt, and why we think that it, rather than an alternative concept, could 
best serve the purpose of our particular enquiry (rather than fall into the error of 
thinking that ‘when you have a hammer, everything is a nail’). Those preferring 
the terms ‘legal tradition’ and ‘legal ideology’ might find, for example, that these 
were not necessarily well suited to explaining why countries differ in their levels 
of court delay (Nelken, 2004; and Nelken, 2006a). Or, more exactly, they would 
need to think about what aspects of the problem their terms might be less likely 
to illuminate as compared to a more open-ended focus on legal culture. 
IV.  USING THE CONCEPT OF LEGAL CULTURE
As this suggests, the value of this or any other concept for comparative enquiry 
can also be clarified by seeking to use it in empirical enquiries. As social scientists 
say, this requires that the concept be ‘operationalised’. The difficulties here are well 
posed in Roger Cotterrell’s influential, highly critical, observations on Friedman’s 
use of the term.4 As he notes, Friedman used legal culture in a variety of ways 
raging from the culture of the individual to that of whole societies. In his work 
legal culture becomes, ‘an immense, multi-textured overlay of levels and regions 
of culture, varying in content, scope, and influence and in their relation to the 
institutions, practices and knowledge of state legal systems’ (Cotterrell, 1997). For 
Cotterrell this makes it implausible to use legal culture in explanatory enquiries. 
In theory, he says, such a variety of level of super- and sub-national units could 
provide a rich terrain for inquiry. But he nonetheless rejects the idea that legal 
 culture can be reflected in ‘diversity and levels’ whilst also having a ‘unity’. For 
him,
if legal culture refers to so many levels and regions of culture (with the scope of each 
of these ultimately indeterminate because of the indeterminacy of the scope of the idea 
of legal culture itself) the problem of specifying how to use the concept as a theoretical 
component in comparative sociology for law remains (Cotterrell, 1997).
4 Cotterrell, 1997. Friedman’s reply to Cotterrell is Friedman, 1997. Cotterrell, 2006 is less damning.
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Other commentators have also questioned its role in explanation (Kenny, 1996). 
These objections are well taken. What needs more consideration, however, is how 
far, as I would argue, these problems point more to the complexities of what needs 
to be explained than to the inapproriateness of this conceptual tool.
Demarcating the Unit
Take first the theoretical problem of trying to delineate ‘the unit’ of legal culture.5 
Most books and articles on legal culture identify this with the boundaries of 
national jurisdictions. They write of French criminal justice (Hodgson, 2006), 
the Japanese way of justice (Johnson, 2002), and (for two editions) Dutch legal 
culture etc.6 Likewise, leading scholars currently debate the specificity or even the 
‘exceptionalism’ of the United States’ type of legal procedure (see, eg Garapon and 
Papadopoulos, 2003) by showing its high level of ‘adversarial legalism’ (Kagan, 
2001) or severity of its punishments (Whitman 2003). But books about legal 
 culture do not have to take the same starting point as those which describe a 
 system’s ‘law in the books’. In comparative law, studies using the notion of families 
of law make uneasy compromises between taking for granted the importance of 
differences between systems of common and civil law, or other such contrasts, and 
also seeking to acknowledge national variations. Thus The Netherlands and Italy 
are both members of the civil law world. But any similarities this may give rise to 
in legal culture are dwarfed by the greater similarities between England and Wales 
and The Netherlands in their pragmatic approach to law or openness to public 
opinion. Legal culture is also not necessarily uniform (organisationally and mean-
ingfully) across different branches of law (see Bell, 2002). Lawyers  specialising in 
some subjects may have less in common with other lawyers outside their field 
than they have with those abroad. 
Patterns of legal culture can and must also be sought both at a more micro- as 
well as at a more macro-level than the nation state. At the sub-national level there 
can be as much variation as between different areas of a nation state (and groups 
within it) as there is between one state and another, and this is all the more likely 
when we study less industrialised and/or less consolidated states. More than this, 
at this level it will often be of interest to study differences in the ‘local legal  culture’ 
of the local court, the prosecutor’s office, or the lawyer’s consulting room. As 
important, there is also increasing need to consider those processes that transcend 
the nation state. The past regular transfers of legal institutions and ideas make it 
often misleading to argue that legal culture is embedded in its current national 
context (Nelken, 2006b; Nelken, 2006c). Much domestic law in Europe in the 19th 
5 The term ‘unit’ is not intended to carry any specific theoretical implications. It should not be 
limited to legally-defined jurisdictions or branches of law. It would be interesting, for example, to 
theorise such units as ‘structures of relation’ or ‘fields of action’. This also has implications for the issue 
of coherence discussed in the next part. 
6 This is also true of most of the chapters in this Handbook.
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century, such as the law of copyright, was mainly invented as a response to its 
existence elsewhere (Sherman, 1997). Some of the laws and legal institutions that 
people think of as most typically their own are the result of imitation, imposition 
or borrowing. Thus there are ‘Dutch’ disputing mechanisms which are in fact a 
result of German imposition during the occupation, and which have been aban-
doned in Germany itself (Jettinghof, 2001).
The adoption of dissimilar legal models is common where the legal transfer 
is imposed by third parties as part of a colonial project and/or is insisted on as a 
condition of trade, aid, alliance or diplomatic recognition. It has also often been 
sponsored by elites concerned to ‘modernise’ their society or otherwise bring 
it into the wider family of ‘advanced’ nations. Japan and Turkey are the most 
obvious examples. In these cases imported or imposed law is designed to change 
existing contexts rather than reflect them.7 Likewise, the hope in many cases of 
current transplants is that law may be a means of resolving current problems by 
transforming the existing society into one more like the source of such borrowed 
law. In what is almost a species of sympathetic magic, borrowed law is sometimes 
deemed capable of bringing about the same conditions of a flourishing economy 
or a healthy civil society that are found in the social context from which the bor-
rowed law has been taken. In Eastern Europe legal transfer becomes part of the 
effort to become (or to be seen to be) more democratic, or more economically 
successful. Turkey, with its eye on accession to the European Union, tries to make 
its laws appear (even) more secular. Those who study these transfers, on the 
other hand, question their potential for producing change in the absence of the 
surrounding context from which they were taken, and emphasise how far such 
innovations are likely to be (re)shaped by the prevailing norms and ideas in the 
places will be applied and interpreted.8
Current developments leading to the increasing globalisation of markets and 
communications mean that the role of super-national entities, organisations and 
networks goes well beyond cases of simple legal transfers (Heyderbrand, 2001). 
The boundaries of the nation state as a unit are regularly traversed as transna-
tional public and semi-public networks substitute, to an increasing extent, for 
national governments in building a ‘real new world order’ (Slaughter, 1997). The 
language of transplants is not well suited to studying new forms of norm- making, 
dispute-channelling and regulation such as the growth of the lex mercatoria, the 
use of ‘soft law’ or other non-binding agreements and persuasive practices by 
international regulators, nor the use of their power to enforce private orders by 
7 Thus, South Africa modeled its new constitution on the best that Western regimes had to offer 
rather than on constitutional arrangements found in its nearer neighbours in Africa. 
8 Nelken, 2003. Commenting on the introduction of United States-style business governance in 
Japan, John Ohnesorge argues that, 
 the proper functioning of that institutional framework depends upon what are, in essence, 
cultural norms, expectations and practices. Truly adopting US-style corporate governance thus 
becomes a matter of importing US business and professional culture more generally (Ohnesorge, 
2006).
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multinational companies. The use of lex mercatoria, for example, is said to ‘break 
the frame’ of national jurisdiction. The multiple orders that grow up produce what 
Santos calls ‘interlegality’, a term that describes ‘a highly dynamic process’ where 
different legal spaces are ‘nonsychronic’ and result in ‘uneven and unstable com-
binations of legal codes (codes in a semiotic sense)’ (Santos, 1995: 473). 
Lawyers and accountants also play an increasing role as entrepreneurs of new 
forms of dispute prevention and settlement (Dezalay and Garth, 1996), mainly, 
if not entirely, so as to service the increasingly important international busi-
ness community. In turn, the opportunities for such activity transform the legal 
profession(s). The importance of private actors has also altered as a result of the 
growth of multinational and international production networks, new technol-
ogy, and changes in work patterns. Rule-formulation and settlement increasingly 
takes place within new agencies of transnational governance, such as North 
Atlantic Trade Association (NAFTA), the Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), and the World Trade Organisation. Legal fields are 
increasingly internationalised, even if this process does not affect all fields to the 
same extent and varies by different areas of legal and social regulation. All this 
means that it makes less and less sense to think of ‘domestic’ norms as forming 
part of distinct national jurisdictions that then interact with transnational norms. 
As important, for those seeking to mark the limits of culture, it becomes ever 
more difficult to set boundaries to our imaginations and expectations: ‘we inhabit’ 
it is argued, a ‘de-territorialised world’. We can participate via the media in com-
munities of others with whom we have no geographical proximity or  common 
history. Hence,
all totalising accounts of society, tradition and culture are exclusionary and enact 
a social violence by suppressing contingent and continually emergent differences 
(Coombe, 2000: 21–40).
Instead, we must face the ‘challenges of transnationalism and the politics of global 
capitalism or multiple overlapping and conflicting “juridiscapes”’ (ibid). At the 
same time, however, even networks are themselves shaped by different contexts. 
As Merry suggests, to keep track of these transnational flows we need to find ways 
to study ‘placeless phenomena in a place’ (Merry, 2005: 44).
In advance of empirical investigation it would therefore be rash to assume 
any necessary ‘fit’ between law and its environing national society or culture. But 
claims about the decline of the nation state can no doubt be taken too far. Given 
the way it often sets boundaries of jurisdiction, politics, and language, the nation 
state will often serve as a relevant starting point for comparing legal culture. Where 
law is deliberately used as a unifying state-building device, practices focusing on 
law may have even more in common than general culture does. The state will also 
often be the main or only source of relevant statistics of such matters as litigation 
or incarceration rates. Beyond law, there is some empirical basis for claimed dif-
ferences in national traits in the way people relate to each other (Hofstedte, 1980). 
Such different, historically conditioned (but therefore also changing) sensibilities 
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may persist over quite long periods.9 And even apparently unconnected branches 
of law may in fact manifest remarkable levels of cultural similarity within a given 
society. As James Whitman has claimed recently, in replying to criticisms of his 
culturalist approach to penal law,
the pattern that we see in comparative punishment is also the pattern we see in many 
other areas of the law. Indeed, I would claim it as a virtue of my book that it shows that 
punishment law cannot be understood in isolation from the rest of the legal culture. 
For example, American workplace harassment law differs from German and French 
workplace harassment law in very much the same way. The same is true of comparative 
privacy law … just as it is true of the law of hate speech and everyday civility … I think 
these studies carry cumulative weight (Whitman, 2006: 389 at 392).
THE NATURE OF COHERENCE 
On the other hand, it would certainly be wrong to limit our enquiry to the nation 
state. As we have seen, we also need to apply the term ‘legal culture’ to a variety 
of different units, each of which is changing and in a relationship of mutual 
interaction with the others. These units shape social life in a variety of ways, for 
example through organisational routines and professional  socialisation (at both 
sub-national, national, international and transnational levels). Culture is sedi-
mented both in historical memories and traditions as well as in more general, 
relatively taken-for-granted, types of practices, attitudes, expectations and ways 
of thinking. Cotterrell is right to remind us that these units may not add up to 
a ‘unity’—except from the point of view of those whose job it is to try to show 
them to be coherent. But, rather than serving to show the concept to be otiose, 
this may be taken to testify to the intricacies of lived legal culture with its mix of 
overlapping and potentially competing elements (a complexity also encountered 
by those comparative lawyers who focus on societies with plural legal orders). 
How do we show that these units serve as the source of cultural patterns of 
ideas and behaviour? What is involved may be captured in any one or more of the 
following claims:
(1)  that there is some intrinsic link between the elements that make up the 
unit;
(2)  that the connection exists insofar as participants talk about it ‘as if ’ it 
exists; or 
(3)  that the supposed coherence is one imposed on units by the observer 
and commentator, for example through processes of classifications or the 
construction of ‘ideal types’. 
For many purposes these three forms of coherence may need to be carefully 
distinguished. Certainly, all students of culture know how important it is to take 
9 But careful historical research is needed to avoid confusing short-term and long-term trends.
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seriously what participants think they are trying to do—since this is what gives 
meaning and purpose to their actions. But this has to be balanced against the need 
for analytic distance. Often, claims about legal culture will need to rely on data 
or findings about comparative patterns that may be unknown to the participants 
themselves. The insider does not know, and cannot know everything that the 
observer would consider relevant to her comparative enquiry. 
For example, even well-informed people living in India think that the courts 
are slow because the country has such a relatively high rate of litigation. But they 
are wrong (Galanter and Krishnan, 2003). Americans, as well as many others, 
are convinced that US tort system regularly produces excessive and undeserved 
awards, but it turns out that, in large part, this impression is manufactured by 
the media (Haltom and McCaan, 2004). More generally, those societies where 
legal professionals express least concern for what Anglo-American writers since 
Roscoe Pound have called the ‘gap’ or gulf between the ‘law in books’ and ‘law in 
action’, may not be those where the gap is least problematic but those where the 
gap is overwhelming. 
On the other hand, there are also difficulties in drawing boundaries when dis-
cussing processes which seek to draw boundaries. How far are we finding, how 
far only imposing, cultural coherence? Certainly, these three types of coherence 
may also have effects on each other, when participants, including legal actors or 
observers, make claims about the existence of cultural patterns which then help 
bring them into existence. The coherence of any given pattern of legal culture may 
be something ascribed to the unit itself or else be something that relates more to 
the relationship of one unit to other units. Table 1 offers some illustrations of such 
variations of  coherence patterns that could be relevant for comparative enquiry. 
The first type of coherence (set out in cell 1) concerns the elements that are 
hypothesised to hold together units of internal or external legal culture. The 
most common kind of claim here has to do with the alleged coherence of a given 
internal legal culture or part of it. An example would be Damaska’s well-known 
attempt to show the contrasting ‘affinities’ between the rules of criminal  procedure 
in common law as compared to civil law countries (Damaska, 1986). With respect 
to external legal culture, on the other hand, we could note Friedman’s invitation 
to think about the shape of expectations towards law held by different groups, 
Table 1.  Varieties of coherence in units of legal culture
Internal Coherence External Coherence
(1)  That which holds together given units 
of internal or external legal culture
(3)  The relationship between legal culture 
and general culture
(2)  Legal culture in relation to political 
culture/economic culture, etc in the 
same unit
(4)  Given units of legal cultures as 
 compared to others
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in different times and places. But we could also include Cotterrell’s proposal 
that we presuppose ‘ideal types’ of community which have different propensities 
to structure their relationships in terms of law (Cotterrell, 2001). The second 
kind of internal coherence (cell 2), on the other hand, invites attention to vari-
ability in the connections between legal culture and other aspects of culture such 
as political culture or economic culture (Brants and Field, 2000). As we have 
already seen in Damaska’s argument, many commentators have suggested that 
in civil law, ‘strong state’ systems, law tends to be more linked to politics, whilst 
in common law systems it is more linked to the market. For this reason the 
privatisation encouraged by neo-liberalism and the de-coupling of law from 
politics associated with globalisation has been more of a ‘shock’ for the 
civilian world.
The third type of coherence (cell (3)) concerns the relationship between, on the 
one hand, legal ideas and, on the other, practices and ideas in the wider society. 
For example, it can be instructive to examine what there is in common between 
what are considered appropriate methods of truth-finding within and ‘outside’ 
of legal institutions (Chase, 2005). Are the same methods of persuasion found in 
law and other forms of enquiry? ‘Legal’ and ‘scientific’ forms of truth telling may 
be symbiotic because they use somewhat different approaches to truth finding. 
It is often assumed that the direction of influence is mainly from culture in gen-
eral to legal culture in particular. But those who argue for so-called constitutive 
theories of ‘law in society’ would see things also working the other way round. 
It is law, or at least different forms of ordering practices, which help shape com-
mon  behaviours and ideas (Calavita, 2001). Societies may also differ in the extent 
to which they encourage similarities in legal and wider cultural practices. An 
 insistence on ‘formalism’ in legal matters may often go together with the presup-
position that there is or should be less formalism in the ‘life world’ of ordinary 
social interaction.
The last type of coherence (cell (4)) refers to the traditional type of legal or 
socio-legal attempt to compare larger legal cultures as relatively independent 
units (often national ones). Scholars adopt a variety of ways to carry out such 
comparisons. Emphasis may be placed more on behaviour or on values. Freek 
Bruinsma, for example, as we have seen, is no longer happy to assume the 
 existence of Dutch legal culture as an objective matter that reflects differences 
in practices shaped by institutional ‘infrastructures’. He now argues that the 
 specificities of legal culture lie in social valuations; Dutch legal culture, as com-
pared to other legal cultures, is best understood if we consider the typically prag-
matic way the Dutch handle issues such as drugs, prostitution and  euthanasia 
(Bruinsma, 1998). As we have noted, we do not necessarily have to assume that 
the links we are describing are somehow intrinsic to the object being described. 
If the focus is on ‘perceived’ or even ‘invented’ and ‘imagined’ unities, research 
may then seek to show how such perceived or imagined  differences themselves 
help to reproduce the boundaries of culture.
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The Problem of Circular Argument
Even if we try to be clear about the unit that we wish to explore, and take care to 
specify the coherence that gives it its unity, we still have to face a further major 
hurdle in using the term legal culture for the purposes of explanation. As Roger 
Cotterrell and many others have objected, we need to avoid falling into the trap 
of ‘essentialism’ or ‘culturalism’, whereby circular arguments are simply assumed 
to show that cultural values cause a given response to events. Question: Why do 
they use law that way in Japan? Answer: Because that is their (legal) culture. Or, to 
put the point another way, when we talk about American or Japanese legal culture 
are we already offering some sort of explanation of behaviour or only indicating 
that which needs to be explained? Is legal culture the name of the question or the 
answer?
While this issue is a serious one, it should not be exaggerated. It is above all 
mainly relevant for those with an interest in prediction who hope to develop 
(positivist) social science explanations showing how variables produce outcomes. 
What legal factors correlate with economic growth? Which conditions are likely 
to determine whether this transplant takes or not? But not all scholars want to 
use the term for this purpose. Many comparative lawyers will be at least as inter-
ested in classification, mapping and description. How should we make sense of 
legal pluralism (Harding, 2001)? How should the phenomenon of ‘soft law’ be 
categorised (Heyderbrand, 2007)? What is there in common between current 
transnational legal processes (Nelken, 2006d)? More importantly, a central part 
of their work has to do with the type of understanding that can only be reached 
through interpretation (see eg Legrand, 1997). What does this legal institution, 
procedure or idea mean? What, if anything, is it trying to achieve? It could even 
be argued that by formulating their questions in this way scholars are more likely 
to be in tune with the many post-positivist schools of social science and cultural 
theorising that have endorsed the so-called ‘interpretative turn’ away from earlier 
mainstream ways of pursuing behavioural science. 
Whereas the positivist approach would seek to throw light on legal culture by 
seeking to assign causal priority between competing hypothetical variables, so as 
to explain variation in levels and types of legally related behaviour, the interpreta-
tive approach, on the other hand, would be more interested in providing ‘thick 
descriptions’ (Geertz, 1973) of law as ‘local knowledge’ (Geertz, 1983). It would 
see its task as doing its best faithfully to translate another system’s ideas of justice 
and fairness so as to make proper sense of its web of significance. It asks about the 
different nuances as between the terms ‘rule of law’, ‘Rechtsstaat’, or ‘Stato di diritto’ 
or the meanings of ‘community’ in different societies (Zedner, 1995). It seeks to 
understand why litigation is seen as essentially democratic in the United States, 
but as anti-democratic in France (Cohen-Tanugi, 1996/1985). In this search for 
holistic meaning, any insistence, for example, on distinguishing the ‘demand’ for 
law from the ‘supply’ of law, is likely to obscure more than it reveals and could lead 
to mistaken practical conclusions (Nelken, 1997). Arguably, if there are differences 
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in the significance attached to official law and legal institutions in Germany and in 
The Netherlands, then even if Germany had the same alternative routes to litiga-
tion that are present in The Netherlands they could well end up producing even 
more work for lawyers and courts.
For the interpretative approach, concepts both reflect and constitute culture; 
as in the changes undergone by the meaning of ‘contract’ in a society where the 
individual is seen as necessarily embodied in wider relationships (Winn, 1994), or 
the way that the Japanese ideogram for the new concept of ‘rights’ came to settle 
on a sign associated with ‘self interest’ rather than morality (Feldman, 1997). In 
order to test its hypotheses the positivist approach is obliged to develop a socio-
legal ‘Esperanto’ which abstracts from the language used by members of different 
cultures, preferring, for example, to talk of ‘decision-making’ rather than ‘discre-
tion’. The rival strategy, concerned precisely with grasping linguistic subtleties and 
‘cultural packaging’, would ask whether and when the term ‘discretion’ is used in 
different legal cultures and what implications the word carries (Nelken, 2002). 
Not least, the interpretative approach is quick to recognise the reflexivity of (legal) 
culture as ‘an enormous interplay of interpretations in and about a culture’ (J 
Friedman, 1994), and thus appreciate that the scholar may also be a (bit) player 
in the processes of legal culture that she seeks to understand. 
This said, rather than treating these approaches as necessarily in competition, 
explanation and interpretation will often be pursued as two complementary 
parts of the search for understanding culture (Nelken, 1994). Many, probably 
most, social scientists do still use terms like legal culture with explanatory intent. 
Friedman himself recommends the term as helpful in enquiries into why people 
use or do not use law, for instance why women do or do not turn for help to the 
police in Italy or France, or why Italian drivers are less likely than the English 
to wear seat belts. So, any effort to encourage a dialogue between comparative 
lawyers and social scientists must face the issue of circular argument head on. 
As Roger Cotterrell rightly noted, special difficulties here arise from the fact that 
Friedman applied the term not only to such variables but also to the units pro-
duced by such variables. While he treats legal culture as a cause of what he calls 
‘legal dynamics’, he also uses it to describe the results of such causes—writing, 
for example, about the traits of a variety of large aggregates such as ‘American 
culture’, ‘Latin American legal culture’ (Friedman and Perdomo, 2003), ‘modern 
legal culture’, and even ‘global legal culture’. Although what he means by legal 
culture when speaking of these aggregates does have a lot to do with people’s 
expectations of the law, the ‘traits’ he indicates as characterising modern legal 
culture are not only about such expectations; they also describe the results of 
such expectations.
To avoid confusion it would be best to distinguish between talking about 
legal culture as a variable having to do with attitudes, opinions and behav-
iour towards the law, and speaking about it as an aggregate (what Glenn calls 
‘a  holistic signifier’). For added clarity, legal culture as a variable describing 
 attitudes etc towards law could perhaps be re-labelled ‘legal consciousness’, as 
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in Table 2 below. Nonetheless, it would be a fallacy to assume that variables 
always explain, or that aggregates never do. The difference between legal cul-
ture as a variable and as an aggregate can often be slippery. We tend to think of 
aggregates as large, often national, units of legal culture, but all variables 
could also be seen for some purposes as aggregates. For example, attitudes to 
law, which Friedman treats mainly as a variable, could, where appropriate, be 
dis-aggregated into the different elements that make them up. This is even true 
at the level of the individual, where a person’s ‘attitude’ could be taken to repre-
sent the sum of opinions tested in a survey instrument. Conversely, aggregates 
can also ‘explain’. Even large aggregates, such as American legal culture, become 
variables when they act on or influence something else. Thus, as Table 2 below 
indicates, legal culture as variable and as aggregate serves both in making 
explanations, and a means of representing matters which themselves need to be 
explained. The key here is to recognise that the term legal culture may be used 
in a variety of different kinds of explanations. 
As indicated by Table 2, Friedman’s interest in legal culture as the term for why 
people turn to law can be examined as a topic that can serve both as an explana-
tion and as something that needs to be explained (cells (1) and (2)). Friedman’s 
approach tended to merge the question of understanding people’s demands on 
and expectations of the law with a range of somewhat different questions such 
as how law changed to meet the new needs created by technological change, or 
how powerful groups were able to bring pressure on law to shape it to suit their 
ends. But micro-social qualitative studies in sociology of law in the United States 
over the past 20 years have been especially concerned to probe the role of legal-
ity for different social actors as it emerges from their narratives about their lived 
experiences. They have tried not to assume that law is or should be a priority in 
everyday life and have sought to tease out its often contradictory role in people’s 
lives. Quantitative survey research has also shown that people distinguish between 
confidence in the technical efficiency of legal remedies and their views about its 
social legitimacy (Toharia, 2003). More recently there have been calls to recon-
sider the way macro-social factors shape the way law is presented to consciousness 
(Silbey, 2005; Garcia-Villegas, 2006). 
Table 2.   Explanations using the concept of legal culture 
Legal Consciousness Legal Culture
As Explanation (1) Feelings about the law 
and the choice to use law 
as one factor which shapes 
the legal system
(3) The influence exerted 
by given patterns of atti-
tudes etc.
As Needing Explanation (2) Why people choose to 
use or not to use the law
(4) Why given units of 
legal culture have different 
patterns
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The other two cells (3) and (4) have to do with legal culture seen holistically as 
both a tool of explanation and as something to be explained. Difficult theoreti-
cal issues that arise in using legal culture for these types of explanatory enquiry 
revolve around the question of how to mark off ‘the cultural’ from other types 
of motivation or aspects of collective life. Is culture something to be related to 
and contrasted with other aspects of society, for example, legal rules, institu-
tional resources or social structure? Or does its influence work through these? 
Should the term culture be reserved for irrational, or at least value-based action, 
rather than purely instrumental social action? If not, how else can we draw a line 
between culturally shaped behaviour and all other behaviour? In general, how far 
should (legal) culture be treated as a residual explanation of individual or collec-
tive action, to be resorted to only after other social, economic or political factors 
or reasons have been exhausted?
It is important to notice that cell (3), where the effort is to show how legal 
culture influences individual or group behaviour within a given society or unit, 
is the one in which the dangers of circular or tautological arguments are greatest. 
But there are plausible arguments for asserting such influence. These can range 
along a continuum in which, at one extreme, the term describes the consequences 
of giving allegiance to highly dramatised common values, and, at the other, cul-
ture refers to the implications of taking certain things for granted. Of especial 
interest in the current historical period is the phenomenon of what we might 
call ‘relational legal culture’, ie the extent to which attitudes and behaviour in 
one legal culture are influenced by information (or alleged information) about 
what is happening in legal cultures elsewhere. For example, there is evidence that 
when ‘league tables’ of legally-relevant behaviour such as incarceration rates are 
published, countries try to come into line so as not to be too distant from the 
norm or average of other countries. In a multitude of transnational economic, 
health, criminal justice, human rights and other initiatives, governmental and 
non-governmental agencies, networks of regulators and others exert pressure 
to change through processes of signalling and monitoring conformity (Nelken, 
2006d). One of the most pressing tasks of the comparative sociologist of law is 
to try and capture how far in actual practice what is described as globalisation 
represents the attempted imposition of one particular legal culture, in particular 
the Anglo-American model (Ferrarese, 2001). For Friedman, we are rather seeing 
a convergence towards the individualistic type of legal culture suited to the socio-
economic challenges of ‘modernity’ (Friedman, 1994). 
Where legal culture is that which needs to be explained rather than that which 
does the explaining (cell (4)) the risk of circular argument is less (but we still 
may find ourselves tempted to use one feature of legal culture to ‘explain’ another 
feature). On the other hand, this sort of enquiry risks becoming unwieldy and 
inconclusive. Almost everything about a society (or other unit) can turn out to 
be relevant to explaining why its legal culture, or even just one aspect of it, differs 
from another’s. Why does Italy, for example, have such long court delays? The 
answer involves looking at a long list of factors. In the first place there are the 
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 relevant laws, especially those to do with civil and criminal procedure. In addition, 
the role of the European Court of Human Rights is crucial in creating pressure 
for the Italian legal system to come into line. There is also the management and 
organisation (or lack of organisation) of the courts and legal profession, claims 
about the supply of law not keeping pace with the demand, economic interests, 
political priorities etc (Nelken, 2004). It can prove surprisingly difficult to decide 
which of these factors is crucial (especially as the relevant facts can be elusive). For 
example, comparative statistics suggest that Italy, too, has a comparatively low rate 
of litigation despite the continual complaint about court overload (Blankenburg, 
2003). Interpretations of these facts can be even more controversial. Do economic 
interests such as those represented by small businessmen gain from the current 
situation, or are they its chief victims? If the latter, why don’t they put more pres-
sure on the politicians to do something? 
V.  CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR REFLEXIVITY
In this chapter we have discussed some the meanings of legal culture as well as 
some of the benefits and problems of using this term in enquiries in comparative 
law. It should now be easier to appreciate why simply reframing questions about 
legal transfers or legal engineering in terms of the compatibility or potential 
 resistance of local legal culture will rarely, if ever, provide conclusive answers 
about what should be done. (But arguably this is also true of any other attempt 
to apply ideas in the world of practice.) We could add that legal culture as a term 
of art has not been developed mainly by comparative lawyers. Insofar as its roots 
lie in the social sciences, the comparative lawyer will have to ask herself how far, 
in using this term, she ‘buys into’ any larger set of theoretical ideas about law 
and society and related methodological protocols. Friedman uses the concept in 
the context of an input-output model of social systems and a pluralist view of 
power. But the sense of legal culture would certainly change if marshalled within 
 competing approaches such as those of Marx, Foucault, Bourdieu—or Luhmann. 
In addition, our understanding of the meaning of legal culture will need to change 
as scholarly ideas of culture change.
The main advantage of thinking about law in the same breath as culture is that 
it alerts us to cultural variation in how law is thought about and its ascribed and 
actual role in social life. For example, amidst all the effort to reform the efficiency 
of legal institutions in developing countries, few have stopped to consider that in 
many societies (and in all societies in at least some contexts) official law is mainly 
experienced as a source of unpredictability that threatens to disrupt everyday nor-
mative patterns and agreements. But we also need to learn about our own cultural 
common-sense. If Friedman thinks that external legal culture is what really gives 
law its shape, whereas civil law scholars tend to assume that its dynamics must be 
located more in internal legal culture, this may be in part at least a reflection of 
differences in expectations about legal culture in the common law and civil law 
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world. Likewise, for those coming from the Anglo-American world it is too easy 
to take for granted a ‘pragmatic-instrumentalist approach’ to law; the idea that 
law is designed to achieve something (which means we struggle to make sense of 
the many ritual and expressive aspects of legal institutions and procedures even 
in our own society). When we find that foreign institutions do not perform as we 
expect them to we may be too quick to describe their claims as myths (Goldstein 
and Marcus, 1977)—rather than recognising that in some respects nothing can 
be as important as a myth (Langbein and Weinreb, 1978; and Nelken, 2002). The 
possibility that we are working with an ethno-centric idea of legal culture is all the 
more likely as we range more widely in the world’s cultures (Chiba, 1989). 
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
 1.  How would you define the term ‘legal culture’? How does your definition 
relate to competing terms such as ‘legal tradition’ and ‘legal ideology?’ 
How would you decide which was the appropriate term to use?
 2. Can legal culture be used as an explanatory concept? How?
 3.  Does it still make sense to talk of national legal cultures at a time of 
increasing transnational legal processes?
 4.  Imagine that you have been asked to act as a consultant for a World Bank 
project designed to make courts in a third world country more accessible 
and efficient for local and international users. What type of local and 
international social, economic and political factors would be relevant to 
your consultancy? How, if at all, could the effort to understand the local 
legal culture be useful?
 5. Consider the following two claims:
  (1)  The concept of legal culture is an essential tool for the comparative 
lawyer in making sense of current transnational legal processes.
  (2)  The concept of legal culture has too many meanings to be useful to 
comparative lawyers.
What arguments could you find in support of each of these statements?
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6Is it so Bad to be Different? Comparative 
Law and the Appreciation of Diversity
ROGER COTTERRELL*
KEY CONCEPTS
Similarity and difference between laws and legal systems as foci of com-
parative law; Harmonisation and unification of law as dominant concerns 
of comparative lawyers; Analogies in comparative law with debates about 
assimilation and multiculturalism; The importance of respect for the dis-
tinctiveness of legal cultures; European legal convergence, its cultural sup-
ports and its critics; Legrand’s ‘contrarian challenge’ to the mainstream of 
comparative law; Cultural diversity and the new jurisprudence of difference; 
Methods and problems of cultural comparison in comparative law; The 
comparative study of fundamental legal values; Whitman on American ‘lib-
erty’ and European ‘dignity’; The challenge of cross-cultural observation and 
understanding.
I.  UNITY FROM LEGAL DIVERSITY
Is it so bad to be different? Is it undesirable that laws apparently regulating the same matters differ from one legal system to another, perhaps permit-ting things in one system, while prohibiting them in another? Does it matter 
that styles of legal thought, or traditions of legal practice, may vary greatly, so 
that lawyers in one legal system have great difficulty understanding how lawyers 
in another think and how legal decisions are made and justified? Legal sociolo-
gists have shown that there are also strikingly different popular ideas in different 
countries about the purposes of law and what is to be expected from it (see eg 
Nelken, 2003). At least since the time of the ancient Greeks, realistic commenta-
tors have seen legal diversity as inevitable. ‘The things which are just by virtue of 
convention and expediency are like measures’, wrote Aristotle, ‘for wine and corn 
measures are not everywhere equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail 
* I am grateful to David Nelken for comments on this chapter.
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markets. Similarly, the things which are just not by nature but by human enact-
ment are not everywhere the same’ (Aristotle: 7). 
Yet there have always been scholars who have sought more from law than is 
represented by this diversity. Aristotle sensed that, alongside the differing laws of 
different jurisdictions, there might be a natural justice that ‘everywhere has the 
same force and does not exist by people thinking this or that’ (ibid). Later, over 
the centuries, philosophers postulated the existence of a ‘natural law’, more funda-
mental than enacted law; a law given by ‘nature’—the natural order of the world, 
or perhaps human nature—and thus superior to (and underpinning the authority 
of) the contingent, man-made laws of different nations. They asked how far law 
could really be worthy of respect if it had nothing universal about it.
What kind of knowledge is law if that knowledge is true (valid) in one town 
but invalid in another, a few miles away across the border? Similarly, what kind 
of moral force can law have if here it says one thing about right and wrong, and 
there it says something else (perhaps the opposite)? Thus, epistemological argu-
ments favour a search for unifying foundations of law (ie arguments focused on 
worries about law’s status as a philosophically secure form of knowledge), and 
moral arguments operate too (suggesting that if law is to have moral worth it must 
depend on more than the contingencies of where political borders lie). Equally, 
political arguments have long encouraged some kind of universalist ambition for 
law: maybe political misunderstandings between states could be reduced if agree-
ment on legal principles (perhaps governing the actions of states themselves) 
could be achieved.
The search for unifying foundations of national laws in natural law was always 
controversial insofar as it depended purely on philosophical speculation. As 
modern comparative law emerged in the 19th century, when empirical scientific 
methods were increasingly favoured as a foundation of knowledge, debates about 
law’s universality took new forms, grounded in the study of specific legal sys-
tems. The philosophers’ aim of finding a natural law to inspire the improvement 
of man-made law, justify its existence or provide its moral censor, was largely 
superseded. Its place was taken by the comparatists’ aim of studying foreign 
legal systems and improving law by harmonisation (creating rules to harmonise 
relationships between legal systems) or unification (producing uniform rules 
applicable across national boundaries in place of divergent national rules). Yet 
comparative law, seeking ‘grand similarities’ behind national ‘differences in detail’ 
still held to the ambition to ‘deepen our belief in the existence of a unitary sense 
of justice’ (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998: 3). One might say that the torch of legal 
universality passed from philosophers to lawyers, and from theory to practice. 
Instead of speculating on human nature as a basis for a universal, morally impera-
tive law, comparatists aimed at practical legal reform in fields where reconciling 
differences between legal systems seemed a real possibility. 
This agenda of harmonising or unifying law has dominated much of 
comparative law since the beginning of the 20th century and given it a solid, 
if multi-faceted legitimacy. Some comparatists seeking to reconcile differences 
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between legal systems might see themselves as connected to generations of phi-
losophers pursuing the ideals of natural law.1 They might also think of themselves 
as linked with the pioneers (often themselves influenced by natural law thinking) 
of an international law to promote peace between nations.2 But, above all, they 
could see themselves as facilitating everyday legal communication—especially 
on economic matters3—between advanced nations of the modern world.  An 
important means of doing so could be by harmonising private (especially con-
tract and commercial) law between continental European civil law systems,4 and 
perhaps later (as today in the European Union) between civil law and common 
law approaches. This harmonisation work would simplify legal transactions and 
reduce cost, delay and legal uncertainty in commerce.
But it might be asked whether old aspirations (for example, of the natural law-
yers) to understand the deepest roots of law in the human condition have been 
lost as modern comparatists have become diligent selectors or drafters of uniform 
laws. Comparative lawyers realised that it was important to study the diversity of 
laws and not just assume some ultimate unifying authority for them in ‘nature’. 
But did comparatists fail to take the roots of that diversity sufficiently seriously? 
Powerful attacks on natural law thinking in the 18th and 19th centuries came 
from scholars who argued that law must be studied in relation to the cultures 
in which it develops (Stein, 1980). Natural law thinking failed to appreciate that 
law is rooted less in a universal human condition than in the specific conditions 
of different cultures. Hence differences between laws and legal systems may not 
be just matters of contingency; they may express profound characteristics of the 
cultures that produce them. This cultural awareness failed, however, to become a 
dominant influence in comparative law. 
Some writers see a main reason for this failure in the pervasive influence of 
legal positivism (Legrand, 2005: 631 at 643; Legrand, 2003: 242, 277; and Ewald, 
1995: 1889 at 1982–3). Treating law as ‘posited’—enacted or declared by human 
law-makers in official processes—legal positivism marginalises law’s links to other 
things not officially posited in this way. So, ultimate values (such as liberty, human 
dignity or equality) are not in the foreground of positivist legal analysis. Nor 
are matters of tradition (accumulated historical experience, custom, collective 
memories) or emotional bases of law (such as elements of national sentiment or 
patriotism). Analysis is of rules, rather than of the values they may imply, tradi-
tions they may embody, or sentiments that may surround them. 
Legal positivism tends rather to view law as instrumental; a tool of government 
(ie policy-driven law), or private interests (ie in the form of contracts, property 
1 See Del Vecchio, 1969: 31–7, exploring philosophical bases of comparative law.
2 Compare Lepaulle, 1922: 838 at 857: ‘divergences in laws cause other divergences that generate … 
misunderstandings and conflicts among nations which end with blood and desolation’.
3 Cf Édouard Lambert’s view that, ‘the essential mission of comparative law is one of economic 
peacemaking, the realisation of an international economic entente’ (Jamin, 2002: 701 at 715).
4 Ibid: 701 at 716.
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entitlements, etc). Law appears as a means of pursuing projects and regulating 
deals—changing the world in big or small ways. And much contemporary com-
parative legal scholarship also sees law mainly in these terms. Legal positivism 
may be a necessary part of Western lawyers’ professionalism, but it sees law as 
little more than clusters of rules, to be juristically organised and refined to fit them 
for their purpose. In comparative law, this refining is often a search for the most 
appropriate precept from the rule-books of various legal systems. 
Given the importance of a predominantly instrumental view of rules, it seems 
unsurprising that positivist comparative law should define its own rationale in 
instrumental terms, guided by the practical tasks that law is required to serve. In 
fact, the idea of purpose or function has provided the primary modern basis for 
legal comparison. The search for the most efficient rule to serve a given social or 
economic function has been the primary technique for unifying law in compara-
tive legal studies. But is functional efficiency everything? And can functions be 
identified without asking whether in different legal systems, local values, tradi-
tions or sentiments may differently colour the definition of those functions, the 
importance attached to them and the tests of their successful fulfilment? In short, 
can we talk about similarity and difference in laws and their functions without 
talking about culture? 
II.  AN ANALOGY: ASSIMILATION AND MULTICULTURALISM
It might be helpful to put comparative law to one side for a moment and think 
about everyday life. Is it so bad to be different, or to be thought to be different? 
Sometimes, clearly yes: one might be misunderstood, patronised, discriminated 
against or bullied. Practical definitions of similarity and difference are adopted 
by majority populations or powerful groups. They are used to label others 
(minorities, the less powerful) and to make assumptions about them that fit the 
labellers’ preconceptions, rather than the experience of the labelled. If people are 
singled out as different, life may be easier for them if they try to be less different 
by assimilating to the dominant norm, trying to hide the things that make them 
seem different. But this may be impossible. Even limited efforts may be counter-
productive in the assimilators’ lives, denying a part of who they are. In any case, 
these deliberate changes may be inadequate—criteria of difference can always be 
revised, the goal posts can be moved. 
Anyway, why should anyone be required to attempt such a self-denying trans-
formation? Will communication be made easier by an attempt to become ‘the 
same’? Those people who want to communicate will seek to do so across differ-
ence (and may see difference as enriching the experience). For effective communi-
cation there will need to be sincere efforts on both sides to translate the experience 
of each in terms that the other can understand. There will also need to be a serious 
wish on both sides to appreciate the other’s experience and viewpoints and there 
will need to be mutual respect for the autonomy and dignity of others (both 
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those considered different and those seen as similar) as human beings. Where 
these conditions are sustained over time, communication may become rich, with 
perceptions of difference being part of the richness. But those not wishing to 
communicate may use the impossible demand for assimilation (that the different 
become the same) to control or silence minorities or to victimise the powerless. 
An entirely reasonable stance (for those who feel strong enough, individually or 
collectively) is to refuse demands or temptations to assimilate, even to the extent 
that assimilation is possible. Instead, one might legitimately demand to be treated 
with respect in one’s difference, as long as one is prepared to give equal respect 
to the difference of others. Indeed, it might be suggested that the idea of differ-
ence could be replaced with that of individuality or distinctiveness. Why should 
difference not be accepted and welcomed—re-interpreted in terms of facets of 
individual experience or distinctive character?  The claim might be that produc-
tive integration requires not assimilation, but mutual acceptance and mutual 
learning about the other, in a framework of universal respect for human dignity 
and autonomy.
How does this relate to comparative law? Is the process of unifying law between 
different legal systems anything like a process of assimilation between different 
people? Certainly, parallels can be drawn and they help to clarify what is at stake 
in recent demands that comparative law should shift focus from seeking legal 
similarity (via harmonisation or unification) towards appreciating the virtues 
of legal diversity. Indeed, some comparatists have invoked ideas reminiscent of 
those that feature in debates about multiculturalism and assimilation. They have 
demanded respect in comparative legal studies for distinctive cultures, including 
legal cultures, in a way that parallels demands for respect for individual or group 
identity in the face of calls to assimilate to majority norms. 
Some comparatists today, reflecting ideas of earlier jurists and historians 
(Whitman, 2003a: 315–26), emphasise that law’s identity is inseparable from its 
culture. They insist that a legal culture’s integrity and identity should be respected 
against calls for legal harmonisation. Correspondingly, an ethnic minority group 
might demand that its cultural integrity and collective identity, its special subjec-
tive experience, be respected against calls for ‘difference’ to be erased or reduced 
(for example, calls for its distinctive traditions, norms or beliefs to be abandoned 
where they differ significantly from those of the majority). The demand for 
respect for difference—whether applied to legal cultures or minority popula-
tions—often appeals to arguments that cultural richness is lost by reducing diver-
sity, that imposing uniformity is morally illegitimate, and that homogenisation 
(removal of difference) is impossible and attempting it will produce confusion, 
disruption and disorder. 
Perhaps most fundamental, in relation to all these debates, is the question of 
relative power. The main problem for those who suffer from the way the labels 
‘similar’ or ‘different’ are used is their lack of control over the use of these labels. 
For example, how far two people, X and Y, resemble or differ from each other is a 
matter of the perceptions of both X and Y, negotiated between them. But if X has 
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greater power than Y to define what counts as similarity or difference, to deter-
mine its significance and control its consequences, X may effectively decree how 
and with what effects Y is treated as the same or different. This is what produces 
the main resentments surrounding invocations, denials or criticisms of difference. 
Y wishes to have equal control of the defining process—to be a subject asserting 
difference or similarity, not merely a differentiated or assimilated object. The lan-
guage of similarity and difference should belong to both X and Y. 
Is this a no less fundamental complaint with regard to the relations of legal 
systems, or legal cultures? Some are far more powerful or influential than others; 
they may define what is normal, optimal or most appropriate in law. When other, 
less powerful legal systems or legal cultures are defined in their degrees of differ-
ence or similarity by the more powerful ones, the more powerful may ultimately 
determine the fate (the independence and integrity) of the less powerful. To 
defend one’s own right to assert difference, to demand that one’s own subjective 
experience in one’s own (legal) culture be respected and valued, not removed or 
subjected to assimilation (harmonisation or unification), becomes, in such cir-
cumstances, obviously a form of resistance to power. It is an effort to gain access 
to the vocabulary of difference for one’s own purposes, rather than accepting the 
definitions and purposes of the stronger party. In a legal context, what is meant 
here is resistance to the imposition of legal ideas, styles or purposes by economi-
cally, militarily or politically stronger nations or groups of nations. 
When matters are expressed in this way one can see a direct analogy between—
and sometimes a similar level of emotional investment in—the politics of 
multiculturalism and the politics of difference (between legal cultures) in 
comparative law.
III.  LEGRAND AND EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW
Emotional investment is clearly present in the writings of Pierre Legrand, the 
most outspoken and passionate current advocate of the need to appreciate differ-
ence in comparative law. Legrand uses words like ‘repression’, ‘oppression’, ‘totali-
tarianism’ and ‘violence’ in talking about the orthodox practices and attitudes of 
comparatists, as he sees them. Comparative lawyers, he says,
must purposely privilege the identification of differences across the laws they compare 
lest they fail to address singularity with authenticity (Legrand, 2001: 1033 at 1049).
 Insofar as they fail to do this (which is often),
comparative legal studies, because of the totalitarianism and the oppression inherent 
to a strategy of sameness and assimilation, is a practice of violence (Legrand, 2005: 631 
at 706). 
Legrand’s attacks have focused mainly on the most sustained international har-
monisation enterprise in contemporary comparative law—the effort to develop 
a common European private law. He sees this project as a reckless denial of 
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legitimate difference between the legal systems of Europe. Its most ambitious 
aspect is the (tentative and controversial) idea of creating a European code of pri-
vate law (Legrand, 1997). Legrand has criticised, in the harshest terms, the kinds 
of thinking that inspire work preparing the way for such a code. More broadly, 
he claims that despite the long-term harmonisation efforts of comparatists in 
international committees and permanent study groups, as well as the impetus 
from European Union Directives in many legal fields, European legal systems are 
not converging in either regulatory practice or juristic outlook (Legrand, 1996). 
They remain separated by differences of legal culture—above all, in his view, by 
profound cultural incompatibilities between English common law and continen-
tal European civil law. 
For Legrand, the ‘ambition of a European concordantia is (and must be) a chi-
mera.’ (ibid: 52 at 81). Harmonisation of European private law is ‘impossible’ and 
‘wishful thinking’ (Legrand, 2001: 1033 at 1037, 1039 and 1043) because civil law 
and common law approaches in Europe are ‘irrevocably irreconcilable’, represent-
ing different mentalités—ie cultural outlooks or worldviews (Legrand, 2006: 13 
at 30, 31). Their ways of reasoning with, practising and developing law, and their 
attitudes to legal sources and professional traditions are fundamentally different. 
A civil lawyer and a common lawyer cannot think like each other when it comes to 
understanding the most profound assumptions of their respective legal traditions. 
Of course (one assumes), they can learn much from each other but (Legrand 
insists) they cannot substitute their most basic professional formations.
We might want to stop at this point and ask: If cultures can present this irrec-
oncilable difference when set against each other, what are their boundaries (how 
are cultural similarity and difference determined)? and what are the specific 
components of cultures that set up these formidable barriers to assimilation or 
harmonisation? We might turn to the multiculturalism analogy again and note 
that individuals can certainly cross cultures and can see themselves as inhabiting 
several cultures. They can, in some circumstances, leave cultures and join new 
ones, or move in and out of cultural environments. Indeed, they might find their 
cultural identity a very complex, shifting, negotiable, even sometimes indetermi-
nate matter. 
Thus, immediately, the issue of what culture is presents itself. Actually it is a 
cluster of issues. What are the components of culture and how are they to be sepa-
rated and structured? What is the nature of cultural experience? How are cultures 
to be identified by those who inhabit them as well as by those who observe them 
as outsiders? These are hardly new questions and have been much discussed in, 
for example, the literature of anthropology, where culture has long been a central 
concept. In relation to law, one might ask: What cultural boundaries exist and 
which really matter? For Legrand, a civil law/common law cultural boundary 
is fundamental, legal cultural variations in the civil law world being apparently 
much less problematic. While he offers few reasons for his view that this cultural 
divide is crucial, rather than others, there is no doubt that in the formative period 
of modern comparative law, many comparatists on the European continent saw 
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English common law as profoundly alien to the Romanist traditions that shaped 
a significantly shared European civil law outlook. 
Whether this legal cultural divide remains as significant as Legrand claims is, 
however, much disputed. Ole Lando, drawing directly on his extensive experience 
as a leading figure in the Commission on European Contract Law over more 
than two decades, and in other harmonisation projects, sees shared values and a 
‘common attitude’ among lawyers from different European countries (including 
Britain) as the key to success in reaching agreement on uniform law.
Several factors have caused this common attitude. The similar economic and political 
structure of the [EU] Member States is one. Another is their common cultural heritage. 
All Europeans share the Christian ethic, and have been influenced by Roman law and 
the great moralists. The milieu in which both judges and law professors are raised and 
live is also a factor. Most of the guardians and preachers of our law and justice grew up 
in well-to-do bourgeois homes with moral traditions. In Europe, the middle class has 
been the guardian of ethics, and so have the parents of the judges and professors … 
Thus, the legal values of the European brotherhood of lawyers are very similar (Lando, 
1999: 20, at 21–22).
These views are hardly uncontroversial, but the idea of a European legal elite with 
a common culture of its own that facilitates negotiation to achieve harmonisation 
is a familiar one; very much a self-image of comparative lawyers seeking legal sim-
ilarity. ‘To a considerable degree,’ the influential comparatist Alan Watson claims, 
‘the lawmakers of one society share the same legal culture with the lawmakers of 
other societies’ (Watson, 1983: 1121 at 1157).  Again, then, the question as regards 
culture is: Which cultures count most? Is a common culture of transnational 
juristic elites (if such a culture exists) the dominant one, even if it may differ from 
cultural environments of everyday legal practice and popular legal experience in 
different national systems? 
Lando’s approach, like that of many comparatists, presupposes functionalism. 
Recalling harmonisation discussions in which he participated, he notes that 
the participants would consider how the courts of their own country had or would 
have reacted to a case, and they often found that although the rules were different, the 
courts had or would have reached the same results. The consensus was greater than one 
would have expected when one compared the legal rules and techniques of the various 
countries (Lando, 1999: 20).
Functional analysis emphasising common problems to be solved is seen as a route 
to consensus, by-passing conceptual differences and differences of legal style.
Legrand, like other cultural comparatists, has attacked what he sees as the 
poverty of functional analysis (Legrand, 2005), but European legal harmonisa-
tion is mainly driven by a desire to ensure that law serves agreed (largely eco-
nomic) functions in Europe as efficiently as possible. Something like Lando’s 
assumptions about a shared legal professional culture (reinforced by a common 
European culture: see, eg Wieacker, 1990) operate to fuel general optimism about 
harmonisation. Thus, the divide between common law and civil law approaches 
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is often presented as no more than a minor bump in the road for the harmonisa-
tion steamroller to roll over. Nevertheless, Legrand is right to note that striking 
misunderstandings still exist about the nature of common law among some 
civil lawyers engaged in harmonisation. Even as sophisticated a German jurist as 
Reinhard Zimmermann writes of ‘the casuistic nature of the English law, with its 
bizarre traditionality, or with its peculiar interlocking of common law and equity’ 
(Zimmermann, 1996: 576 at 587), and others mistake common law’s careful 
empiricism and pragmatism—with its deliberate distrust of theory and of large-
scale conceptualisation—for evidence of its primitive condition.
But why insist on the ‘impossibility’ of harmonising European law when this 
harmonisation seems to be well under way? Legrand’s answer is that harmonis-
ing rules is very far from achieving a unification of legal understandings and 
practices. The same rule interpreted in two different national legal cultures will 
actually mean something different in each of them. So, legal harmonisation is 
illusory. There might be standardisation of the letter of the rules but there will not 
be harmonisation of their meaning as law.
Since the legal is also cultural, ‘uniformity’, in the sense of a commonality across laws, 
is a promise that law is simply ontologically incapable of fulfilling (Legrand, 2001: 1033 
at 1047). 
In support, Legrand often cites Gunther Teubner’s well-known argument 
(Teubner, 1998) that unpredictable consequences will follow from the introduc-
tion, as a consequence of a European Directive, of the concept of good faith in 
English contract law (eg Legrand, 2006: 13 at 26; Legrand, 2003: 293 and 303). 
Teubner sees no reason to suppose that good faith will mean the same thing in 
English law as in, say, German law, once the economic conditions of commerce 
and contracting in the two countries are taken into account:
[T]he question is not so much if British contract doctrine will reject or integrate good 
faith. Rather, it is what kind of transformations of meaning will the term undergo, how 
will its role differ, once it is reconstructed anew under British law? (Teubner, 1998: 11 
at 12).
In fact,
it is inconceivable that British good faith will be the same as Treu und Glauben German 
style which has developed in a rather special historical and cultural constellation (ibid: 
at 20).
The meaning of law depends on how a legal discourse reacts to its specific 
environment.
Teubner’s arguments certainly help Legrand by showing that a general appeal 
by comparatists to common functions served by different laws in different systems 
may gloss over complex historical conditions, colouring the way law’s functions 
are understood. Law’s relations to economy, polity and ‘diverse fragments of 
society’ may vary (‘from loose coupling to tight interwovenness’) in different 
countries (ibid: at 18). But it is very important to note that Teubner rejects any 
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unified notion of culture as an analytical tool, or even as a rhetorical device for 
criticising legal harmonisation. Instead, he draws on a sophisticated social theory 
(developed by the sociologist Niklas Luhmann) that breaks down everything that 
Legrand would understand as culture into an interplay of more of less distinct 
social systems of communication. 
In the present context, two conclusions should be drawn from Teubner’s 
complex arguments. First (supporting Legrand), there are strong grounds for 
saying that functional analysis alone is inadequate as a method for comparat-
ist harmonisers—too many unanalysed assumptions stand behind the idea that 
common functions of law can be found to unite legal systems. But, secondly 
(against Legrand), it remains doubtful whether a concept of culture as such can be 
operationalised to explain why meanings of law may differ between legal systems 
even when legal rules seem the same. Perhaps the portmanteau concept of culture 
needs breaking down into defined, analysable elements, so that it might become 
possible to understand, more precisely, how different aspects of culture colour 
law’s meanings, or indeed supply them.
IV.  HARMONISATION’S MORAL DEFICIT?
Whether or not harmonisation is ‘impossible’, Legrand sees much wrong with 
even attempting it. It is ‘politically complicitous, inherently oppressive, and 
fundamentally antihumanistic’; it ‘sings oh-so-sweetly to Power’, to the narrow 
demands of commerce, capital and the forces of globalisation:
I find it unlikely that the European civil code will prove socially progressive and not 
pander to market-oriented ‘law-and-economics’ dogmas (Legrand, 2006: 13 at 27).
European harmonisation serves ‘instrumentalism, and managerialism’ (ibid: at 
28) and ‘operates in a deracinating world of faceless markets’ (Legrand, 2001: 1033 
at 1048). Through it, the cult of efficiency will rule everything and drive forward 
economic liberalisation in Europe—an anti-humanistic development because it 
ignores other values, other important aspects of culture and human flourishing. 
In opposition to it, Legrand sets an ideal of fostering ‘the respect due the variety 
of lived experiences’ (ibid). 
Clearly, the focus of attack has shifted here—but without any major change 
of tone—from claims about the technical problems of harmonisation to much 
broader moral and political arguments. Behind everything are claims about 
the nature of communication through law. Legrand seems to see, on one side, 
instrumental technically-oriented communication, narrow in aims and cultural 
reference, and thus impoverished to an extent that may make it hardly meaning-
ful communication at all: ‘a promise [of understanding] that law is simply onto-
logically incapable of fulfilling’ (Legrand 2001:1033 at 1047). On the other side 
is the elusive but essential ideal of cultural communication—an opening up to 
an awareness of the ‘other’ (especially the other’s law) which involves a difficult, 
sustained effort of sensitivity. In preferring this latter kind of communication, 
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Legrand shifts to moralistic language. It is ‘bad faith’ (ibid: at 1043) to fail to 
recognise difference and to try to sweep it aside by assuming (or engineering) 
similarity; and there is a duty of ‘justice’, owed to culture itself, to leave it as rich 
as before, not to impoverish it (Legrand, 2006: 13 at 36). 
At the same time, Legrand asserts, the mundane claim that transaction costs 
will be lowered through harmonisation is a ‘cheap fiction’ (ibid: at 27). Even 
instrumentalism requires moral honesty and should not be pursued through 
sleight of hand. If economic efficiency were (misguidedly) to be accepted as an 
adequate reason for trying to remove legal differences in Europe, no one has yet 
proved that harmonisation will promote this efficiency. Legrand is surely right to 
make this last point. It is striking that although efficiency claims are frequently 
made in favour of harmonisation, little or no empirical research is cited to sup-
port them. Leading harmonisers feel the need only to say that
we consider it to be a safe assumption, supported by anecdotal evidence, that significant 
cost factors are involved and that these costs factors are operative in practically all sec-
tors of the market economy (Von Bar, Lando and Swann, 2002: 183 at 198–9).
These matters, it seems, do not need empirical demonstration.  
Harmonisation, for Legrand, is intellectually authoritarian: a ‘cultural totali-
tarianism’ (Legrand, 2006: 13 at 27). What seems to be meant is that experience, 
in all its complexity and richness, is reduced by this process to fit a grid of legal 
rules. A European code of private law, ‘as a form of law, will contain what would 
otherwise overflow: experience’ (ibid: at 21). Law should express what people 
think, feel and encounter in everyday social relations, but uniform positive rules 
abstracted from context (which are what harmonisation promotes) will deny 
this connection of law to life. For Legrand, English common law in Europe risks 
becoming a sacrifice offered to the gods of positivist-functionalist harmonisation, 
so that it will be ‘encrypted into the language of the grid’ (ibid: at 19), its life (as 
accumulated historical experience and a style of juristic working that reflects that 
experience) drained away in the process. 
A final problem links these claims as to why harmonisation should not be 
attempted with the earlier claim that it cannot actually be achieved. Because, as 
Teubner suggests, harmonised law will mean different things in different legal 
systems, its precise effects are, for Legrand, dangerously unpredictable, risking 
legal ‘chaos’ for the common law system as it becomes ‘de-embedded’(ibid: at 33). 
There will be
disintegrative consequences either in terms of broken linkages across various fields of 
local law or fractured connections between law and other disciplines (Legrand, 2001: 
1033 at 1042).
Legrand envisages lawyers in Britain being put in a kind of limbo between 
Europeanised positive law and a local common law culture at odds with it. 
Because, for him, the link between law and culture is so fundamental, a severing 
(or major disruption) of it will not only impoverish positive law and make its 
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meaning uncertain, but will put lawyers in a very undesirable situation—serving 
a law that has lost its roots, and therefore becoming, themselves, functionaries 
without roots in their own culture; morally unanchored technicians. 
How should we take stock of these moral-political criticisms of harmonisation, 
and the claim that European legal difference is to be celebrated and protected? 
We can note, firstly, that the cultural critique is far from being the only kind of 
criticism levelled at European legal harmonisation. Arguments around the value 
implications of harmonisation, the efficiency claims made for it, its relevance 
to European integration, its disruptive effects on national laws, the legal powers 
available to pursue it and the best methods for achieving it have been developed 
in a huge literature.5 Alongside such an array of issues, the sometimes monoto-
nous insistence on cultural difference in Legrand’s ‘contrarian challenge’ can seem 
a rather limited standpoint from which to approach the complex problems of 
legal unity or diversity in Europe. Indeed, comparatists’ debates, however framed, 
about legal similarity and difference might seem a narrow perspective from which 
to view what are ultimately profound conflicts over different economic and social 
visions of Europe. Brief mentions of ‘economic liberalism’ and ‘faceless markets’ 
are not enough to link discussion of the rights and wrongs of legal harmonisation 
to larger, far more fundamental themes about the effects of globalisation and the 
power-play of international relations in European transformation (see, eg Van der 
Pijl, 2006). 
It might even be said that, although European legal harmonisation has been 
(largely because of Legrand’s work) a main focus for recent demands for com-
paratists to appreciate legal difference, it is actually one of the weakest fronts on 
which to fight for a re-orientation of comparative law. So much activity is now 
aimed at creating new European law that the demand for comparatists to privilege 
European cultural (in this context especially national) differences may seem a 
Canute-like stance in the face of a tide of legal change. And, very significantly, the 
invocation of culture works here for harmonisation as well as against it. Claims, 
noted earlier, about a common European culture and about the cultural unity of 
legal elites can easily be set against claims of cultural diversity in Europe. Again, 
it can be argued that, perhaps by contrast with some other legal and social fields, 
the private law relationships where harmonisation is sought do not reflect major 
European cultural differences. So, familiar issues reappear. What bits of culture 
matter most, and how? Whose culture counts most? Can cultural similarities be 
assumed for some problems or tasks of legal regulation but not for others? How 
are distinctions within culture to be drawn and understood?
In general, the task of making the appreciation of legal difference as prominent 
in comparative law as the search for legal similarity is very difficult. In a climate 
where lawyers and legal scholars are expected to be (and generally wish to see 
5 For summaries of the issues see, eg Wilhelmsson, 2002; Weatherill, 2004; and Hesselink, 2004.
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themselves as) ‘useful’, the practical benefits of reducing legal differences may 
seem self-evident (even if evidence to prove the efficiency payoff is not necessar-
ily sought). The appreciation of difference, however, is usually justified in much 
broader humanistic terms—the arguments are, as has been seen, mainly moral 
ones. They must, in many instances, be set against deep-rooted juristic convic-
tions; in particular, the positivist approach to law that is second-nature to most 
modern lawyers, and the functionalist outlook often assumed in legal policy 
debates.  
V.  THE LEGAL VISIBILITY OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCE
Yet the moral imperative to appreciate difference will not go away. For all its 
difficulties there is something of immense importance in it. Positivism and func-
tionalism—the default positions for legal inquiry, the easy-ways-out for avoiding 
entanglement with culture—have allowed modern comparative law to marginalise 
the broadest humanistic aspirations of comparatists and to discard, as impracti-
cal or lacking in analytical rigour, the inheritance of philosophical, historical and 
sociological ideas present at the birth of modern comparative law in the decades 
leading up to the start of the 20th century (Cotterrell, 2006a: chapter 8).
Must practicality and efficiency trump humanistic appreciation of individu-
ality and difference? We need to return again to the multiculturalism analogy. 
Assimilation (a single cultural outlook) rather than multiculturalism (an ongo-
ing, sometimes difficult conversation between cultures) might seem to be a way to 
avoid friction—to achieve efficiency, in a sense—in social arrangements.  But the 
social ‘efficiency’ might be superficial. Where it is the result of coercion by more 
powerful groups to change the cultural practices of weaker ones, it may produce 
resentment. If the weaker groups eventually gain strength they may react against it 
with unforeseeable consequences. And often, as noted earlier, to become culturally 
the same is impossible. These problems affect the search for unity in law, insofar 
as law expresses or reflects culture. What has prevented arguments about culture 
from getting a fair hearing in modern legal inquiry has been the dominance of the 
positivist view that law can be understood without specific reference to culture.
For various reasons this analytical separation of law from culture is breaking 
down in important respects in many Western societies. Cultural differentiation 
has been brought sharply to the attention of legal elites even in the United States, 
where the viability of cultural assimilation was long assumed.6 American critical 
race theory (CRT), created by lawyers belonging to—and seeing themselves, in 
some respects, as speaking for—ethnic minority groups, has demanded a hearing 
in debates on the nature and effects of law. As a ‘minority critique’ of dominant 
legal ideas, CRT has forced itself on the attention of American legal elites. It 
6 On debates around this policy, see Wacker, 1979; and on the survival or revival of assimilationism, 
see Jacoby, 1994, and Alba and Nee, 2003.
146  Roger Cotterrell
has contributed to the growth of a ‘jurisprudence of difference’ (see Cotterrell: 
2003: chapter 8), which no longer views law’s regulated population as culturally 
uniform and sees new agendas for law as it confronts difference. Some American 
comparatists have sensed both a challenge and an opportunity for comparative 
legal studies in this situation (Demleitner, 1999; and Curran, 1998). Lawyers have 
long understood the virtues of assuming similarity—treating all as equal before 
the law and recognising no special statuses derived from cultural particularities. 
But the new jurisprudence of difference emphasises the fact that law applies dif-
ferently to different groups in the same population. These groups may also seek 
different things from law, asking that it recognise cultural conditions specific 
to them.
This situation ultimately poses great dilemmas. The demand to appreciate 
difference through law comes not just from minority populations pressing claims 
on law, but from jurists re-examining the normative unity of law: that is, its integ-
rity as a coherent set of rules underpinned by common values, shared traditions, 
convergent projects and uniform sentiments. Does law really have this unity? 
What is in issue here is cultural unity.  Rules may cohere in juristic analysis but not 
in the meanings they have for the various cultural populations subject to them. 
Here, raised in a new, different context, is Legrand’s basic question of law’s mean-
ing, with its answer dependent on cultural context.
In contemporary Britain, which has been characterised explicitly in recent 
decades as a multicultural society (not one seeking assimilation of minorities to a 
consciously fostered uniform culture), the issues go further. It is not just a matter 
of law being seen from different cultural standpoints, but of demands, in some 
contexts, for a recognition of differential law—law that can express cultural dif-
ference (for example, the distinctive practices associated with particular religious 
beliefs or ethnic traditions). The idea of a kind of legal pluralism (a situation in 
which different laws might apply to different cultural groups, at least to a limited 
extent) has been mooted, and even seen as reflected in practice (Shah, 2005). 
What has this to do with comparative law? As long as comparative law is 
assumed to be concerned only with relations of laws between different nation 
states the answer may be: very little. But comparatists have long addressed the 
question of how far legal uniformity is possible between population groups hav-
ing different legal traditions, values and expectations. That these groups have 
been largely identified as national populations might even be a relatively ines-
sential detail of the comparatists’ general project. The European private law focus, 
discussed earlier, may not be wholly satisfactory for debating general approaches 
to legal similarity and difference, but it at least illustrates that comparative law 
has a role in analysing the development of law within a legal system (in this case, 
that of the European Union) as well as between national systems. Equally, since 
comparatists have long been familiar with different degrees of power, influence 
or prestige operating between the legal systems they compare, there should be no 
particular difficulty in recognising an interaction of more or less powerful, influ-
ential or prestigious bodies of law derived from different cultural sources in the 
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same political society. For example, among British Muslims, an unofficial ‘living 
law’ reflecting Islamic traditions (angrezi shari’at) now exists alongside official 
state law as a significant form of normative regulation in certain contexts (Pearl 
and Menski, 1998: chapter 3; and Menski, 2001). 
Thus, what started out in this chapter as an analogy between debates on multi-
culturalism and debates in comparative law becomes, in these circumstances, no 
longer just an analogy but rather a range of contexts for considering the same set 
of problems focused on negotiating legal similarity and legal difference.
The idea that comparative law’s main concerns are with seeking similarity 
(unification, harmonisation) seems narrow and increasingly out of touch with 
changing legal experience, when law is required to recognise changing popula-
tions, diverse cultures in nation states, and new issues about the relations between 
law, religion and tradition. Law is faced with representing or managing difference 
in legal aspirations no less than with promoting similarity in legal experience. 
Questions about national sentiment and diversity of cultural allegiances are 
also becoming legally significant (as matters bearing on law’s practical claims to 
authority) in a far more obvious way than in past decades. In a culturally complex 
world, allegiances (to law as to most other embodiments of authority) become 
complex and multiple. Yet, as we noted earlier in discussing conditions of multi-
culturalism, something is needed to hold the diverse elements together. To address 
these newly pressing issues about law and culture, comparative law must adjust 
its gaze. Like other legal studies it needs to abandon its attachment to an exclusive 
focus on the nation state. The great virtue of an emphasis on cultural difference 
is that it points towards a far richer comparative law, aware of the way the world 
is changing beyond (and more profoundly than) the transnational extension of 
economic networks and the ever quickening pace of world commerce.
How is this richer comparative law to be realised? Legrand’s own insistence 
that comparatists should privilege difference is certainly not limited to his attacks 
on the harmonisation of European law. But where he goes beyond this focus 
(Legrand, 2005) his statements about what comparative law should be doing, and 
why, become vague. The ‘contrarian challenge’ sometimes seems to come down to 
a general exhortation to respect the other and to study law with the aid of history, 
philosophy and sociology. This is important but does not take us far. The reason, 
I think, for the lack of specificity is a reluctance to explore exactly where a focus 
on cultural difference in law leads. 
Ultimately it must lead to the study of culture itself, with all the problems that 
entails. Indeed, where culture has become a focus for critical legal theory (espe-
cially in American critical race theory) it is significant that lines between legal and 
social analysis tend to blur. The need to assert cultural difference in all its complex 
manifestations is so pressing for critical race theorists that legal aspects are some-
times reduced to just one aspect—a specific, limited expression—of diffuse but 
pervasive social experience (see, eg Delgado and Stefancic, 2000). For comparatists, 
however, the reason for invoking culture is likely to be to understand differences 
specifically in juristic practice and experience. For Legrand, the essential cultural 
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difference is even narrower, namely, a difference between common law and civil 
law juristic practice. The appeal to culture seems to be reduced to a restatement of 
comparatists’ familiar distinctions between legal styles or ‘families’ of law. It is left 
to legal sociologists to point out the sheer complexity of exploring how modern 
legal and cultural experience inter-relate in practice, and how culture in its many 
aspects shapes legal understandings (Nelken, 2005; and Nelken, 2003).
VI.  HOW CAN WE STUDY CULTURAL DIFFERENCE IN LAW?
This is not to suggest that when lawyers recognise cultural difference they invari-
ably stop short of considering the broadest horizons that this recognition opens 
up. Sometimes, attempts to study foreign law raise such profound challenges of 
cultural ‘otherness’, that scholars of this law become ‘area’ specialists, immers-
ing themselves fully in the cultural matrix of a particular area of the world (for 
example, China, India or South East Asia) and trying to explore this matrix ‘from 
inside’ so as to assign meaning to its legal aspects as these are understood within 
it. But this entails that these scholars often do not see themselves as comparatists, 
since their exploration of law within culture has largely taken the place of inter-
preting law across cultures (Huxley, 2002: 5). Comparative legal study, however, 
involves not giving up on the possibility of translating experience across cultural 
difference. There has to be a way of appreciating (interpreting and understanding) 
difference; not merely observing strangeness. 
Here the task seems much harder than that of seeking similarity by harmonising 
law. Harmonisers assume that a common framework of understanding is avail-
able and that their task is to find and use this. The task of the difference-focused 
comparatists, however, is somehow to understand without such a common frame-
work, without assimilating the unfamiliar to the familiar. Cultural comparatists 
write of the ‘impossibility of perfect comparison’ since each ‘cultural context is 
unique to some extent’ (Curran, 1998: 43 at 45, 49). However, the aim is com-
munication and empathy; a matter of understanding the experience, sentiments 
and beliefs of the other (Ewald, 1995: 1889 at 1941–2). For Legrand, appreciating 
difference involves ‘thick or deep understanding’ (Legrand, 2003: 280, 289, 297). 
For the American comparatist Vivian Curran it entails imaginative ‘immersion’ in 
the foreign cultural context (Curran, 1998). But these formulations do not clarify 
the preconditions and limits of these strategies, or how to distinguish good com-
parisons from poor ones. 
We have seen that reliance on the concept of culture itself adds further difficul-
ties. Culture tends to be treated as a unity rather than analysed into distinct com-
ponents, which might have some structured relation to each other (see Archer, 
1985) and be more manageable entities for comparison. Nevertheless, cultur-
ally-focused comparative law opens up exciting possibilities if ways can be found 
to break down culture into components that can be compared in their relations 
to law and if the methodological difficulties are always kept in mind, so that 
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comparatists are modest in their claims to be able to understand ‘the other’ 
and the other’s law. The findings of cultural comparative law will always be 
provisional, partial and contested—yet they may still be enlightening and 
thought-provoking, perhaps not just for the researcher’s ‘home’ audience, but 
even for the foreigners whose law is being studied. 
Some ambitious recent work by an American comparatist illustrates the kind of 
enlightenment that might be hoped for, as well as the difficulties discussed above. 
James Whitman, in a series of major articles, has studied profound differences 
between United States law and continental European law in terms of what he sees 
as contrasting cultural values underlying significant parts of this law. Because 
he focuses on fundamental values—primarily ‘liberty’ in the American case and 
(human) ‘dignity’ in the European context—he implicitly breaks down the idea 
of culture, taking one set of elements from it for consideration. I have argued 
elsewhere that culture (for the purposes of legal inquiry) is made up of distinct 
elements that can be roughly summarised as shared ultimate values or beliefs, 
common traditions and experiences, collective sentiments, and common or con-
vergent (primarily economic) projects (Cotterrell, 2006a). What is important is to 
distinguish the components of culture analytically and to explore their ramifica-
tions when they are expressed in or addressed by law. Whitman’s approach might, 
then, be promising in avoiding generalised appeals to culture and concentrating 
on the element of values; asking what meaning is given to these values in different 
contexts and how they are expressed in positive law.
Whitman’s starting point is a regret expressed by some American legal 
scholars about the difficulties of introducing European-style ‘hate speech’ 
legislation in the United States to criminalise the use of calculatedly insulting 
or inflammatory words. In America, he explains, the legal value of freedom 
of speech trumps most efforts to control hate speech. A main reason, for 
Whitman, is that the United States lacks a ‘culture of dignity’, found notably 
in Germany and France, which has underpinned controls on hate speech in 
these and other European countries. 
In a 120-page essay (Whitman, 2000) he explores the sources and effects of 
this culture of dignity, finding its origins in old conceptions of social hierarchy 
and of the protection of aristocratic honour, for example through duelling. These 
conceptions gave rise to penal laws (still existing in Germany) to protect individu-
als from insult and affront to their dignity. Legal provisions that once protected 
aristocratic honour and ensured due deference were gradually transformed by 
a process of social ‘levelling-up’ into laws protecting the honour and dignity of 
every citizen from insult. In France, dignitary law, as Whitman calls it, has atro-
phied as a distinct form but the culture of dignity remains strong, expressed in 
forms of civility notably different from those typical in the United States. Thus 
Whitman’s argument—developed through an elaborate presentation of relevant 
law and social norms—is that European ideas of human dignity, fundamental 
to continental legal culture, are traceable to old European conceptions of social 
hierarchy. The United States lacks any such legal emphasis on individual dignity 
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because its social and legal history is different. Lacking a tradition of aristocracy, 
it also lacks a legal concept of human dignity.
In other writings Whitman has continued to emphasise a sharp contrast 
between American and continental European legal cultures. He notes, for 
example, that attitudes to privacy differ greatly between the United States and 
continental Europe. Americans and Europeans care deeply about privacy, as their 
law shows, but in different ways. Compared to French and German law, American 
law provides relatively little commercial privacy (for example, as regards credit 
ratings) but treats the privacy of the home as sacrosanct (in Europe wire-
tapping has been much less of a legal issue than in the United States). The 
American focus is overwhelmingly on privacy against the state and on the pro-
tection of commercial interests. American law recognises a ‘right of publicity’, 
essentially to control the commercial exploitation of one’s image and related 
matters. In continental European systems, law gives rights to control the use of 
one’s image on the grounds of protection of human dignity. It is an aspect of 
personal dignity and autonomy to have a legal right to choose whether and how 
one’s image is used. In the United States the right to free speech (often, in practice, 
exercised by the mass media and other commercial interests) invariably triumphs 
over claims of human dignity but, in continental Europe, the former is always 
balanced against the latter through the assertion of rights to  ‘dignity’, ‘honour’ or 
‘personality’ (Whitman, 2004: 1151 at 1197). In summary:
Europeans are consistently more drawn to problems touching on public dignity, while 
Americans are consistently more drawn to problems touching on the depredations of 
the state (ibid: at 1163).7
In a brief discussion it is impossible to represent the detailed legal analysis that 
accompanies Whitman’s arguments about American and continental European 
legal cultures.8 What is important here is to note how ambitious these arguments 
are. They range over large areas of positive law and do not confine themselves 
within orthodox juristic fields. Positivist comparatists might scorn such wide 
generalisations about legal cultural difference (despite the considerable legal doc-
trinal detail offered) as well as about categories such as ‘dignitary law’ that are not 
juristically recognised in the legal systems studied. Again, it might be asked what 
the scope of Whitman’s arguments is intended to be: for example, how much of 
the legal idea of human dignity he considers to be traceable specifically to old 
norms of social honour (Neuman, 2003). The cultural and legal canvasses on 
which he paints are obviously vast. 
7 On contrasts between legal values of ‘liberty’ in the United States and of ‘dignity’ in Germany, 
see also Eberle, 2002.
8 See also Friedman and Whitman, 2003, arguing that the legal concept of sexual harassment, 
imported from American law, is being transformed in some continental European countries into 
a more general concept of ‘moral harassment’ centred on protection of employees’ dignity in the 
workplace.
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There is a more fundamental problem, however. How far can Whitman, as a 
cultural ‘outsider’, understand the European legal culture(s) he studies? Europeans 
may well recognise the sources of important elements of their legal culture in old 
ideas of social hierarchy, yet see a fundamental distinction between the old law of 
insult and more pervasive modern ideas of human dignity. They may trace the 
latter much more directly, for example, to reactions to the experience of war and 
destruction in 20th century Europe. Again, there may be debate about Whitman’s 
understanding of civility. When he talks of European ideas of civility as based 
on a ‘levelling up’ of requirements of respect and honour he sees ‘some vision of 
hierarchical superiority’ surviving in them (Whitman, 2000: 1279 at 1331).
Respect has, at its heart, something to do with superiority and inferiority’ (ibid: at 1332) 
and the promise of dignity is for ‘most people, most of the time … a promise that they 
will be regarded as better than somebody else (Whitman, 2003b: 265).
Thus, he sees something false in European civility. An
outward show of respect … a realm of form and not of inner conviction, a realm of 
purely ritual self-abasement’ rather than ‘the sincere acknowledgement of the equality 
of others. (Whitman, 2000: 1279 at 1291).
By contrast, American manners focus on the latter. They represent, for Whitman, 
a ‘levelling down’ to a basic social equality reflected in informality and directness 
in social contacts. 
As cultural observation this is surely interesting but matters could be seen differ-
ently. A European view might be that, in essence, civility is not about social equality or 
inequality at all. It is about treating the other as a fellow human being with whom it is 
necessary to co-exist and who must therefore be shown respect simply to avoid fric-
tion and ease the processes of social interaction. European civility does not need to be 
characterised (as in Whitman’s account) as somehow false. In fact, ostensibly respect-
ful treatment is unlikely to be viewed as civility if perceived to be false. But neither is it 
an affirmation of social position. It is possible to have civility between social unequals 
(and this is culturally valued) no less than between equals. It may be important for 
civility to be neutral as regards social status. 
Perhaps, indeed, Whitman’s interpretation reflects his own American cultural 
heritage of (presumed) social equality and what he himself characterises as 
American incomprehension of European ideas of civility. More fundamentally, 
following his own arguments about a contrast between American and European 
cultural values, European understandings of civility may be coloured by a sense 
of human dignity as a value, while American understandings of civility may be 
coloured by a corresponding sense of liberty and of the social equality (of oppor-
tunity) needed to enjoy it.
I raise these very speculative matters only to illustrate that comparative studies 
of fundamental legal values (as, probably, of other aspects of culture in relation 
to law) can never be conclusive, but only suggestive. Clearly there can be no 
standpoint outside culture from which to pursue comparative legal studies. But 
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this insurmountable problem does not destroy the interest or significance of 
studies of legal culture. They may contribute to the intercultural conversation 
that leading cultural comparatists advocate. Unless done with immense sensitiv-
ity and a real desire for empathy, these studies may provoke irritation, or worse, 
from those who see the foreign culture under scrutiny as their own. And there 
can be no way of escaping the imprecision of the concept of culture itself. For all 
these reasons cultural comparative law is likely to be enduringly risky. It will not 
measure up to the protocols of rigour that positivist legal analysis demands. It 
may seem impractical and unfocused in its objectives when set alongside some of 
the business-like efforts of comparatist harmonisers, but the potential of cultural 
studies of legal difference for allowing a bolder spirit of curiosity to flourish in 
comparative law might be some considerable consolation. These studies might 
be seen as vehicles through which comparatists can take on again the mantle of 
humanist scholars analysing law as a rich cultural creation. If we can no longer 
believe in the promises of a universal natural law rooted in human nature and 
experience, it might be possible to believe in the possibility and validity of a study, 
through comparative law, of the infinitely rich varieties of human experience and 
their specifically legal expressions.
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
 1.  Has comparative law been more interested in ‘seeking similarity’ between 
laws and legal systems, or in ‘appreciating difference’ between them? What 
factors have inclined it towards one or other of these emphases?
 2.  Why does Legrand think that harmonisation of laws in Europe cannot 
be achieved? Is it, as he claims, wrong even to try to work towards this 
harmonisation?
 3.  How should comparative lawyers understand the concept of culture? What 
aspects of culture are most significant in affecting legal development?
 4.  How useful is the analogy between debates about multiculturalism and 
debates in comparative law about the merits of harmonisation of laws?
 5.  How far is it possible for people—including comparative lawyers—to 
understand a culture different from their own? What methods should they 
use in trying to do so?
 6.  Is it a worthwhile general aim today to try to reduce differences between 
legal systems, legal styles or legal cultures?
 7.  Is the study of fundamental legal values a potentially fruitful approach in 
comparative law?
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7The Economic Approach: Competition 
between Legal Systems
ANTHONY OGUS
KEY CONCEPTS
Efficient and efficiency; Competition between legal systems; Heterogeneous 
demand for law; Homogeneous demand for law; Artificial product differen-
tiation; Network.
I.  INTRODUCTION: ECONOMICS AND LAW
T
he starting point for this chapter is the obvious fact that the legal 
framework has an enormous impact on the economy, national and global. 
Economic historians have demonstrated how some of the key character-
istics of a legal system have helped to facilitate and sustain economic growth. 
From this, the intriguing possibility arises that the causal link between the law 
and the economy can be traced in the opposite direction: if certain types of law 
facilitate economic growth, then perhaps the pursuit of economic growth can 
help to explain legal developments. If this causal connection can plausibly be 
established, then understanding the economic functions of law can make a major 
contribution to comparative law, for example, by explaining why, in some areas, 
convergences between legal systems occur.
Economists use the word ‘efficient’ to indicate arrangements and processes 
which maximise economic welfare.1 In tracing the possibility that the law in dif-
ferent jurisdictions is driven, or at least influenced, by a concern to reach efficient 
outcomes, we should distinguish between the two principal instruments for legal 
development: legislation and case-law. And we ought also to recognise that in both 
forms of law-making, the economic goal will have to compete with other goals, for 
example a desire to redress or control outcomes which are regarded as unfair or 
1 More particularly ‘allocatively efficient’, which applies to maximising welfare in a given society, to 
be distinguished from ‘productively efficient’, which means maximising output for a given individual 
or firm. See Ogus, 2006: 26–7.
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unjust—these goals are sometimes referred to collectively as ‘distributional justice’. 
Now, of course, the importance to be attributed to efficiency, relative to distri-
butional justice, may well vary not only between legislature and judges but also 
between different jurisdictions. That would mean that, politically or ideologically, 
it is considered desirable in certain jurisdictions to sacrifice some economic growth 
to achieve greater fairness in society. For example, it might be the case that the his-
tory of civil law systems reveals a greater readiness to protect consumers against 
traders than that of common law systems. 
Nevertheless, it is not always easy to identify the extent to which the law-
 making process adopts or reflects particular goals. First, law-makers (politicians 
and judges) are not always explicit about their aims and objectives. Secondly, even 
if they are explicit, the statement of goals may disguise the true intent. Indeed, an 
important economic theory (known as ‘public choice’) suggests that much legisla-
tion has little to do with general goals such as efficiency or distributional justice; 
rather it serves to advance the interests of those groups who are most successful 
in lobbying politicians. In such cases, there may be insufficient transparency to 
detect the private interest motivation.
We should note also the possibility that the law might evolve spontaneously 
towards efficiency, without this being the conscious aim of law-makers. The 
political-economist Hayek famously argued that customary law, as developed 
particularly in common law jurisdictions, has this spontaneous effect because 
judges seek in general to match the law to the expectations of citizens (von Hayek, 
1973–79). Other evolutionary theorists have, in a similar vein, argued that the 
processes of litigation lead to the same outcome because litigants will tend, in 
general, to appeal against inefficient rules, rather than efficient rules, and thus, 
over time, efficient rules will survive better than inefficient rules: the ‘efficiency of 
the common law theory’ (Priest, 1977).
II.  THE LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Some early writers on political economy perceived the importance of law for 
economic welfare. Hobbes, for example, recognised that if entrepreneurs lacked 
confidence in the coercive power of the state to enforce contracts, they would not 
enter into trade; and Adam Smith recognised that ‘a tolerable administration of 
justice’ was an important condition to carry a state to ‘the highest degree of opu-
lence’ (Smith, 1980: 322). More from an historical and sociological perspective, 
Max Weber found that economic development was a consequence of formal and 
‘rational’ legal systems. 
In modern times, there has been much focus on how adherence to the ‘rule 
of law’ facilitates economic development. Although the ‘rule of law’ has been 
given a variety of meanings, it must clearly be distinguished from ‘rule by law’, 
which implies mainly that law is used as an instrument of governmental power 
and perhaps also for resolving disputes. As linked to the familiar concept of ‘law 
and order’, a system so characterised may be one subservient to tyrannical and 
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arbitrary government and may not be conducive to trade and commerce. The 
‘rule of law’ which has been shown to facilitate economic growth (Keefer and 
Knack, 1997) tends to have the following features:
• rules published and thus knowable in advance
• mechanisms ensuring the application of rules without discrimination
• binding decisions by an independent judiciary 
• (a minimum) recognition of basic human rights
• compliance by the government and its officials with relevant rules
What then of private law? What features have had a particularly strong impact on 
the economy? In comparing economic development in different European coun-
tries, economic historians have found an explanation in the ability of the private 
law framework to generate effective incentives for creative and productive activity. 
This meant in particular the extent to which contract law could generate mutual 
trust in commercial transactions and to which property rights could ensure an 
adequate return on investment. 
Now since all legal systems, however primitive, have some set of contractual 
and property rights, the crucial question is how well they are able to adapt to 
changing conditions. This is a matter not only of the capacity of the system to 
broaden its parameters to embrace, for example, intellectual property; it is also a 
question of doing so at relatively low cost. Put succinctly, the benefits arising from 
legal instruments must exceed the costs of using them. 
Take, first, the benefits of legal developments responding to technological or 
other changes. When agricultural land was used mainly to support the local com-
munity, a system of common ownership was unproblematic. But with the growth 
of markets and the need to specialise, advantages were to be secured from the 
enclosure of the land and the amalgamation of smaller units. Property law, which 
inhibited enclosure or insisted on the physical division of land for inheritance 
purposes, would thus hinder economic growth. Then, in response to technological 
development, industry became more dependent on large-scale capital investment 
and organisations. No doubt, existing systems of property and contract rights 
could be applied, but the key to success lay in devices for reducing the costs of 
applying appropriate legal instruments. The legal system required mechanisms 
which could, at low cost, finance transactions (eg negotiable instruments), spread 
risk (insurance) and, most importantly, underpin legal organisations by arrange-
ments which, while generating a sufficient return for entrepreneurs, would ensure 
the effective monitoring of inputs to the profit-making enterprise (limited liability 
corporations).
The extent to which, in a particular jurisdiction, these developments may have 
occurred faster or slower depended on a variety of factors related to legal culture 
and the law-making process. For comparative lawyers the intriguing questions 
arise whether the common law or the Romano-Germanic systems have been, in 
this regard, more or less successful, and what characteristics of the legal culture 
have had an important impact on economic growth. 
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It has, for a long time, been recognised that the English common law, through 
its development of banking and insurance, the joint-stock company and patent 
law, was conducive to the economic developments that became known as the 
‘industrial revolution’. Studies also suggest that countries adopting legal institu-
tions from within the common law tradition have experienced, in more recent 
times, faster growth than those countries drawing on the civil law tradition. 
If these generalisations are accepted, what characteristics of the common law 
culture might provide the explanation? At a very general level, it should be noted 
that civil law countries have been more identified with government interven-
tion in the market than common law countries. Of course, to a large extent, this 
reflects political ideology, but the determinants of political ideology and legal 
culture might not be that far apart. Take the following hallmarks of traditional 
common law culture:
• non-career judges
• greater use of juries and non-professional judges
• greater reliance on customary law and precedent
• less reliance on legislation and codification
• oral rather than written processes
Most of them are consistent with the idea that the administration of justice should 
be decentralised and thus further removed from the heavy hand of government, 
which can so often constrain economic development.
III.  COMPETITION BETWEEN NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS
The economic perspective has, in recent times, generated important insights into 
the relationship between legal developments in different jurisdictions through the 
idea of there being some degree of competition between legal systems. The idea 
is relatively simple and is drawn from the way that markets for ordinary products 
and services operate. If suppliers of (say) teddy bears have to compete with one 
another, consumers can choose by reference to how each supplier’s combination 
of price and quality meets their preferences. Provided that information about the 
available options is readily available, this should lead to the production of what 
consumers want at lowest cost. In a sense, and to a certain degree, a democratic 
system of government functions in this way: political parties compete by offering 
different programmes to match what the voting population may desire. 
It might seem strange to think in terms of legal subjects (individuals and firms) 
having a choice between different legal orders: the legislature in any one jurisdic-
tion normally has the monopoly of law-making powers. Nevertheless, there may 
be some limited competition between that legislature and the courts and also 
between different court systems with overlapping jurisdictions, such as famously 
occurred between the common law and chancery courts before the 19th century. 
Once we introduce transactions involving more than one jurisdiction, the issue of 
competition between legal sources becomes less artificial and, with the increased 
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mobility of enterprises and the globalisation of markets of modern times, it has 
become quite significant.
Take, first, the decisions of large firms where to site their business. Subject to their 
freedom to do so, they will want to establish in the jurisdiction which best meets 
their preferences, regarding the security of their employees and assets, and those 
aspects of local conditions which best enhance their profit-making capacity. A num-
ber of different considerations are involved, amongst which may feature the legal 
system, and the costs which the local law imposes on their business. For their part, 
governments are also interested in attracting large firms to their jurisdiction because 
that is likely to generate more employment as well as increased tax revenue.
Secondly, to some extent, the principles of private international law enable 
firms and individuals to select a legal system to govern their transaction or busi-
ness, even though the connection with the jurisdiction may not be very strong. 
The freedom, subject to public policy constraints, of parties to an international 
contract to choose the law to apply to the contract constitutes the classic example. 
There is, indeed, a long tradition of foreigners selecting English law to govern 
their contract and submitting to the jurisdiction of the English courts even where 
the transaction has no particular connection with the UK. So too, if only to a 
lesser extent, corporations may be ‘registered’ in a jurisdiction, and therefore be 
subject to its law, even if the firm has no major physical presence there: in the 
United States the State of Delaware famously attracts a large number of firms to 
its corporate law regime. 
Clearly there are also advantages to the local legal profession in having its legal 
system adopted in this way. It will normally lead to more work for them and 
therefore an increased income. Moreover, because of their technical legal exper-
tise, relevant members of those professions are likely to be able to influence local 
law-makers to adapt law to meet the preferences of those who will create more 
business for them. 
To observe this process of competition in practice, take the case of Trendex 
Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria.2 A Nigerian bank was sued for 
defaulting on a commercial letter of credit. It invoked the principle of sovereign 
immunity because of its close connection to the Nigerian government. A majority 
of the Court of Appeal held that even if the bank were to be regarded as a depart-
ment of government it could not claim immunity in respect of a purely commer-
cial transaction. This ruling followed judicial developments in Belgium, Germany, 
The Netherlands and the United States, rather than a long line of English authori-
ties. Recognising the importance of the decision for those adopting English law in 
contracts, Lord Denning, MR observed [1977] QB at 556: 
Whenever a change is made, someone some time has to make the first move. One coun-
try alone may start the process. Others may follow. At first a trickle, then a stream, last a 
flood. England should not be left behind on the bank ... ‘We must take the current when 
it serves, or lose our ventures’: Julius Caesar, Act IV, sc. III.
2 Trendex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529 (CA).
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Note, too, that even without the possibility of physical mobility or the operation 
of choice of law clauses, a comparison of domestic law with its foreign counterpart 
may show that local industry is legally disadvantaged relative to its international 
competitors. For example, if the industry has to comply with stringent regulation 
governing the safety of its products or services, its costs will be higher and there-
fore so also will be its prices. Representatives from that industry then might apply 
pressure to politicians within the jurisdiction to alleviate the burden. 
In summary, some degree of competition between national legal systems can 
be envisaged when those who are the subject of law—firms and individuals—
have an effective choice as to the legal regimes which should govern their affairs. 
To this may be added a further proposition: the more the legal subjects are 
engaged in transboundary activities, the more likely that they will have an effec-
tive choice of legal regime. In the case of a sale of goods between parties within 
a single jurisdiction, it may be theoretically possible for them to select the law of 
another jurisdiction to govern their transaction, but it is very unlikely they will do 
so, given that they will both normally incur higher costs in nominating a foreign 
jurisdiction. In an international sale of goods, by hypothesis, there is no single 
jurisdiction which unites the two parties in this way. It follows, too, that there are 
areas of law that are less likely to deal with transboundary activity—such as land 
law—and in relation to which, therefore, there will be less competition between 
jurisdictions.
IV.  CONSEQUENCES OF COMPETITION: DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE
What consequences are likely to flow from competition between legal systems? 
Will there be (as Lord Denning’s observation suggests) a convergence of legal 
principles by means of imitation and transplants? Or will differences remain and 
perhaps even increase? To answer these questions, we need to have regard to two 
key factors: the area of law concerned; and possible barriers to transplants and 
convergence.
Provided that there is a democratic basis to, or inspiration for, law-making, 
legal developments occurring in a particular jurisdiction are likely to reflect pref-
erences, values and generally-held opinions in that jurisdiction. In some areas 
of law, the preferences, values and opinions are going to differ sharply between 
jurisdictions even though they may be close both geographically and in economic 
development. For example, a jurisdiction (say) in Southern Europe, which is 
influenced by the Roman Catholic church is unlikely to share the same set of 
values regarding family relationships and therefore family law as (say) a jurisdic-
tion in northern Europe where the influence of religion on legal policy-making 
is much smaller. Nor, from the United Kingdom, do we have to travel very far to 
find a jurisdiction, namely France, which offers a far more generous set of laws 
governing the compensation of road accident victims; and that difference must 
reflect a divergence in social values.
Competition between Legal Systems  161
Now, competition may exert some pressure on national law-makers even in 
areas such as these. Single sex couples may be attracted to living and working in 
countries where there relationship is to some degree formalised; and there is even 
an argument that tourism may be boosted by laws more favourable to less com-
mon lifestyles (Brown, 1996: 271–4). More generous road accident compensation 
provision leads to higher transport costs for industry in France, compared to 
England, and may result in competitive pressure from that source. Nevertheless, 
these competitive forces, if they exist at all, are unlikely to be significant relative to 
the strength of opinion that underpins the legal differences. Putting this another 
way, and using the language of economics, the demand for the law governing these 
areas is ‘heterogeneous’. Note, too, that the law governing such areas tends to be 
interventionist law, that is, law which imposes outcomes, according to the public 
policy adopted. In summary, competition among suppliers of interventionist law, 
reflecting heterogeneous demand, is unlikely to result in a convergence of legal 
principles.
In contrast, law can also be facilitative, that is, rather than imposing policy deter-
mined outcomes, it accepts—indeed reinforces—what individuals and firms want 
and protects expectations by rending the desired outcomes legally enforceable. The 
classic example of facilitative law is contract, but parts of company law and prop-
erty law also fit into this category. The demand for facilitative law is predominantly 
homogenous, rather than heterogeneous: that is, the preference of those wishing 
to invoke the law is unlikely to vary significantly across jurisdictional boundaries. 
Those making contracts in Greece or Portugal basically have the same desire as 
their equivalents in Britain or Sweden, that the consensually approved outcome 
should be reached at minimum cost. The qualification ‘at minimum cost’ is impor-
tant, because if one legal system provides the legal means of achieving the desired 
outcome at a significantly higher cost than another legal system and the parties are 
free to choose the latter to govern their contract, then they will be motivated to do 
so. If other contracting parties have the same perception and act in the same way, 
the jurisdiction with the higher set of costs will lose legal business and the law-
makers there will be under pressure from legal practitioners to reform the law. 
To give an example, suppose that a seller in Jurisdiction A enters into a contract 
with a buyer from Jurisdiction B. In the event of a serious breach, both parties 
would prefer that the party not in breach would be able to terminate the contract 
without a formal judicial decision to that effect. Suppose that Jurisdiction A 
permits such unilateral termination, but in Jurisdiction B termination normally 
requires a judicial decision. Subject to other considerations, it is in the interests of 
the parties to select Jurisdiction A in their choice of law clause. If there is a reduced 
demand for the more costly rule in Jurisdiction B, competition between the two 
legal systems will generate pressure for the formalistic approach in Jurisdiction 
B to be abandoned, and in consequence there will be some convergence between 
the two legal systems.
The Trendex Trading case, described above, is an example of English courts 
being under competitive pressure to change the law in favour of an approach 
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adopted abroad. Another interesting area of convergence is that of the trust. In 
comparison with civil law equivalents, the Anglo-American trust concept has 
proved to be a very cost-efficient device for certain types of financial transactions, 
and civilian systems have been under pressure, at the very least, to recognise the 
existence of the concept under the rules of private international law and, in some 
cases, to assimilate the device. As an Italian jurist has observed: the ‘trust has 
obtained an easy and well-deserved victory in the competition in the market of 
legal doctrines’ (Mattei, 1994: 10).
To summarise: competition between legal systems may be expected to influ-
ence legal developments, but not necessarily towards convergence. In areas of law 
which are predominantly ‘interventionist’, with rules inspired by public-policy 
imposing outcomes, there are likely to be differences in public policy values in 
different jurisdictions and legal rules may thus continue to diverge. Where, on the 
other hand, the law is predominantly ‘facilitative’, allowing firms and individuals 
to determine their own preferred outcomes, some degree of convergence may be 
anticipated, on the assumption that pressure will be exerted for legal rules which 
enable those preferred outcomes to be reached at lowest legal cost.
V.  TRANSPLANTS AND OBSTACLES TO CONVERGENCE
Convergence, whether or not resulting from competition, normally takes place 
by one jurisdiction imitating rules or concepts of another jurisdiction, what are 
sometimes referred to as ‘legal transplants’. There has been much discussion in 
the mainstream comparative law literature on the difficulties of transplanting 
from one legal culture to another (notably, Kahn-Freund, 1974; and Legrand, 
1996). In this part, I wish to explore why there may be economic reasons for such 
difficulties, and that entails returning to the question whether legal practitioners 
within a particular jurisdiction will be motivated to support, or rather to oppose 
legal transplants. The question is important because the legal profession plays a 
very important role in influencing law-makers on what law reform is, or is not, 
desirable.
We may start by recognising that practising lawyers can benefit from an 
increased demand for their services when their legal system is adopted by legal 
subjects either migrating to the jurisdiction or adopting it under choice of law 
principles. That might suggest a strategy of facilitating competition between 
legal systems and supporting reform measures which, as in the Trendex Trading 
example, reduce legal costs in order to attract more legal business. On the other 
hand, practising lawyers will wish to retain the business emanating from legal 
subjects already located in the jurisdiction. If competition between legal systems 
means that the loss of such business exceeds potential gains from ‘immigrant’ 
legal business, then legal practitioners will oppose measures which facilitate the 
competition. For an example, take the continental European approach to choice 
of law governing a company’s existence and internal affairs. Traditionally, this 
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has been dominated by the ‘real seat’ doctrine, whereby the applicable law is that 
of the jurisdiction in which the firm’s administration is physically situated. This 
doctrine inhibits freedom in the choice of law, which, as we have seen, has had 
such an impact in the United States, enabling many corporations to establish 
legally in Delaware. There is some evidence (Carney, 1997) that a change to the 
European approach was resisted by the French authorities on the ground that, if 
greater freedom were to be conferred in where firms could incorporate, chartering 
business in France would be lost to competing jurisdictions. 
Resistance to the international harmonisation of law by practising lawyers 
from a particular jurisdiction may, indeed, indicate that in the ‘market for law’ a 
significant number of those (mainly firms) requiring a legal framework for their 
activities have a preference for the distinctive set of rules emanating from that 
jurisdiction. In 1981 the Law Society of England and Wales opposed the Vienna 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods on the ground, inter 
alia, that it would result in a diminished role for English law within the interna-
tional trade arena (Lee, 1993: 132). 
There is, nevertheless, a possibility that the profit motivation of lawyers who 
benefit from the demand for legal work in a particular jurisdiction can lead 
them to exaggerate the peculiarities of the law in that jurisdiction, in order to 
resist competition from those practising in other jurisdictions. Economists use 
the expression ‘artificial product differentiation’ to describe a situation in which 
a supplier draws attention to unreal or irrelevant differences between a prod-
uct supplied and those otherwise available in the market, in order to secure a 
monopolistic position and make enhanced profits. Lawyers everywhere tend to 
use jargon and procedures which distance them from other professional activities 
(such as accounting), thereby rendering the content of the law more abstruse than 
it needs to be and, in consequence, inflating the demand for their services. By par-
ity of reasoning, it is possible to argue that lawyers will be tempted to emphasise 
the characteristics of their own legal system that are not easily grasped by lawyers 
from other jurisdictions, in order to create a barrier to competition from those 
lawyers (Ogus, 2002). And that will, of course, lead them to oppose proposals 
for harmonising the law that would deprive them of these advantages. When, 
therefore, comparative lawyers refer to the incompatibility of certain legal cul-
tures that constitute major obstacles to harmonisation, these may be phenomena 
which exist, which are enhanced by human design, and which have an economic 
explanation.
VI.  LEGAL CULTURE: A NETWORK LIKE THE RAILWAYS?
When the railways were developed in Europe in the 19th century, there was 
not originally a single system, but a number of different systems scattered geo-
graphically, each of them with its own set of technical specifications, notably 
as regards the distance between the rails. And this diversity led to some degree 
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of competition, in particular between ‘narrow-gauge’ and ‘broad-gauge’ rail-
ways. As the amount of travel increased and intercommunication between the 
systems reduced costs, so a struggle for which would be the dominant system 
emerged, initially within national boundaries and subsequently internationally. 
Eventually, a single set of specifications was adopted for most of Europe so that, 
for example, the same rolling stock could be used for a journey between Paris 
and Istanbul.
Railways constitute what economists call a ‘network’. This is a technical system 
providing links for users of services, such that the greater the number that use it, 
the greater the value for all of them. (Another example is the fax system. I would 
be stupid to purchase a fax machine unless many of the people I wish to commu-
nicate with also have one; and the more they use it, the more all of us will benefit). 
As the system becomes more and more popular, so demand tips in its favour, 
rendering competition by alternative systems less and less effective. Eventually, 
the system may become so dominant that it acquires monopolistic power, at least 
for some time, until technological advance generates other possibilities (think of 
DVDs eventually challenging video systems).
We can think of legal cultures in a similar way. Consider how a legal ‘sys-
tem’ emerges. Within any society there will be some individuals or institutions 
responsible for resolving disputes and perhaps some others responsible for the 
formulating of rules to deal with such disputes. A particular set of linguistic, 
conceptual and procedural devices will become conventional for these purposes, 
and their regular use will reduce the costs of reaching decisions in individual 
cases. Although within a given society there may be a number of different 
networks of language, concepts and procedures, as with railways, the attractive-
ness of one set will enable it to achieve dominance. The greater the number of 
transactions and disputes adopting a particular set, the higher the expectation 
that in future other transactions and other disputes will also adopt it. Some 
competition may continue to exist for some time (think of the rivalry histori-
cally in England between the common law and equity), but at least rules will 
develop for co-ordinating them.
Within a jurisdiction, the monopolistic power of the dominant legal culture 
is likely to be enhanced by the efforts of legal practitioners, for the profit motive 
described above (Part V), to reinforce differences with other systems. But what 
about transactions and other legal relationships that transcend jurisdictional 
boundaries? We have already seen (Part III above) how parties involved in these 
are likely, if they have freedom of choice of law to govern the issue, to select the 
legal system which minimises their costs. That phenomenon might well have 
the effect of destabilising the (for domestic practising lawyers) profit-generating 
peculiarities of the legal cultures relevant to the issues involved, because those 
peculiarities are likely to render adoption of the law from that jurisdiction more 
costly. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that those areas of law (for example, 
sale of goods) which frequently govern interjurisdictional transactions and 
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 relationships are likely to be far less marked by distinctive legal cultures than 
those areas of law (for example, land law) only rarely involved in such trans-
actions and relationships. And the analogy with railways is again pertinent. 
Ordinary railway systems in continental Europe frequently cross national 
boundaries, and an international set of technical standards superseded 
national standards. However, urban underground railway systems have, by and 
large, preserved their own sets of specifications.
VII.  HYBRID LEGAL SYSTEMS
In the last part we considered jurisdictions in which there is a single dominant 
legal culture. We come, finally, to jurisdictions where this is not the case and 
which comparative lawyers refer to as ‘hybrid’, ‘mixed’ or ‘pluralistic’, because 
the legal system has absorbed two or more legal cultures. These include juris-
dictions (for example in Africa) where one legal culture has been imposed by 
a colonial power, but where it must ‘compete’ with a native legal culture. Also, 
jurisdictions whose legal systems reflect the different legal cultures of succes-
sive occupations, for example, Quebec (French and English) and South Africa 
(Roman-Dutch and English). A third category covers jurisdictions, for example 
Japan and Turkey, which experienced industrialisation relatively late and which 
needed to import legal cultures to provide a more sophisticated legal frame-
work than native law could supply: indeed, there was some degree of competi-
tion between, for example, French and German law, to provide this framework 
(Örücü, 1999: 80–117).
In considering how hybrid legal systems evolve in the face of competition 
among legal orders, it is possible to make generalisations which apply to all three 
categories. So, for example, importing transplants from other legal systems may 
be assumed to be easier than for jurisdictions of a single dominant legal culture 
because the existing system is already sufficiently flexible to accommodate differ-
ent cultures. We might also expect that in hybrid jurisdictions, legal practitioners 
will be less able to exploit legal-cultural characteristics in the manner envisaged 
above in Part V, because some degree of internal competition between the legal 
cultures will reduce the monopolistic power of the profession to engage in exces-
sive jargon and complexities. However, for this to be the case, the competition 
between the cultures must be real, and not merely hypothetical. Take the cases of 
Japan and Turkey. The fact that the domestic law-makers could choose between 
the foreign models did not necessarily mean that the selection would be made by 
reference to the lowest cost criteria. The selection process could, for example, be 
heavily influenced by professional groups who had a financial interest in one of 
the foreign legal cultures, perhaps because they had received training within that 
tradition. Nevertheless, commercial interests, keen to invest in the jurisdiction, 
might also apply pressure and that might override the profit-seeking efforts of 
practising lawyers.
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VIII.  CONCLUSIONS
The analysis in this chapter can lead to the following conclusions:
•  Law is important for economic growth and the goal of economic growth 
can help to explain legal developments, so also the relationship between 
developments in different legal systems;
•  Common law systems may have features which have been particularly con-
ducive to economic growth;
•  Competition between legal systems occurs particularly where there is free-
dom of choice as to the applicable legal regime;
•  Competition between legal systems tends to influence a convergence of legal 
principles in areas of facilitative law;
•  Practising lawyers may be expected to oppose reforms, including propos-
als for convergence of legal systems, that will reduce the demand for their 
 services;
•  An economic interpretation of ‘legal culture’ suggests that it is a ‘network’ 
which may reduce the costs of communication between those using the legal 
system, but its characteristics may be exploited by practising lawyers to resist 
competition;
•  ‘Hybrid’ legal systems can benefit from the competition of legal cultures 
inherent within the jurisdiction.
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
1. In what ways can law stimulate economic growth?
2.   What distinguishing features of the common law and civil law legal tradi-
tions might either stimulate, or rather inhibit, economic growth?
3.  To what extent, and in what circumstances, is there competition between 
national legal orders?
4.  When is competition between national legal orders likely to lead to a con-
vergence of principles and when to a divergence?
5.  How and when might practising lawyers benefit from a convergence of 
legal principles or from a divergence?
6. In what ways can a legal culture inhibit competition for legal services?
7.  Are ‘hybrid’ legal systems likely to be more or less conducive to compe-
tition for legal services than legal systems with a single dominant legal 
culture?
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8A General View of ‘Legal Families’ and of 
‘Mixing Systems’*
ESI˙N ÖRÜCÜ
KEY CONCEPTS
Legal family; Family tree; Tree model; Wave theory; Diffusion; Transposition; 
Mix; Mixed system; Mixedness; Encounter; Overlap; Combination; Underlay; 
Overlay; Cross-fertilisation.
I.  INTRODUCTION
One of the conventional tasks of comparative law has been the placing of legal  systems in legal families for taxonomic purposes and ease of organisation, although
the idea of a ‘legal family’ does not correspond to a biological reality; it is no more than 
a didactic device (David and Brierley, 1985: 21).
However, biological and linguistic taxonomies have been used in classification as 
organising devices. The practice has been to study legal systems that best represent 
large groups and then make generalisations based on concepts such as original-
ity, derivation and common elements.1 Similarities and relationships serve as the 
bases for classification. The interest in classifications is confined to general char-
acteristics, substance, sources and structure. The essence does not lie in diversity 
of rules in a given topic, nor in external criteria and context, only in the affinities 
being considered.  
Today, what is needed is an entirely fresh approach within which legal systems 
can be classified according to parentage, constituent elements and the resulting 
* This chapter hails from Örücü, 2004b (‘Family Trees for Legal Systems: Towards a Contemporary 
Approach’): 359–75 as well as Örücü, 2004a: ch 10:3.
1 For a summary of some past efforts at classification see Zweigert and Kötz, 1998: 63–7. See 
also Bogdan, 1994: 82–91.
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blend, and then be re-grouped on the principle of predominance.2 Although parts 
of the new landscape may resemble the old, the whole will look very different.
Existing classifications rely on private law, are Euro-centric and therefore  heavily 
weighted towards the civil law and the common law families. Moreover, fixed clas-
sifications can have only a limited life-span as legal systems may shift from one 
cluster towards another, so that the placing of a legal system in the legal families 
framework may have to be re-thought from time to time (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998: 
66). New families may appear. For example, it has been suggested that an ‘African 
legal family’ is emerging (ibid); and interest in ‘mixed jurisdictions’ is now increas-
ing, such jurisdictions being seen as members of a so-called ‘third family’.3
René David talked of ‘constant elements’ (David and Brierley, 1985: 17–20) and 
Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz proposed using ‘legal styles’ to discover shared 
distinctive elements between legal systems (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998: 67–8). 
However, they also pointed out that
as the example of ‘hybrid’ systems shows, any division of the legal world into families, or 
groups is a rough and ready device (ibid: 72).
We are also warned:
The suitability of any classification will depend upon whether the perspective is world-
wide or regional, or whether attention is given to public, private or criminal law (David 
and Brierley, 1985: 21 and Bogdan, 1994: 85).
Yet in Europe today in search of a ‘new ius commune’, it is commonplace not only 
to talk of civil law and common law families, but to treat them as if they are the 
only two monolithic entities. Such an approach is inadequate.
In short: traditional classifications, mostly based on the ‘law as rules’ approach 
differ as to whether they simplify or multiply the number of legal families, in how 
they place various legal families in their schemes, and consider official law and the 
‘top-down’ models exclusively. It might be said that the groupings are all ‘legally 
structured’, and ‘structure-specific’. An entirely culture-specific approach may not 
be conclusive, but the relationship between legal and social systems must be given 
due weight. This indicates the importance of sociology of law to comparative 
lawyers together with a multi-disciplinary approach.
It is apparent that the ‘legal families’ division based on the ‘law as rules’ approach is 
collapsing. Other approaches are being put forward. One such suggestion, presented 
as being less biased, is the ‘cultural families’ division based on the ‘law as culture’ 
approach. On this basis four broad cultures have been distinguished: the African, 
the Asian, the Islamic and Western (that is,  cultures with European roots—Europe, 
America and Oceania) (van Hoecke and Warrington, 1998: 495 at 502). 
2 This chapter hails from my ‘Family Trees for Legal Systems: Towards a Contemporary Approach’ 
Chapter 18 in van Hoecke (ed) 2004b, 359–375 as well as Örücü,  2004a, Chapter 10:3.
3 Note the launching of the World Society of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists in New Orleans (November 
2002), and see Palmer, 2001.
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Adam Podgorecki places legal systems in ten groups: based on official and 
 intuitive law; based on different types of legitimacy; adequate, guiding and 
restrictive; monolithic and pluralist; oppressive (including punitive) and  tolerant 
(including liberal); based on state and less formal types of conflict resolutions; 
self-generated and imposed; accessible and inaccessible; based on religious atti-
tudes of the population; and those rooted in capitalist and communist social 
reality (Podgorecki, 1985: 3). 
Another approach, giving prominence to yet another context, is the ‘law and 
economics’ approach. Here we see how Ugo Mattei tries to draw the taxonomy 
away from the so-called Euro-centric axis to present a new map for the world’s 
legal systems. This classification is based on the rule of professional law, the rule 
of political law and the rule of traditional law, these three forming a triangle on 
the apices of which all legal systems can be placed (Mattei, 1997). 
Andrew Harding, whose main interest is in South East Asia, categorically tells us 
that all Eurocentric comparatists fall into the ‘legal families trap’. According to him,
[l]egal families tell us nothing about legal systems except as to their general style and 
method, and the idea makes no sense whatsoever amid the nomic din of South East Asia 
(Harding, 2002: 36 at 51).
All the above indicates that scholars fail to agree on whether the notion of families 
is basic and scientific, or theoretically and descriptively useless. Those who use the 
concept do not even agree on the criteria for classification and groupings.
The discussion might also consider whether there is an emerging ‘European 
legal family’, but this would be yet another monolithic approach, a new creation 
ignoring  developments both within and outside Europe.  
Recently there has been increasing interest in mixed, or hybrid systems. 
Vernon Palmer calls ‘mixed jurisdictions’ the ‘third family’ (Palmer, 2001)—
the first and the second being for him, civil law and common law; and Jan Smits has 
published a monograph entitled ‘The Making of European Private Law: Towards a Ius 
Commune Europaeum as a Mixed Legal System’ (Smits, 2002). To talk of a new fam-
ily with the name ‘mixed jurisdictions’, however, would not be satisfactory, as clearly, 
not all ‘mixes’ can be pooled together and not all the existing members of such a 
family would have the same or similar ingredients. It would be extremely difficult to 
place, for example, Quebec and Algeria—both mixed systems—into one family. The 
simple mixes, the complex mixes, as well as the dual systems and systems adhering 
to legal pluralism cannot be lumped together (see Örücü, 1996). 
II.  ENCOUNTER, OVERLAP AND COMBINATION
Pier Guiseppe Monateri has suggested ‘contamination’ as the basis for 
 understanding the world of legal systems:
[T]he actual legal world is more to be seen as a world of ‘contaminations’ than a world 
split up into different families (Monateri, 1998: 83 at 107).
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He claims that this idea is neither new nor linked to globalisation since ‘practi-
cally every system, even in antiquity has grown through “contaminations”’(ibid), 
the practice of borrowing having always been the normal path of development. 
In his view, the 
widespread cross-diffusion of French and German patterns within Civil law, and the 
overcoming of American models at the present, shape a similar legal landscape all across 
the world, with a wilderness of local variants (ibid).
It is true that a comparative lawyer can detect cross-pollination and ‘horizontal 
transfers’ between systems at all times. 
Surely what is necessary today is a re-assessment of individual legal systems 
according to the old and new overlaps, combinations and blends, and of how the 
existing constituent elements have mingled and are mingling with new elements 
entering them. I propose a scheme that regards all legal systems as mixed and 
overlapping, overtly or covertly, and groups them according to the proportionate 
mixture of the ingredients. To do this, it is essential to look at the constituent ele-
ments in each legal system and to re-group legal systems on a much larger scale 
according to the predominance of the ingredient sources from whence each sys-
tem is formed. The starting point is appreciation of the fact that all legal systems 
are overlaps, combinations and mixes to varying degrees.
Thus, some continental systems, such as the Dutch, are combinations of 
Roman, French, German and indigenous laws, and some are combinations of 
Canon, Roman, French, Austrian and German Laws and ius commune, such as the 
Italian. Indeed, all European systems can be better approached as overlaps. Then 
there are other combinations such as common law, religious law and indigenous 
customary laws, as in countries such as India and Pakistan; and French, Socialist, 
Islamic and indigenous customary tribal laws, as in Algeria. In fact, French law, 
German law and common law are themselves all outcomes of overlaps of various 
ingredients. English law is becoming more and more an overlap of common law, 
various civilian systems and European law. Indeed, classical English common law 
itself was an overlap of Roman law, civilian ideas, canon law, equity and domestic 
common law.4 In this approach the underlays and the overlays must be care-
fully distinguished, because layers may also shift their positions. For example, 
in Hong Kong, until 1990, English common law was the overlay, with Chinese 
customary law the underlay, but now, common law is becoming an underlay 
alongside Chinese customary law, both under a growing overlay of modern 
Chinese law. 
This approach would particularly help the classification of systems such as 
those of Malaysia, Singapore, Burma and Thailand. In fact, the whole of South 
East Asia would be better served by this approach. In this way, off-shoots and 
sub-groups can be more clearly seen and catered for. For example, since the end of 
4  For contributions from Islamic and Talmudic laws into common law, see the literature men-
tioned by Glenn, 2001 133 at 141–2. See also Glenn, 2005.
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the 19th century, Thailand, which was never a colony, has had in its modern tex-
ture a real mixture of sources such as English law, German law, French law, Swiss 
law, Japanese law and American law. These sit alongside historic sources which 
have been in existence since 1283: rules from indigenous culture and tradition, 
customary laws and Hindu jurisprudence are still to be found in some modern 
enactments. In addition, Thai codes were originally drafted in English and French 
and subsequently translated into Thai. So, where could this legal system be placed 
in the traditional classification of legal families?
The same question can be posed for Malaysia, where first there was the ‘native’ 
law of the aboriginal inhabitants which is still today regarded as positive law by 
courts. Then came layers of transplanted law: adat law (a number of Malay cus-
toms); Hindu and Buddhist laws; Islamic law; Chinese law; Thai law; the English 
common law tradition coloured by Anglo-Indian codes and the United States 
model. There are further influences in South East Asia: French, Dutch, German, 
Swiss, Portuguese and Spanish Civilian traditions; American, Japanese and Soviet 
laws (Harding, 2002: 36 at 42–3). The region
has an abundance of legal traditions, practically all of them having been ‘received’ 
or ‘transplanted’ in one sense or another, and encompassing all of the world’s major 
legal world views and systems … except perhaps for African law and Eskimo law (ibid: 
36 at 47). 
Which of the commonly used classifications deal with these? 
Of special interest are four kinds of encounters between legal systems, legal cultures 
and socio-cultures: (see Örücü, 1995) those between systems of socio- and legal-
cultural similarity; those between systems of socio-cultural similarity but  legal-
 cultural differene; those between systems of socio-cultural difference but legal-cultural 
similarity; and those between systems of both socio- and legal-cultural difference. 
These encounters lead to overlaps, interrelationships, mixed and mixing systems and 
systems in transition. Law can be approached as the product of a process of transposi-
tion. The concept ‘transposition’, as in music, helps to highlight the crucial importance 
of the internal tuners who adjust the mix, adapting it to the new instrument (see 
Örücü, 2002). 
Considering legal systems as overlaps, combinations, marriages and off-spring 
leads to terminology such as fertilisation, pollination, grafting, intertwining, 
osmosis and pruning, which paves the way to an understanding of developments 
in our day.
In linguistics, the ‘tree model’ of language development reflects an  evolutionary 
approach and is the one generally used to explain ramification and divergence. 
The ‘wave theory’, on the other hand, showing that changes can spread like waves 
over a wide area, can also handle the equally important forces of  convergence,5 
as can ‘diffusion’ (Twining, 2004). However, similarities do not always arise from 
5 See, for an analysis of these theories, Renfrew, 1987, especially 105 at 244–8. 
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genetic relationships, neither does resemblance necessarily indicate common 
origin. There can be ‘horizontal transfers’ between adjacent systems. ‘Horizontal 
transfer’ can also explain why a borrowed concept or institution does not always 
exactly retain its original meaning. Areas nearest or adjacent to the initial change 
will change first and may even give up their own peculiarities. Subsequent re-
groupings may come about on the ‘wave model’ mentioned above. Thus, conver-
gence can occur between concepts or systems that were originally very different. 
It flows from the foregoing that a wave need not start from a fixed centre either. 
Developments can take place in steps with no one locale as the prime innovating 
centre. It is not necessary to depict one as the donor and the other the recipient. 
In this perspective, there is no one localised homeland but ‘cumulative mutual-
ity’. Interaction is the essence. The ‘tree model’ and the ‘wave model’ can be used 
together to explain developments; so can the ‘knock-on-effect’. This combined 
approach indicates a way forward for an understanding of how legal systems func-
tion, change and develop. 
Civil law and common law would appear near to, but not necessarily at the 
prime innovating center. It is of course, possible to go right back to the laws of 
Hammurabi and to Greek laws before even considering Roman law—the ingre-
dients of which possibly included elements of Hindu law through Egyptian and 
Greek channels—as the starting point of civil law.
When one looks at legal cultures and traditions, one sees that civil law and 
common law are but two of the ancestors, others being, according to one divide 
for instance, Chthonic, Talmudic, Islamic, Hindu, and Asian (Glenn, 2000). Even 
then, Patrick Glenn says: 
In looking at (only) seven legal traditions of the world, it has been impossible to avoid 
the existence of other recognisable legal traditions. Some might say the other legal tra-
ditions are minor ones, which complement or oppose the traditions which have been 
examined. This may or may not be accurate, since there are no well established criteria 
for distinguishing major from minor traditions … If the traditions in law which have 
been examined here … appear presently as the major ones of the world, it may be that 
this is only a conclusion of first impression, and that there are other legal traditions … 
which are still more profound and which await investigation, and recognition, as being 
of primary importance (Glenn, 2000: 318–19).
So we see that combinations have taken place between systems and sub-systems 
of different origins. It may be difficult to determine with exactitude the degrees 
of hybridity when there is much overlap, cross-fertilisation, reciprocal influence, 
fusion, infusion, grafting and the like. The simple conclusion is that there are no 
pure systems in the legal world and that there are various degrees of hybridity 
arising from different levels and layers of crossing and intertwining between the 
roots and branches of adjacent ‘family trees’.
Some of the off-spring showing overt signs of their different legal-cultural, 
racial, ethnic and religious origins, have already been grouped as ‘mixed jurisdic-
tions’, and treated as numerus clausus. However, there are many overt and covert 
mixtures that are the off-spring of the same or of other combinations. 
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Even within the continent of Europe, one can see complicated crosses such as 
those in Malta (Ganado, 1996), where legal history began with the Phoenician 
 settlement and continued with the Roman conquest bringing the Corpus Iuris. 
Then the Normans invaded and brought feudal law as applied in Spain, Naples 
and Sicily. The invasion of the Moors had direct influence on the Maltese 
 language. The sovereignty of the Knights of St. John recognised local usage 
and issued declarations of private law drawing on laws of other countries, 
mostly Italian. Then came the French with their Napoleonic laws. Finally, the 
British brought the common law. So here in Malta we see a good example of 
an eclectic criminal code drafted under a strong Italian influence but with 
pervasive English and Scottish impact, and a commercial code largely based on 
the French, with maritime law following English law. The 1873 Civil Code is 
predominantly based on the French and Italian codes and also on the Municipal 
Code de Rohan, the Civil Code of Louisiana and the Austrian Civil Code. 
Canon law applies in the realm of family law where there is also the influence 
of English law, German law, Italian law and French law. Constitutional law is 
mainly British. The official languages are Maltese and English. The ingredients 
work cumulatively and interactively. 
There are, of course, even more extreme and unexpected crosses. Sometimes, 
seeds are scattered even more widely. For example, Turkey is a cross between 
Swiss, German, Italian, French and Roman laws, a covert Islamic law and local 
customary law, as well as more recently, European law and American law. This was 
brought about as a result of grafting, pruning, tuning and intertwining by an elite 
concerned with changing not only the law and legal culture but the people them-
selves and the way of life from the traditional to the modern, by the introduction 
of radical social reform laws to accompany the forging of a new legal system by 
receptions from abroad (see Örücü, 2006). 
It is possible to say that European law today reflects combinations between 
common law—such as Irish, English and American laws—and civil law in its 
many varieties—such as German, French, Dutch and Danish laws—as well as the 
laws of mixed jurisdictions, such as Scottish law, all with their own diverse his-
toric ingredients. An enlarged Europe will have even more to accommodate, as it 
will have to engage with socialist law and legal culture and other varieties of the
civilian tradition. The status of Islamic law and its impact in Europe is now an impor-
tant subject of study. As people are on the move in Europe, so are legal systems.
One can no longer concentrate solely on what are regarded classically as the 
great ‘parent’ systems (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998: 41). 
The ‘family trees’ approach I proposed (Örücü, 2004a; and Örücü, 2004b) is 
initially deconstructive and critical. After deconstruction, the aim is to reconstruct 
a more reliable map of the legal systems of the world.6 Distinctiveness cannot be 
6 The question still remains, however, whether this approach could go far enough to embrace 
legal pluralism and all layers of law such as the global, international, regional, transnational, inter-
 communal, territorial, state, sub-state and non-state, in the mapping.  See Twining, 2000: 136–41.
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ignored, and even when comparative law is used as an instrument of integration 
in Europe, one must be aware of the virtues in ‘distinction’ and ‘diversity’. Whereas 
in classical classifications only ‘similarity’ mattered, in the ‘family trees’ approach 
‘distinctiveness’ matters as well as similarity. The relevant degrees of distinction 
and similarity decide on the place of a legal system. The ‘family trees’ project rests 
on the assumption of fluidity. 
In this attempt at re-aligning legal systems and placing them on their 
genealogical trees, we must consider transpositions, reciprocal influences and 
cross- fertilisation, both horizontally and vertically. Transpositions tell us much 
about the development of the law and allow us to understand cultural and legal 
 navigation as well as the role of tuning in legal development.
Legal systems have always looked to each other for law reform. The legal systems 
of today, most of which are in transition, need models that are socio-culturally 
and/or legal-culturally different from their own. History tells us that when legal 
systems of diverse socio- and/or legal-cultures meet, the diverse elements co-exist 
side by side in the resultant legal system (Örücü, 1995; and Örücü, 2002). 
Some of the terms employed for analysis of movements today are ‘seep-
age’, ‘contaminant’, ‘irritant’, ‘underlay’, ‘overlay’, ‘cross-fertilisation’, ‘incremental 
reception’, ‘competing systems’, ‘hyphenated’ legal systems, ‘layered law’, ‘chance’, 
‘choice’, ‘prestige’, ‘efficiency’, ‘elite’ and ‘historical accident’. Any one of these terms 
may be appropriate for the analysis of a specific move and for the explanation of 
a specific growth.
In the past many shoots sprouted on the family trees through impositions 
and colonial contact. Indeed, the English common law has been likened by Lord 
Denning to an ‘oak tree’ which grows only in English soil and if this tree were to 
be planted elsewhere, it would need to be severely pruned.7
Today we do not live in a period of imposition or solely in a period of volun-
tary reception. It is a time of imposed reception—a seemingly voluntary activity 
of import under circumstances in which the exporters hold all the cards. In this 
market, the exporter packages and labels his model as the one to be preferred 
over others. Such imposed receptions are frequently seen in the Central and East 
European states, and within the context of European integration. While the con-
tinental civilian systems are trying to impose civilian type codes on the English 
common law, the English common law is introducing the system of judge-made 
law to them. Whatever the means, the end result will be more transposition, more 
intertwining and more new shoots.
Past receptions from civil law and Roman law into English law for 
instance, have been called ‘sporadic receptions’ or ‘injections’, with ‘civil law based 
 reasoning filtering into common law’ (Ibbetson, 1998: 224 at 228) ensuring that 
7 Denning LJ (as he then was) in Nyali Ltd. v Attorney General [1955] 1 All ER, 646 (CA) at 653. 
This case and opinion is also quoted by Mubirumusoke, 1978:131 at 154.
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English law was constantly enriched. However, any rules based on Roman law or 
the later ius commune ‘were immediately cut off from their roots’, and ‘assimi-
lated into the specifically English framework, and given life outside their original 
context’. The resultant new law ‘did not remain in dialogue with the old law from 
which it derived’, and ‘once the borrowings are cut off from their roots they cease 
to be part of the same culture’ as they grow in the new soil. Therefore, the influ-
ences were not systematic and the solutions did not remain the same. Nevertheless, 
these affected the growth of the tree. Today, European law is regarded by many as 
an ‘irritant’ or a ‘contaminant’ of the common law. Again, the results will become 
apparent in the manner of the tree’s growth.
To sum up: as comparative lawyers, our main work now is to deconstruct the 
conventionally labelled pattern of legal systems and to reconstruct them with 
regard to origins, relationships, overlaps and interrelationships, and diverse ‘fer-
tilisers’ such as the social and cultural context, and the ‘grafting’ and ‘pruning’ 
used in their development. In this way the comparative lawyer can draw up family 
trees, leaving ample space for newly forming growths.
III.  MIXING SYSTEMS
The conclusion, then, is that all legal systems are mixed. There are no exceptions. 
Only the ways of mixing and the character of the ensuing mixtures are different. 
The level of combination and therefore the extent of the mix varies (see Reid, 
2003). The word ‘mixed’ is now much more frequently used and has acquired 
many different meanings: a ‘combination of various legal sources’; a ‘combination 
of more than one body of law within one nation, restricted to an area or to a cul-
ture’; ‘the existence of different bodies of law applicable within the whole territory 
of a country’; and ‘legal systems that have never had a single dominant culture’. 
It has been pointed out that ‘mixed’, as in ‘mixed jurisdictions’, implies a 
historic fact, a reality and a ‘local jurisdiction’, whereas the emphasis should be on 
‘experiences in encounters’ and therefore, the ‘encounter’ and the ensuing dynamic 
exchange should be highlighted (Kasirer, 2003: 481 at 488). Patrick Glenn, who 
analyses the encounters between the various common laws of the world—which 
he calls ‘relational laws’—sees ‘mixed systems’ for instance, as places of conflu-
ence of these common laws which he regards as in ‘ongoing interdependence’; 
places where we see an unsuccessful ‘process of exclusive appropriation of one of 
the common laws’. However, he also foresees a decline in the significance of the 
notion of the historically designated ‘mixed jurisdictions’ ‘with the increase in 
importance in the world of overlapping laws’ today (Glenn, 2005: 119). 
Instances of mixing are complicated. They may be overt or covert, structured 
or unstructured, complex or simple, blended or unblended, and are often difficult 
to define. When talking of ‘mixed legal systems’, the importance of the ‘ongoing 
mixing’ of legal systems must also be considered. In ongoing states of ‘mix’, a wide 
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knowledge is required to fully analyse this phenomenon, since many systems are 
shifting and in transition, and new types of mixes are constantly coming into 
being. 
The new ‘mixes’ are like cake mixes, where the outcome is not precisely known 
until the cake is fully cooked. There is always the chance of the cake being spoilt 
by under or over-cooking. Moreover, whether the final taste of the cake retains 
the taste of the individual ingredients, whether the cake tastes ‘right’ in the mouth 
and whether the recipe is a good one cannot be determined until the cake is 
eaten. However, in legal mixes the degree of success cannot be measured as eas-
ily. Neither can ‘success’ be defined from a single standpoint. Pre-determined 
economic, social, cultural, religious or ideological ends are all factors by which 
success is measured. Efficiency, internalisation, cultural shift, and the actual use 
of the new legal structures can all be criteria for measurement. 
It has already been said that all systems are in fact separate and distinct. All 
differ in the way they have been formed, as their histories show. All have elements 
from different sources. Systems also differ in the way the legal elite react to their 
mix, handle it and tune the incoming legal elements to mould them into a legal 
system. In addition, systems differ as to how the mix is sustained, nurtured or 
killed (see du Plessis, 1998). In all these senses each system is unique. However, as 
well as having features that are unique, each has features shared with others and 
features common to all. This enables us to study mixed systems both separately 
and together.
In addition, a study of a legal system 50 years ago and again today may reveal 
considerable changes in its structure, context and conceptual infill, and also in the 
attitude of lawyers, academics and people to it and its ‘mix’. 
Sometimes ‘mixedness’ can be the manifestation of a transition, sometimes it 
can be a final outcome of the process. When ‘mixedness’ is the end result and is 
there to stay, this state of ‘mixedness’ justifies applying the term ‘mixed jurisdic-
tion’ to the legal system. It must be recognised that mixed systems share their 
‘mixedness’ to a higher or lower degree with these other mixed systems called 
‘mixed jurisdictions’. ‘Mixedness’ is usually a result of historical accident and 
accidents can lead to unexpected outcomes along unexpected paths. Thus, mixed 
systems can be viewed along a spectrum. As a general observation, one can start 
with simple mixes8 where the blend is mainly between two Western traditions—
the civilian and the common law. This blend is as to content and substance, and 
not necessarily as to structure, although some of these systems have codified their 
civil laws, such as that of Louisiana, and some have not, such as that of Scotland. 
Today, at the substantive level, all legal systems are mixed, whether we regard them 
as mixed legal systems or not.
Scotland for instance, designated as a classical ‘mixed jurisdiction’, has one 
of these simple mixed systems, a system ‘mixed’ only at the substantive level. Its 
8 See, for an analysis of mixed systems, Örücü, 1995 and Örücü, 1996. 
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history is unusual. The path of the migration of law from different sources into 
Scots Law was seepage, imitation, inspiration, voluntary reception and imposed 
reception. The starting point was Scots customary law, which was then overlaid 
by Anglo-Norman law, canon law, Roman law and European civil law, and later 
in modern times by English law. Further, the system now has to absorb European 
Community law and European human rights law. 
The Scottish mix did not ‘result from the imposition of the Common Law upon 
a Civilian system by a colonial power, as in Louisiana or South Africa’, but rather 
from the close cultural and political ties with the jurisdictions of both traditions 
‘at different stages of its history’ (Reid, 2001). Thus the Scottish legal system can 
be regarded as being a system ‘mixed from the very beginning’ (Sellar, 2000), while 
Scottish jurists created the ‘mix’ by selecting ‘the best’ of the ingredients from 
various sources. However, the exact balance between the elements of this ‘mix’ in 
modern Scots law has long been, and still is, the subject of constant controversy 
at home and abroad. 
Since, through cross-fertilisation and horizontal transfers, all legal systems 
within the European Union will eventually mix to some degree, a study of legal 
systems already mixed can provide valuable lessons for these mixing systems, 
and therefore the study of how they work is fruitful. In fact, mixed legal systems 
have always been the ‘laboratories’ of comparative lawyers, their ‘vantage point’ 
(Kasirer, 2003). Now they have gained a special place in the process of European 
integration. Jan Smits, for example, says that mixed legal systems will provide 
‘inspiration’ and that the experiences of South Africa, Scotland, Quebec and 
Louisiana are consequently of great importance for the future developments of 
European private law (Smits, 2001: 9; and Smits, 1999: 25 at 35).
The existence of ‘mixed legal systems’, the creation of new mixes, and the pres-
ent process of mixing may prove to be problematic for those who adhere to the 
definitive role of the cultural context. Unless one starts from the premise that 
‘mixedness is itself the culture’, there is no easy way forward. Even if one does start 
from that premise, one has to probe into the generation of the ‘mixedness’. This is 
related to ‘horizontal transfer’, the possibility of which in turn is refuted by those 
who state that ‘legal transplants are impossible’ (Legrand, 1997; and Legrand, 
2001). So we can end in an impasse.
Obviously the mixed legal systems that attract attention in the European inte-
gration process are the simple ones, the ‘mixing bowl’ type,9 with only a limited 
number of ingredients. For seekers of a new ius commune, one of the obstacles is 
that the ingredients to be blended or interlocked come from two different legal 
 cultures—the common law and the civil law—and this, notwithstanding the vari ety
that exists among the systems that belong to the so-called civil law tradition. 
We must not limit our view of the world of ‘mixing’ to the confines of the 
European Union or the Western world, however. When looked through the lens 
9 See, for the coining and explanation of such terminology, Örücü, 1995; and  Örücü, 1996.
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of history, we see that many of the mixes of the past were formed by strong move-
ments of transmigration of legal institutions and ideas, mostly in the form of 
impositions, and of divergent linguistic, communal or religious traditions. Legal 
systems are constantly mixing, blending, melting, and then solidifying into new 
shapes as they cool down, while transposition and tuning take their effect. There 
will always be new movements, new transposition and further tuning. As noted 
earlier, law is the outcome of a series of transpositions and legal systems are born 
out of overlaps.
Yet, as a consequence of transmigration of law, problems do arise. Systems that 
are mixing are evolving, are in transition, are inter-related or are in the process of 
becoming mixed systems. Special attention must be paid to legal-cultural conver-
gence and non-convergence that may come about as a result of legal import, and 
to any ensuing socio-cultural non-convergence. In this context, cultural plural-
ism, the clash of diverse cultures, and the consequences for the importing legal 
system are of particular contemporary interest, and legal pluralism is another 
significant concern. 
As has already been observed, mixed systems can be visualised as lying along 
a spectrum. At the far end of the spectrum is the position where transposition 
has not worked and the official legal system has ‘curdled’ and is dysfunctional, as 
is the case in Burkina Faso and Micronesia (see Tamanaha, 2001: xi–xii). At the 
other extreme is the position where the transmigration works smoothly, because 
of extensive similarities in structure, substance and culture and fine ‘tuning’ such 
as in The Netherlands. Between these extremes lies a range of places. The com-
position of each depends on conditions such as the size of the transmigration, 
the characteristics of the legal movement, the degree of success of transpositions 
and ‘tuning’, the element of ‘force’ or ‘choice’ inherent in the move and the social 
culture of the new environment. 
At times, elements from socio-culturally similar and legal-culturally differ-
ent legal systems come together forming ‘mixed jurisdictions’ of the already 
mentioned ‘simple’ kind, which I call ‘mixing bowls’, the ingredients being still 
in the process of blending but in need of further processing if a ‘purée’ is to be 
produced. An example of this type is Scotland as seen above. Next come the 
‘complex’ mixed systems, where the elements are both socio-culturally and legal-
culturally different. I have called this type the ‘Italian salad bowl’, where, although 
the salad dressing covers the salad, it is easy to detect the individual ingredients 
clearly through the side of the glass bowl. A good example of this is Algeria. Then 
there is what I call the ‘English salad plate’, the ingredients sitting separately, far 
apart on a flat plate with a blob of mayonnaise at the side into which the different 
ingredients can be dipped before consumption. Examples of this are the Sudan 
and Zimbabwe, which lie towards the far end of the spectrum. The examples 
become more extreme along the path, ending in ‘curdling’, with a dysfunctional 
legal system, as already mentioned.10 
10 For a picture of this spectrum see Örücü, 1995; and Örücü, 1996.
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The more complex mixes might appear in places where the legal system or the 
law is based on, or heavily determined by, religion or belief, but they could also 
be in places where unexpected events are happening. Examples of this are: Hong 
Kong, where in its relationship with China there is talk of ‘one country two sys-
tems’; Hungary, where there was a civilian tradition with no civil code, a socialist 
era with some freedom for the civilian tradition to live on and where there is now 
a new era of transformation; and Turkey, where the dominant elite had a ‘vision’ 
which entailed changing not only the legal culture but also the socio-culture by 
employing foreign legal models leading to the erasure of the indigenous ones, 
followed by a ‘limping marriage’ with the European Union. Transmigration of 
laws might take place between legal systems of both legal and socio-cultural 
diversity, creating either legal pluralism, a mixed jurisdiction or hybrid system, or 
unexpected results under pressure from an ‘élite dominante’. Sometimes there are 
overlaps between these meanings, and a place could have a ‘complex’ system in 
any or in all these senses. These systems obviously defy the traditional theory of 
‘legal families’, classical paradigms being totally inadequate.
However, as ever, an evolutionary dynamism emerges and systems go their own 
way. There can never be sameness. Concepts or institutions coming into different 
environments begin to change and internal ‘contamination’ occurs. Here the ‘wave 
theory’ of linguistics already referred to, which shows how change spreads like 
waves over a whole area and which can handle both resemblance and difference, 
may aid our understanding.   
When the Euro-centric spectacles are removed, the comparative lawyer imme-
diately sees that indigenous laws rarely consist of single homogenous  systems. 
Many indigenous legal orders and social orders can live side by side. To find, 
understand and re-present this law can be extremely difficult, especially when 
some of it is unwritten and some written but imperfectly translated. For example, 
in many Asian systems Western law was added to the religious laws of Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Confucianism and Islam, which themselves co-existed prior to 
colonisation. The mixture was also complicated by the fact that not all laws 
were  applicable to all peoples, different parts of the population being classified 
as ‘foreign Orientals’, ‘assimilated Asians’, ‘Europeans’, ‘non-natives’ or ‘natives’. 
The resultant mixture continues to give rise to problems in countries such as 
Indonesia, Taiwan and Malaysia even today. The comparative lawyer must under-
stand the relationship between these layers of systems in order to depict such 
systems in transition today.
In summary, transmigration of law has followed the paths of colonisation, 
re-settlement, occupation, expansion, and inter-relationship. The methods of 
these migrations were imposition, reception, imposed reception, co-ordinated 
parallel development, infiltration, imitation, and variations and combinations of 
these. The consequences have been the birth of systems in transition and mixing, 
mixed jurisdictions, inter-related systems, evolving systems, layered-law, hyphen-
ated legal systems, harmonisation, unification and standardisation. There are 
conceptual implications in all this. 
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Reciprocal influences must be examined in new ways, since the emphasis, the 
consequences and the means are different to those of the past. Most obvious 
‘reciprocal influence’ today is in Europe within the European Union, but transpo-
sitions from the Western legal traditions to the Central and East European legal 
systems are of greater importance. Beyond Europe, other cross-fertilisations are 
taking place. One such is that between China and Hong Kong. The consequences 
are the birth of a ‘new genre of mixité’, more ‘complex’ mixes, the blurring of the 
demarcation lines between the generally accepted classifications of legal families, 
and the emergence of new clashes between legal cultures themselves, or legal 
cultures and socio-cultures. The means are apparently voluntary reception rather 
than colonisation and imposition as in the past, though imposed receptions are 
more prominent in some instances. 
Many legal systems are experiencing fundamental upheaval, some re-shaping 
themselves in social, economic and legal terms, with the help of outside models 
chosen from competing systems. They are systems in transition. Some, living 
within certain regions or groupings, are fundamentally affected by reciprocal 
influences. Some others are swayed by globalisation. Comparative lawyers must 
approach this new world with improved tools. 
As seen above, it has been suggested by Vernon Palmer that we should be 
talking of a new ‘third legal family’ alongside the common law and the civil law 
families with the name ‘mixed jurisdictions’, to include a number of historically 
determined mixes which he regards as sharing certain characteristics. These sys-
tems, Palmer says, ‘are built upon dual foundations of common-law and civil-law 
materials’—that is, there is a ‘specificity of the mixture’; the mix is obvious to both 
insiders and outsiders—that is, ‘obvious to an ordinary observer’; and the private-
law sphere has ‘the outward appearance of a “pure” civil-law system’, whereas the 
public law sphere ‘will appear to be typically Anglo-American’—that is, there is 
a ‘structural allocation of content’. According to him, these ‘are the lowest com-
mon denominators of a mixed jurisdiction’ (Palmer, 2001: 7–9; and Palmer 2006: 
467–8).
The concept of ‘mixed jurisdictions’ is used by Vernon Palmer in a narrow and 
conventional sense, which considers only co-existing and commingling between 
the civil law and the common law—that is ‘simple’ mixes—and talks of a ‘closed 
family’ of 15 members, with seven of them studied in his work.11 His entry ‘Mixed 
Jurisdictions’ in the Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, starts with a summary 
of his views.
‘Mixed jurisdictions’ as they are classically called, make up roughly 15 political entities, 
of which 11 are independent countries. Most (excluding Scotland and Israel) of these 
11 These are Israel, Louisiana, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Québec, the Republic of South Africa 
and Scotland. One could take issue even with some of these systems which have also other ingredi-
ents, such as Israel. Zimmermann  says that Palmer uses the term ‘mixed legal systems’ in a restricted, 
technical sense (Zimmermann, 2004: 3). 
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are the former colonial possessions of France, the Netherlands or Spain which were 
 subsequently transferred to Great Britain or the United States (Palmer, 2006: 467).
This is only a partial answer, as clearly not all ‘mixes’ can be pooled together and 
not all the existing members of such a family would have the same or similar 
ingredients. It would be difficult for example, to place Scotland, Quebec, Hong 
Kong, Thailand and Algeria—all mixed systems—into one family. Simple mixes, 
complex mixes, and dual systems and systems adhering to legal pluralism cannot 
be all grouped together.12 Even if we were to accept that Palmer’s 15 individual 
legal systems share certain characteristics to justify placing them together and to 
give this conglomeration the status of a ‘third family of mixed jurisdictions’, what 
of contemporary mixing systems and systems in transition? How would these be 
grouped and analysed? Palmer’s attempt does not solve the problems of under-
standing and analysing the world we live in today. 
One other approach is that offered by Anthony Ogus, who looks at mixed or 
‘hybrid’ systems through the lenses of a ‘law and economics’ scholar and places 
them into three categories (Ogus, 2001). In his first group are those systems 
‘where a culture was imposed by a colonialist power, but where a native culture 
persisted to some degree’. In this category the native culture ‘competes’ with the 
imposed culture. He gives many African countries as examples. ‘Countries which 
have experienced successive colonialist or other occupation’ fall into his second 
category. Here, each successive foreign culture has had a major impact on the legal 
culture and competes with the others. The examples he chooses for this category 
are Quebec, Louisiana and South Africa. Countries
which experienced industrial and commercial development relatively late and where 
rulers recognised the need to look elsewhere for more sophisticated legal input than the 
domestic legal system could provide (Ogus, 2001: 36).
form his third category, his examples being Japan, Turkey and Greece. Ogus says 
that in this category ‘there were effectively “tenders” from several major legal 
cultures to supply the necessary set of specifications’. East European States using 
Western models for law reform are also regarded as falling into this category, 
though ‘in somewhat different circumstances’ (ibid). 
Anthony Ogus offers some predictions for the future. He is of the opinion that 
the three categories share characteristics that separate them from legal systems 
12 A number of examples follow:
 •  mixed systems with civil law and common law: Botswana, Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, 
Seychelles;
 •  mixed systems with civil law and customary law: Burundi, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, South 
Korea, Japan;
 • mixed systems with civil law and Muslim law: Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Brunei;
 •  mixed systems with civil law, common law and customary law: Cameroun, Sri Lanka, Vanuata, 
Zimbabwe;
 • mixed systems with civil law, common law and Muslim law: Iran, Jordan, Somalia, Yemen;
 • mixed systems with civil law, Muslim law and customary law: Djibouti, Eritrea, Indonesia. 
184  Esin Örücü
with one dominant culture. The expected outcome is that mixed systems will be 
‘more efficient, and adapt more readily to changing external variables, than those 
with a single dominant culture’, though much depends on how the competition 
works. Of course, there is always the possibility that optimal selections may not be 
made from between the different ‘tenders’. The ‘rents’ to be enjoyed by a particular 
foreign legal system may be too attractive for domestic lawyers trained in that 
system to resist. Despite such problems however, from the ‘law and economics’ 
point of view, the future is quite bright for mixed systems. They should, ‘unless 
obstructed by private interest groups allied to a particular culture, adapt more 
readily to efficient legal reform’ (ibid: at 36–7). Comparative lawyers need to con-
sider what contribution does a ‘law and economics’ approach have in assessing 
‘mixed systems’ over and above other approaches.
We should ask ourselves whether the examples referred to in this chapter could 
be better understood using the approaches suggested by Anthony Ogus or Vernon 
Palmer. 
One of our examples was Malta, which has now joined the European Union. 
What kind of new mixing can we expect? How is it possible to fit this mixture into 
any of the suggested categories? 
Another example was Thailand, which was never a colony. Its modern texture 
has been formed from many sources and the legal system of today still grapples 
with problems of translation and connotation. How, then, are we to categorise 
Thailand? 
Turkey, yet another example, was placed by Anthony Ogus in his third cat-
egory. It might fit there. But does that aid our understanding of the system as it 
works? Further still, can his predictions for future success apply here? Turkey is 
now trying to assimilate many European Community Directives and the ‘acquis 
communautaire’ in the hope of joining the European Union. One of the condi-
tions is the ‘improvement of the legal system’ and further ‘modernisation’ of the 
law, ‘modernisation’ being understood to mean further elimination of ‘traditional 
values’. What does the future hold for this mixture?
Although not ‘mixed jurisdictions’ in Vernon Palmer’s sense, the three examples 
above are certainly ‘mixed’ and ‘mixing’ systems, the various elements from differ-
ent sources being woven into the tapestry of their laws. 
IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
All legal systems are born of different parentage, from marriages between systems 
and sub-systems of such. Some parents cohabited, some had life-long and some 
passing relationships. It is difficult to determine the exact level of hybridity in 
each legal system. What is clear, however, is that combinations of disparate legal 
and social cultures give birth to mixed systems. Later formations of such systems 
are by horizontal transfer. Overlap, cross-fertilisation, reciprocal influence, fusion, 
infusion, grafting and the like are all responsible for the coming into being of 
mixed and mixing systems, all forever in flux, as are all legal systems. As is now 
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widely acknowledged, there are indeed no pure systems in the legal world and 
various degrees of hybridity arise from various degrees, levels and layers of cross-
ing and intertwining.
It is obviously easier to handle such legal systems when there are clear signs 
of their different legal cultural, racial, ethnic and religious origins. Some of these 
systems have already been grouped as ‘mixed jurisdictions’ and are treated as 
numerus clausus as noted. However, as has also been pointed out, there are many 
other overt mixes with different origins. More important still, there are also covert 
mixtures, the results of the same or of other combinations. It is the covert and the 
ongoing mixes that really tease the comparative lawyer. 
It follows from the foregoing that awareness that law is not static, that it 
moves and changes and that legal systems today are at a crossroads, is essential. 
Irrespective of whether the future holds confluence or divergence for legal sys-
tems, one thing is certain: more and more systems will be mixed and mixing, be 
they in Europe, in South East Asia or the Middle East. In line with these develop-
ments, comparative law research itself is at a cross-roads, and the new turning 
point is to study this process of ‘mixedness’ in order to facilitate an understanding 
of current and future patterns of legal development. It is the study of this ‘mixed-
ness’ that can illuminate the path towards the comprehension of the interaction 
of law and culture. 
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
 1.  Are the suggested terms ‘transposition’ and ‘tuning’ the most appropriate 
terms for movements of law? Explain with examples.
 2. Should the ‘transplant theory’ be re-considered? If yes, how? 
 3.  Can ‘mixed systems’ be analysed in general terms? Can there be a satisfac-
tory definition of a ‘mixed system’? Discuss.
 4.  How is the existence of mixed systems to be reconciled with the classical 
classifications of legal families?
 5. Discuss various outcomes of movements between systems.
 6.  Palmer regards mixed jurisdictions as a new ‘third family’. Assess this 
view.
 7.  Are there shared characteristics of mixed jurisdictions? If yes, what are 
these characteristics?
 8.  Should mixed legal systems be studied more as experiences in encounters, 
‘meeting points’ or ‘points of contact’ rather than as jurisdictions?
 9. Do mixed systems represent cross-cultural dialogue?
10. Analyse ‘mixed’ as a historical reality and ‘mixing’ as an ongoing flux. 
11.  What questions arise when the system of laws of one country is taken over 
by another? What chances are there that the new law will be adjusted to 
the home environment and what are the risks that it will be rejected?
13.  Which of the classifications and criteria used to group legal systems into 
legal families do you find most helpful?
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I.  INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I explore the stony yet immensely fertile field of compara-tive law beyond Europe and argue that, largely for historical reasons, Asian, African and other non-Western legal systems seem inherently more attuned 
than Western legal systems and scholars to the intellectual and practical  challenges 
of comparative law and legal pluralism. Non-Western legal systems appear 
deeply aware of the mixed nature of all laws, and have been acutely conscious 
of the dynamic nature of legal systems as constantly negotiated entities that can 
be manipulated in many ways to achieve desired outcomes (Menski, 2006a). 
While non-Western legal systems and concepts have been systematically belittled 
over the past centuries, a side effect of globalisation and of post-modernity is a 
notable current resurgence of acknowledgment that legal systems beyond Europe 
need to be studied in their own right and have a legitimate place on the global 
tree of law (see Örücü, 2004). At the same time, this complex process of post-
modern and largely post-colonial re-thinking remains shackled by ‘white’ colonial 
 presuppositions.
Practical pressures and enhanced historical awareness have propelled some 
modern legal systems beyond Europe (about which we generally know far too 
little) to construct plurality-conscious models of handling legal diversity and 
conflicting concepts. This happens in hotly contested environments,  sidetracked 
by politically motivated assaults of ‘modernists’ as well as ‘traditionalists’, 
in a spirit of implied commitment to what universalist scholarship tends to 
call ‘human rights’, but which manifests itself as situation-specific ‘justice’ or 
‘equity’. Since such legal developments beyond Europe retain deep respect for 
the internal plurality of traditional rule systems and processes, they are easily 
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misconstrued as commitments to traditionalism. This has led to anguished 
inconclusive debates about whether there are legitimate value systems under-
lying different human rights conceptualisations across various legal cultures 
(Renteln, 2004). The critical question, then, becomes, at a global level, whose 
values we accept as conducive to justice.
At the same time, the necessarily hybrid legal constructs in Asia, Africa and 
other regions of the South have been achieved without giving up the vision of 
 harmonisation as practically advantageous in a global world and in modern 
nation states. Of much interest to comparative lawyers, pluralism and legal 
uniformity appear everywhere beyond Europe in multiple contests. After some 
contextualisation, this chapter provides two Indian case studies of plurality-
conscious legal constructs, demonstrating how Hindu law, Islamic law and other 
legal systems can co-exist within a national legal regime and can all contribute 
to a culture-specific,  composite national identity unique to a particular country. 
This may serve as a model for other nations in terms of coping with diversity and 
difference, not only outside Europe. It is also a lesson in how to ‘do’ comparative 
law beyond Europe.
II.  THE CONTEXT OF THE FIELD
Having accepted an impossible brief, I start with the comment that law 
beyond the Bosporus and Gibraltar, and similarly beyond the Mexican border, 
is still little known among most Western scholars, who tend to have outdated 
perceptions of what laws the people of these Southern regions actually follow. 
These are the vast majority of today’s world population, mainly brown and 
black people, with their own laws, partly transplanted from the North, but 
by no means just inferior copies of Western legal systems.1 Legal scholarship 
world-wide has not yet overcome centuries of Euro-centric legal study assum-
ing that Enlightenment and legal theory were produced—and are owned—by 
the West. As a result, one finds the odd admission that legal scholarship on a 
global level may learn something from Asia and Africa, but it is not clear what 
such knowledge can contribute to existing legal theory. Where does that leave 
the voices of Asian, African, Oceanic and South American laws and lawyers? 
How are we going to make sense of such laws, and can we, indeed, learn from 
them? Where do we start, and how far can we get? Anyone working in this field 
seems to be classified as a ‘comparative lawyer’, but perhaps all law should be 
perceived as comparative law (Twining, 2000: 255). 
1 As a specialist on South Asian laws, emphasising the critical role of Hindu law and Muslim legal 
concepts in the sub-continent, rather than just common law influences, I often encounter surprise and 
opposition. On Hindu law, see Menski, 2003. On South Asian Muslim law, see Pearl and Menski, 1998. 
On common law influences, see Galanter, 1989. Exaggerated claims that colonial influences virtually 
wiped out indigenous knowledge are found in Cohn, 1997. More balanced is Benton, 2002.
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Looking around, we find the term ‘comparative law’ contested, with 
 scholars quibbling over minute details, rather than working on the ‘big 
picture’.2 Comparative law is not yet a mature entity and is only just beginning to 
shake off colonial hubris and the ‘white’ supremacist presuppositions that went 
with it (see David and Brierley, 1985; and Zweigert and Kötz, 1998). Prized new 
studies of the many different legal traditions of the world have pushed the bound-
aries of the field in interesting, much discussed directions (Glenn, 2000/2004).3 
Assessments of comparative law have been critical (eg Legrand, 1996), but there 
is widespread agreement that we are at a new cross-roads, enjoying rejuvenation 
and exciting times for comparative lawyers (see Harding and Örücü, 2002). In the 
advertising blurb for the Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Smits, 2006), 
Alan Watson, doyen of the ‘transplant theorists’ and long-standing critic of com-
parative law, writes:
Comparative law is moving swiftly from a long infancy to teenage maturity, and Jan 
Smits provides the essential tonic … I agree with many of the arguments and disagree 
with others. This is the nature of healthy adolescence (Watson, 1974/1993).
These new wise words of an old man are subtle confirmation that jurisprudence, 
or legal theory (if you prefer that term) and comparative law are intensely politi-
cal, and remain quite personal.4 Legal scholarship often links closely to the instru-
mentalist uses of law as a tool to implement reforms and to make dreams come 
true. Legal philosophers are like a small army of armchair revolutionaries, often 
using the stones from the fertile field of comparative law as weapons. Legal theory 
accounts for much brain-washing in legal education and also underpins much 
illegality in legal practice, as Hans Kelsen found when the Pakistanis applied his 
brilliant legal theory to justify military dictatorships.5 
Legal theorists have largely tended to ignore the social dimensions of law, but 
there are (and have always been since Montesquieu and other early great minds) 
notable exceptions (see Cotterrell, 1989; and Cotterrell, 2006). Law as experienced 
by ‘little people’, akin to Ehrlich’s ‘living law’ (Ehrlich, 1936), has not received suf-
ficient attention. The socio-legal dimension remains undervalued all around the 
world.6 Attempts to critique Euro-centric positivism through showing the limits 
of law remain insufficiently received (Hinz, 2006). Polite critical voices from the 
East receive equally subtle acknowledgment, but little more, it seems (Chiba, 1986; 
Chiba, 1989). Law as a globally known concept is actually built on un-agreed 
2 Annelise Riles notes ‘ubiquitous angst about the disciplinary identity of comparative law today’ 
(Riles (ed), 2001: 3). Andrew Harding and Esin Örücü note the growing popularity of comparative law, 
but highlight that ‘it is also fraught with internal contradiction, uncertainty, and a sense of mid-life 
crisis’ (Harding and Örücü, 2002: xii).
3 For a set of critical reviews, see (2006) 1.1 The Journal of Comparative Law 100. Glenn, 2005, 
introduces ‘common laws’ as a globally present form of interactional law.
4 Riles, 2001 contains excellent case studies. 
5 Kelsen, 1970 was famously interpreted by Pakistani judges to legitimise military rule in State v 
Dosso, PLD 1958 SC 533. 
6 For a vigorous critique of Indian legal scholarship in this respect, see Baxi, 1982; and Baxi, 1986.
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and thus constantly shifting and negotiated foundations, marked by an endless 
 internal plurality that many legal scholars find irritating and deeply  frustrating.7 
Legal pluralism, another unruly adolescent in the extended joint family of 
legal studies, struggles to find acceptance in mainstream legal scholarship,8 but 
miniscule progress may be recorded over time. There is much justification for 
a sustained critique of comparative law as a willing handmaiden for various 
 imperialistic agenda (Menski, 2006a: 46–50).
Students of comparative law need to be aware of such troublesome issues on 
a global level and will have to make up their own minds about which arguments 
they accept and which they would tend to oppose. Can we really have one law 
for the whole world? (Menski, 2006a: 3–24) Do we assume that secular legal 
approaches can eventually get rid of the influence of religion on law? Can state law 
fully abolish and override ‘religion’ and ‘tradition’ by declaring that they are not 
law? (See Carroll, 1997: 97 at 105) Can customary laws, one of the basic founda-
tions of legal traditions, really become entirely irrelevant in legal modernity? Do 
state-made laws actually create new forms of custom, and what sense do we make 
of the argument that customs are at the same time old and new? (Bennett, 2004) 
Can state law, at the stroke of a pen, introduce a new legal system?9 More specifi-
cally for the present discussion, is there room in the world’s joint family of law for 
the many legal systems of Asia and Africa that are undoubtedly ‘mixed’, beyond 
recognising that they are hybrids and often contain elements of Western laws? 
What about frequently unacknowledged non-Western elements? To what extent 
do we accept that Hindu law, Chinese law, Islamic laws and the myriad of African 
laws have a future in this globalising world? Will there be a universal concept of 
law? And what, then, would this look like?
Such big questions indicate that there will never be universal agreement on 
what we mean by law. Presently, much existing scholarship is still not willing to 
acknowledge this and to accept that people in Asia and Africa, and elsewhere in 
the erstwhile ‘Third World’ have their own laws and claim ownership of their 
own ways of dealing with legal matters. We are often still just looking for traces of 
European transplants, and proudly clutch evidence of perceived success without 
examining how such positive results are achieved in socio-legal reality. Not only 
in Asia and Africa do reported cases and official documents not give a faithful 
picture of the totality of law in a particular nation.10
7 For details see Menski, 2006a, introduction and ch 1.
8 From pioneers like Hooker, 1975, and Moore, 1978, it has been a long way to current applied 
studies like Shah, 2005, focusing on the contested position of non-European legal traditions in today’s 
Western legal systems. See also Shah and Menski (eds), 2006.
9 Communist China tried this in Art 1 of the Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China 
1950 by abolishing the feudal marriage system and putting into effect the new democratic marriage 
system.
10 An example of treating restitution of conjugal rights as a barbaric remedy, is found in Sareetha 
v Venkata Subbaiah AIR 1983 AP 356, while Harvinder Kaur v Harmandil Singh AIR 1984 Del 66 
took the opposite view. The Indian Supreme Court in Saroj Rani v Sudarshan Kumar AIR 1984 SC 
1562 found in favour of maintaining the family, and against the ‘bull-in-the-china-shop’ effect of 
individualism.
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Asian and African debates about the direction of legal reform today often 
take place prominently within the wider context of globalisation and the many 
assumptions that this term carries with it (see Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and 
Perraton, 1999; and Robertson, 2003), as well as now in the context of inter-
national debates about human rights and good governance with a focus on 
constructing a world legal order. The tainted heritage of comparative law in 
this respect is well known (Harding and Örücü, 2002: vii–viii; Menski, 2006a: 
38–45), and only partly overcome. Post-colonial legal, political and military 
realities do not reassure new nations that they have the right to develop as they 
see fit. However, we should not waste precious space here by simply criticising 
various inadequate approaches. Rather, the present chapter provides constructive 
examples—case studies that readers may pursue in more depth—of how today’s 
laws beyond Europe actually work in practice. It is a fact that non-European laws 
are more self-consciously plural than European laws and tend to recognise value 
pluralism. They prefer community-based processes of dispute resolution, tend to 
privilege tort over crime, with resultant compensation regimes,11 and tend (not 
only because they are resource-starved ‘developing countries’) to emphasise eco-
nomic responsibilities between members of social groups and families, and also 
across gender boundaries. Such methods clash with Western-led assumptions 
about state centricity, individual autonomy and rights-based approaches. Beyond 
Europe, however, the notion that one’s rights depend on other people’s duties 
remains a strong legal foundation.
When we approach comparative legal studies in a culture-sensitive way, as prac-
tical comparative lawyers, we need (or are developing in the process) expertise 
in particular national legal systems or in specific legal traditions of the world.12 
Few law students in the world are required to venture into this field of legal stud-
ies.13 It remains extremely difficult to approach legal traditions or non-Western 
national laws, since this requires much cultural knowledge, insight into chthonic 
traditions and value systems that are not our own, and use of technical terms from 
languages that may not even have words for ‘law’.14 Going down that route, we are 
bound to realise that ‘law’ is culture-specific and immensely diverse. Recent 
scholarship on legal theory suggests that ultimately we are maybe just fussing 
over different values, bringing us back to basic debates about natural law, 
expressed earlier in Rudolph Stammler’s concept of ‘good law’,15 or Masaji Chiba’s 
11 Eg, in relation to the Islamic ‘blood money’ (diyat).
12 A good example of the latter approach is Glenn, 2000/2004.
13 On a model of good practice, see Menski, 2006a: 66–81.
14 Thus in Sanskrit, the classical language of Indic traditions, rita (‘macrocosmic order’) and 
dharma (‘microcosmic order’), the duty of every individual to do the right thing at all times, cannot 
simply be translated as ‘law’. 
15 The German jurist Rudolf Stammler (1856–1938) proposed a theory of ‘natural law with a 
 changing content’, which holds that ‘while the ideal of justice is absolute, its application must vary 
with time, place and circumstance’ and depends heavily on moral attitudes. For further details see 
Stone, 1965: 167–81.
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‘legal postulates’,16 while Emmanuel Melissaris now speaks of ‘value pluralism’ 
(Melissaris, 2004). Law is, of course, also intimately linked to ‘power’ in all kinds 
of forms, and to economics, giving rise to perennial complaints about corruption 
and lack of accountability and transparency.
The recognition that law itself is a huge field of multiple contests, and an inter-
nally plural phenomenon, was long suppressed in dominant and largely idealistic 
Western legal thought that simplistically privileged the state as a maker of rules 
and came out, ultimately, as ‘legal centralism’, the claim that the state alone was 
the maker of laws. That this myopic modernist vision is difficult to maintain in 
real life is becoming more evident in world-wide legal practice,17 and is acknowl-
edged in recent theoretical writing (Örücü, 2004: 42). Lego-centric domination 
was earlier savagely criticised by John Griffiths (Griffiths, 1986), supported since 
by many others, but our thought patterns continue to associate law primarily with 
the state. It seems difficult to unlearn such mental maps, since they creep into 
the subconscious and influence our daily language—we may not even notice (see 
Menski, 2006a : 79–80). It remains, of course, tempting, anywhere in the world, to 
simply assume or claim (especially on the part of those in power) that positivism 
is the foundation of law. This kind of mono-cultural myopic thinking leads, how-
ever, directly to African and other despots, who appear to be top-ranking students 
of lego-centric axioms, and corrupt regimes anywhere in the world.
III.  INTERLINKEDNESS AS A FOUNDATION FOR ‘MIXING’ LAWS
Beyond Europe, there is a long-standing, immensely rich awareness that ‘law’ is 
first of all a culturally embedded phenomenon and is specific to particular people 
who are interlinked at many levels. This does not mean that one gives up on law 
reform, but a typical non-Western state would probably be a ‘soft state’, allowing 
much room for non-state law. Beyond Europe, ‘law’ is not normally perceived as 
a separate entity that can be manipulated without repercussions in lots of other 
areas. It is interconnected, linked from the macrocosmic spheres of natural law 
right through to the personal sphere of the socio-legal domain. All along, it also 
contains elements of the religious and the secular, the social and the psycho-
logical, and virtually anything else. The boundaries between what is legal and 
what is not become really fuzzy, leading to irritated comments by legal scholars 
(see Tamanaha, 1993; and Tamanaha, 2001). Since this fuzzy interlinkedness is 
explicitly recognised in Asian and African perceptions of ‘law’ and their current 
diasporic manifestations all over the world, there seems no need for insiders to 
16 Chiba writes: ‘A legal postulate is a  … value system specifically connected with a particular  official 
or unofficial law … It may consist of established legal ideas such as natural law, justice, equity … 
sacred truths and precepts … social and cultural postulates’ (Chiba, 1986: 6).
17 An interesting example from the United Kingdom is Chief Adjudication Officer v Bath [2000] 1 
FLR 8 (CA), where English law had to recognise, ultimately, that an unregistered Sikh marriage could 
still be treated as legally valid. 
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discuss this in so many words, with the result that outsiders often do not notice 
that the European approach, to the effect that ‘law’ is just ‘law’, does not really 
make sense in such cultural contexts. Many meaningful silences need to be studied 
when we analyse law beyond Europe.
Law is therefore not just about rulers and their codified rule systems, but about 
a plurality of voices and values, and thus negotiations of difference and diversity 
at many different levels, and at all times. The book of law is never closed. Any form 
of law, even God-given Islamic law, is philosophically and practically perceived 
and applied as inherently dynamic and interactive.18 It is not just a given static 
entity that cannot be negotiated in particular social contexts. Beyond Europe, 
states and their people are almost always deeply attuned to the constant need for 
skilled legal navigation at all times.19 
As a result, most legal systems outside Europe continue to cultivate personal law 
systems, or personal status law, where at least family law and matters of succession and 
property (but often much else) are governed by different rules and processes for differ-
ent groups of people. Often, but not always, the determinative criterion is ‘religion’, as 
in the Ottoman millet system (see Yılmaz, 2005). In the personal laws of India today, 
the internally plural systems of Hindu law, Muslim law, Christian law, Parsi law, Jewish 
law and, importantly, a secular option co-exist side by side. Apart from ‘religion’, the 
criterion for distinction is often social and ultimately ‘ethnic’, leaving room for social 
groups with different identities to develop their own ways of doing things. That this 
leads to limitless plurality ‘on the ground’ troubles only fundamentalists, among 
whom one must count those who still dream of global legal uniformity. 
Others, concerned to bring some sort of legal order into this limitless mess, often 
in the context of nation building, focus more on harmonisation and uniformisa-
tion. But such top-down strategies often face fierce accusations of neo-imperialist 
designs and post-colonial civilising missions, especially if the modernising forces 
are driven or supported by a dominant majority or by foreign donor agencies. For, 
whose value systems should prevail in such a harmonised legal entity? How does 
one construct national legal uniformity in a state composed of many different 
people without overlooking or victimising certain interest groups and disregard-
ing certain types of law? In this context, there are huge concerns, often in relation 
to Islamic countries, about minority protection and freedom of religion. As in 
comparative law, if in comparative religion one does not respect that ‘the other’ 
should have a voice and a claim to legitimacy, there are bound to be what we now 
call human rights abuses, and there will be terrorism and war.20
18 See Menski, 2006a: ch 5. Current soul searching and violence among Muslims is centrally con-
cerned with this particular dilemma. For a good discussion see Ramadan, 2005.
19 For example in Iranian law, the traditional Shi’a ‘temporary marriage’ (mut’a) has today taken the 
shape of an engagement-like arrangement, allowing young couples to move in public without being 
harassed by the morality police.
20 In Sri Lanka, much of the vicious conflict between dominant Buddhists and the Tamil Hindu 
minority concerns the right of minorities to recognition as an integral different element of the nation 
state. No proper balance has been found so far.
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Beyond Europe, there is much heartburn over the boundaries of ‘general law’ 
and ‘personal law’, with encroachments from either side jealously watched and 
harshly critiqued.21 Protagonists of national legal uniformity (who are often also 
ardent visionaries of globally uniform law) are quick to condemn aberrations 
from the path of uniformisation, but one finds also exciting examples of official 
laws explicitly taking account of local customary norms, building them into new 
national legal systems.22 In some countries, for example Thailand, earlier expo-
sure to European laws that did not necessarily produce appropriate results leads 
now to a re-indigenisation.23 Next door Malaysia maintains the bipolar vision 
of co-existence of local Muslims with their internally plural Shari’at law and 
 ‘others’ (Chinese, Hindus, Christians and others) covered by a secular legal system 
without sufficient recognition of specific cultural roots, though it does not work 
satisfactorily (Aun, 1999; and Teik, 2003). Other countries in the region struggle 
to find an appropriate balance between national visions and local plural realities. 
Where interaction between and within different legal systems is not recognised, 
there are bound to be problems over minority rights and justice for certain groups 
of people (see eg Kooistra, 2001; and Dillon, 2001).24 
Beyond Europe, the legal families concept makes even less sense than it does 
from a Euro-centric perspective. The realisation that law is not simply a matter 
of state-centric positivism strikes students of Asian and African legal history the 
moment they start looking at ancient systems of law in which the state seems 
peripheral. The entirely Euro-centric, rough taxonomic models privileging com-
mon law and civil law have led to a carving up of the earlier colonial realms 
into common law and civil law spheres of influence as two monolithic entities 
(see David and Brierley, 1985; Zweigert and Kötz, 1998; and de Cruz, 1999). In 
Africa, the application of this rationale allows for Anglophone, Francophone 
and Lusophone classifications, which are still not enough to cover the immense 
 pluralities of the ‘dark continent’.25
In traditional non-European legal systems, we find many different factors influ-
encing how a legal tradition develops over time. In ancient Hindu law (Menski, 
2006a: chapter four), but not only there,26 the state seems for a long time virtually 
absent as law-maker. Later ruler figures (the ra-ja- as king, but equally as head of 
21 For a strong critique of the encroachment of local custom on criminal law in India, see 
Dhagamwar, 2003: 1483–92.
22 Good case studies would be the Republic of South Africa and Namibia, on which see Hinz (ed), 
2006). In Namibia, the Traditional Authorities Act, 2000 and the Community Courts Act, 2003 give 
explicit recognition to local customary courts. In India, the deliberate retention of customary forms of 
Hindu divorce under s 29(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 allows customary patterns of divorce to 
co-exist with statutory forms under s 13 of the same Act, leading to remarkable confusions in private 
international law.
23 I have heard this referred to as ‘Thaiification’. On Thai law, see Harding, 2001.
24 One could also look in more detail at Tibetans in China.
25 See the various entries under ‘Law’ in Middleton (ed), 1997, vol 2, 526–59. For a sharp critique of 
the treatment of African customary laws, see Ramose, 2006: 351–74.
26 On ancient Chinese law, see Bodde and Morris, 1967; and van der Sprenkel, 1977. 
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household) appear as servants of a higher cosmic order rather than powerful legal 
entities in their own right. No holder of legal power is really perceived as totally 
autonomous.27 There is always the dimension of interlinkedness with other and 
higher entities, the latter not just religious, but also in a secular sense, precisely 
because the underlying methodology of interlinking everything permits no clearly 
definable boundaries between what is religious and what is not. 
So the ancient Chinese Emperor held the Mandate of Heaven, as long as he 
could keep control of his realm, but also risked being legitimately removed if 
things went wrong in his Empire. The basic structure of traditional Chinese law 
and its institutions shows an intricate linkage of state, society and values, manifest 
ultimately as ‘confucianisation of the law’ (see Menski, 2006a: ch 7). Confucianist 
idealistic principles of self-controlled order and adherence to a sense of duty and 
performance of proper conduct (li) were combined with more realistic statist 
legalism that privileged formal state law (fa) and deterrent and deliberately cruel 
punishments (hsing). This pattern of underlying cultural presuppositions about 
whether individuals are good or bad, equal or different, and whether they can be 
educated through punishments or not, is roughly matched in other traditional 
legal systems, reflecting vigorous early debates about such universal questions 
virtually everywhere in Asia and Africa. 
Such alertness to difference, and sensitivity to the interlinkedness of law with 
other concepts, led to forms of traditional governance in which traditional rulers 
were (and are) limited in their range of activities, responsibilities and authority,28 
often heading a ‘soft state’. A Hindu ruler, for example, was always in theory (and 
thus largely in practice, because he could be legitimately killed if he ignored such 
concepts) subject to a higher order, embedded in a pattern of natural law, as were 
Islamic, African and ancient Chinese rulers in their own culture-specific ways. 
Experienced field scholars have perceptively written of the ideal of an equilibrium 
and, even for Africa, highlighted the ‘relative emphasis on imperium, tradition 
and divine revelation’ (Kuper and Kuper, 1965: 17).29 Such interlinkages were not 
appreciated by early Western scholars and were actually denied by Max Weber and 
others (Rheinstein, 1954; and Weber, 1968).
Significantly, such ancient culture-specific understandings of good governance 
are reflected in modern methods of governance in some countries, shown below 
in detail for India. Culture-specific forms of natural law and plural normative 
order are omnipresent and impact on methods of dispute settlement, which never 
rely just on one source of law, but strongly recognise the need to negotiate con-
flicting perspectives. The result is a conscious search for agreeable compromises, 
not a winner-take-all approach of the adversarial model.
27 But for early Islamic law, and particularly the much-criticised Umayyads as God’s representatives 
on earth, see Hallaq, 1997; and Hallaq, 2001.
28 T Bennett refers to popular maxims to the effect that ‘a chief is a chief by the people’, (Bennett, 
2004: 4). On African kings, see also Ramose, 2006: 351–74.
29 This matches my triangular model of state, society and values: see Menski, 2006a: 185–9.
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Seen from this comparative perspective, recent comparative law scholarship 
subtly indicates that maybe the Euro-centric perspective that privileged the state 
(lego-centrism) and territoriality (nationalist concerns) is not only quite paro-
chial (Twining, 2000: 3), but an idiom based on lost memory which does not lead 
towards a globally acceptable method of understanding law and its many plurali-
ties, mixed manifestations, and commonalities (Glenn, 2005). Below I now pres-
ent two case studies from Indian law to illustrate the cultivated complexity of laws 
beyond Europe and our current difficulties in making sense of new developments 
in such plurality-conscious legal systems.
IV.  THE INDIAN UNIFORM CIVIL CODE: HARMONISED PERSONAL LAWS 
RATHER THAN UNIFORMITY
India became independent from Britain at midnight on 14/15 August 1947, while 
Pakistan was carved out of that same colonial Empire at the same midnight hour 
as a state explicitly for Muslims.30 The Republic of India then laboured with its 
composite past and the new challenges of the globalising 20th century to develop, 
eventually, new models of plurality-conscious reconstruction which are today 
highly instructive for comparative lawyers. 
India started from a basic position of secularism, which in its specific Indian 
meaning implies a non-discrimination guarantee to all non-Hindu minorities that 
they would also have a legitimate place and a voice in this new state, despite there 
being a Hindu majority of more than 80%.31 Built on such deliberately ‘mixed’ 
foundations, and a conscious renunciation of power by the ‘religious’ majority, 
India has over the past 50+ years managed to remain a stable  democracy,32 to 
the surprise of many observers (Menski, 1995: 561–5). Meanwhile, it has quietly 
restructured its entire legal system to remain in harmony with this plurality-
conscious national vision, which has been in need of adjustment over time. The 
subtlety of this process only partially explains why there is so little debate.
The key challenge is whether a young nation state, with now well over a billion 
people, can aim to have a legal system that is nationally the same for all citizens.33 
India swiftly created a Constitution by 1950, much amended by now, and has a 
huge array of colonially-grounded general laws that apply to all citizens, and often 
30 Initially split between West and East Pakistan, by 1971 the Bengalis of East Pakistan had had 
enough of West Pakistani colonialism and created the new state of Bangladesh. Since the late 1970s, 
Pakistan has gradually re-inforced its vision of an Islamic Republic, which fails to give due recogni-
tion to minority laws, the concerns of women, and different faiths (even sects among Muslims) in the 
country.
31 Specifically on secularism, see Madan, 1987, and Madan (ed), 1994. More broadly, see Larson 
(ed),  2001.
32 On the Indian Emergency of 1975–77 as a shock therapy and cathartic experience, see Menski, 
2006a: 259–73.
33 A challenge also faced by other large countries, eg China, Brazil, Indonesia and the rainbow 
nation of South Africa.
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to all persons in India. The best example of such laws remains the Indian Penal 
Code of 1860, still applied today all over the sub-continent. Another important 
law, discussed below, is the restructured Criminal Procedure Code of 1973, origi-
nally of 1898. Such laws apply to all citizens alike, at least in theory (see Menski, 
1996: xxv-liv).34 
The challenge of legal uniformity arises particularly in family laws, where the 
personal law system has been retained, while the vision of a uniform civil code 
appeared on the horizon immediately after independence and made its first 
official appearance as a programme for development in Article 44, a Directive 
Principle of State Policy in the Indian Constitution of 1950:
44. Uniform civil code for the citizens
The state shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the 
territory of India.
Article 44 must be read within the wider agenda of secular post-colonial nation 
building, seeking equality for all citizens, as guaranteed in the Fundamental Rights, 
especially Article 14.35 This aim was built on the assumption that law reform hap-
pens through secular codification, despite Nehru’s realisation that ultimately people 
 themselves would have to change their ways of doing things (Sagade, 1981: 27–35). 
India’s ambition to promulgate a uniform civil code is not just an Indian 
problem, therefore, but concerns a universal predicament for lawyers and legal 
systems. Torn between legal uniformity and normative plurality, with innumer-
able local and regional diversities of cultures, customs, religions and therefore of 
laws, the new nation’s desire for nationally uniform legal regulation was strong 
in the 1950s, and uniformity continues to be an important vision. But achiev-
ing justice through total equality seems rather difficult when one is faced with 
many continuing diversities which are simply not going to disappear because of 
legal intervention. This raises the question whether difference and plurality are 
actually as problematic as is often made out by Euro-centric legal scholarship. 
Beyond Europe, readier recognition of difference reflects cautious acceptance of 
the multiple realities of human life. If a good law is perceived to be about a ‘good 
life’, it is an ancient truth (to which India can lay much claim because of its ancient 
Sanskrit literature) that this can manifest itself in quite different ways. India, it 
seems, has re-learnt important lessons about such issues since the 1950s. To see 
this simply as re-traditionalisation or even evidence of fundamentalist national-
ism would not do justice to the complexity of the issues encountered by India in 
its post-colonial efforts to find its national identity as a composite entity.
34 A country with 300+ million people living below the poverty line can hardly claim that its basic 
fundamental rights are a fact for all citizens. 
35 While Art 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws to all persons 
in India, Arts 15 and 16 permit the state to make special provisions particularly for women, children 
and historically disadvantaged classes, thus reflecting awareness that equality is not a socio-legal reality 
and remains a long-term goal.
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The idea that a developed law should appear in codified form had been 
implanted in the minds of Indian scholars at least since Sir Henry Maine’s Ancient 
Law in 1861. Such evolutionist thinking has remained strong but is much criti-
cised today (see Sack and Aleck, 1992: xviii–xix). In independent India, from the 
start, it was not an option that the Hindu majority of the new state should impose 
its law on all other citizens. Indian law could not be just Hindu law, it had to be 
‘secular’. Hence arose the deeply flawed modernist vision that a new, culturally 
neutral law should be constructed through a uniform civil code. But which law is 
culturally neutral? 
Notably, Indian legal reform efforts focused initially on an older secular colo-
nial legal model, which needed updating. The resulting Special Marriage Act, 1954 
allowed any Indian to marry and divorce according to a state-controlled legal 
regime of secular rules, irrespective of religious affiliation, with rules  following 
European statist models. Thus, marriages were only legally valid if registered 
before a state official. Grounds for divorce, which involved a court hearing, 
copied English-style legal rules into Indian law and were warmly welcomed at 
the time. This law was thought to be particularly attractive for people entering 
mixed  marriages, and was the proper law under which a foreigner would marry 
an Indian spouse. However, the 1954 Act never became popular in India and leads 
a peripheral existence. It is today beginning to be criticised as outdated, inter alia 
because (reflecting the spirit of the 1950s) its rules, even today, insist on parental 
consent to marriage (Champappilly, 2006: 149).36
Wide-ranging reform efforts focused around the same time on the modernisa-
tion of Hindu personal law, sparking off huge debates. Most controversial were the 
formal abolition of polygamy for Hindus and the introduction of divorce on fault 
grounds, with significant consequences for female property rights, maintenance 
and access to children. There is no room for details here (see Derrett, 1970; Derrett, 
1978; Menski 2001; and Menski 1998), but the next part focuses  specifically on 
divorced Indian women’s right to maintenance from the ex-husband.
Since the secular approach was pervasive after independence, Hindu  chauvinism 
appears to have been kept in check from the start by the secularity-focused leader-
ship under Nehru, which also ensured that the Sikhs, Buddhists and Jainas were 
in unifying efforts subsumed under Hindu law.37 Subsequent family law reforms 
continued the 1950s trend of copying Western legal developments, and especially 
the important Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 further harmonised the 
Special Marriage Act, 1954 and the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
But since the early 1980s, statutory reforms to Hindu law have basically ended 
and the focus has shifted to the courts, while particularly feminist efforts to 
36 He notes that the 1954 Act ‘is now obsolete. It has not travelled with the time’.
37 This caused some vigorous protest, reflected in numerous court cases. Particularly, the Sikhs felt 
the reforms gave women excessive property rights. On the more docile reaction of Jainas, see Menski, 
2006b: 417–35.
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engineer further statutory changes have created much debate and some recent 
results.38 Meanwhile, there has been increasing judicial recognition that the 
Western-inspired Hindu divorce reforms might not, after all, be an ideal model 
(see Derrett, 1978; and Menski, 2001: chapter two). India rejected ‘irretrievable 
breakdown’ as a formal ground for divorce among Hindus,39 and since the late 
1980s courts have been refusing more divorce decrees to men and women, saying 
in effect that India is not America, and that the country cannot afford a scenario 
in which millions of women and children are suffering as a result of liberalised 
divorce laws (see Menski, 2001: 130–3). This growing social welfare concern gave 
rise to determined judicial and legislative activism since the late 1970s in relation 
to post-divorce maintenance, an issue debated in the next part.
Regarding the vision of a uniform civil code on marriage and divorce, India 
appeared to make no progress. However, after the liberalising 1976 reforms of 
Hindu divorce law, the tiny Parsi community of India agreed in 1988 to reform its 
colonial family law;40 clearly an attempt to preserve their ethnic identity within 
Indian legal structures. This now left only the Muslims, Jews and Christians of 
India outside the nascent uniform statutory framework. The Jews of India were 
by now too depleted in numbers to take action (see Katz, 2000), and still seem to 
wait for the uniform civil code to materialise. The Muslims of India, as always, 
resented any pressure to have their personal laws codified by the state and, despite 
admission of crisis (see Mahmood, 1986), opposed suggestions that their shari’at 
law could be statutorily regulated. However, Indian Muslim shari’at law permits 
fairly easy divorce, favouring the husband’s extra-judicial talaq.
The Christians of India, comprising many different sects and churches, were 
held back through opposition by their conservative religious leadership to a more 
liberal divorce regime. Christian divorce law therefore eventually stuck out as 
imprisoning spouses in unhappy marriages. Until recently, particularly a Christian 
wife was virtually chained into a marriage for ever, while her co-citizens of other 
religions could seek divorce. Under the Constitution of India and its equality 
 provisions, here was clearly a case for relief through a uniform civil code.
But this was not an easy process. Amazing things happened during the 1990s 
when the High Court of Kerala, a southern state with more than 20% Christian 
population, dared to rewrite section 10 of the colonial Indian Divorce Act, 1869 to 
permit divorce among Christians in Kerala on the basis of simple cruelty.41 Such 
deliberately provocative judicial activism, a significant development in Indian law 
with wide repercussions worth studying (see Ahuja, 1997; Menski, Alam and Raza, 
2000; and Sathe, 2002) gave strong signals to Parliament that it ought to bring 
38 See the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, following a series of earlier local Acts, mainly 
in Southern states.
39 See particularly V Bhagat v (Mrs) D Bhagat AIR 1994 SC 710.
40 The Parsi Marriage and Divorce (Amendment) Act, 1988 amended the 1936 Act, thus bringing it 
in line with Hindu law and the secular rules of the Special Marriage Act, 1954.
41 Mary Sonia Zachariah v Union of India, 1995(1) Kerala Law Times 644.
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the hopelessly outdated Christian divorce law into line with the majority law and 
secular concepts under the 1954 Act. The 1869 Act had been promulgated at a 
time when divorce was granted only in the most exceptional circumstances, facing 
‘religious’ opposition from the Churches.
But nothing further happened for a long time after 1995, and several Supreme 
Court judges found it necessary, even beyond 2001, to issue strongly worded calls, 
in certain strategically important cases, about the desirability of a uniform civil 
code.42 Such cases caused catchy headlines in the press, but they were becoming 
rarer, while some older academics still propagated legal uniformity as a desirable 
aim for India today (Kumar, 2003).
Meanwhile, India’s Parliament was evidently waiting for the right time to 
reclaim the initiative in law making. It is probably no coincidence that on 24 
September 2001, just two weeks after 9/11,43 the purportedly slumbering colos-
sus of the Indian legislative machinery suddenly sprang into action, passing the 
Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001. This finally brought Indian Christian 
divorce law broadly into line with India’s other divorce laws, providing 10 grounds 
for dissolution of Christian marriages, plus an additional ground for the wife if 
she could prove that ‘the husband has, also since the solemnisation of the mar-
riage, been guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality’. After enormously tortuous lob-
bying and many setbacks, this Act finally almost completes the jigsaw puzzle of 
Indian legal uniformity: Another personal law system of India was now brought 
into line with the majority law and the secular ‘lead model’. This was done almost 
secretly, in record time, and there has been hardly any debate of this important 
development so far.
Why this remarkable silence? Apart from the Jews, Indian Muslims are now the 
only community not formally covered by the gradually emerging uniformised 
personal law system of India in relation to marriage and divorce. But it makes 
perhaps little difference whether a personal law is formally codified or not. What 
matters are the substantive provisions, and these are in fact similar for Indian 
Muslim law, despite the absence of codification. So, India now basically has a 
uniform civil code without admitting it!
But the original vision of a uniform civil code, as a new common code shared 
by all citizens, has simply not been realised and, I believe, will never materialise.44 
42 Concern about abuse of conversions to Islam and polygamy appears in Sarla Mudgal v Union 
of India, AIR 1995 SC 1531. Several later cases did not fully support the uniform civil code: see 
Ahmedabad Women Action Group (AWAG) v Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 3614; and Pannalal Bansilal 
Pitti v. State of AP, AIR 1996 SC 1023. The judges in Lily Thomas v Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1650 
almost apologised for Sarla Mudgal and, while finding a uniform law highly desirable, cautioned 
against premature action, warning that it might be ‘counter-productive to unity and integrity of 
the nation’ (at 1669). The most recent judicial endorsement of a uniform civil code is found in John 
Vallamattom v Union of India, 2003(3) Kerala Law Times 66 (SC), where VN Khare, CJ stated (at 80): 
‘A common civil code will help the cause of national integration by removing the contradictions based 
on ideologies’. Oddly, this was about two years after the reforms of 2001, discussed below.
43 And, most notably, only two days after Danial Latifi v Union of India, 2001(7) SCC 740 had been 
decided, in the same sitting as the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 2001 (see below).
44 AN Allott anticipated earlier that this was ‘no more than a distant mirage’ (Allott, 1980: 216).
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Instead we see, more than 50 years later, how Indian family law has made skil-
ful use of a different model of legal uniformity, which the original law-makers 
perhaps did not perceive as a viable option, but which represents legal realism 
in India today.45 What has happened under our very noses, then, but even most 
Indians have not noticed (let alone the outside world), is that virtually all the vari-
ous Indian personal laws have been uniformised along similar lines without losing 
their status as separate personal laws. This is the revised culture-specific Indian 
model of a uniform civil code, equity rather than equality, harmonised personal 
status laws without going as far as introducing a newly codified uniform civil code 
as originally envisaged. 
Post-modern India, therefore, seems to have found an exciting solution to 
the conundrum of legal uniformity which may be a suitable model for many 
countries in the world and may require a revision of legal theory (Menski, 2006c: 
13–28). The Indian experience shows that achieving greater legal uniformity 
does not necessarily require dangerous radical surgery through introduction 
of a strictly uniform code of family law for all citizens. Rather, India employed 
carefully planned minor surgeries over a long period of time, leaving the body 
of personal status laws intact. The result is more than cosmetic surgery, however. 
The various Indian personal laws now look more like each other than ever, but 
they are still identifiable as Hindu, Muslim, Parsi, and Christian law, by title and 
substance. They respect ethnic and religious identities without giving up on major 
national reform agenda, in this case seeking to achieve a more gender-equitable 
divorce regime. 
Despite the impression of a refusal to submit to law reforms, this also goes for 
Muslim law in India, which retains its uncodified form and respects the apparent 
reluctance of Muslim leaders and spokespersons to contemplate legal reform. In 
substance, but not in form, Indian Muslim law now differs little from the other, 
codified personal laws. This leads to the politically tricky question whether some 
reforms in this field have actually been made in Hindu-dominated secular India 
by adjusting the laws in this field to traditional Muslim legal norms.
Whatever the answer to this somewhat provocative suggestion, Indian law has 
certainly not been static over the last 50 years, but the subtle movements—often 
highly politicised and perceived as dangerous for communal harmony in a plu-
ralistic state dominated by Hindus and Hindu concepts—have had a deeper silent 
agenda which has not been abandoned despite communal riots, multiple accusa-
tions of fundamentalism, and much politicised commentary by academics, who 
often place their own agenda above the national interest. India has now virtually 
reached its aim of having a uniform personal law for all Indians in the fields of 
marriage and divorce. Since 2001, the result has not been a formally uniform 
legal provision, but much greater substantive equality than before. The fact that 
45 The possibility of this particular model (which was then not favoured) was clearly indicated in 
Dhagamwar, 1989: 67.
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46 This also illustrates, as U Baxi emphasises, that ‘[t]he local, not the global … remains the crucial 
site of struggle for the enunciation, implementation, enjoyment, and exercise of human rights’ (Baxi, 
2002: 89).
this remarkable achievement, by 2001, had hardly been commented on is largely 
due to the nature of scholarly politics. As the next part demonstrates, some signal 
events in Indian law (specifically the Shah Bano case) have almost entered global 
consciousness. This raises another uncomfortable question: Why is there such 
selective reception of non-European laws in the West? 
The answer, I suggest, lies not only in global scholarly agenda, but in the fact 
that India’s determined restructuring into a harmonised concurrent system of 
personal laws by 2001 does not fit with modernist perceptions of what law reform 
beyond Europe should look like. India has refused to adopt the uniformising, 
Western-inspired 1950s modernist agenda and has constructed its own culture-
specific model—actually a typically Asian model—taking account of the fact that 
its people adhere to different legal systems while sharing a territorial framework.46 
Significantly, though, the recent developments are not only a defeat for dreamy 
universalism or Euro-centric modernism, but also an equally serious defeat for 
Hindu fundamentalism, which appears to be another major reason why in India 
itself there has been such widespread embarrassed silence over the 2001 reforms. 
Some further explanations are required on the last point. Conscious of being 
a vast majority, many Hindus had all along wanted all Indians to follow basic 
principles of Hindu law under the guise of a uniform civil code. More radical ele-
ments among Hindu nationalists (the so-called hindutva brigades) expected the 
end of Muslim law in India as a result of the uniform civil code, and thus advo-
cated uniformisation through creeping hinduisation of the entire Indian legal 
system. During the recent period of governance by a central Indian government 
composed mainly of Hindu nationalists, the enormity of this Hindu nationalist 
project struck many more observers, but certainly not enough legal scholars. The 
uniform civil code project as a tool of hindutva would have been deeply unaccept-
able to the plurality-conscious secularists of India, who clearly prevailed. It would 
have been disastrous for India as a nation, too.
Since the overriding policy and vision of secularism has always restrained 
Indian hinduisation and has asserted itself successfully in the context of the 
uniform civil code, India now has to continue negotiating different concurrent 
personal laws, and will, in my view, indefinitely retain that system. I see no other 
acceptable route for a huge nation composed of so many different kinds of people. 
Plurality consciousness in the garb of Indian secularism (with its special mean-
ing, clearly too little understood) has rescued the nation from the blood-stained 
dark alleys of communalist excess. Here, then, comparative lawyers find strong 
evidence that national laws beyond Europe may take a quite different form even 
in their most developed manifestations, not following the state-centric uniformis-
ing territorial paradigms of Western jurisdictions. Beyond Europe, mixed legal 
systems clearly create different shoots on the global tree of law.
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V.  THE SHAH BANO BANDWAGON: THE MYTH OF INDIAN 
POST-DIVORCE MAINTENANCE LAW
Culture-specific legal realism prevailed in Indian law over globalising ideology 
also in another, closely related field. It demonstrates even more than the previous 
example how Western scholars and their non-Western followers can easily misun-
derstand and misrepresent non-European legal developments that do not fit their 
own political and intellectual agenda. The result may be a totally distorted image 
of socio-legal reality and even of legal facts, as the present scenario shows.
The Shah Bano bandwagon started rolling slowly, even prior to the case 
itself, when explicit concerns about the predicament of divorced wives in India 
were imported—significantly by Indira Gandhi47—into the revised Criminal 
Procedure Code, 1973, which in section 125(1) now defined a ‘wife’ as including 
a divorced wife. This itself is a remarkable pro-women achievement, with tricky 
consequences for Indian men, as we shall see. Thus, important social welfare 
considerations were introduced, by a combination of legislative alertness and 
eventual judicial activism, to help protect Indian divorced wives from vagrancy 
and utter destitution. Because the 1973 Code applies to all Indians, it now became 
possible for Muslim wives to petition for maintenance beyond the traditional 
iddat period of roughly three months,48 and to ask for life-long maintenance.49 
Well before the famous Shah Bano case of 1985,50 the Indian Supreme Court had 
already established by 1979 that a Muslim ex-husband would only be exempt 
from further responsibility for his ex-wife if the provisions he had made were 
sufficient for her ‘to keep body and soul together’.51 
By the time Shah Bano’s husband engineered his case to get around such 
women-friendly social welfare arguments of Indian law, the battlefield was set, 
and the key facts are almost stereotypical: After almost 40 years of marriage and 
several children, an elderly Muslim woman was divorced by her lawyer husband 
who wanted to enjoy life with a younger woman. He claimed that giving his old 
former wife the stipulated iddat money and the haq mahr52—together just a few 
hundred rupees—fulfilled his legal obligations towards her, relying on traditional 
Muslim law to exempt himself from any further liability towards his ex-wife. 
The Shah Bano bandwagon really started rolling when she eventually obtained a 
verdict from the Supreme Court,53 holding that her ex-husband had a legal 
47 On Indira Gandhi as ‘Mother India’ and a modern ‘traditional’ ruler, see Menski, 2006a: 264–6 
and Menski, 2003: 258–9.
48 The iddat comprises three menstrual periods and is primarily designed to ascertain paternity of a 
child in the womb. During this period, the Muslim husband must maintain the wife.
49 Earlier, a Muslim husband faced with a claim for maintenance from his wife could simply have 
divorced her by talaq, ending her status as a ‘wife’. 
50 Mohd. Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano, AIR 1985 SC 945.
51 Bai Tahira v Ali Hussain Chothia, AIR 1979 SC 362.
52 The mahr or mehr is the dower promised by the Muslim husband to the wife at the time of the 
marriage. For details, see Pearl and Menski, 1998: 190–201.
53 Mohd Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano, AIR 1985 SC 945.
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obligation to maintain her until death (remarriage not being a realistic option) 
under section 125 of the 1973 Code as well as under traditional shari’at law.54 
Even under the Qur’anic provisions, so the Supreme Court said, there was an obli-
gation on divorcing Muslim husbands to be good and generous to a former wife. 
Instantly a storm broke loose among Indian Muslims, with riots and vigorous 
protests which highlighted the difficult relationship between Indian Muslims and 
the state. The young Prime Minister at the time, Rajeev Gandhi, took remedial 
action by resorting to rapid codification. Acceding to the demands for a separate 
Act for Muslims on post-divorce maintenance, Gandhi upset the proponents of a 
uniform civil code and was universally perceived to cave in to Muslim pressures 
by swiftly promulgating a special Act called the Muslim Women (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. Despite murmurs of disapproval, there were no 
riots on the street: the legislative ploy had worked, since everyone was happy to 
believe that divorcing Indian Muslim men now had no further legal responsibility 
for their ex-wives after the iddat period.55 Secular activists were disgusted and the 
Shah Bano bandwagon rolled faster.
Despite its pro-women name, this Act was thus believed to be designed to exon-
erate Muslim ex-husbands from the obligations imposed by the Shah Bano case 
and section 125 of the 1973 Act. The 1986 Act, portrayed as ‘a terrible blunder all 
around’,56 was immediately challenged in numerous constitutional petitions by 
secularists and modernists,57 but the Indian Supreme Court sat on these impor-
tant cases for almost 15 years. We know today that this was deliberate judicial 
passivism, while outside observers simply saw further evidence that Indian law 
was inefficient and suffered from extraordinary delays in litigation. There was, 
however, a higher purpose behind this long judicial silence, which only recent 
findings have uncovered.58
Meanwhile, all around the world, after the 1986 Act, modernist scholars of 
various hues had climbed onto the Shah Bano bandwagon and loudly deplored 
the backwardness of Indian law, which had allegedly let down Indian Muslim 
women (see Rajan, 1999; and Jaising: 2005: 7–8, 17–18). Shah Bano became a 
global symbol for the unacceptability of non-Western laws in the modern world 
and signified India’s stubborn patriarchal backwardness. The world was appalled: 
Journalists joined the chorus, claiming that India had not only abandoned moder-
nity and legal uniformity, but had let down its Indian Muslim women so badly 
that they would be driven onto the streets and into destitution. India had given in 
to Muslim fundamentalism. Hardly anybody cared to ask whether it was in line 
54 Part of the problem was that five Hindu judges were interpreting the Qur’an.
55 This is reflected in virtually all serious publications: see, eg Weiss, 1995: 341 at -343, which sug-
gests that the 1986 Act ‘revoked Muslim women’s rights to maintenance granted under the state’s civil 
laws’.
56 Mehta, 1994: 98.
57 The recollections of Baxi, 2002: 82 sharply bring out the conflict of laws scenario.
58 The evidence is found in Agnes, 2001: 91–2, where she reports that arguments in the Danial Latifi 
case ‘were concluded in August/September 2000 and the judgment is reserved till date’.
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with Islamic principles to simply abandon Muslim ex-wives to destitution and 
prostitution. The dominant tenor was that Muslim men had been given excep-
tional privileges by the modern Indian state and had got away, once again, on the 
basis of religious exemption. The contested image of the Indian state was further 
sullied by such scholarly and publicity-seeking outbursts, which continue today. 
Even the most respected legal scholars of India, ‘modern traditional’ positivists at 
heart, seemed to rely on such political gossip, which created serious misinforma-
tion (see Sathe, 2002: 19). 
Fortunately for India and for Indian Muslim women, this is not the whole 
truth. While the cacophony of devastating criticism of Indian law-making 
drowned the voices of reason for a long time, calm straightforward statu-
tory interpretation in a spirit of legal realism found it hard to gain eventual 
acceptance in this highly politicised cauldron of anger, contempt and suspi-
cion. The full story is not told in a few words, but ended as a damp squib on 
22 September 2001, when the Supreme Court of India finally delivered its 
verdict in the constitutional petitions of 1986.59 Remarkably, just two weeks 
after 9/11, having waited for 15 years, the Indian Supreme Court merely reiter-
ated the familiar legal position that making reasonable distinctions between 
citizens on the basis of certain criteria—in this case religion—would not be 
unconstitutional in itself. Muslims in India (this was the message) had a right 
to be different and to be heard as part of the nation. However, they also had 
the same basic constitutional obligations as other citizens, so that the terms 
of their existence were determined ultimately by state law, not by higher com-
munal or religious authority. Indian state law, then, clearly did not give in to 
Muslim demands, but met them half way: ‘You may have a separate law as a 
matter of Muslim personal status, but you are bound, as everyone else, by 
shared national criteria and, in this case, specific concerns over social welfare 
for ex-wives’. At the end of the day, so the Supreme Court’s message went, 
Indian Muslim husbands who wished to divorce retained a legal responsibil-
ity under Indian state law (as well as a moral obligation under shari’at) for 
the future welfare of their former wives. In India, these obligations would 
have to be met within a tight time frame, namely within the iddat period, to 
protect the ex-wife from destitution. Similar legal obligations are shared by all 
other Indian ex-husbands under section 125 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code of 1973, which had sparked off the controversy in the first place. 
Demanding a separate Muslim Act was thus not a viable escape route for 
Muslim ex-husbands. 
No riots followed this skilfully crafted judgment, which avoided explicit refer-
ence to the desirability of a uniform civil code. Rather, there was stunned silence, 
not surprising since the decision in Danial Latifi represented another defeat for 
legal modernism, and was therefore not welcome for positivism-focused legal 
59 Danial Latifi v Union of India, 2001(7) SCC 740.
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scholars. Once again, post-colonial post-modern Indian law was able to respect 
the traditional plurality of personal status laws while maintaining an equitable 
uniform system of rule, and protecting women’s rights as well.
To analyse this scenario in more depth, one needs to be aware that earlier the 
stipulated upper financial limit for the ex-husband’s support under section 125 of 
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 extended only to 500 rupees, reflecting con-
cerns about vagrancy of near-destitute ex-wives. The Muslim Women (Protection 
of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 contained no such stipulated upper limit, skil-
fully following the shari’at principle that the particular circumstances of husband 
and wife need to be considered from case to case. That the 1986 Act had not in 
fact taken away the rights of divorced Muslim wives was gradually confirmed by 
an increasing number of High Court cases, since well before 1988.60 It emerged 
that section 3(1)(a) of the 1986 Act, interpreted progressively, not only required 
a Muslim ex-husband to maintain his ex-wife during the iddat period (which any 
decent Muslim should do anyway), but he also had to make provisions for the 
time after the iddat period, and should do so during the iddat period.61 In other 
words, if a Muslim divorced wife reaches the end of her iddat period and the 
husband has not maintained her and has not made reasonable provisions for her 
future welfare (which might include arranging a remarriage for her) the ex-wife 
can go to court once the iddat finishes and can claim both entitlements. 
There is a 1990 case in which a rich Muslim woman claimed more money from 
her millionaire husband and succeeded.62 Muslims were thus potentially worse 
off than all other Indian ex-husbands. The growing body of High Court cases 
re-assured the faraway Delhi law-makers (who appear to have been watching 
this carefully) and the Indian Supreme Court (which cautiously maintained a 
studied silence), that the climate was eventually beginning to be right for further 
steps in securing better and more equitable financial protection to all Indian ex-
wives. That appropriate moment, it appears, came just two days after the Danial 
Latifi decision, on 24 September 2001, when the Indian Parliament removed the 
500 rupees limit for all Indian ex-husbands by passing the Code of Criminal 
Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2001. Notably, this small but highly significant Act 
restored legal uniformity across the board in financial terms, while maintaining 
the separate Muslim law enactment. 
There seems to be no explanation of legislative intent. Whether this is purpose-
ful silence, legislation by stealth, or a new strategy to reinstate a higher level of 
60 Important decisions are Arab Ahemadhia Abdullah v Arab Bail Mohmuna Saiyadbhai, AIR 1988 
Guj. 141; Ali v Sufaira, 1988(2) Kerala Law Times 94; and a large number of cases in the Kerala High 
Court and in other courts. There are only a few High Court decisions that absolved Muslim husbands 
from further responsibility.
61 The relevant portion in s 3(1)(a) reads that a divorced Muslim woman shall be entitled to ‘a 
reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period by 
her former husband’.
62 Significantly, again from Kerala, see Ahammed v Aysha, 1990(1) Kerala Law Times 172.
Beyond Europe  209
legal uniformity is not clarified, but this Act achieves three important things at 
once. First, it simply removes the earlier ceiling of 500 rupees in section 125(1) 
for all Indians, which now seems to encourage litigation by wives and other needy 
relatives also in middle class scenarios, opening up attractive new avenues for 
legal business. Secondly, the Act introduced a new proviso to strengthen rights 
to interim maintenance, pendente lite; crucial in Indian conditions of widespread 
poverty. Thirdly, and closely linked, the amendment promised speedy disposal of 
cases, as far as possible within 60 days from the filing of the petition. The Indian 
state evidently means business here, yet people will need time learning to use (and 
rebalance) this new law, and there will be much resistance. This partly symbolic 
legislation is likely to have a deep impact on future negotiation of gender relations 
in Indian law and society. In India’s official maintenance law for women after 
divorce, legal harmonisation was successfully reinstated after the 1986 Muslim 
personal law detour—a textbook example of an activist and progressive personal 
law enactment, ultimately designed to strengthen legal uniformity, national 
 cohesion and women’s rights. 
While this new social welfare law awaits implementation, there are early indi-
cations of severe difficulties for most Indian ex-wives in claiming their legal 
entitlements, including Muslim ex-wives claiming under the 1986 Act.63 But com-
parative lawyers, aware that law anywhere in the world has crucial symbolic func-
tions and that these are highly significant in legal systems beyond Europe, should 
not become too pessimistic: laws everywhere are there to be negotiated in a spirit 
of plurality-consciousness (Menski, 2006a: 612). That the Indian state so clearly 
supports the claims of divorced wives from all communities speaks volumes about 
the awareness of inside players behind such law reforms, the seriousness of the 
problems faced by many Indian ex-wives, and the role of judicial alertness.
Evidently, the Indian legal developments on post-divorce maintenance closely 
match the uniform civil code strategies discussed above. Both confirm that sub-
stance is more important to the Indian state than form and that legal plurality is 
not a problem in itself. Developing such plurality-conscious legal arrangements, 
India has gone well beyond simply protecting the most vulnerable sections of 
society from vagrancy.
VI.  CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS LEGAL HARMONISATION 
WITHIN PERSONAL LAW SYSTEMS
What lessons about laws beyond Europe does this contain for comparative law-
yers? The Asian and African experience, exemplified here by India, indicates that 
all countries, in light of their own culture-specific legal histories and resultant 
diversities, have to construct legal systems that suit their specific people. There is 
63 See the excellent work by Vatuk, 2001: 226–48.
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no ‘law of the world’; no one model that every state could follow. Beyond Europe, 
there will always be a vast array of mixed legal systems, from which the ‘iden-
tity postulate’ of any given country needs to be constructed as a kind of ethnic 
entity,64 indeed akin to Stammler’s ‘right law’ (Stone, 1965: 167–81).
In these mixed legal systems, local cultural elements are evidently going to 
remain critical ingredients. In a state like India, these are bound to be Indic, even 
Hindu, but they will never be exclusively in control. Academic writing, afraid of 
nationalist fundamentalism, may deny and oppose the influence of Hindu and 
other personal laws, privileging state-made ‘secular’ laws over the culturally-
anchored laws of the people, but in global comparative law this reflects wishful 
thinking rather than rational analysis.65 Not only beyond Europe, comparative 
lawyers must learn to harmonise local influences with emerging global patterns 
of thought, avoiding the current mental cul de sacs that dismiss local cultures 
as obstacles to the implementation of international laws and globally uniform 
human rights principles. In the age of localised globalisation, a new phase of 
diversity-conscious identity construction has become necessary, but many 
 scholars from outside Europe, too, find it hard to overcome the Euro-centric 
domination of legal thinking.
The Indian case studies demonstrate how the tensions between legal 
 uniformity and respect for difference can be (and need to be) carefully nego-
tiated over time to achieve gradually a more justice-sensitive approach that 
takes account of all stakeholders, especially structurally disadvantaged people 
like women and children. While blind modernisation was always treated 
with some caution in India, from about 1988 onwards Indian judges (and 
probably also Parliament) re-thought the andro-centric strategies of deal-
ing with  family conflicts in a wider social welfare context, recognising that 
most women,  living within a patriarchal system, remain disadvantaged in 
access to resources. Having made repeated symbolic moves to improve the 
property rights of Indian Hindu and Christian women,66 the Indian state sees 
no contradiction in pursuing individualising strategies while also reminding 
those with privileged access to family resources (mostly men) of their duties 
towards other family members. Looking specifically at the facts and circum-
stances of each case—an ancient prominent strategy of legal systems beyond 
Europe—Indian courts are now more attuned to alleviating the negative 
effects of patriarchy. While emphasising modern-looking individual property 
rights, also of women, the post-modern Indian state also re-employs tradi-
tional concepts of interlinkedness, specifically traditional family obligations, 
64 On the concept of ‘identity postulate of a legal culture’, see Chiba. He explains that
‘[i]t guides a people in choosing how to reformulate the whole structure of their law, including, 
among others, the combination of indigenous law and transplanted law, in order to maintain their 
accommodation to changing circumstances’ (Chiba, 1989: 180).
65 An instructive recent example of such supposedly rational Indian legal writing, inspired from 
Canada, is Sagade, 2005.
66 Most recently in the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005.
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as a social welfare mechanism. This dual strategy also protects the state from 
expectations that it should be directly responsible for social welfare.
This gendered dialectic of rights and duties is more clearly visible now, and 
shows that India pursues both individual autonomy and reinforcement of col-
lective responsibility to bring better justice within reach for all citizens. The sig-
nals are indeed confusing and contradictory. While men can often afford better 
lawyers and continue to hold unfair advantages as controllers of most resources, 
in post-modern India they are now again held primarily liable for the welfare of 
needy family members. This kind of moral responsibility has increasingly been 
turned into a legal obligation by the quiet activism and occasional deliberate pas-
sivism of the Indian judiciary. Indian men, irrespective of religion and personal 
laws, might now feel that they are all in the same perilous boat: Getting married 
under Indian law now means taking on serious responsibilities for women and 
children—potentially for life—whether the marriage lasts or not. As demon-
strated, the agenda of uniformising nation building and support for traditional 
family life have been conflated in unexpected ways, leading to latent perceptions 
of the oppression of men (see Mahmood, 1986; and Kusum, 1993). 
Thus, accepting patriarchy as a fact, which is hardly a difficult task for 
Indian lawmakers—(though it hurts the feelings of many activists), has 
become a newly invigorated Grundnorm for Indian law today. Post-modern 
constitutional dharma in India, hardly new, feeds again on traditional joint 
family models (see Menski, 2001). Individualised European welfare models are 
known, but widely perceived as unsustainable. It is not readily  acknowledged 
that Western laws have not overcome patriarchy and gender discrimination 
either, and have only managed to remove some glaring discriminations. The 
realistic post-modern Indian strategies of gendered re-negotiation are far too 
slow for many impatient activists (Sagade, 2005), and are widely perceived as 
oppressive (Jaising, 2005).
In this wider context, we see a gradual shift away from the initial vision 
of a nationally uniform civil code towards a system in which supposedly 
indigenous values—here the ancient Indic notion of relative justice or equity 
(nya-ya)—reassert themselves, now as gender-sensitive re-alignment of respon-
sibilities of Indian family members to each other. As indicated,  comparable 
processes of re-invention of tradition are observable in many legal systems 
beyond Europe. India’s new social welfare orientation has clearly relegated 
the political football of the uniform civil code to a minor position on the 
league table of agenda. Through Danial Latifi, the Indian state de-prioritised 
the ‘modern’ principle of formal legal uniformity in favour of securing ‘tradi-
tional’ equitable legal entitlements. India’s judges, secular gate-keepers of the 
welfare system, firmly cajoled Muslim sharks back into the Indian net of social 
welfare arrangements. This net of national law does not have escape holes, but 
different sections. Thus, it becomes clear that Indian Muslims can keep their 
personal laws, but cannot wriggle out of social welfare obligations that apply 
uniformly to all Indians. 
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The Indian state thereby acknowledges the need to avoid, as far as possible, 
that millions of women, children and now, increasingly, old people become desti-
tute, without being able to offer direct help. In most nations beyond Europe, this 
is a huge issue. The number of welfare claimants under any category would be 
enormous. Fiscal prudence, as much as a desire to protect women, children and 
senior citizens, demands a different approach to social welfare from that stipu-
lated by Western-style state-driven modernity; a lesson that prosperous European 
nations are painfully learning at present when they have to scale back. Developing 
countries like India seek to avoid such problems by not even promising their 
 citizens state welfare as part of the social contract.
Despite the prominence of Western-dominated positivist legal indoctrina-
tion, many Indian judges have become post-modern Indic realists, probably the 
hard way. There are accounts of judges choking over their breakfast while read-
ing reports of atrocities committed by the state and its agents.67 One prominent 
retired Indian judge recounts how his sensitivities for justice were sharpened by 
suffering abuses himself (Iyer, 2004: 29).
The almost stunned reception of Danial Latifi, two weeks after 9/11, swiftly 
cleared the road for an alert government to further smooth the path towards 
greater harmonisation of India’s personal status law and a deepening of social 
welfare commitments. This demonstrates how global events may influence 
local laws. While critical matters of social welfare have moved centre-stage, the 
case for the introduction of a uniform civil code in India has now become less 
and less convincing,68 especially since the personal law system demonstrates 
that it can take care of the pressures of potential inequality through a process 
of gradual harmonisation of all Indian personal laws. Thus, as we saw, India 
has actually achieved the equivalent of a uniform civil code, but in a different 
shape than envisaged earlier. Meanwhile legal debates lag seriously behind the 
actual law, with its situation-specific justice of dharma, nya-ya and shari’at in 
their idealistic secularised reconfiguration, which is always going to remain 
culture-specific.
The challenge now is to make these existing personal laws work better within the 
protective framework of a general Constitution and wider international norms. 
This is a central legal task everywhere beyond Europe, by no means unique to 
Indian law: it is in fact a global legal challenge. The lessons that India has begun 
to draw from its new scenario of sophisticated plurality will be of much relevance 
to comparative legal scholarship worldwide.69
67 This may lead to suo motu petitions, as in the case of a widow aged 80 deprived of pension rights: 
Ram Pyari v Union of India, AIR 1988 Raj. 124.
68 Significantly, Rajeev Dhavan points out that the uniform civil code agenda ‘grows out of a 
 nineteenth-century dream to codify all laws in the manner of the later Justinian of Roman law or of the 
Napoleonic Code’ and ‘has now been trivialized into becoming a tragic farce’ (Dhavan, 2001: 317). 
69 Recognition that the world is more like India than the United States is reflected in Larson, 
2001: 345.
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QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
 1.  To what extent could it be argued that non-Western legal systems are more 
attuned to pluralism than Western legal systems?
 2.  What, if anything, can the study of comparative law from an Asian/African 
angle contribute to global legal theory?
 3.  Why does the ‘legal families’ concept not make much sense beyond 
Europe?
 4.  Discuss, with examples, the concept of ‘interlinkedness’ as a central feature 
of laws beyond Europe.
 5.  ‘Non-European informal methods of dispute settlement might resemble 
healing rituals rather than legal processes, but they are just as powerful as 
formal legal mechanisms’. 
   Discuss with examples.
 6.  ‘Laws beyond Europe demonstrate that, while recognition of difference 
and plurality is hardly unproblematic, it does not need to be perceived as 
a problem that prevents thinking about creative solutions’.
   Discuss with examples.
 7. Is law ever culturally neutral?
 8. To what extent is legal uniformity a value in itself?
 9.  Looking at the example of Indian laws, how realistic is it to assume that 
an ex-husband should maintain his ex-wife until she dies or remarries?
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Convergence of Private Law in Europe: 
Towards a New Ius Commune?
JAN M SMITS
KEY CONCEPTS
European private law: Ius commune; Unification and harmonisation.
I. INTRODUCTION
T
he emergence of a common private law for Europe is a topical issue. 
Over the last two decades we have seen much debate on the question to 
what extent the European Union is in need of a uniform private law and 
what this law should look like. The symbolic starting point of this debate is often 
seen as the 1989 resolution of the European Parliament in which it called for 
the elaboration of a European civil code.1 Since then, many books and journal 
articles have been devoted to the future of private law in Europe and it is certainly 
no exaggeration to say that out of this debate a whole new scholarly discipline of 
‘European private law’ has emerged with its own journals,2 annual conferences 
and university chairs. This discipline looks at questions related to the convergence 
of the laws of contract, tort and property as well as of family law. Often, these 
questions are referred to as the ius commune-debate, referring to that period of 
time (mainly the 17th and 18th century) in which a true common law did exist in 
continental Europe, even though the present time can hardly be compared with 
the cultural and legal climate to that time, in which all lawyers—at least in large 
parts of the European continent—used the same legal language (that of Roman 
law) and were all part of one unified culture.
1 Resolution A2–157/89. This call was repeated in 1994 (A3–00329/94) and 2001 (C5–0571/2001). 
Cf. resolution A6–0055/2006.
2 Among these are the Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (ZEuP, established 1993); European 
Review of Private Law (ERPL, 1993); Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (MJ, 1994); 
and Europa e Diritto Privato (1998).
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The aim of this contribution is to discuss several of the questions which the 
emergence of a European private law raises; not to give definitive answers but to 
provide the reader with the tools necessary to answer them for him or herself. 
First (Part II below), attention is paid to the need for convergence of private law: 
What are the reasons usually given for harmonising or unifying private law and 
are these reasons in any way convincing? Secondly, the question is raised how 
convergence of private law takes place at present. Thus, unification by treaties and 
harmonisation through Directives are discussed below in Part III, together with 
the far-ranging idea of creating a European civil code. A third question (Part IV 
below) is whether convergence of private law is at all possible. Some have argued 
that the differences among the 28 private law systems we have in Europe (27 
national systems and Scots law) are too large to come to any real convergence. 
This is an important argument which deserves to be mentioned here. Finally, vari-
ous other methods to reach (further) convergence of private law in Europe will be 
considered. Should the European Union continue with the present harmonisation 
process by issuing European directives or should other methods (also) be used to 
reach more convergence of law? For instance, such wide-ranging pleas have been 
made for promoting a European legal science and education and for convergence 
of law through competition of legal systems. These and other methods are dis-
cussed in Part V below.
Before embarking upon our venture, one remark on terminology seems apt. 
Often, the terms convergence, unification, harmonisation and legal integration 
are used interchangeably to describe the process of the coming together of the 
national private laws of the Member States of the European Union. In this sense, 
these are ‘utterly flexible and indeterminate’ terms (Boodman, 1991). However, it 
seems useful to reserve the term harmonisation for the specific method of legal 
convergence through European Directives. This leaves diversity as to the form 
and means used in place, only harmonising the end result to be achieved by the 
Member States (cf Article 249 of the EC Treaty3 ). On the other hand, I will use 
the term unification for the process that may lead to uniform law (such as in the 
case of treaty law). This uniform law presupposes that national legal systems com-
pletely disappear and that a new, uniform, law is applied in a uniform way across 
all of Europe—a result that, as we will see, is hardly ever reachable.
II.  THE NEED FOR CONVERGENCE
Diversity of Private Law in Europe
Any contribution on the unification of private law should start with acknowledg-
ing that the European Union’s private law is at present immensely diverse. One 
can identify four groups of private law regimes within the European Union on 
3 Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated version), [2006] OJ C 321.
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the basis of common history, the sources of law recognised and the predominant 
mode of legal thought. The first group consists of the common law systems of 
England and Ireland, with their emphasis on judge-made law and the central 
authority of the English House of Lords and the Irish Supreme Court respectively. 
Cyprus (a British colony until 1960) also belongs to this group. The second group 
consists of the traditional civil law countries, characterised by a central role for 
a national civil code, but also by a highest court whose decisions are in practice 
often just as important as the code provisions. Among these countries, one can 
distinguish between those that have a code that is to a greater or lesser extent still 
based on the Code Napoleon (France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Spain, Portugal, Italy 
and Malta) and those that have a code that is based more on the German model 
(Austria, Germany, Greece and The Netherlands).
A third group is formed by the Scandinavian Member States (Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland). They not only share a common history, but also have 
several common statutes, such as a common statute on sale of moveable goods 
and a common contract law Act. Finally, there is the large group of countries 
that entered the European Union in 2004, almost all of which have a new or at 
least recently revised civil code (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovenia). The way in which these new or revised 
codes are applied and interpreted by the national courts cannot be compared to 
the way in which this is done in traditional civil law countries. Generally speaking, 
the mode of interpretation is much more literal.
It should also be noted that within these four groups there can be considerable 
differences in substance. Even such basic topics as formation of contract, damages 
in tort and transfer of property are often treated differently depending on the 
jurisdiction involved. And where the substance is the same, the judicial style and 
way of reasoning may still differ.
The First Motive for Convergence: the Internal Market
What should one think of these differences? Sometimes, it is seen as a goal in 
itself to get rid of legal diversity: differences between European countries are to 
be avoided because differences are bad. Why should it be that title to a moveable 
object be transferred with the contract of sale in Belgium, but upon delivery in 
The Netherlands? And why should the victim of a traffic accident be protected less 
in Portugal than in France? This line of reasoning, which does not even address 
the adverse effects of diversity, does not seem very convincing. There have to be 
other, real, motives for unification.
The development of the common market is usually seen to be the most impor-
tant motive for convergence of private law within the European Union. Articles 
2 and 3 of the EC Treaty make it clear that ‘the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States to the extent required for the functioning of the common mar-
ket’ may be pursued. This implies that in so far as national private law stands 
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in the way of this common market, the European Union is competent to take 
measures.
It is worthwhile to look in somewhat more detail at this relationship between 
the common market and private law. How is it, exactly, that divergence of private 
law may distort the functioning of the European economy? The reasoning of the 
European legislator becomes clear from the following passage from the preamble 
to Council Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts:4
[T]he laws of the Member States relating to the terms of contract between the seller of 
goods or supplier of services, on the one hand, and the consumer of them, on the other 
hand, show many disparities, with the result that the national markets for the sale of 
goods and services to consumers differ from each other and that distortions of competi-
tion may arise amongst the sellers and suppliers, notably when they sell and supply in 
other Member States.
It is thus the creation of similar European conditions for the seller (or otherwise 
professionally acting party) that is decisive for the European Union: if legal 
regimes differ too much, competition among sellers from various European 
countries will be distorted. It is this basis of Article 3 (elaborated in Article 95 of 
the EC Treaty) on which most European Directives with relevance for private law 
are based. This so-called acquis communautaire consists of almost 20 Directives 
on the core of private law.5 Most of them deal with specific contracts such as 
consumer sale, time-share, package travel, consumer credit, financial transactions 
and distance marketing, others regulate, for example, products liability, electronic 
commerce and unfair contract practices. There are no Directives on family law 
and the law of immoveable property for the simple reason that these topics are 
probably not covered by Article 95.
An interesting question is whether the argument of the European Commission 
is completely convincing: Does harmonisation of private law really promote the 
internal market? This is an important issue because, in its ‘Tobacco judgment’ of 
2000,6 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that a measure based on Article 
95 of the EC Treaty must genuinely have as its object the improvement of the con-
ditions for the functioning of the internal market. The mere finding of disparities 
between national rules and ‘the abstract risk’ of distortions of competition is not 
enough: these must be real or at least probable. If this condition is not met, the 
ECJ can strike down the measure taken.
To the European Commission, the question has a clear answer. For consumers 
and small and medium-sized enterprises in particular, not knowing other private 
law regimes may be a disincentive to undertaking cross-border transactions. This 
may lead some suppliers of goods and services to refrain from offering to consum-
ers in other countries, while others will enter into business but then  suffer from 
4 [1993] OJ L 095/29.
5 There are various text editions of these Directives available. See, eg Radley-Gardner, Beale, 
Zimmerman and Schulze, 2003; and Smits, Hardy, Hesen and Kornet, 2006.
6 Case C–376/98 Germany v European Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I–8419 (ECJ).
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high transaction costs.7 This way of reasoning is, however, not entirely satisfac-
tory. In itself it is true that concluding a transfrontier contract is more costly than 
concluding a contract in one’s own country, but it is an open question whether 
harmonisation of private law will reduce these costs substantially. It is likely that 
in this respect not only other parts of the law (such as tax law and procedural law) 
are more important, but it is also to be recognised that the costs of transfrontier 
contracting are primarily caused by de facto barriers such as different languages, 
cultural differences and distances (Smits, 2006b; and Vogenauer and Weatherill, 
2006). Also for consumers, such barriers seem to be more important than differ-
ences in private law.
The Second Motive for Convergence: a European Civil Code as a Symbol of 
one European Identity
Another motive for unification of private law is in the desire to create a European 
identity: one Europe requires one private law (Alpa, 2000). In the same way that the 
19th century national codifications were a means to create a national identity distinct 
from the identity of other peoples, a European civil code would be the symbol of one 
Europe and of solidarity among the Member States (mentioned in Article 2 of the 
EC Treaty). This motive is closely connected to the very reason for the founding of 
the European Communities. In the aftermath of World War II, the desire to bury the 
hatchet once and for all among European countries and get rid of national differ-
ences that might serve as a new reason for conflict, was an essential part of this.
The identity argument does not seem very strong. It is often remarked that 
the core of the European identity does not lie in uniformity but in cherishing the 
European plurality of languages, cultures and law. What is more, even the official 
motto of the European Union is ‘united in diversity’. One only needs to point at 
the example of the United States to realise that one national identity does not 
necessarily imply a uniform law: every American state has its own private law. It 
also seems likely that for example, a common foreign policy is much more a token 
of European unity than a common law (cf Wilhelmsson, 2002).
III.  A EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW THROUGH IMPOSITION: INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTIONS, EUROPEAN DIRECTIVES AND THE IDEA OF A 
EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE
Unification through International Conventions
The traditional method of achieving uniformity, ie through binding treaties 
between different countries, has not been very successful in the field of private 
law. The reason is obvious: A treaty can only come into being with the agreement 
of the contracting states and will only enter into force after approval by the states 
7 See, eg Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council: A More Coherent Contract Law: An Action Plan, COM (2003) 68 final, OJ EC 2003, C 63/01.
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in which the treaty is to apply. Experience shows that reaching such uniformity 
is particularly difficult in the area of private law. And if agreement is reached, 
the treaty is often either based too strongly on one legal system or has, by way of 
compromise, escaped into vague formulations, leaving the treaty with little unify-
ing effect in practice.
Private law conventions include treaties on bills of exchange and cheque law, 
leasing, factoring, letters of credit, liability for nuclear damages and oil pollu-
tion and transportation law. The best-known example is the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG)8 that 
provides substantive rules for transfrontier and commercial sale of moveable 
goods. This convention is now ratified by almost 70 countries. One of the main 
problems with the CISG, however, is that its provisions are rather abstract and 
consequently leave much discretion to national courts in interpreting the conven-
tion. This also illustrates a more general problem with unification through con-
ventions. They usually do not provide for a highest court that can take the lead in 
interpreting the treaty, thus leaving real unification ineffective.
There is still a third problem with conventions, at least from the viewpoint of 
legal convergence in Europe. This is that it is open for states to decide whether to 
become a party to the treaty or not. Thus, the CISG was not ratified by the United 
Kingdom and Portugal. Of course, this can also be seen as an advantage because 
where the convention is ratified, it is passed through national parliaments and is 
thus democratically more legitimate than, for example, European Directives or 
Regulations. It is precisely for this reason that some argue that instruments unify-
ing private law should first pass through national parliaments also in order to gain 
sufficient democratic legitimacy.
Harmonisation through European Directives
Until now the most widely used method of achieving a higher degree of unifor-
mity between the private laws of the European Union has been through European 
Directives. Directives are binding as to the result to be achieved, but leave form and 
methods of implementation to the Member States (Article 249 EC Treaty). Thus, 
harmonisation leads to a ‘law of uniform results’, whereby the rules that achieve 
these results are national in character. This has the obvious advantage that a Member 
State can decide for itself how to fit a new Directive into the national legal system’s 
structure and terminology. The reverse side of this is that it is sometimes difficult 
for the European Union institutions to monitor to what extent a Member State has 
implemented the Directive in a proper way. Another problem with Directives is 
that the duty to implement European law can lead to Fremdkörper (foreign bodies) 
inside the national legal system. A well-known example of this is the introduction 
of a requirement of good faith in consumer contracts in English law. This has been 
8 Final Act, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980).
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criticised by Teubner as forming a ‘legal irritant’ (Teubner, 1998), not leading to 
harmonised law and endangering the unity of the private law system.
The present acquis, as outlined above, has not generally been met with enthu-
siasm. It has been characterised as being fragmentary, arbitrary, inconsistent 
and ineffective. It is fragmentary because it only covers certain topics, a ‘Brussels 
brick here and there’ (Remien, 1996: 8 at 11). For example, in the field of con-
tract law only some specific contracts are covered and of these contracts only 
specific aspects are dealt with (such as the duty to inform the consumer about 
the qualities of the object sold). This is worrying for continental lawyers, as their 
ideal of a comprehensive and consistent civil code is being disrupted by law of 
European origin. It was precisely this fragmentation that prompted the European 
Parliament’s call for a European civil code. The acquis is also quite arbitrary in the 
sense that it is unclear why some types of contracts are being covered and others 
are not. Why is it that package travel and consumer sale are addressed, but not the 
regular insurance contract? If the European legislator believes in harmonisation 
to remedy defects in the functioning of the common market, there is much more 
to be addressed than previously. Thirdly, the acquis is inconsistent. Often time 
periods for revocation differ without good reason (from seven calendar days in 
case of door-to-door sales, seven working days for distance contracts and 10 cal-
endar days for timeshare, to 14 calendar days for distance marketing of financial 
services). Finally, the acquis is not very effective. Almost all directives in the field 
of private law aim at minimum harmonisation, meaning that Member States can 
establish more stringent provisions to protect consumers. The effect of this is that 
companies are still being confronted with divergent legislation and may still be 
deterred from doing business elsewhere. Minimum harmonisation may thus not 
be suited to create the desired level playing field for European business.
These problems were decisive in leading the European Commission to start a 
debate about the future of European contract law.9 It is likely that this will lead to a 
so-called ‘common frame of reference’ (CFR) in the field of contract law, which is, 
after all, the most important part of the present acquis. This CFR will provide three 
types of provisions. First, it will consist of definitions of legal terms like ‘contract’ 
and ‘damages’ so that we know how these should be interpreted in a ‘European’ 
way. Secondly, the CFR is to contain fundamental principles (such as freedom of 
contract, binding force and good faith). The most important part of the CFR, how-
ever, will consist of model rules of contract law, drawing on the present acquis and 
the ‘best solutions’ found in the Member States’ legal orders. This CFR will serve as 
a ‘tool box’ for the European legislator:10 where it finds this appropriate it can make 
9 Communications from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
on European Contract Law, COM (2001) 398 final, OJ EC 2001, C 255/1;  A More Coherent Contract 
Law: An Action Plan, COM (2003) 68 final, OJ EC 2003, C 63/01; European Contract Law and the 
Revision of the Acquis: the Way Forward, COM (2004) 651 final.
10 Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: 
‘European Contract Law and the Revision of the acquis: The Way Forward’ COM (2004) 651 final, 
Annex 1.
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use of the CFR to draft directives or review the existing acquis. In addition to this, 
the ECJ and national courts could also use the CFR as a source of inspiration.
One can express doubts about the usefulness of the CFR as long as it is only a 
non-binding instrument. We have to wait and see whether it will really be used to 
re-draft the present Directives that are often a compromise of the various views 
in the Council of Ministers. It is also hard to see how the CFR can deal with the 
above problems of the acquis being fragmentary, arbitrary and only offering mini-
mum harmonisation. It probably takes a more active European legislator to deal 
with these problems. This raises a fundamental question: Could the disadvantages 
of the current centralist methods of unification not be avoided if the European 
Union were to take more decisive action and introduced a European civil code?
The Idea of a European Civil Code
Traditionally, civil codes, as we find these on the European continent, aim at a sys-
tematic, coherent, complete and national codification of private law. Most of the 
continental codes were introduced as part of a desire to create a national identity 
for the countries involved. They cannot, in any way, be compared to the ‘codes’ 
that we know in the common law world, such as the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) and the American compilations of separate statutes. Civil law codes are the 
alpha and omega of civil law reasoning, even though there are many statutes on 
private law outside of the codes and even though the courts have an essential role 
in interpreting the codes and in creating new law.
It is quite obvious that a European civil code cannot be like a national code in 
this civil law way. Two differences immediately spring to mind. First, a European 
code as a systematised and complete whole presupposes a European system of 
private law (Jansen, 2006: 253). Such a system does not exist yet. What is more, 
the view that law should be put into a comprehensive code is not adhered to by 
common lawyers. It seems rather arrogant to think that the civil law approach of 
codifying law would also appeal both to the English and the Irish. Below (Part 
IV below), we will see that this is an important argument against the view that 
convergence of law is possible by imposing rules on the European Member States. 
Secondly, if a European civil code were to be created, it could only be successful 
if also a European court were also put into place to control its interpretation. It is 
unlikely that the most effective way of doing this—that is, by giving this European 
court the competence to decide concrete cases that have passed through the 
national judiciary—would be accepted by countries such as France or the United 
Kingdom.
There is yet another reason why introducing a civil code for the European 
Union11 would be problematic. Article 95 of the EC Treaty may provide a suf-
ficient basis for the regulation of contract law (see above), but certainly not for 
11 See, in more detail, Smits, 2002: 28 ff.
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other parts of the law one usually finds in national codes (think of family law, 
property law and tort law). In addition to this argument, one wonders if it is wise 
to base the far going step of introducing a European civil code into the EC Treaty. 
A separate treaty would probably be a better option because this would allow 
national parliaments to decide on the introduction of the code. It has already been 
argued by some authors12 that, in drafting the CFR, it is wrong to follow a merely 
technical approach. Instead of fully discussing the political decisions that are to 
be made—like to what extent a European code should enhance ‘social justice’ and 
protect weaker parties—the focus is now on the drafting of rules.
All this leaves little doubt about the chances of introducing for Europe a civil 
code as known in the civil law tradition. However, types of codes other than the 
traditional ones are more feasible. Two possibilities spring into mind. One is to 
create a model code that can be chosen by the Member States if they so desire. 
This is the model of the American UCC. It has the clear advantage that no com-
petence in the EC Treaty is needed. The decision is taken at the national level. 
Moreover, not every state would have to opt for (‘opt in’) the code and if it did, 
it could amend the code as it wished. The other possibility is to have the relevant 
actors (such as contracting parties) elect a European set of rules to exist next to 
the national ones. Such an ‘optional instrument’ was proposed by the European 
Commission in its 2004 Communication. However, in both scenarios private law 
will continue to suffer from an inevitable fragmentation.
Unification by Imposing Law
Looking over these attempts to create a more convergent private law in a centralist 
way (through the classic methods of unification and harmonisation), the result is 
not encouraging for those who have set their hopes on European and State insti-
tutions. But there is still another important argument that needs to be taken into 
account in this debate: Is it at all possible to have convergence of private law? We 
have already seen that this was denied by Gunther Teubner for the principle of 
good faith. In the next part, we will see that Pierre Legrand makes a more extreme 
claim about the possibility of unifying law.
IV.  IS CONVERGENCE OF LAW AT ALL POSSIBLE?
Once one has established that there is sufficient reason for the unification of 
private law, another question calls for attention: If a European private law is put 
into place, will it lead to real convergence? This is denied by some, including 
the Canadian scholar Pierre Legrand, who eloquently argued that a European 
civil code, or any other attempt at unifying European private law, is not feasible 
12 Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, ‘Social Justice in European Contract Law: 
a Manifesto’ (2004) 10 European Law Journal 653 ff.
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because of cultural differences among the various European countries and in 
particular between the civil law and common law tradition.
Legrand takes as a starting point that merely drafting uniform rules does not 
result in uniform law. To him, law is much more than just rules. The mean-
ing of a particular rule in a particular cultural and national context can only 
be established after studying that context. And this context, the legal mentalité, 
differs between the various countries. Legrand claims that these differences are 
even unbridgeable in the case of continental civil law and English common law. 
Epistemologically, the common law reasons inductively with an emphasis on facts 
and related case law, while in the civil law systematisation is of crucial importance. 
Whilst the civilian lawyer tries to rationalise judgments and statutes into a logical 
system, the Anglo-American lawyer has an aversion to formal rules and makes a 
conscious choice for driving out and even fighting continental civil law influence. 
This choice stems from cultural differences: an English child is already a common-
law lawyer in being, claims Legrand, long before it ever knows that it wants to be 
a lawyer.
This view has far-reaching consequences for the convergence debate. It implies 
that any attempt at harmonisation of civil law and common law is doomed to 
failure. The Englishman will continue to look at European measures as a common 
lawyer, and the Frenchman as a civilian lawyer. To the former, law is an ars judi-
candi, for the latter a scientia iuris. Moreover, in Legrand’s view the whole idea of a 
European codification is arrogant because it imposes on common lawyers the sup-
posedly superior world view of civilian legal doctrine. The truth is, claims Legrand, 
that they each offer fundamentally different accounts of reality. This leads Legrand 
to conclude that ‘legal systems ... have not been converging, are not converging and 
will not be converging’(Legrand, 1996: 52 at 61–2; and Legrand, 1997).
Legrand’s argument is to be taken seriously. Even though it has radical implica-
tions and was severely attacked as being, inter alia ‘pessimistic’, ‘destructive’, ‘anti-
European’ and ‘esoteric’,13 no one will deny that superficial similarities among 
legal systems do not reveal anything about underlying differences in legal culture. 
This point is well formulated by Esin Örücü: 
We can predict ... that if, for example, codes were moved into the common law, they 
would soon become glossed by judicial decisions, exceptions would creep in and the 
general principles therein would lose their significance altogether. Again, if the style of 
decisions in the common law were inserted into the civilian legal culture, within a short 
period of time they would start getting shorter and less comprehensible; facts would 
become blurred; reference to past decisions would be replaced by reference to statutory 
provisions and so on (Örücü, 1987).
This is both a very practical and a highly convincing view on the European con-
vergence process. It makes clear that law and society are closely interrelated and 
13 Legrand himself sums these up, and other, qualifications of his own work by others (Legrand, 
2006).
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texts will always be interpreted in the legal culture in which they are applied. 
There may come a time when this legal culture is entirely European, but this time 
has not yet come. In this sense, Legrand is right to say that European legal systems 
‘have not been converging’ and ‘are not converging.’ To hold that they also ‘will 
not be converging’ is a more problematic statement because this we cannot pre-
dict: legal culture can change.
This critical view of the European convergence process points to other than 
centralist methods towards a common private law for Europe. If we agree that 
imposition of a uniform text will not lead to uniform law, we should look for 
methods that allow the element of national legal culture to play a role in decid-
ing whether uniformity is needed or not. Only such soft methods of convergence 
allow us to find out when legal culture stands in the way of unification. After all, 
the premise is that if unification is not left to the Member States or to European 
institutions but to the actors that are directly touched by legal unification, they 
will decide to what extent they are in need of uniform law. Bottom-up methods 
of unification make this possible.
V.  HOW TO ACHIEVE FURTHER CONVERGENCE? THE BOTTOM-UP 
APPROACH
Introduction
In this part, the various non-centralist methods that can be used to reach further 
convergence of private law are discussed. Such ‘voluntary creation’ can take dif-
ferent forms. First, the role of legal education and legal scholarship is discussed. 
Then, attention is paid to the method of drafting principles of European private 
law. Finally, we will look at competition of legal systems.
European Legal Science and Education
The first method to be discussed here is the creation of a European private law by 
legal science and legal education. Its adherents draw inspiration from the times 
before the national codifications of private law in the 19th century. They point out 
that the ius commune tradition, as based on the Justinian codification of Roman 
law, provided a common European background to the local variations of law in 
Europe for a long time. Just as the ius commune of the 17th and 18th centuries was 
a legal system primarily made at the Universities, a new ius commune should find 
its origin there as well. Paul Koschaker (1879–1951) therefore started his famous 
book on the history of Roman law in Europe with the sentence: ‘there is no legal 
discipline that is more European than private law’(Koschaker, 1947). It implies 
that students can be raised in a European legal fashion and practitioners could 
benefit from the comparative legal material made available to them by scholars. 
Thus, it is by ‘reception’ that in the end a ius commune europaeum will emerge. 
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Of course, it takes European handbooks to be written and national courts and leg-
islators being able to look for solutions abroad, but if such revival of the European 
legal tradition (and therefore a denationalisation of law) takes place, it opens the 
door towards a new ius commune. Reinhard Zimmermann, one of the best known 
proponents of this view, puts it like this:
[T]he essential prerequisite for a truly European private law would appear to be the 
emergence of an ‘organically progressive’ legal science, which would have to transcend the 
national boundaries and to revitalise a common tradition (Zimmermann, 1997: 293).
This is an appealing view that will probably continue to inspire legal scholarship 
in the following decades. But there are two things we should be aware of in evalu-
ating the importance of legal scholarship and education for the Europeanisation 
process.
First, it should not be forgotten that for this new European legal scholarship to 
be effective it should differ in one important aspect from the old ius commune. 
The old ius commune was to a very large extent a European continental tradition 
only. English law was but part of it to a limited extent. Zimmermann is right in 
stating that in England also Roman law was taught at the universities of Oxford 
and Cambridge and was sometimes applied by courts, but this should not lead us 
away from the fact that the ius commune tradition was far more influential on the 
European continent (Zimmermann, 2004: 21 ff). A new European legal science 
should be just as much formed by English scholars as by civilians—and there is 
no doubt that this is what will happen.
Secondly, we should once more emphasise that the old ius commune was pri-
marily a scholarly tradition. It did not mean that there was uniformity in legal 
practice. Just as Roman law could only incrementally influence legal practice, a new 
European legal science will only be received very slowly in national legal practice. 
In this respect, one must not forget that in most continental countries there have 
been two centuries of separate development of national law. In all European uni-
versities, the study of national law is still far more important than the study of a 
European common core. This cannot be changed in one or two decades—if ever.
But apart from these two remarks, the importance of a Europeanisation of legal 
science and education cannot be over emphasised. It is the necessary ‘flanking 
measure’ (van Gerven, 2002: 405 ff) for any harmonisation or unification: the de-
nationalisation of private law must necessarily go hand in hand with an interna-
tionalisation of legal education and research. Legal scholars are always glad to add 
that it is the only way to forego Rudolph Von Jhering’s famous statement of 1852 
that legal science had been degraded to ‘Landesjurisprudenz’ and that this was a 
situation unworthy for a true science (von Jhering, 1924: 15).
In the context of this chapter, it is only possible to point at some initiatives to 
develop European curricula and research projects. The number of law faculties 
offering fully developed bachelors degrees in European or comparative law can 
still be counted on the fingers of one hand, but there are not many European uni-
versities left where no attention is paid to the comparative aspect at all. Besides, 
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it will never be the case that all European law students will attend a ‘European’ 
law school. This is also the experience in the United States. Only the ‘national 
law schools’ train their students in American law and their graduates form only a 
small percentage of the total number of American law graduates (Reimann, 1996). 
It is the law of the state that is taught in most law schools. If one adds to this the 
often major differences in the educational system of the European Member States, 
as well as linguistic differences, one cannot be too optimistic.
On the other hand legal scholarship has Europeanised enormously since the 1990s. 
Apart from many new law journals and books devoted to the study of European pri-
vate law, several big research projects have been initiated. They illustrate the various 
approaches one can adopt in doing this type of research. Thus, within the so-called 
Trento common core project, inspired by the work of Rudolf Schlesinger on forma-
tion of contract in the 1960s (Schlesinger, 1968), a large group of scholars, mostly 
from European countries, have united to seek the common core of European private 
law. Their approach is to draft fictitious cases and see how these cases are solved in 
the various European jurisdictions. They thus do not ‘wish to push in the direction 
of uniformity’ but only want to describe how the law differs. This is also the case with 
the Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe, a project inspired by the example of 
American casebooks. Here too, the aim is ‘to help uncover the common roots of the 
different legal systems ... not to strangle ... diversity’.14 Unlike the Trento project, these 
casebooks contain cases actually decided in Europe’s main jurisdictions. Casebooks 
on tort law, contract law and unjust enrichment have already been published. Another 
large project directed at educating PhD students in a European way is the Maastricht 
based Ius Commune Research School. Finally, mention must be made of the so-called 
European Civil Code project, led by the Osnabrück professor Christian Von Bar. Its 
aim is to draft provisions that could become part of a European civil code.
Again, the example of the United States shows that we should be aware of the 
fact that the influence of these writings on national legal practice may be very 
little. In the United States, the most popular academic products are casebooks, but 
they hardly play a role in legal practice (Reimann, 1996). But perhaps, the climate 
in Europe is different: the ‘Ius Commune Casebook on Tort Law’, for example, has 
already been cited at least twice by the House of Lords.15
Drafting Principles of European Private Law
Another well-known method consists in drafting ‘principles’ of European private 
law. The best-known set of European principles is that formed by the Principles 
of European Contract Law (PECL), first published in 1995.16 They were followed 
14 Foreword to van Gerven, Larouche, Lever, Von Bar and Viney (eds), 1998 Casebook—Tort Law: 
Scope of Protection (Oxford, Hart Publishing – out of print): v.
15 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59 (HL); Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services 
Ltd [2002] 3 WLR 89 (HL).
16 All the principles mentioned can be found in Smits, Hardy, Hesen and Kornet, 2006. Another set 
of contract law principles, based on the Italian Codice Civile, is provided by Gandolfi, 2001.
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by Principles of European Trust Law (1999), European Insolvency Law (2003) and 
European Tort Law (2005). Within the European Civil Code-project, principles on 
tort law, special contracts and restitution are being drafted, and work on Principles 
of European Family Law is well under way. Unlike what the word ‘principles’ would 
suggest, these sets often contain very detailed rules after the model of civil code 
provisions. The drafters usually try to codify either the common core of European 
legal systems or a ‘progressive’ solution which they find to be the best rule for the 
European Union. It is important to emphasise that these principles are not drafted 
by the EU itself, but are private initiatives mainly by legal academics. This does not 
preclude the European Commission from closely following and sometimes even 
co-financing the drafting process.
There is little doubt that the idea of drafting principles of private law is based 
on the American experience with the so-called ‘restatements’ of law. Since 1923, 
the American Law Institute has tried to make the law of the 50 American private 
law jurisdictions more intelligible by issuing such restatements. Still, there is a 
difference: American law is presumed to form one common law—despite diver-
sity among the States—that only needs to be described, while the drafters of the 
European principles have to make what are sometimes difficult choices between 
different solutions. But both the restatements and the sets of principles should 
have persuasive authority: they can inform parties, courts and legislators because 
of their inherent quality.
It may be useful to illustrate the functions of European principles by reference 
to the PECL. The drafters themselves describe three functions (Lando and Beale, 
2000: xxiii and Article 1:101). First, contracting parties can expressly adopt the 
PECL as the law applicable to their contract. A choice for such a ‘neutral’ set of 
rules can be useful where parties cannot reach agreement about an applicable 
national law. However, at present this choice is problematic because it is not cer-
tain that Article 3 of the EC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations 198017 (the Rome Convention) allows a choice for other than a 
national legal system. This implies that national mandatory law will remain appli-
cable. It is also doubtful whether parties will find the PECL precise enough, with 
its rather abstract provisions, and in the absence of extensive case law on how to 
interpret these.
A second function of the PECL is that they can serve as a model for legisla-
tors and as a tool for courts. Thus, the Unidroit Principles of International and 
Commercial Contracts of 1994, in content very similar to the PECL, were used as 
a model for parts of the new Civil Code of the Russian Federation and the new 
Chinese Contract Code. Likewise, courts can interpret their own law or the CISG 
in the light of the PECL.
Finally, the PECL can be a tool for the institutions of the European Union 
itself when making contracts with third parties or when drafting new legislation. 
17 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome 1980) (80/934/EEC)
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It is, for example, likely that the CFR (Part III above) will closely resemble the 
PECL. In the same vein, the ECJ could profit from the principles of European 
tort law. Article 288 of the EC Treaty states that the liability of the Community 
institutions and its civil servants exists ‘in accordance with the general principles 
common to the laws of the Member States’. Without scholarly work on what 
these principles are, the ECJ will have a tough job in deciding a case on this 
provision.
How should these projects to draft principles be assessed? We should keep two 
things in mind. The first is that representing the law through general principles 
is typically a civil law way of looking at the law. The phrase by Oliver Wendell 
Holmes (1841–1935) that ‘general propositions do not decide concrete cases’18 
has more than a grain of truth in it, even for civil law jurisdictions. In a national 
legal system, drafting principles is fruitful because there is an underlying morality 
that all national legal actors know of. To make use of principles at the European 
level is more problematic, at least as long as a European morality is missing. Again, 
an example is provided by the principle of good faith. Article 1:201 of the PECL 
unconditionally states that ‘each party must act in accordance with good faith 
and fair dealing’. What this principle means when deciding an individual case 
very much depends on the national system in which it is applied. In France, it 
may mean something else than in Germany, let alone in England.19 In this sense, 
European principles can only offer a skeleton, leaving out the ‘flesh and blood’ 
that national systems offer.
Second, it is likely that there are diverse views on what are the right and ‘fair’ 
principles for the European Union.20 Thus, one uniform principle can probably 
not take into account the diversity of different socio-economic constellations 
within Europe, unless it is a very abstract one. This is also what the Privy Council 
accepted for the British Commonwealth when it stressed that the strength of the 
common law tradition is that it is able to adapt itself to the differing circum-
stances of the different countries.21
It is for this reason that I believe the main aim of drafting European prin-
ciples should not be found in their practical functions, or in being a precursor 
to imposed law, but elsewhere. It is first and foremost the role they can fulfill in 
legal education and research that makes them worth drafting. They can be a lan-
guage of communication among students and scholars from different countries, a 
tertium comparationis. And in this function in particular, the PECL and Unidroit 
Principles have already been very successful: they are used at many universities 
as teaching material, not primarily to study a future European law but to better 
understand one’s own legal system.
18 Lochner v New York 198 US 45 (1905).
19 Cf Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128 (HL) at 138.
20 Walzer, 1983: 8 ‘There is no single set of primary or basic goods conceivable across all moral and 
material worlds—or, any such set would have to be conceived in terms so abstract that they would be 
of little use in thinking about particular distributions’.
21 Invercargill City Council v. Hamlin [1996] 2 WLR 367.
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Competition of Legal Systems
Above we have seen several reasons why attempts to unify private law may not be 
successful: there may not be sufficient basis for it in the EC Treaty, it may lead to 
a fragmented and incoherent law, and national legal culture may prevent conver-
gence from taking place. But there are also positive arguments in favour of legal 
diversity. One of these arguments was originally put forward by the American 
scholar Charles Tiebout (1924-1968). Tiebout describes the needs of firms and 
consumers in terms of differing preferences (Tiebout, 1956). If there is diversity 
of law, it means that legal systems can compete with each other to satisfy these 
preferences: consumers and firms can choose the legal system which, in their view, 
best protects their interests, provided they can leave a jurisdiction which they do 
not like (‘vote with their feet’). Introducing uniform law would reduce this exit-
opportunity and lead to less preferences being satisfied.
Apart from this advantage of satisfying as many preferences as possible, there 
is still another benefit of diversity of law. It makes it easier to make innovation 
in the law. Looking at other countries’ solutions to legal problems shows whether 
these solutions function or not. In this way, states can be regarded as ‘experiment-
ing laboratories’. The well-known American judge Louis Brandeis (1856–1941) 
once wrote:22
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, 
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory and try novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country.
Experience elsewhere can be an enlightening or a frightening example. Thus, 
recognition of gay marriage by The Netherlands in 2002 has been an example to 
other countries. Recognition of this type of marriage would most probably not 
have been possible in case European family law would have been harmonised by 
the European Union.
It is important to see that, in this view, diversity of law is not seen as a coinci-
dence but as a reflection of diverging preferences: the role of eg good faith is dif-
ferent in England than in Italy because of, perhaps unconscious, diverging views 
on what is just. Often this argument is related to Friedrich Carl Von Savigny, who 
emphasised the ‘organic link’ between the law and the people (Von Savigny, 1814: 
78). But one need not endorse this ‘Historical School’ perspective to admit that it 
is wrong to impose one uniform preference on all: those for whom the law exists 
should decide which rules serve their interests best.
An important question is whether this competition among legal systems could 
also contribute to unification of law. In fact it could do so in two different ways. 
First, if everyone would be able to move to the jurisdiction they prefer, practically, 
it would mean that there would be only one law applied. But it is likely that long 
before this exit-process would be finished, something else would happen. This is 
22 Brandeis, J in  New State Ice Co. v Liebmann 285 US 262 at 268.
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the second way in which competition contributes to uniform law: if too many 
people were likely to leave, national governments would be stimulated to make 
their jurisdiction more attractive by offering the same or a more attractive law 
as the other country. This is also one of the main objections23 to allowing full 
competition of legal systems: it may lead to the famous ‘race to the bottom’—a 
level of law that is the lowest of all the jurisdictions among the competitors. Yet, 
as often as this fear for ‘social dumping’ is expressed, there is as yet little empiri-
cal evidence to support it (Barnard, 2000). More importantly, full competition 
among legal systems does not seem to be desirable. It is precisely the purpose 
of minimum harmonisation to allow the ‘race’ only to take place within certain 
restrictions. Sometimes, the law has to be mandatory if it is to offer protection to 
weaker parties.
As long as this minimum level is guaranteed, regulatory competition provides 
an important method of convergence because the need for unification is primarily 
determined by legal practice itself and is not imposed from above. This still leaves 
open the question what such competition should look like. Two remarks have to 
be made.
First, it should be clear that competition does not necessarily imply that citizens 
or firms really move physically from one jurisdiction to another. It is also possible 
that they choose another legal system while physically staying in their country 
of origin. In the field of company law, the European Court of Justice has already 
paved the way for a free movement of companies.24 They can establish the firm 
in their country of choice while still doing business in their place of residence. 
If they prefer the English limited company as a more suitable means for their 
company than the Dutch ‘BV’ or the German ‘GmbH’, they are free to choose it. 
Within the limits of Article 3 of the Rome Convention, this is also possible in the 
field of contract law.
Theoretically, one could even think of a variant in which not so much an entire 
legal system is chosen as the applicable law but specific rules are. This ‘free move-
ment of legal rules’ allows the transfer of rules from one country to another on 
a ‘market of legal culture’. (Mattei, 1997; and Smits, 1998). There is abundant 
evidence for such ‘legal transplants’ leading the legal historian Alan Watson to 
conclude that most legal change is the result of borrowing law from elsewhere 
(Watson, 1974: 94). Thus, in the 19th century, contract law rules, such as those 
on offer and aceptance, were exported from Germany to the common law world, 
while at the present time many Anglo-American institutions like trust, franchising 
and lease are being borrowed by countries on the European continent. Of course, 
it would be wrong to think that law can travel through time and place without any 
fundamental change in meaning, but it is certainly true that these transplants do 
contribute to a more uniform law.
23 There are other objections as well: see Smits, 2006a.
24 Case C–212/97 Centros Ltd v Ehrvervs—og Selskabsstryelsen [1999] ECR I–1459 (ECJ).
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Secondly, competition only works if there is sufficient information available 
about other legal systems. Often, this is not the case: a Dutch party may not know 
the intricacies of German law or English law, let alone Polish or Czech law. This 
is different in the United States, where there is plenty of information available 
on more than 50 jurisdictions and where all this information is in one language. 
Within the European Union, comparative lawyers thus have an important role to 
fulfill in unveiling information about foreign law. Moreover, the legislator can try 
to promote competition by creating an ‘optional legal system’. Such a ‘28th system’ 
(in view of the presence of Scots law besides the 27 state legal systems, not a com-
pletely justified term) was in fact proposed by the European Commission in its 
Communication of 2004.25 It could, for example, be chosen by contracting parties 
if they felt it served their interests better than a national jurisdiction. The advan-
tage of such a 26th system is that it could be made available in all languages of the 
European Union and be made as transparent as possible. Once such an attractive 
system were put into place, one could see whether parties would choose it or not. 
In this way, creating an optional system is an experimental way of establishing 
the need for uniform law: if legal culture prohibited the choice of other laws than 
one’s own, it would become apparent automatically.
VI  CONCLUSION: AN ORGANIC DEVELOPMENT OF LAW, OR NOT?
The above can be summarised in six points: 
(1)  With 26 different jurisdictions, the present private law of the countries of 
the European Union is very diverse. This diversity provokes four different 
questions. First, is there a need for unification of private law in Europe? 
Secondly, how does convergence take place at present? Thirdly, is conver-
gence of law at all possible? Fourthly, what are the best methods for mov-
ing towards a more uniform private law?
(2)  There are usually two motives given for unification of private law: the 
development of the European common market (Articles 2 and 3 of the 
EC Treaty) and the need for a symbol of a European identity. However, 
it is questionable whether these arguments—if they are accepted—justify 
replacement of national private law by a uniform law of European origin: 
they need to be weighed against the arguments in favour of diversity. 
These arguments are that legal diversity allows different (national) prefer-
ences to be satisfied and allows innovations in the law.
(3)  Traditionally, convergence of private law takes place through unification 
(by international conventions) and harmonisation (through European 
Directives). Each of these methods has its problems. Harmonisation 
through Directives is the most advanced in the field of contract law, but 
25 See n 10 above. See also the First Annual Progress Report on European Contract Law and the 
Acquis Review, COM (2005) 456 final.
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this acquis suffers from being fragmentary, arbitrary, inconsistent and 
ineffective. It is an open question whether the newly proposed Common 
Frame of Reference (CFR) will remedy these deficiencies.
(4)  There is a recurrent call for a European civil code. Although such a code 
could deal with most of the problems associated with the present methods 
of convergence, there are also a number of objections to it. One is that the 
idea of a code as a systematic and complete codification (and a European 
court to interpret it) is alien to common lawyers. Another objection is that 
there is no basis for a comprehensive civil code in the EC Treaty.
(5)  The possibility of unifying European private law is denied by Pierre Legrand. 
He argues that there are unbridgeable epistemological differences between 
the civil law and the common law tradition, rendering convergence of law 
impossible. This argument prompts the need for a ‘bottom-up’ approach 
towards convergence: If unification is not left to the European institutions 
but to the national actors that are directly touched by it, they will decide to 
what extent they are in need of uniform law.
(6)  Three bottom-up approaches towards convergence are: the enhancement of 
European legal science and education; the drafting of principles of European 
private law; and allowing competition of legal systems. Each of these soft 
methods has its merits and problems. The problems can partly be overcome 
by an active approach by the European legislator setting minimum stan-
dards to protect weaker parties and creating optional legal regimes.
The gist of the above is that, as long as we are uncertain about the need for uni-
form law and do not know whether national legal culture stands in the way of its 
imposition, a ‘bottom-up’ approach towards unification is to be preferred. In my 
view, only this approach can reveal to what extent national private law is resistant 
to unification. It does not mean the European legislator should sit still: it can very 
well promote competition of legal systems by creating an optional regime and by 
setting minimum standards. Likewise, the drafting of principles and enhancing of 
European legal education and scholarship are vital as flanking measures. But in the 
context of this book, the fact that the author adopts this ‘organic’ view of the con-
vergence process is not important, as the reader will also find the arguments for the 
opposite view in the above. This is what makes the discipline of European private 
law such a fascinating topic for debate: many views on the future of private law in 
Europe can be argued for.
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
 1.  List three problems with unification by way of international conventions. 
To what extent do these problems also persist with respect to harmonisa-
tion through European Directives?
 2.  How do you weigh the arguments in favour of and against a uniform 
European private law? Is it in this respect useful to differentiate between 
various areas of the law (contracts, torts, property and family law)?
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 3.  In the 1997 volume of the Modern Law Review, there is an article by Pierre 
Legrand entitled ‘Against a European Civil Code’ (Legrand, 1997). In this 
contribution, he applies his line of thinking discussed above to the idea of 
introducing a civil code for Europe. Do you agree with this line of thought?
 4.   Competition of legal systems seems to be a promising method for allowing 
convergence without at the same time endangering national legal culture. 
Can you also identify objections to this method? Can these be overcome?
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND FURTHER READING
Alpa, G (2000) ‘European Community Resolutions and the Codification of Private Law’ 
European Review of Private Law 333.
Barnard, C (2000) ‘Social dumping and the race to the bottom: some lessons for the 
European Union from Delaware’ 25 European Law Review 57.
Boodman, M (1991) ‘The Myth of Harmonization of Laws’ 39 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 699.
Collins, H (1995) ‘European Private Law and the Cultural Identity of States’ 3 European 
Review of Private Law 353.
Gandolfi, G (ed) (2001) Code européen des contrats (Milano, Giuffre Editore).
Grundmann, S and Stuyck, J (eds) (2002) An Academic Green Paper on European Contract 
Law (The Hague, Kluwer Law International).
Hartkamp, AS, M. Hesselink, E. Hondius, C. Joustra, E. du Perron and M. Veldman, (eds) (2004) 
Towards a European Civil Code, 3rd edn (Nijmegen and The Hague: Ars Aequi Libri).
Hesselink, MW (2001) The New European Legal Culture (Deventer, Kluwer).
—— (2002) The New European Private Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International).
Jansen, N (2006) ‘European Civil Code’ in JM Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar).
Koschaker, P (1947) Europa und das römische Recht (Munich, Beck).
Lando, O and Beale, H (eds) (2000) Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International).
Legrand, P (1996) ‘European Legal Systems Are Not Converging’ 45 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 52. 
—— (1997) ‘Against a European Civil Code’ 60 Modern Law Review 44.
—— (2006) ‘Antivonbar’ 1 Journal of Comparative Law 37.
Örücü, E (1987) ‘An Exercise on the Internal Logic of Legal Systems’ 7 Legal Studies 318. 
—— (2004) The Enigma of Comparative Law: Variations on a Theme for the Twenty-First 
Century (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff).
Mattei, U (1997) Comparative Law and Economics (Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan 
Press). 
—— (2003) The European Codification Process: Cut and Paste (The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International).
Radley-Gardner, O, Beale, H, Zimmermann, R and Schulze, R (2003) Fundamental texts on 
European Private Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing).
Reimann, M (1996) ‘American Private Law and European Legal Unification—Can the 
United States be a Model?’ 3 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 217.
Remien, O (1996) ‘Über den Stil des Europaischen Privatrechts’ 60 RabelsZeitschrift 8.
Convergence of Private Law in Europe  239
Schmid, CU (2001) ‘Legitimacy Conditions for a European Civil Code’ 7 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 25.
Schlesinger, RB (ed) (1968) Formation of Contracts: a study on the common core of legal 
systems (Dobbs Ferry, Oceana).
Smits, JM (1998) ‘A European Private Law as a Mixed Legal System’ 5 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 328.
—— (2002) The Making of European Private Law (Antwerp-Oxford: Intersentia).
—— (2006a) ‘European Private Law: a Plea for a Spontaneous Legal Order’ in DM Curtin, 
JM Smits, A Klip and JA McCahery (eds), European Integration and Law (Antwerp-
Oxford, Intersentia) 
—— (2006b) The Need for a European Contract Law (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing)
Smits, JM, Hardy, R, Hesen, G and Kornet, N (eds) (2006) European Private Law (Nijmegen, 
Ars Aequi Libri).
Teubner, G (1998) ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends 
Up in New Divergences’ 61 Modern Law Review 11.
Tiebout, C (1956) ‘A pure theory of local expenditures’ 64 Journal of Political Economy 416.
Van Caenegem, RC (2002) European Law in the Past and the Future (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press).
Van Gerven, W (2002) ‘Codifying European Private Law: Top Down and Bottom Up’ in S 
Grundmann and J Stuyck (eds), An Academic Green Paper on European Contract Law 
(The Hague, Kluwer Law International).
Vogenauer, S and Weatherill, S (eds) (2006) The Harmonisation of European Contract Law 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press).
Von Jhering, R (1924) Geist des römischen Rechts, vol 1, 8th edn (Leipzig).
Von Savigny, FC (1814) Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 
(Heidelberg). 
Walzer, M (1983) Spheres of Justice: a Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York, Basic 
Books).
Watson, A (1974) Legal Transplants (Edinburgh, Green). 
Wilhelmsson, T (2002) ‘The Legal, the Cultural and the Political—Conclusions from 
Different Perspectives on Harmonisation of European Contract Law’ European Business 
Law Review 546.
Zimmermann, R (1997) ‘The Civil Law in European Codes’, in DL Carey-Miller and R 
Zimmermann (eds), The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law (Berlin). 
—— (2004) ‘Roman Law and the Harmonisation of Private Law in Europe’ in AS 
Hartkamp, M Hesselink, E Hondius, C Joustra, E du Perron and M Veldman (eds), 
Towards a European Civil Code, 3rd edn (Nijmegen, Ars Aequi Libri).
Principles of European Contract Law (PECL):
http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission_on_european_contract_law
Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts:
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm
Principles of European Tort Law:
http://www.egtl.org/Principles/index.htm
The Common Core of European Private Law (‘Trento-project’):
http://www.jus.unitn.it/dsg/common-core
240  Jan M Smits
European Commission’s website on European Contract Law:
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/
index_en.htm
Study Group on a European Civil Code:
http://www.sgecc.net
Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe:
http://www.law.kuleuven.be/casebook/index.php 
11
Comparative Family Law: 
Moving with the Times?
MASHA ANTOKOLSKAIA
KEY CONCEPTS
Marriage; Capacity to marry; Equality of spouses; Same-sex marriage; 
Grounds of divorce; Irretrievable breakdown of marriage; Cohabitation out-
side marriage; Registered partnership; Harmonisation of family law. 
I.  INTRODUCTION
T
he present family law in Europe is to a large extent the product of the 
radical transformations that commenced in the 1960s and 1970s. As result 
of these changes, by the end of the millennium the monopoly of the tradi-
tional family based on marriage as a life-long union, which seemed to have been 
so universal and everlasting, had gone—a situation that is considered almost as 
self-evident today as it has been unthinkable for centuries. The society dominated 
by traditional values gave way to a pluralistic society, one in which different forms 
and sets of family values co-exist alongside each other. Divorce and serial monog-
amy began to be considered normal. In this general atmosphere of tolerance, men 
and women became more and more free to choose between marriage or some 
other form of personal relationship. Extra-marital sex, non-marital cohabitation, 
and birth outside wedlock lost their stigmatic character. Same-sex relationships 
became first decriminalised, then legalised, and then, in some countries, even 
equated with marriage. Due to the fact that more and more children were born 
outside marriage, it became increasingly unacceptable for the legal status of these 
children to differ from that of children born within a marriage. Thus, eventually 
illegitimate children were granted a truly equal place alongside their legitimate 
brothers and sisters. The women’s rights movement managed to overcome the 
centuries-long dominance of the man within the family.
Another important aspect of the contemporary picture of family law in Europe 
is the influence of the human rights instruments. By far the most important 
among these instruments is the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights 
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and Fundamental Freedoms. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has 
both been accused and praised for deriving ‘a whole code of family law’1 from its 
Article 8, which initially contained no more than the negative obligation on the 
part of the state to refrain from arbitrary interference in the family. In develop-
ing the concept of family rights, the ECtHR had to use the so-called ‘dynamic 
interpretation’ of the Convention. Because the text of all three Articles relating to 
family rights—Articles 8 (the protection of family life), 12 (the right to marry and 
to found a family) and 14 (the prohibition of discrimination)—did not always 
provide relief, the Court, in deciding cases, had to involve factors which were 
external to the Convention, and considered that ‘the Convention must be inter-
preted in the light of present-day conditions’.2 Since the political mandate of the 
Court was indubitable only within the margins of the Convention, it needed an 
additional source of authority every time it employed an extensive or even contra-
legal interpretation of the original provisions. In seeking such authorisation, the 
ECtHR generally referred to the consensus or the ‘common European standard’ 
among the Contracting States. One of the vehicles that balanced the need for a 
gradual extension of the protection of family rights and the self-restraint of the 
Court’s power was the doctrine of ‘margin of appreciation’. Because the scope 
of protection of family rights under the Convention has been developed by the 
Court on an unsystematic case-by-case basis, the level of protection that is actu-
ally attained in various fields of family law is also quite uneven. As the following 
examples will show, it varies from the lowest common denominator in respect 
of the right of divorce, to a high degree of protection with regard to the equal-
ity of marital and extramarital children and the right to marry on the part of 
post-operative transsexuals.
II.  THE LAW OF MARRIAGE
A New Concept of Marriage
Since the 1960s, marriage has undergone important transformations. The impor-
tance of the procreative function of marriage diminished as marriage ceased 
to be the only union through which children were bestowed full legal rights in 
respect of the parents and their families (Willekens, 1997: 69). The relationship 
between the spouses evolved from the inferior position of the wife to spouses’ 
equality. Due to women’s emancipation, increasing female employment and 
the progress of social welfare, the function of the family as provider of financial 
means and security also diminished. This development contributed to an atti-
tudinal shift from marriage based on economic necessity and duty, to marriage 
based on affection and free commitment. The modus of marriage generally 
1 Marckx v Belgium Series A no 13 (1979) 2 EHRR 330 (Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, dissenting). 
2 Ibid., para 41.
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evolved from life-long monogamy to serial monogamy. This evolution of the 
concept of marriage is reflected, after some delay, in the European human rights 
law. The initial variant of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 was based upon the traditional concept of 
marriage as a heterosexual, male-dominated union. Article 12 of the European 
Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the identical provision of Article II–69 
of the rejected European Union Constitution slightly modernised this concept by 
making the right to create a family independent of the right to marry. The main 
tendencies in regard of marriage during the last half of the 20th  century in every 
European country were the secularisation and de-ideologisation of  marriage law, 
the acceptance of the right to marry as a fundament human right, the diminishing 
of marriage impediments, the lowering of the age of capacity to marry, and the 
granting of equal legal rights to spouses. 
General Tendencies in the Law of Marriage
De-ideologisation of the Law of Marriage 
The present state of affairs is that the actual level of de-ideologisation of marriage 
is still quite different throughout Europe. Two opposing tendencies with regard 
to the de-ideologisation of marriage law are apparent in Europe throughout the 
period under discussion. On the one hand, the avoidance of ideological declara-
tions both in the definition of marriage and during the civil marriage ceremony 
can be considered as one of the general trends of marriage law. On the other hand, 
many European countries (eg England and Wales) are quite reluctant to strip 
marriage law completely of its traditional ideological décor. 
In Western European countries the tendency towards the de-ideologisation of 
marriage comes down to stressing the contractual nature of marriage and the 
release of marriage law from religious influence. In the Eastern European coun-
tries the same tendency is apparent, but here it is rather a reaction to communist 
marriage ideology. In both cases the de-ideologisation tendency reflects the grow-
ing awareness that the law is unable to regulate feelings and moral convictions. It 
is for these reasons that many countries have chosen to avoid declarative rules that 
cannot be enforced and at best can only provide some educational effect. Another 
incentive to avoid ethical declarations has to do with the difficulty of finding 
shared ethical values with regard to marriage in a modern pluralistic society. The 
best example of such an attitude is the Swedish ‘neutrality policy’ formulated dur-
ing the preparation of legislative reform of 1973 (Agell, 1998: 127–9). This policy 
was based on two fundamental choices—respect of ideological pluralism and the 
non-privileged legal treatment of marriage as compared to unmarried cohabita-
tion. According to the neutrality policy,
the legislation on marriage should not contain laws of specified, ethical nature, 
since ethical viewpoints could vary and couples should be allowed to develop their 
 relationship within their own individual assumptions and values (ibid: 127).
244  Masha Antokolskaia
The tendency towards de-ideologisation is also overtly manifest in Dutch 
 marriage law, which deliberately avoids dealing with ethical and religious aspects 
of marriage and limits itself to regulation of its practical civil aspects. The same 
applies to Russian law. In similar fashion, Swedish law deliberately allows spouses 
to avoid vows for life. 
At the same time, many European countries continue to preserve the tradi-
tional ideological message of the law of marriage. In spite of the secularisation 
and liberalisation of marriage law during the 1960s and ’70s, in conservative 
circles marriage retains a symbolic ethical and ideological meaning, inherited 
from the past. This appreciation is still an appealing argument for retaining the 
vows for life and the duty of fidelity as part of the marriage ceremony. Of course 
in a time of widespread divorce, a promise of commitment for life is more an 
expression of intent than the reflection of a future reality.3  
Secularisation of the Law of Marriage
The secularisation of marriage law has gone so far that presently there is no 
European state that does not provide for the civil registration of marriage. It is 
here, however, that the ‘common core’ ends. Europe continues to be divided into 
countries with obligatory civil marriage and those with a two-tier system of civil 
and religious marriage. 
A majority of European jurisdictions, eg the Czech Republic, Denmark, England 
and Wales, Finland, Greece, Croatia, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Norway, Northern Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Scotland and Sweden, provide 
for a dual system of civil and religious marriage. Such a solution could be char-
acterised as half-hearted secularisation, but it could also be  attributed to respect 
for pluralism and religious tolerance. The latter interpretation is reinforced by 
the presence of countries with the most liberal family law, e.g. the Scandinavian 
countries, among the countries with a dual system of marriage celebration. Two 
tendencies, perhaps at first glance contradictory, can be traced with respect to the 
development of the dual system of marriage registration in Europe. On the one 
hand, predominantly Catholic countries, like Malta and Spain, have democratised 
the choice between civil and religious marriages. On the other hand, in Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic and Croatia, where the compulsory civil 
registration of marriage was associated with the militant atheism of the Soviet 
domination, alternative religious celebration of marriage was introduced in 
the framework of the post-communist restoration of democracy (Kaserauskas, 
2004: 322). The two aforementioned tendencies complement each other in the 
way that they provide individuals with free choice with regard to the form of the 
 celebration of their marriage.
3 For instance, in the English literature it is suggested that the life-long character of marriage can 
now only be interpreted to mean that ‘the marriage must last for life unless it is previously terminated 
by a decree or some other act of dissolution’ (Lowe and Douglas, 2007: 41). 
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A minority of European jurisdictions, ie Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, France, Germany, Luxemburg, Moldova, The Netherlands, Russia and 
Turkey, recognise only civil marriage as a legal marriage. Some, while refusing 
 religious marriage’s civil consequences, do not prohibit its celebration prior 
to civil  registration. Others, eg France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Switzerland, The 
Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Turkey, are more strict and do prohibit 
the celebration of religious marriage prior to civil celebration. All of these 
countries adhere to a strict separation of church and state and consider that, 
as the religious celebration of marriage is allowed prior or subsequent to civil 
marriage, religious freedom is sufficiently safeguarded without the attribution 
of legal consequences to such celebration. 
Capacity to Marry
After the 1960s, national laws on capacity to marry became increasingly devoid 
of remnants of religious concepts of marriage and related legal restrictions. The 
right to marry assumed the status of a fundamental human right in 1950, when it 
was incorporated into Article 12 of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
However, neither Article 12 nor the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights or later international human rights instruments, like Article 9 of the non-
binding European Union Charter and the corresponding Article II–69 of the 
rejected European Union Constitution, present the right to marry as an absolute 
and unconditional right. The determination of restrictions to the right to marry 
is left to the national laws of the Member States (van Grunderbeeck, 2003: 201 ff ). 
This capacity on the part of the national states is rather broad, albeit not unre-
stricted. Thus, the national states are not allowed to implement restrictions affect-
ing the fundamental essence of the right to marry. Such violation of a right to 
marry is, however, not easily acknowledged. As a result, the international human 
rights instruments did not initiate any developments in this area, but rather 
codified the common core that had already been achieved through the progressive 
development of the substantive laws of the national states. 
The laws governing the age of marriage display a similar tendency towards 
coupling the age of marriage to the age of majority. This development is clearly 
supported by the lowering of the age of majority as part of the overall emancipa-
tion of youth after the 1960s. At present the great majority of European countries 
have coupled the age of marriage to the age of majority which is set at 18 years. 
In only a few countries (eg the United Kingdom) the general age of marriage is 
still below the age of majority. A second tendency that can be observed is a trend 
towards equating the age of marriage for both sexes and lifting the minimum 
age of marriage. This transformation has to do with the later socialisation of the 
youth in industrialised countries and the equalisation of the social roles of men 
and women. It has also been held that differing ages of marriage for males and 
females falls within the scope of unjustified discrimination on the ground of sex, 
prohibited by the international human rights instruments. 
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There is also a clear tendency to diminish the number of marriage impediments 
that are based on consanguinity and affinity. A marriage between descendents and 
ascendants is prohibited all over Europe. The same applies to a marriage between 
brothers and sisters.4 Some countries have limited the number of impediments to 
these closest blood-relatives.5 However, the majority of European countries pro-
vide for a more extensive list of impediments based on consanguinity and affinity. 
These prohibitions are often mitigated by the possibility to seek dispensation.
Transsexual Marriage
As was already mentioned, the traditional requirement that the marriage part-
ners must be of opposite sexes has become a matter of a sharp discord. Many 
European countries on their own initiative have hesitantly granted transsexuals 
the right to marry. The issue of transsexual marriage remained nonetheless con-
troversial. The process of piecemeal recognition of the rights of transsexuals to 
marriage was brought to an end through the intervention of the European Court 
of Human Rights. The matter has more than once been a subject of scrutiny by 
the ECtHR,6 but only in 2002, in the case of Goodwin v United Kingdom7 did the 
ECtHR finally acknowledge that the refusal to provide legal recognition to the 
new gender of post-operative transsexuals violates both Article 8 and Article 12 of 
the Convention. In this landmark decision the ECtHR, in spite of the continuing 
absence of consensus among the European countries, withdrew the issue of the 
legal recognition of post-operative transsexuals from the scope of the Contracting 
States’ margin of appreciation and imposed on them the obligation to grant trans-
sexuals the right to marry. The significance of this decision can hardly be overes-
timated. It has already had,8 and will continue to have, an indefectible impact on 
the marriage laws of all European countries. 
Of course, the marriage of persons of the same sex remains a highly  controversial 
issue of capacity to marriage. With the ECtHR’s abandonment of the traditional 
notion that procreation is an indispensable characteristic of  marriage,9 one of 
4 Only Sweden has made marriage of half-brothers and sisters possible upon dispensation; see 
Bradley, 1996: 67.
5 Eg Austria, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Russia and Sweden.
6 In Rees v United Kingdom Series A no 106 (1986); Cossey v United Kingdom Series A no 184 (1990); 
X, Y and Z v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 143; and Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom 
(1998) 27 EHRR 163.
7 Goodwin v United Kingdom (App no 28957/95) (2002) 35 EHRR 18.
8 For instance, the law of England and Wales has been changed according to this decision. The 
Gender Recognition Act 2004 (which came into force on 4 April 2005) allows post-operative trans-
sexuals to marry in their acquired gender.
9 The court observed that ‘Article 12 secures the fundamental right of a man and woman to marry 
and to found a family. The second aspect is not however a condition of the first and the inability of any 
couple to conceive or parent a child cannot be regarded as per se removing their right to enjoy the first 
limb of this provision’ Goodwin v United Kingdom (App no 28957/95) (2002) 35 EHRR para 98. 
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the most important arguments against same-sex marriage seems to have been 
removed. Also, the definition of the right to marry in Article 9 of the European 
Union Charter and Article II–69 of the rejected European Union Constitution 
contains some alterations, compared to the corresponding Article 12 of the 
Convention. In contrast to Article 12, the Charter does not use the words ‘men 
and women’ in respect to this right. However, the Explanatory note reveals that
this Article neither prohibits nor imposes the granting of the status of marriage to 
unions between people of the same sex. This right is thus similar to that afforded by the 
Convention, but its scope may be wider when national legislation so provides.
At the moment the majority of European jurisdictions, with the exception of The 
Netherlands, Belgium and Spain, are reluctant to open up marriage for same-sex 
couples. However, there are indications that Sweden and Denmark are likely to 
join these three countries in the near future. At the same time, the proliferation 
of same-sex marriage has also provoked a counter-reaction. Thus, in December 
2005, Latvia introduced no less than a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage. 
Equalisation of the Rights of Spouses
In the 1970s–1980s, all Western European countries embraced formal legal 
equality between the spouses, which had already been introduced in Russia and 
Scandinavia in the 1920s and in West Germany and the Eastern European coun-
tries after the Second World War. By the end of the 20th century, spousal equality, 
save for some remnants in the field of the law of names, had been achieved in 
every European country. 
III.  LAW ON DIVORCE
Advance of No-Fault Divorce
The law on divorce was deeply affected by the transformations of the 1960s–
1970s. The most important change was that divorce lost its social stigma and is 
no longer seen as deviant behaviour. The period after the 1960s is characterised by 
important liberalisation of divorce—and in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy—by 
its (re)-introduction. The transformation of divorce law underwent in this period 
a major qualitative change. Before this time, the steady liberalisation of divorce 
law amounted, for the most part, to a ‘steady accumulation of specific grounds’, 
largely accomplished by adding ‘new specific matrimonial offences and condi-
tions’ to already existing ones (Phillips, 1988: 563). In the 1960s the main event of 
liberalisation became the introduction and the advance of no-fault divorce. 
England and Wales
In England the 1969 divorce reform reflected a compromise between the propo-
nents and opponents of liberalisation of divorce. The new Law formally introduced 
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a single ground for divorce: the irretrievable breakdown of marriage. However, 
this breakdown could be proven only upon the existence of certain circumstances 
(Lee, 1974: 73). As a result ‘the practical proposals to implement this new prin-
ciple [irretrievable breakdown] were as conservative as the idea itself was radical’ 
(Stone, 1990: 307). Three of the ‘circumstances’ were the same old fault grounds 
that were accepted before: adultery, cruelty (which was now called ‘unreasonable 
behaviour’) and desertion. In addition there were no-fault ‘circumstances’: two 
years of separation followed by an application for divorce by mutual consent; and 
five years of separation followed by an unilateral application, contested by the 
other spouse (ibid). The state control of divorce was reinforced by the introduc-
tion of a hardship clause. In 1996 a long-debated attempt to introduce no-fault 
divorce based on a period of separation for reflection failed. The Family Law Act 
1996, which provided for no-fault divorce, did not come fully into effect.10 
Germany
In Germany the fault grounds were abolished during the 1976 divorce reform and 
irretrievable breakdown became the sole ground for divorce. In the case of divorce 
by agreement, the breakdown was presumed if the spouses had been separated 
for at least one year. It has been suggested in German literature that the real pur-
pose for this one-year delay was ‘to serve the scruples of those who disapprove of 
divorce by mutual consent’, which remained highly controversial, as undermining 
the stability of marriage (Giesen, 1973). If the spouses had lived apart for three 
years, this constituted an irrefutable presumption of marital breakdown. However, 
a hardship clause allowed the court to postpone the dissolution of a marriage in 
exceptional circumstances (Gottwald, Schwab and Büttner, 2001: 59). 
France
When divorce reform was first contemplated in France in the 1970s, French 
society appeared to be highly politically divided upon the issue. The spirit of the 
French Revolution
was flourishing in some of the learned writings, and the divorce proposals of the social-
ist and communist parties were seeking to eliminate fault divorce completely and replace 
it with divorce for objective grounds (Glendon, 1976).
The opponents of liberalisation of divorce opposed these ideas and the general 
public was hopelessly split (ibid). As a result, the French divorce law provided for 
a mixed system: divorce à la carte (ibid), retaining the fault-based divorce, along-
side divorce by mutual consent and divorce on the ground of the  irretrievable 
10 In 2001 the Government announced its decision to repeal it (Lord Chancellor’s Department, 
Divorce Law Reform—Government Proposes to Repeal Part II of the Family Law Act 1996 (LCD, 2001)). 
For the history and context of the Act see: Cretney, Masson and Bailey-Harris, 2002: 304–8.
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breakdown of a marriage (to be proven by a six year separation).  An attempt 
to introduce no-fault divorce in France failed in 2004. After almost five years 
of debate about the future of French divorce law, fault was retained. The new 
French divorce law of 200411 maintained the plurality of grounds of divorce. The 
main changes brought about by the new law were in the modifications of the 
particular grounds. Divorce upon mutual consent has been greatly simplified and 
de-formalised. Divorce upon unilateral request on the basis of the irretrievable 
breakdown of marriage after six years of separation was changed into unilateral 
divorce on the basis of the irretrievable breakdown of marriage after a two-year 
separation (Fulchiron, 2005: 245–7). Divorce based upon fault has been retained 
because of the conviction that it still ‘meets the needs of the majority of French 
people’ (Fulchiron, Ferré-André and Gouttenoire, 2004: 184).
Sweden
Rather out of pace with the rest of Europe, Sweden took a radical step in the lib-
eralisation of divorce law by introducing divorce on demand. In the mid-1960s 
a ‘new radicalism’ had come to dominate Swedish politics. The Swedish minister 
of justice laid down in a directive for the experts appointed to prepare the new 
legislation that ‘legislation should not under any circumstances force a person to 
continue to live under a marriage from which he wishes to free himself ’.12 The 
concept of fault was also to disappear entirely from Swedish divorce law. The 
resulting Law of 197313 provides that in the case of unilateral divorce or when 
the spouses have minor children, a divorce is to be automatically granted after 
a six-month period of reflection without any inquiry into the reasons for the 
divorce. If both spouses agree to divorce and no minor children are involved, a 
divorce has to be granted immediately. The Swedish system openly left behind the 
concept of irretrievable breakdown and started to speak of divorce in terms of an 
entitlement and a right (Bradley, 1996: 71–2). 
Re-introduction of Divorce in Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland
Alongside the introduction of no-fault divorce in the countries with a more or less 
long-standing divorce tradition, no-fault divorce was adopted by some countries 
that previously had no divorce at all. In Italy, Portugal (for the Catholics) and 
Spain, divorce, based upon both fault and non-fault divorce, was re-introduced 
respectively in 1970, 1977 and 1981. In contrast, Ireland instantly embraced the 
principle of irretrievable breakdown of marriage in its Law of 1996. 
11 Law 2004–439 of 16 May 2004 came into force on 1 January 2005.
12 Abstract of protocol in justice department matters (1971), 233–234.
13 Entered into force on 1 January 1974 and is still applicable. In 1987 the rules on divorce were 
incorporated in the new Marriage Code. See Jänterä-Jareborg, 2003: 3.
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Beyond the Fault/no-Fault Dichotomy
The advance of no-fault divorce throughout Western Europe evoked the idea that 
Europe is moving towards a spontaneous harmonisation of family law.14 However, 
as the turn of millennium approached, the no-fault movement gradually lost 
most of its vigour. Attempts to get rid of the fault grounds failed in England and 
Wales in 1996, in France in 2005, and in Belgium in 2007.15 Two Eastern European 
countries, Latvia and Lithuania, have recently re-introduced fault grounds in their 
divorce law. This retroactive movement is consonant with the situation in regard 
to covenant marriages in the United States.16
The introduction of no-fault divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown 
of marriage was such a change compared to the fault-based divorce sanction, that 
there was a strong temptation to see the map of European divorce law mainly in the 
light of the fault/no-fault dichotomy. However, with the passage of time it appeared 
that the reality is much more complicated. As long as many countries allowed 
divorce exclusively on the ground of fault, this analysis had its merits; in such a situ-
ation the ‘innocent’ spouse had no other option but to opt for an accusatorial pro-
cedure, while the ‘guilty’ spouse had no option at all except to purchase or coerce 
the co-operation of the ‘innocent’ party. Since nowadays not a single European 
country retains fault-based divorce as the sole ground (Martiny, 2003), the situ-
ation has utterly changed. The invocation of fault is now only one option among 
many, often providing the fastest route to divorce. Thus, although the retention of 
fault grounds still has its (often symbolic) meaning, it no longer says a great deal 
about the character of the divorce law of a particular country, and the abolition of 
such grounds does not automatically mean that divorce becomes any easier. The 
unsuccessful attempt to remove fault grounds in England and Wales provides 
a good example. The current law offers the spouses the possibility to obtain a 
fault-based divorce within four to six months,17 whereas the repealed provisions 
of the Family Law Act 1996 made it impossible to obtain a divorce decree before 
a one-year period of ‘reflection’ had elapsed, which was to be extended by six 
months, even for consenting spouses if they had children. In addition, although 
the Act removed the need to prove a reason for the breakdown of the marriage, 
14 K Neumayer even spoke of ‘entering into the period which is marked by a kind of ius com-
mune’ (Neumayer, 1978: 1). In a similar vein see also Pintens and Vanwinckelen, 2001: 16; and Phillips, 
1988: 570.
15 The Belgian divorce is changed by Law of 12 April 2007. This law is proclaimed that irretriev-
able breakdown of marriage and the mutual consent to be the only two grounds for divorce. However 
the breakdown can be established upon the proof of specific ‘circumstances’. Culpable behaviour is 
maintained among such circumstances.
16 Three American States: Louisiana (in 1991); Arizona (in 1999); and Arkansas (in 2001), have 
retreated from no-fault divorce by adopting legislation allowing a couple at the time of marriage to 
sign a ‘covenant marriage’ agreement, stating that they voluntarily restrict the grounds for possible 
future divorce to fault grounds: see Maxwell, 2003: 263–4. 
17 Fourth Annual Report of Advisory Board in Family Law (2000–01), para 3.5 (cited in Maxwell 
(2003): 299, n 95).
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the new system insisted that the couple should settle ancillary matters beforehand, 
which may be much more difficult than proving any fault (Hale, 1997: 9).
What is Hidden Behind the Concept of the Irretrievable Breakdown 
of Marriage?
The recent survey of current divorce law in Europe provided by the Commission 
on European Family Law (CEFL) National Reports,18 reveals a phenomenon, 
which, paraphrasing Zweigert and Kötz, could be called ‘functional disequivalence’ 
(Zweigert and Kötz, 1998: 36 ff ). It is easy to see that, confusingly enough, under 
one and the same designation of ‘irretrievable breakdown’ virtually every type of 
divorce can be hidden19; from fault-based (England and Wales, Scotland, Greece 
and partly also Poland and Bulgaria) to divorce by consent (The Netherlands, 
Russia). If we look beyond these labels, we can roughly distinguish five more or 
less pure functional types of divorce grounds: fault-based grounds, irretrievable 
breakdown in the narrow sense of this term, divorce on the ground of separation 
for a stated period of time, divorce by consent and divorce on demand. 
In theory, fault-based divorce presupposes a court enquiry into a matrimonial 
offence, but the strictness of this inquiry has been watered down over the course 
of time. For instance, in England and Wales, the so-called ‘special procedure’ 
under which undefended divorces are granted without any court hearing resem-
bles more an administrative divorce than the old-fashioned divorce trials. That, 
combined with the possibility of obtaining a divorce immediately, sometimes 
makes fault-based divorce attractive even for consenting spouses. 
Divorce based upon irretrievable breakdown in the narrow sense is granted 
upon a subjective criterion alone—if the court is convinced that the marriage 
cannot be saved (as in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, The Netherlands, Poland, 
Hungary etc.)—or upon a subjective as well as an objective criterion, such as a 
certain period of separation (four years in Ireland, three years in Austria etc). In 
the jurisdictions that prescribe the subjective criterion alone, the court inquiry is 
nearly a dead letter in non-contested cases; however, in contested cases it may be 
quite intrusive, especially in countries like Bulgaria and Poland where allocation 
of the fault is required. In the jurisdictions that combine subjective (convincing 
the court or other competent authority) and objective (period of separation) 
criteria, proving the breakdown is twice as difficult, because even after the stated 
period of separation has expired the court can refuse a divorce if it is not con-
vinced that the marriage has irretrievably broken down. 
18 See Jänterä-Jareborg, 2003;  and Boele-Woelki, Braat and Sumner, 2003. The National Reports 
are further referred to by the name of the reporter and the reported country. 
19 This is apparent from the CEFL National Reports. See Martiny, 2003: 537–40.
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Many jurisdictions where divorce is to be granted after the simple expiry of 
the stated period of separation call this an irrefutable presumption of the irre-
trievable breakdown of a marriage, but others consider it a separate ground 
(Norway). In both cases, however, a divorce is granted automatically and without 
further inquiry. The accessibility of divorce basically depends on the length of 
the  separation period. These periods vary quite significantly: six years in Austria; 
two years with consent and five years without consent in England and Wales; four 
years in Switzerland and Greece; three years in Italy and Portugal; two years in 
Germany and France; and one year in Denmark, Norway and Iceland. As in most 
of the jurisdictions these periods are rather lengthy, this form of divorce is less 
attractive if a shorter route is available to the spouses.
Divorce by consent is covered in some jurisdictions under the designation of 
irretrievable breakdown, and constitutes an irrefutable presumption thereof (eg 
Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, England and 
Wales, Russia, Scotland). In other countries consent is presented as a separate 
ground (Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Greece and Portugal). In both cases the court 
with competent authority grants divorce automatically and without inquiry into 
the reasons for divorce if the spouses are agreed. However, most of the states still 
consider divorce by consent to be a dangerous diminishment of state control of 
divorce. The multiple restrictions of the right to divorce by consent often make it 
a less attractive and speedy form of divorce. Only Dutch and Russian law de facto 
allow for divorce on the ground of simple consent without any further restric-
tions. In some countries the marriage must be of a certain duration: three years 
in Bulgaria, two years in Belgium, one year in the Czech Republic and Greece. 
Other countries allow consensual divorce only after a certain period of separa-
tion: two years in England and Wales; one year in Scotland and in Germany; 
and six months in Denmark, the Czech Republic and Iceland. In most countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Germany, Hungary, Denmark and Portugal) 
an agreement to divorce alone is not sufficient and the spouses are required to 
reach an agreement on ancillary matters as well. This list of restrictions reveals 
that most of these countries are still reluctant to recognise the autonomous 
decisions of the spouses alone as a sufficient ground for divorce. The state, 
in one way or another, has to protect spouses from their own ill-considered 
decisions.
Divorce on demand, when each of the spouses is simply considered to be 
entitled to divorce irrespective of the objections of the other spouse, is explicitly 
recognised in Sweden, Finland and Spain, and indirectly in Russia. This is, beyond 
doubt, the easiest form of divorce; fully respecting the autonomous decisions of 
the spouses (or at least of one of them) and accepting that the state is not capable 
of keeping a marriage intact against the will of even one of the spouses. The only 
state intervention in this kind of divorce is a short waiting period of six months 
for contested divorces or divorces with minor children in Sweden, the same period 
for all divorces in Finland, and a possibility of a three-month reconciliation 
period for contested divorces under Russian law. 
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Many countries have not just one, but multiple grounds for divorce. In this case 
especially, consenting spouses have the possibility of a kind of ‘ground shopping’. 
Empirical data seems to suggest that spouses, assisted by their lawyers, are always 
able to choose the shortest way to divorce just as water will always find its way to 
the lowest point. 20
This rough survey illustrates that , in spite of all the optimistic expectations 
that were derived from the no-fault reforms, no substantial common core has 
so far emerged. Even if the fault grounds were to completely disappear from 
the European scene in the foreseeable future, this alone would not significantly 
increase the scope of the common core.
IV.  NON-MARITAL COHABITATION
From the 1960s onwards, Europe witnessed a rapid and unprecedented rise of 
non-marital cohabitation. At the turn of the millennium, around 30 per cent 
of all couples under 30 years old in Europe were cohabiting.21 The legislative 
response to this major social change was somewhat delayed. In the beginning 
only few countries chose to acknowledge it with favourable legal policy. A notable 
exception was Sweden, which in the late 1960s proclaimed a positive attitude 
towards cohabitees. This became known as the ‘neutrality’ policy (Sörgjerd, 
2005: 343–5), which holds that the law should be ‘neutral in relation to the dif-
ferent forms of living together and different moral views’ and warns ‘not [to] 
create unnecessary difficulties’ for those who decide to create a family without 
 marrying.22 
However, even after the attitude towards cohabitation became more benevo-
lent, the majority of European countries were reluctant to pass specific regulation 
with respect to non-marital cohabitation. This reluctance was not the reflection 
of a conservative attitude alone, but was grounded in objections originating from 
different sides of the political spectrum. Together these arguments led to the idea 
that there should be a ‘law-free space’, an area of deliberate non-regulation. Part 
of this idea was inspired by the fear that legal regulation of cohabitation would 
weaken the institution of marriage.23 Another reason had to do with the concern 
for personal autonomy (Deech, 1980: 300).24 It was argued that if cohabitees 
20 For instance, in England and Wales 68.6 % are granted upon fault grounds, as this proves to be 
the shortest route to a divorce: see Lowe, 2003: 103.
21 The European Union average for all age groups is 8% (Editorial Note, ‘The European Picture of 
Cohabitation’ (2001), 168). 
22 Committee Report (SOU 1972: 41), 58.
23 For a short account, see Forder, 1999: 7. On the undesirability of creating ‘two competing sys-
tems’, see Agell, 2003: 131.
24 Ruth Deech, for instance, argued that each of the basic ideas of individualism—the dignity of the 
individual, the autonomy, the privacy and the self-development—had its influence on the legislative 
non-intervention in the field of cohabitation. 
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 voluntary choose to avoid the legal regulation attributed to marriage, the state 
should respect this choice and not try to impose another form of legal regula-
tion on them (ibid: 300–301). Another ground for the non-regulation policy 
was the fear that cohabitation regulation modelled on marriage would reinforce 
traditional gender-role divisions, resulting in women’s dependency (O’Donovan, 
1984). In addition to this, the multiplicity of different patterns of cohabitation 
gave rise to the view that it is impossible to design any general rules that are able 
to cover all those forms (Forder, 1999: 7).
Eventually, the discussion surrounding the regulation of different-sex 
 cohabitation came to be intertwined with same-sex couples’ struggle for legal 
and social recognition (Schrama, 2004: 117). The problems of same-sex couples 
were, from the outset, rather different from those of heterosexual cohabitees. The 
main problems of same-sex cohabitees were two-fold: they had no legal protec-
tion; and society did not recognise their relationship. Differing from opposite-sex 
cohabitees, the lack of legal protection for same-sex couples did not result from 
their own implicit or explicit choice not to marry, but from the legal impossibility 
of doing so. 
First Legislation on Unmarried Cohabitation
Thus, albeit for different reasons, the legal regulation of both opposite- and 
same-sex cohabitation remained controversial for a long time. The accommoda-
tion of heterosexual cohabitation, partly by way of piecemeal adjustments of the 
existing laws and partly by virtue of judicial activity, started in the 1970s. In 1973 
Sweden was the first European country to pass specific legislation on non-marital 
cohabitation.25 In 1987 legal protection was extended to same-sex couples. Thus, 
Sweden also became the first country where same- and opposite-sex cohabitation 
acquired equal legal protection. The law was applicable to unmarried cohabitees 
by virtue of de facto cohabitation, without a requirement of registration, contract 
or any other expression of an intent to institutionalise their relationship. The 
main purpose of the law was to grant a weaker party some minimal protection if 
the relationship ceased (see Saldeen, 2005: 504)26. Therefore, the legal protection 
was of a rather limited scope and mainly covered only patrimonial relationships 
and some public law issues. 
In 1991 the Joint Household Act (see Sarcevic, 1980: 294),27 with a significantly 
more limited scope of protection, was enacted in Norway. 
25 The Unmarried Cohabitees Act was enacted in 1973. In 1987, it was replaced by the more com-
prehensive Cohabitees (Joint Homes) Act.
26 Before the 1987 Act entered into force, the Law on Homosexual Cohabitees made its provisions 
equally applicable to same-sex couples. 
27 Act relating to the Joint Residence and Household when a Household Community Ceases to 
Exist, of 4 July 1991.
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It is often forgotten that Yugoslavia and Hungary were also among the 
countries that pioneered the regulation of non-marital cohabitation. After 197428 
the codes of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia and Kosovo extended some 
rules of matrimonial property and maintenance law to durable marriage-like 
relationships (Mladenovic, Janjic-Komar and Jessel-Holst, 1998: 26). In 1992, 
the same was done in Macedonia. Slovenia was a case apart among the Yugoslavian 
autonomies states. In 1976, the Slovenian Marriage and Family Regulation Act 
completely assimilated durable cohabitation into marriage in almost all personal 
and property aspects. This example was followed by Serbia in 2005. In Hungary, 
the statutory regulation of non-marital cohabitation dates from 1977. Initially, 
both former Yugoslavian autonomies and Hungary regulated only opposite-sex 
cohabitation. In 1995, the Hungarian Constitutional Court proclaimed the legal 
definition of cohabitation as an exclusively opposite-sex union to be discrimina-
tory and therefore unconstitutional.29 The court gave the legislature one year to 
adjust the law. In 1996, the definition of non-marital cohabitation was amended 
and made gender-neutral. Thus, same-sex couples came to enjoy the same pro-
tection as opposite-sex couples. In 2003, Croatia also extended legal regulation 
regarding cohabitation to same-sex couples. 
Advance of Registered Partnership Legislation
However, up to the mid 1990s the countries referred to above were a mere excep-
tion. Only in the last decades of the 20th century was there a clear sea-change. The 
legal policy surrounding cohabitation generally evolved from tolerance to positive 
recognition. This shift in attitude was, however, largely confined to the regulation 
of same-sex cohabitation only. In order to accommodate the needs of same-sex 
couples many countries introduced the institution of registered partnership. The 
model of registered partnership that spread across Europe was first introduced in 
Denmark in 1989. In the following decade, the same model was adopted by the 
whole of the Nordic region: in Norway in 1993; in Sweden in 1995; in Iceland 
in 1996; and in Finland in 2001. In 1998, The Netherlands introduced the same 
model with one significant difference; registered partnership was opened for both 
same- and different-sex couples. In 2001, Germany followed the Scandinavian 
example as well, but initially, due to political and constitutional constraints, went 
significantly less far in the equalisation of registered partnership with marriage. 
In 2004, a form of registered partnership similar to the Scandinavian model was 
introduced, among others, in the United Kingdom, and in 2005 in Switzerland.
28 In 1974 the newly adopted Federal Constitution of Yugoslavia placed the jurisdiction of family 
matters into the hands of the autonomies, which then enacted comprehensive family codes in the 
next decade. 
29 Decision No 14 of 8 March 1995. 
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30 With the exception of Catalonian law and the laws of some other Spanish autonomies, which 
made their cohabitation laws applicable to unmarried opposite-sex couples’ de facto cohabitation.
Several countries, such as France, Belgium and the Spanish autonomies chose 
a model rather different from the registered partnership Scandinavian style. The 
Pacte civil de solidarité (PACS) that was adopted in France in 1999, the Belgian 
regime of statutory cohabitation, and the various laws that were enacted in the 
Spanish autonomous communities from 1998 onwards, granted only very limited 
protection, and only for those same- and opposite-sex couples who elected for the 
prescribed registration.30
Apart from same-sex marriage as such, the institution of registered partner-
ship is the most forthright and uncompromising response to same-sex partners’ 
demands for equality and recognition. The introduction of registered partner-
ship actually paved the way for the opening-up of marriage to same-sex couples 
in some countries. The idea of registered partnership is based on the ‘equal but 
separate’ doctrine, which involves granting same-sex couples nearly all the rights 
of married couples, without giving their union the name of marriage. Such a 
marriage-like institution is capable of giving same-sex partners adequate legal 
protection while almost eliminating institutional discrimination and contributing 
to the further social acceptance of same-sex couples.  
V.  DELIBERATE HARMONISATION OF FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE
The picture of present day family law in Europe is not complete without mention-
ing the recent activities aimed at the promotion of the harmonisation of family 
law in Europe. In the 1990s, the harmonisation of private law in Europe began to 
receive a good deal of attention. Private initiatives dealing with this subject one 
way or another had already been evolving at the beginning of the 1980s. Family 
law was a relative latecomer and played more or less the role of Cinderella within 
the harmonisation setting. This probably had to do with the alleged unsuitability 
of family law for harmonisation due to strong cultural and historical constraints. 
The so-called ‘cultural constraints’ argument suggests that the family laws of the 
different European countries are embedded in their unique national cultures 
and history. This cultural and historical diversity is unbridgeable and therefore 
 family laws do not converge spontaneously and cannot be harmonised deliber-
ately. The cultural constraints argument is verbalised in a nutshell by Wolfram 
Müller-Freienfels, who wrote a long time ago:
Family law concepts are especially open to influence by moral, religious, political and 
psychological factors; family law tends to become introverted because historical, racial, 
social and religious considerations differ according to country and produce differ-
ent family law systems (Müller-Freinfels, 1968–69); see also de Oliveira, 2000; and 
Hohnerlein, 2000–01).
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Marie-Thérèse Meulders-Klein has even claimed that family law constitutes the 
hard core of any legal culture (Meulders-Klein, 2003: 109). For this reason the 
issue of harmonisation of family law long remained on the fringes of the discus-
sion surrounding the harmonisation of private law in general. However, in the 
late 1990s the attitude towards the harmonisation of family law gradually evolved 
towards a more positive one (Boele-Woelki, 2002b: 175–7). 
As result of this change of attitude, in 2001 the international Commission 
on European Family Law (CEFL) was established by an international group of 
prominent scholars.31 Like all other groups and commissions active in the field of 
harmonisation of private law, CEFL is a self-appointed group, composed of academ-
ics who do not represent their national governments, nor are commissioned by any 
supranational organisation. CEFL consists of two bodies: the Organising Committee 
and the Expert Group. The Organising Committee acts as a co-ordinating and orga-
nising body.32 The Expert Group comprises 22 members, including the six members 
of the Organising Committee. They cover almost all European  countries, among 
which are all the EU Member States and most of the candidate countries, as well as 
non-associated countries like Norway, Switzerland and Russia. 33 
The objective of the CEFL is to elaborate non-binding Principles of European 
Family Law, which can serve not only as reference works for scholars and stu-
dents, but also as sources of inspiration and perhaps even as models for national 
and supra-national legislatures (Boele-Woelki, 2005d; and Örücü, 2005). The 
first subjects chosen by the Organising Committee for CEFL’s activities were 
the grounds for divorce and the maintenance obligations of former spouses. The 
reasons for this choice have been extensively elucidated by the chairperson of 
the CEFL Katharina Boele-Woelki (Boele-Woelki, 2002a: 22–5). Divorce law was 
selected because of the pan-European convergence tendency that is manifest in 
the gradual shift from fault-based divorce to divorce based on the irretrievable 
breakdown of marriage (Pintens and Vanwinckelen, 2001). The Principles on 
divorce were published in 2004 (Boele-Woelki, 2003b). The same year the CEFL 
started to work on the second field: parental responsibilities. The choice for 
this subject was, to a large extent, determined by the wealth of the international 
instruments in this field.34 The Principles on parental responsibility are published 
in 2007 (Boele-Woelki, 2007). After this the CEFL will start working on the third 
subject: informal long-term relationships.
The Drafting Methods
The method of comparative research-based drafting adopted by CEFL is 
the same as that practiced by most other groups engaged in the  promotion 
31 See http://www.law.uu.nl/priv/cefl > Establishment.
32 See  http://www.law.uu.nl/priv/cefl > Organising Committee.
33 See http://www.law.uu.nl/priv/cefl > Expert Group.
34 For more on the reasons for this choice see Boele-Woelki, 2005: 142–4.
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of  harmonisation of European private law. The first step is to draw up a 
 comprehensive  questionnaire. Such questionnaires, drafted from a comparative 
perspective, aim to cover all the variations within European jurisdictions. On the 
basis of the questionnaire, the members of the Expert Group deliver National 
Reports. On the basis of these reports the draft Principles, along with comments 
and a comparative overview are elaborated by the Organising Committee. After 
thorough discussion of the draft Principles by the whole of the CEFL, the final 
draft is drawn up by the Organising Committee (Boele-Woelki, 2005b: 14–41). 
While drafting the Principles on the basis of the comparative material delivered 
in the National Reports, two methods are generally used: the so-called ‘better law’ 
and ‘common core’ methods. The ‘common core’ method involves the elaboration 
of rules that are common for all or most of the relevant jurisdictions. The  ‘better 
law’ method involves the selection of a rule that represents a minority or just 
one jurisdiction, or even the elaboration of a completely new rule by the drafters 
themselves (Antokolskaia, 2003: 159–83). 
In spite of the wealth of literature on the harmonisation of family law35 and the 
blooming drafting activities on the part of the CEFL, the harmonisation of family 
law remains highly controversial and the discussion on its feasibility and desir-
ability is far from being at an end (Martiny, 2004: 307–33). This lack of consensus 
has led to the situation that while the popularity of the idea of harmonisation of 
family law has been notably increasing throughout the last decade, resistance to it 
has not diminished. The opponents of harmonisation keep relying on the cultural 
and historical constraints as their main contention. The progress of the harmoni-
sation activities only made the debate sharper. The perseverance of the opposition 
as such is no indication of weakness of the idea of the deliberate harmonisation. 
Nor does it mean that the CEFL, or indeed the various other groups and commis-
sions in the field of private law in general, have started their work prematurely 
without awaiting genuine consensus. A general consensus on such a controversial 
issue will probably never be reached. This means that if harmonisation activities 
were ever to be started, they could only have started in spite of serious opposition. 
Whatever the practical impact of the CEFL Principles will be, their contribution to 
the development of comparative family law is undisputable. The National Reports 
made by the CEFL experts36 and the comparative overviews not only represent 
a new methodology of comparative research; working in a permanent network 
of national experts, they also form a wonderful source of reliable, up-to-date 
 comprehensive information on the national family laws in Europe.
35 For a recent overview see Martiny, 2004: 328–33 and the CEFL website: http://www2.law.uu.nl/
priv/cefl/ under the rubric ‘publications’.
36 The integral reports are published on the CEFL website: http://www.law.uu.nl/priv/cefl > work-
ing fields 1(Divorce/Maintenance) and 2(Parental Responsibility). The integrated version of the 
reports are published in  Boele-Woelki, Braat and Sumner, 2003 and Boele-Woelki, Braat and Curry-
Sumner, 2005.
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QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
 1.  Which general trends can be monitored in the development of family law 
in Europe during the last 50 years?
 2.  What are the main tendencies in the development of marriage law in 
Europe during the last decades?
 3.  Does the advance of no-fault divorce make divorce laws in Europe more 
similar?
 4.  What is the main difference between the problems surrounding the legal 
regulation of same-sex and different-sex cohabitation?
 5.  What are the main reasons for the differences in pace and profundity of 
the modernisation of family law in the various European countries?
 6.  What is your opinion in regard to the feasibility and desirability of delib-
erate harmonisation of family law in Europe? 
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Comparative Commercial Law: Rules or 
Context?
NICHOLAS HD FOSTER*
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This chapter examines the reasons for the importance of comparative commercial law, and considers what approach should be taken to its study. Is commercial law purely technical? If so, one need only compare rules. 
If it is not, then the broader context must be considered, and the topic becomes 
considerably more complex.
After considering various examples, the chapter concludes that the broader 
context does affect commercial law and that a contextual approach is necessary. 
An outline is given of the ways in which the context is relevant, together with an 
indication of the main characteristics of a contextual approach. It also concludes 
that comparative commercial law is fundamentally no different from other com-
parative law topics, and is of general significance for comparative legal studies.
I.  GLOBALISATION AND COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL LAW
The essence of commerce can be found in the Latin words which make it up: cum 
(with) and merx/merci- (goods). It is the exchange of assets and services with a 
view to profit. Commercial law can therefore be defined as the law relating to the 
facilitation and regulation of commerce.
However, the use of the term varies both across and within legal traditions. 
Across traditions, the common law tendency is to restrict its use to transactions, 
whereas civilians extend it to institutions, such as companies and partnerships. 
Civilian1 usage is followed in this chapter, but the emphasis is on transactions. 
* Many thanks to Peter Muchlinski and Camilla Baasch Andersen for their comments on this chap-
ter and to Camilla for suggesting some additional wording, as well as stimulating discussions resulting 
from co-teaching.
1 ‘Civilian law’ refers to continental European legal systems and their offshoots. It is used in prefer-
ence to ‘civil’, because this word can also mean the sort of law regarded as basic in such systems, such 
as the law of persons and the law of obligations. ‘Civil law’ is used only in the latter sense.
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Within traditions, the term can cover the law governing all types of transactions, 
ranging from those taking place between private individuals and consumer trans-
actions to multi-billion dollar contracts. This chapter deals only with the law 
relevant to business-to-business transactions.
Why study commercial law in a comparative light? Firstly, because comparative 
commercial law constitutes a useful laboratory for the formulation and testing 
of general comparative law theories, furnishing numerous intriguing case stud-
ies. But most people study it because globalisation has made it important from a 
practical point of view.
In the period immediately preceding ‘globalisation’,2 roughly 1947–1989, the 
world was very different. It was divided into two ideologically hostile camps, the 
capitalist and the socialist/communist. Almost everywhere, the state took an active 
part in the economy, notably through nationalised industries. In socialist/commu-
nist regimes, the state owned the means of production and attempted to control all 
economic activity by means of commands (the command system). Protectionism 
(the protection of domestic markets and jobs from foreign competition), although 
substantially less than before the Second World War, was still at a relatively high level 
in many economies, some of which were effectively closed to the outside world.
From the late 1970s to the early 1990s various decisive events took place. In 
the People’s Republic of China (the PRC), the death of Chairman Mao Zedong 
in 1976 was followed by the ‘Open Door Policy’, the progressive opening of the 
Chinese economy to the outside world. In 1979, Margaret Thatcher was elected 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Departing from the previous right-wing 
policy of leaving in place reforms made by socialist predecessors, she initiated a 
series of unprecedented changes, including the privatisation of large sectors of the 
economy. In the United States President Ronald Reagan also pursued ‘neo-liberal’ 
policies which favoured free markets and private enterprise. The Soviet Union’s 
empire in Eastern Europe collapsed in 1989. In 1991 the Soviet Union was dis-
solved. The Uruguay Round of the GATT3 concluded in 1995 with a significant 
reduction in protectionism and the creation of the World Trade Organisation, 
which has far more members than the GATT (nearly all the countries in the world, 
in fact), and a much stronger enforcement system, including effectively compul-
sory dispute settlement procedures.
Throughout this period great technological advances were made. In particular, 
information storage, manipulation and diffusion were revolutionised. Examples 
include the Internet, e-mail, mobile telephones and computerised databases. 
Calculations can be effected far more quickly than before at a fraction of their 
former cost as a result of a vast increase in computer calculation power.
2 Or, more accurately, the present period of internationalisation.
3 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is an international agreement the aim of 
which is to reduce protectionism. It is now administered by the World Trade Organisation. A ‘round’ is 
a series of international negotiations aimed at the further reduction of barriers to trade. ‘The Uruguay 
Round’ was so named because its first session took place in Punta del Este, Uruguay.
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The consequences were profound. The ideological conflict between capital-
ism and socialism/communism has practically disappeared, a situation famously 
(and controversially) described by Francis Fukuyama as ‘the end of history’ 
(Fukuyama, 1989). Neo-liberal, market-based ideology predominates, albeit 
with local modifications. The ideal role of governments has become economic 
encouragement, co-ordination and regulation rather than participation or con-
trol (see Salacuse, 1999). Formerly socialist/communist regimes abandoned the 
command system. They and the mixed capitalist/socialist countries followed 
Margaret Thatcher’s example and largely marketised and privatised their econo-
mies. Most states have drastically reduced barriers to trade, foreign investment 
and foreign participation in their economies, financial markets are much more 
open, financial flows are far less restricted and, thanks to technological advances, 
financial transfers are easy and cheap. People are much freer to move from one 
country to another. International trade and international investment have greatly 
increased. Business activities have been transferred to developing countries. States 
compete for foreign business and investment. Multinational corporations have 
become even more powerful. International business transactions have increased 
in number and complexity. To put it more generally, we live in a world in which 
‘the intensification of worldwide social relations ... link distant localities in such 
a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away or 
vice versa’ (Giddens, 1990: 64).
Commerce is an essential part of this new order, and there has been a con-
sequent enormous increase in commercial and associated law-making activity, 
founded on two generally, if not universally held, assumptions: (1) an efficient 
legal system which protects property rights and facilitates transactions is essential 
for commerce; (2) differences in commercial law are inefficient, and they can and 
should be removed by harmonisation. Like the global marketplace itself, both 
types of activity tend to be dominated by neo-liberal, market-driven, Anglo-
Saxon ideology and Anglo-Saxon concepts of commercial law, a dominance aug-
mented by large multinational law firms, all of which are American or English in
origin.
At the same time, we also see ‘localisation’, ‘a re-tribalisation of large swaths of 
humankind by war and bloodshed.’ According to Benjamin Barber, ‘The planet 
is falling precipitantly apart AND coming reluctantly together at the very same 
moment’ (Barber, 1992: 53). Examples include the resurgence of Islam (1979 
was also the year the Shah left Iran after the Iranian Revolution), the tragic 
events of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath and the break-up of the former 
Yugoslavia.
On the domestic legal level the result is ‘the most massive effort that the world 
has ever known to use state power instrumentally through law’ (Seidman and 
Seidman, 1995: 44). Sometimes voluntarily, sometimes as a result of external 
pressure, governments rushed to create commercial law systems which facilitate 
trade and foreign direct investment, always by some form of imitation of, or 
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inspiration from, Western law. On the international level there has been a huge 
increase in harmonisation activity. Take security law. In 1977 Ulrich Drobnig pre-
sented a report to UNCITRAL on possible harmonisation (UNCITRAL, 1977).4 
In 1980 further action in this area was indefinitely postponed because success 
was considered to be ‘in all likelihood unattainable’ (UNCITRAL, 1980: para 
28). In stark contrast, the list of harmonisation projects since 1994 is too long 
to set out here, but includes the UNCITRAL draft Legislative Guide on Secured 
Transactions 2002, the EBRD Model Law on Secured Transactions 1994 and the 
OAS Model Inter-American Law on Secured Transactions 2002, as well as numer-
ous individual country projects (see Goode, 1998: 47-8).5 On the other hand, 
the consequences of localisation include a growth in interest in non-dominant 
regimes such as Islamic finance, the ‘return to the Shari’a’6 in some Muslim-
majority jurisdictions, and a resistance to harmonisation in certain quarters.
The number of people wishing to acquire knowledge in these areas has there-
fore greatly increased. They come principally from two types of jurisdictions: 
(1) the legal systems of economically developed countries (the ‘Westerners’, sub-
divided into the Anglo-Saxons and the Rest); and (2) legal systems in the course of 
‘modernisation’, some of which experience considerable tension between the vari-
ous internal and external sources of their law (the ‘Modernisers’). Those working 
on harmonisation of law can be considered as a third group, made up of lawyers 
from all types of jurisdictions.
In the Western group, the Anglo-Saxons wish to acquire a general understand-
ing of the sort of local law they might encounter in a transaction governed by 
their law, eg a project finance transaction in which the main contract is governed 
by English law, but the security contracts are governed by German, Kuwaiti 
and Indonesian law. The Rest need to understand the Anglo-Saxon law of the 
main agreements and the way it differs from, and interlocks with, their law. The 
Modernisers have the same goals as the Rest, but also wish to understand Western 
law in order to use it better to reform their own law, or to perform the difficult 
task of defending their legal culture while at the same time accommodating the 
needs of globalisation. The Harmonisers need to understand each other’s law and 
view their own law from an outsider’s perspective in order to produce regimes 
acceptable to all parties.
How should this expertise be acquired? Most people assume that we should 
base our approach on what we might call ‘the instrumentalist view’, which runs 
something like this. Some human activities are ‘close to people’s lives’ (Kahn-
Freund, 1974: 10). Therefore they are affected by the way in which the members 
of a given society think and feel about things which are important to them, their 
4 UNCITRAL: United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.
5 EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; OAS: Organization of American 
States.
6 ‘Shari’a’ is usually, if somewhat misleadingly, translated as ‘Islamic law’.
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cultural attitudes.7 It seems logical that these attitudes should affect the law gov-
erning such activities.8 So if we wish to study the law, we need to study the broader 
context within which the law was formed and operates. This is particularly true 
if we wish to conduct a comparative study, because we go beyond our own law, 
the cultural background to which we instinctively understand, to someone else’s 
law, the cultural background to which we cannot attempt to understand without 
an explicit explanation. Commerce, though, is not ‘close to people’s lives’, and is 
therefore not affected by cultural attitudes. Business people everywhere just want 
to make money. So commercial law is not affected by culture either. It is just 
lawyer’s law, a mere instrument (hence ‘instrumentalist view’) formulated to per-
form technical functions in a technical field. If we wish to study it, all we need do 
is study the different rules and compare them. The broader context is irrelevant.
It follows that, if an activity is affected by cultural attitudes, those attitudes 
will differ from one society to another, and the law governing those activities will 
differ from one society to another. It will be difficult to change the law so long as 
the culture remains the same, and in particular it will be difficult to change it so 
as to make it uniform across various types of society. The converse is also true. If 
an activity is not affected by cultural attitudes, attitudes towards it will not differ 
from one society to another. Any variations in the law are mere accidents, and it 
will not be difficult to change the law in order to make it uniform. If commerce is 
not affected by cultural attitudes, the latter set of consequences apply to it.9
A good example of the instrumentalist view occurred a few years ago during 
the introduction to an LLM course at the School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London. The author and his colleague explained the contextual 
methods used, involving a grounding in such matters as comparative law meth-
odology, the relevant legal systems and their history, and the relationship of 
such matters to commercial law. One student belligerently asked why we did not 
simply deal with subjects like comparative contract formation, implying that our 
approach was an impractical waste of valuable time, which could be much better 
spent on the comparative study of the rules.
7 Culture is a difficult concept. One definition is that it
consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by 
symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of a human group, including their embodi-
ments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (ie historically derived and 
selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be con-
sidered as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of further action (Kroeber, 
Kluckhohn and Untereiner, 1983: 1152–3).
‘Tradition’, preferred by some scholars, is not used herein. This decision was taken solely in order 
to simplify the arguments, and nothing further should be read into it. On the debates, see chs 3, 4 
and 5 above.
8 This assumption, the ‘mirror thesis’, is itself controversial. See Tamanaha, 2001 (the idea of reflec-
tion is outlined at 1–2; it is challenged in chs 3, 4 and 5). See also Kennedy, 1991. 
9 There are numerous difficulties associated with the words ‘uniform’ and ‘harmonisation’. 
‘Uniform’ is used here in a general, non-technical sense. 
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Systems and Cultures
In order to find out whether he was right or not, consider the ideas of system and 
culture as they relate to commercial law.10
Working outwards from the bare rules, it is clear that each topic forms a system, 
a set of interconnected norms, mechanisms and principles which makes a unified 
whole. The parts of the system are given meaning and effect not just by their con-
tent, but also by their relative place within the system. Since each such system is 
legal, it would be logical to call them ‘legal systems’, but that term is normally used 
to denote the entirety of such systems in a given jurisdiction, eg ‘the English legal 
system’. Therefore, for each system below the level of ‘legal system’ in this sense, we 
will use the word ‘regime’ instead. Each regime nests within, overlaps, intersects 
and intertwines with other regimes. They are all interdependent:
there are only a few rules that can be understood and applied without reference to other 
legal rules or concepts (Pistor, 2002: 98).
English security law is a specialist topic within the law of contract. It is also part 
of financial law, and has strong links to insolvency law. It relies on the general law 
of contract, property law, etc. Security and contract law both rely on the general 
principles and approaches of the English legal system as a whole, such as the 
doctrine of precedent and freedom of contract. But they also have a degree of 
autonomy, with specialist rules and mechanisms.
All these regimes and legal systems are associated with groups of people, each 
of which has its legal culture, its
deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of [their regime/sys-
tem], about [its] role ... in the society and the polity, about [its] proper organization and 
operation ... and about the way [it] is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected, and 
taught (Merryman, 1985: 2).11
There are English and French legal cultures, associated with the English and 
French legal systems as wholes. English lawyers think, act and emotionally and 
subconsciously react in a certain way. French lawyers think, act and emotionally 
and subconsciously react differently. There are also legal cultures associated with 
regimes such as English commercial law and international financial law. English 
commercial lawyers think, act and react differently from their colleagues who 
practise family law. All these cultures overlap and intertwine with others. For 
example, although recognisably English, English commercial legal culture has 
features in common with French commercial legal culture.
Since these groups practise, enforce, maintain and develop the law, their legal cul-
tures constitute major influences on it. So much can be regarded as fairly clear.12
10 The following discussion deals simplistically with complex issues used as foundational argu-
ments. For fuller treatments, see in particular chs 2, 3, 4 and 5 above.
11 The original quotation refers to the culture of an entire legal system, the words in square brackets 
replace the word ‘law’ in the original.
12 It should go without saying that other significant influences exist, which may trump legal culture.
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Moving outwards once more, to what degree do the regimes and legal systems 
reflect society generally and its culture?13 One might expect an interaction between 
law and society, law reflecting society’s culture and needs, society determining the 
content of the law. Sometimes this is clearly the case. When divorce was socially 
unacceptable in Western societies, it was legally very difficult to obtain. When 
cultural attitudes changed, the law changed too. However, the metaphor of ‘reflec-
tion’ must be used carefully, for the degree of reflection may vary considerably 
according to the circumstances. The law may be out of step with society, reflecting 
the culture of the past, not the present. One of the functions of legal culture is to 
maintain the legal system, so it is a necessarily conservative force which tends to 
keep the regimes and legal systems as they were at the time of their formation, 
while general culture moves on. In addition, regimes are often not connected to 
all society, but only to a part of it.
The Development of English and French Commercial Law: A Comparative 
Historical Sketch
Let us look at how systems and cultures interact in the commercial law context by 
examining the formation of the English and French regimes.
The two jurisdictions share some common history. When the Western Roman 
Empire collapsed, trade practically disappeared (Volckart and Mangels, 1999: 
435–46). The feudal system which grew out of the ruins of the Empire was based 
on land. The result was a contempt for commerce among the aristocracy, an 
attitude bolstered by the Catholic Church, which also held trade in generally low 
regard. According to St Paul, ‘The love of money is the root of all evil’ (I Tim 6:10), 
therefore: ‘No profession was more suspect than that of the merchant’ (Le Bras, 
1963: 574; see also Mallat, 2000: 92). When trade revived, the aristocracy con-
tinued to view it in a poor light, even when it had grown greatly in importance, 
although by the 15th century the theologians had been obliged to concede that 
trade was acceptable, even if speculation was not.
Attitudes towards finance were even more negative than those towards trade. 
Not only was money-lending viewed with contempt by the aristocracy, ‘usury’ 
was forbidden by the Bible: ‘the profession of merchant can scarcely ever be 
agreeable to God [but the usurer] is the most damnable’ (de Roover, 1963: 76).14 
The Church banned first the clergy and then the laity from lending at interest. 
Some secular laws followed, and in 1311 Pope Clement V declared that secular 
laws allowing usury were void. When trade grew, so did the need for finance, and 
the ban on usury was at first evaded, then slowly lifted. By the early 17th century 
usury had become ‘a matter of private conscience’ (Visser and Macintosh, 1998: 
179, citing Ruston, 1993: 173–4), and the very meaning of the word changed from 
13 On ‘reflection’, see n 8 above.
14 Citing the canon (Church decree) Ejiciens Dominus.
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‘everything received by a lender over and above the capital lent’ (Le Bras, 1963: 
564) to ‘excessive interest’.
The two jurisdictions then went down different paths. England’s success in 
exploiting the opportunities arising from the New World and the Far East, acces-
sible as a result of advances in maritime technology and navigational knowledge, 
eventually led to the creation of a trade-based empire. At a later period, techno-
logical advances, the Napoleonic wars and the Industrial Revolution combined 
in a long period of relative political stability to make commerce even more 
important. It flourished in a general atmosphere of policies favouring private 
property free from state interference, free markets, private projects and their pri-
vate financing. A significant mitigation (although not the complete elimination) 
of the old aristocratic distaste for trade was in evidence, as was a high degree of 
trust for those involved in business and finance. Much was made, chauvinistically 
but with a degree of justification in the context of the time, of ‘English liberty’, the 
fundamental principle being: ‘If it is not forbidden, it is allowed’. Despite being 
significantly eroded, the basics of these attitudes persist. For example, the City of 
London owes its continuing status as a major international financial centre to the 
authorities’ liberal attitude towards overseas banks in the 1960s and 70s.
In France, by contrast, although significant, commerce was less important. 
The contempt for trade had always been stronger and more formalised, reflected 
in a ban on the participation in trade by nobles and the clergy (Masson, 1786: 
121, cited in Kessler, 2003: 518). France lost out in her colonial and commercial 
ventures in North America and the Far East, lost the Napoleonic wars, and went 
through a period of political instability, suffering further defeat in the Franco-
Prussian war. The collapse of John Law’s banking and trading schemes in 1720 
made many French people mistrustful of modern financial systems for genera-
tions. The economy remained predominantly agricultural for longer than in the 
United Kingdom, industrialisation took place later. The revolutionaries continued 
their predecessors’ policy of centralising government, and the post-revolutionary 
economic system was more government-controlled than in England, giving less 
prominence to market forces (see Dickerson, 2005: 31–2), in an environment in 
which the starting point was: ‘If it is not permitted, it is forbidden’.
Without a reason to be modified, the old attitudes tended to persist, and indi-
cations of them can still be seen today. For example, a financial career in the City 
of London is a symbol, even a caricature, of English middle-class respectability, 
whereas corresponding caricatures in France are the civil service, engineering, 
medicine and (private) law.
The two jurisdictions also differed in their commercial legal history. There is a 
degree of commonality between them, the result of some common ancestry in the 
lex mercatoria (literally ‘merchant law’, also called ‘law merchant’). This is alleged 
by some to have been an international body of rules, created and applied by the 
merchants themselves in all Western Europe (often in their own courts) but is 
thought by others not to have existed in this form, or at all (see, eg, Sachs, 2006). 
Whatever the truth of the matter, normative phenomena of some sort did exist in 
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various fields, together with doctrinal writing on the subject, and they influenced 
the law of both jurisdictions.
However, there were also some important differences. In England, the com-
mercial courts of the Middle Ages gradually disappeared. The insertion of com-
mercial law into the common law and its further development were effected by 
the common law judges. They partially used common law techniques, dealing 
with problems as they arose in cases, making no formal distinction between it 
and other parts of the law. This pragmatic approach was of great value in ground-
ing the evolving law in the practice of merchants. Lord Mansfield (Chief Justice 
1756–88), the master architect of English commercial law, even went as far as 
appointing businessmen to his juries and inviting them to dinner to learn about 
their practices. It seems that the new system was also significantly influenced by 
Continental ideas on the lex mercatoria.15 The law so developed was a product of 
the time described above. It had a favourable attitude towards private property 
rights and free markets, and gave great freedom to business people, pragmatically 
taking account of and sanctioning their practices whenever possible. The system 
received statutory support at crucial junctures, notably at the end of the 19th 
century by the enactment of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, the Partnership Act 1890, 
the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 and the Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
The most striking characteristics of the resulting regime include: (i) its relative 
autonomy from other areas of law, allowing a marked difference of approach to 
business-to-business as opposed to business-to-consumer and consumer-to-
consumer transactions; (ii) the principle of the encouragement of commerce (it 
leads, the law follows); (iii) pragmatism, including the encapsulation of experi-
ence and the result of creativity in standard documentation (see McKendrick, 
2003: chapter 12); (iv) a high degree of party autonomy in contracting, resulting 
in flexibility and adaptability;16 (v) considerable scope for creativity by the lawyers 
(see Cranston, 1997: 218–19); (vi) certainty (once parties are contractually bound, 
the courts tend to hold them to their bargain, favouring certainty over fairness in 
the individual case, with minimal protection for the weak or the ignorant—
The attitude of the old common law judges was that life in the business world is rough 
and tough and you should not get into it if you do not know what you are doing (Goode, 
1992);
(vii) the existence of specialised fields, created by a combination of party auton-
omy, certainty of contractual obligation and standard form documents; (viii) the 
fairly efficient and relatively quick resolution of problems, notably through self-
help; and (ix) the specialised knowledge and skill of commercial lawyers.
On the negative side, the law is apparently incoherent, ‘a collocation of ill-
assorted statutes bedded down on an amorphous mass of constantly shifting case 
15 The degree to which rules were imported (or existed in a form which could be imported) is dis-
puted. See, eg Volckart and Mangels, 1999 and Cordes, 2005.
16 See Kum v Wah Tat Bank Ltd [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 439 at 444 (PC), per Lord Devlin.
272  Nicholas HD Foster
law’ (Goode, 2004: 1203), and it is therefore inaccessible to anyone other than a 
specialist. It is relatively inflexible from the statutory point of view, for Parliament 
deals with commercial law only rarely and reluctantly, a situation which has led 
our most eminent academic authority to write that: ‘our parliamentary machin-
ery is wholly inadequate for modern commerce’ (Goode, 2001: 760). The same 
author has argued that contemporary English commercial law is failing to adapt 
to modern conditions (ibid).
In France, the development of commercial law was, for the most part, separate 
from the civil law. Growing up initially through trade with England, Flanders, 
Germany and Italy at the fairs in Brie, Champagne and later Lyons, it drew on 
various sources, such as the statutory law of the Italian cities, parts of Roman 
law (adapted for commercial use), collections of customs and case-law, local 
regulations and Italian doctrinal literature.17 In contrast to the judge-led develop-
ments across the Channel, the system was centralised by government action (one 
cannot at this stage talk of it being incorporated into French law, as only local 
laws existed), notably by the creation of commercial courts and two important 
codifications, the Ordonnance sur le commerce de terre of 1673 (‘Land Commerce 
Ordinance’) and the Ordonnance sur la marine of 1681 (‘Marine Ordinance’). 
However, it must also be said that the Ordinances were based on the experience 
and input of practitioners.
When the new French legal system was created, the Ordinances formed the 
basis of commercial law, to which was assigned the role of a set of adjuncts to, and 
derogations from, the civil law. One consequence of this arrangement is that civil 
law thinking influences commercial law to some degree. Take the indivisible and 
land-based principle of property, the principles requiring a high level of contractual 
certainty, or the restrictive attitude towards transfers of rights. To the common law-
yer, the first principle seems too inflexible, the last two over-protective. Indeed, some 
French colleagues share the common lawyer’s feeling. According to a noted com-
pany law scholar, the French ‘legal system all too often surrounds [business people] 
with a climate of systematic suspicion’ (Guyon, 1990: 948—my translation).
Another result of the subordinate status of commercial law was that less atten-
tion was paid to it than to civil law and a less satisfactory product emerged. The 
Commercial Code was less well drafted, rapidly went out of date and, as further 
legislation was passed in specialist areas, became more and more irrelevant until 
its replacement in 2000. Even now, levels of logic, structure and coherence are sig-
nificantly lower than in civil law. The legal profession was prevented from doing 
as much to improve the situation as it might have done in England by another 
consequence of centralisation, the dominance of legislation, resulting in less flex-
ibility and less adaptability.
On the other hand, the extent of the differences should not be exaggerated. 
Both jurisdictions provide reasonably efficient commercial law regimes, and there 
17 This list comes from Hilaire, 1986: 27.
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has recently been a degree of convergence.18 English law modified its laissez-faire 
law of contract, and has recently adopted a more ‘social’ attitude, evidenced, inter 
alia, by the legislation providing for automatic interest on late payment of debts 
(the Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 1998—a measure designed 
to protect small businesses) and the new administration procedure contained 
in the Enterprise Act 2002, the main aim of which is to save viable businesses 
experiencing temporary problems. A new creativity is evident in the French legal 
profession (Paillusseau, 1997). And the French system is superior in some ways. 
It is more apparently accessible than English law, especially since the coming into 
force of the 2000 Commercial Code, which has remedied many of its predecessor’s 
defects, and the legislator plays a more active role than in England, a considerable 
advantage in the modern age, which often requires detailed statutory regimes.
We can see from this account that the English and French commercial law 
regimes result from historical processes in which differing attitudes to commerce 
have produced different results. Those attitudes, which one can, with some justi-
fication, call ‘cultural’, were determined by the broader (economic, social, military, 
political, philosophical etc) context, as well as by the history and culture of the 
English and French legal systems.
Specific Examples
Some specific examples may shed some more light on the matter.
Consider the Centros case.19 English law does not require the payment of a min-
imum amount of capital on formation of a company; Danish law requires pay-
ment of a substantial sum. Two Danish resident nationals incorporated Centros 
Limited in England solely in order to avoid the Danish requirement. The company 
applied to set up a branch in Denmark, but the application was refused. Centros 
claimed that the refusal was a denial of its EC law right to freedom of establish-
ment. The Danish government claimed that their law protected ‘the interests of [a 
company’s] employees and creditors’, so the refusal was justified.20 The European 
Court of Justice found in favour of Centros.
The case seems to show the influence of general cultural attitudes on law. In 
Denmark, the protection of the individual, including creditors, and particularly 
employees, is considered vital, and companies are seen as having a social, as well 
as a profit-making, function. This view can be contrasted with that prevalent in 
18 But see the World Bank assessment of how easy it is to do business in France, which has caused 
a considerable stir there. In the 2006 survey, for example, France was ranked overall 35th in the world, 
the United Kingdom 6th (http://www.doingbusiness.org/).
19 C–212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen [2000] Ch 446 (ECJ);  see, eg, Looijestijn-
Clearie, 2000; see also C–167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire 
Art Ltd [2003] ECR I–10155 (ECJ) and C–208/00 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company 
Baumanagement GmbH [2002] ECR I9919 (ECJ).
20 Ibid [2000] Ch 446 at 454, per Advocate General La Pergola.
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the United Kingdom, where it is considered more important to encourage busi-
ness in order to stimulate economic activity, thereby creating jobs in a more fluid 
employment market, and where companies are seen as no more than mechanisms 
to make money for shareholders. The Danish general cultural attitude has affected 
Danish legal culture, so that it has become an article of faith that a company must 
have a substantial minimum capital in order to provide a reasonable assurance 
that it will be able to pay its creditors. The attachment to this attitude was so 
strong that the Danish government expended a considerable amount of resources 
defending the rule, despite the fact that minimum capital requirements do not in 
fact provide adequate protection in most cases.
Another example from company law can be found in the People’s Republic of 
China, which had no general company law from the Communist takeover until 
1994. As well as being mechanisms for the private concentration and exploitation 
of capital, joint stock companies are also concentrations of power outside the 
state. In communist ideology, neither has a place in the polity. Once the enforce-
ment of communist ideology was relaxed, company law was introduced: a clear 
example of a direct link between general culture and the law.
Moving to transactions, we see sharp cultural contrasts when considering 
Islamic law. In finance, the foundation of the Western system is interest. Islamic 
law forbids riba, roughly ‘illegitimate gain’. The consensus among scholars is 
that riba includes interest. The entire field of Islamic finance law is based on this 
cultural/religious difference: another clear example of the influence of general 
culture on law.
Security law provides some striking examples.
—   Numerus clausus. Commercial law must be able to adapt to changing com-
mercial needs and practices. This can be done by the legislator, but courts may 
play just as important a role, and they should be allowed to do so. However, 
French legal culture is obstructive rather than helpful in this regard, because that 
pillar of civilian mentality, the dominance of legislation, is fixed in security law by 
means of the numerus clausus principle, ie the rule that the list of security mecha-
nisms is closed (exceptions do exist) (Foster, 1997–98: 14).21
—   Universal security. In modern economies, it is considered important to 
encourage lending. One way of doing this is to allow lenders to take security over 
all the assets, present and future, of commercial borrowers (‘universal security’). 
In England this is so normal that it is hardly ever discussed. In France, such a 
grant was for many years viewed as dangerous, because it would allow financiers 
to abuse the power it gives them (Foster, 2002: 61–2).22 This attitude was no doubt 
comprehensible in the Middle Ages when the economy was overwhelmingly rural 
and borrowers were vulnerable, but to the common lawyer it does not seem to 
be justified in the 21st century, when many businesses are just as sophisticated 
21 But note the 2006 reforms.
22 See also below on the ‘modernisation’ of the law in this regard.
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as their banks and the non-commercial borrower is protected by consumer and 
financial services law.
—   Fragmentation. Efficient security regimes provide general mechanisms 
which can apply to broad categories of assets, reducing complexity and transac-
tion costs. Civilian regimes, however, are typically fragmented, with one type of 
statutory regime per type of asset. Attempts have been made in Italy to encourage 
borrowing by widening the categories of asset which may be given in security. 
The first attempt, however, shows the degree to which the drafters remain con-
ditioned by their legal culture. The reform consisted of a law on pledging hams 
(prosciutti)... To the common lawyer, this is needlessly specific, therefore expen-
sive and inefficient. The introduction of a new, and general, regime (Article 9 of 
the United States Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is a model which has been 
followed elsewhere) was literally unthinkable. More recently, a ‘rotating pledge’ 
(pegno rotativo) has been recognised by the courts, but it still falls far short of 
the flexibility of the English floating charge. The Civil Code, however, contains 
detailed provisions concerning such rural matters as swarms of bees, trained ani-
mals, rabbits and fish.23
In the first two instances above, legal culture has frozen the law. In the third, it 
has, in the view of the common lawyer and some Italian commercial practitioners, 
stultified its development.
In a related field, the transfer of rights and obligations, very early in its history 
English law allowed the transfer of rights to payment of money without notice to 
the debtor. Civilian lawyers still regard such transfers as wrong, even distasteful, to 
the extent that when the English law position is explained to them some find it so 
outlandish that they are convinced the lecturer has made a mistake. Once again, 
the rationale for the attitude, mainly the possibility of ‘Nasty Creditor’ taking 
the place of ‘Nice Creditor’ and enslaving the debtor or sending her to prison for 
non-payment, disappeared many years ago. Once again, legal culture has frozen 
the law.
Various useful examples come from an area of particular importance for com-
parative legal studies, that of ‘legal transplants’.24
—   Unsuitability. The ‘classic’ issue in this area is the potential unsuitability of 
the transplant for the host jurisdiction. The argument runs that if law is developed 
in, by and for the context of jurisdiction A, then introducing it into the different 
context of jurisdiction B will not lead to the same results in B as are produced in A. 
This may not be problematic if the transplanted law still produces useful results, but 
it is possible that the results will be less good or even non-existent. So if context 
23 Pledging hams: Law of 24 July 1985, no 401. The rotating pledge was first recognised by first 
instance courts in the late 1980s. It was sanctioned by the Court of Cassation judgment of 28 May 
1998, no 5264. The references to animals are contained in Arts 924–926 of the Italian Civil Code. Many 
thanks to Emanuele Bosia for the information.
24 The transfer of an item of law from one legal system to another: the very term is controversial, 
hence the inverted commas.
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influences commercial law, we should see problems. Take Albania. The law of 
insolvency was introduced despite the almost total lack of commercial lending 
and is therefore, for the time being at any rate, irrelevant (Channell, 2005: 5–6).
An intriguing instance in which an (ineffective?) attempt was made to deal 
with the issue was the introduction of Western company law into Russia. It 
was realised that ‘effective corporate law is context-specific’; that in developed 
countries it ‘evolved in tandem with supporting legal institutions’, including, 
for example, judges skilled in corporate law; that it developed against a certain 
cultural background; and that introducing United States law into a jurisdiction 
of ‘insider-controlled companies, malfunctioning courts, weak and sometimes 
corrupt regulators, and poorly developed capital markets’ was pointless (Black 
and Kraakman, 1996: 1914).
Phenomena other than unsuitability also merit consideration in the commer-
cial context. They include technical incompetence, lack of enforcement, sidelining 
and adaptation, isolation.
—   Technical incompetence. Since a legal regime is part of the regimes and the legal 
system in which it is embedded, on a purely technical level it must be properly 
inserted into the host jurisdiction. For example, when the Ottoman government 
attempted to import French company law, they failed to enact some essential parts 
of the French legislation because, according to Chibli Mallat:
the Ottoman legislator forgot that it was in the French civil code, and not in the com-
mercial code, that the main regulations of commercial companies are to be found 
(Mallat, 2000: 102).
—   Lack of enforcement is a common problem. Examples abound. We can cite the 
example of Albania again:
Albanian lawyers today often speak proudly of the new system, noting, however, that 
the new laws are European, not Albanian, and that they are not actually being applied 
(Channell, 2005: 5).
—   Sidelining occurs when some item of commercial law is imported, used and 
enforced but, since it was not developed within the host legal system, never really 
‘takes’, never really puts down roots. So it is not reformed or adapted to current 
needs, or is reformed without proper care (Pistor, Keinan, Kleinheisterkamp and 
West, 2002: 840–41).25
—   We see adaptation in the French acceptance of a type of universal security 
(previously frowned upon as seen above), but ‘civilised’ before being absorbed 
into its new environment.26
25 Where they identify problems of ‘lethargy’ and ‘erratic change’.
26 See the new ‘gage des stocks’ (pledge of stocks), Art L527 of the French Commercial Code.[TS 
please line space]
Comparative Commercial Law  277
—   Isolation can be regarded as a typical solution of cultural difference in the 
commercial field, a compromise adaptation to accommodate dominant Anglo-
Saxon ideas. An otherwise objectionable commercial legal regime is corralled 
into a confined space, for use only by the commercial community, protecting the 
rest of the legal system from contamination. Take the United Arab Emirates. It 
has a Western-inspired commercial code, largely insulated from the Islamically-
grounded civil code, and has recently transplanted English law into the Dubai 
International Financial Centre, a geographical area set aside as a separate jurisdic-
tion (see Blair and Orchard, 2005). Or take the passing of specific laws in civilian 
jurisdictions allowing the transfer of rights without notice to the debtor in certain 
defined, commercial, circumstances (see Foster, 2003–04: 79–80).
Finally, the influence of legal culture on commercial law can also be seen in 
an area which is quite closely linked to legal transplants, the harmonisation of 
‘lawyers’ law’. Such harmonisation is generally thought to be easily achieved, 
because it is not cultural. In fact, though, the opposite can be true, because it is 
very much part of the culture of the lawyers concerned. So if lawyers play a sig-
nificant role in the process, and they usually do, the influence of legal culture can 
be considerable. One example is the United Nations Conventions on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, 1980 (CISG), which is interpreted differently in 
different legal cultures, despite the very considerable efforts expended in trying to 
make it uniform (see Baasch Andersen, 2005).
II.  COMPARATIVE CULTURE IN COMMERCIAL LAW?27
What conclusions can we draw? First, a caveat. The examples were chosen on the 
basis of the author’s knowledge and experience rather than by rigorous scientific 
method, so it cannot be claimed that they are comprehensive. It is submitted, 
though, that they are sufficiently numerous and varied to provide reasonably reli-
able, if admittedly somewhat anecdotal, evidence.
Subject to this, it seems clear that commercial law regimes must be considered 
as part of a network of regimes.28 We can therefore say that a local element, the 
interaction with other local regimes, is relevant. This conclusion alone, however, 
does not necessarily affect the core of the instrumentalist view. One might argue 
that such an interaction is a technical legal matter, and that it proves nothing 
about the significance of the extra-legal context.
It does seem clear, though, that the law can be influenced by historically and 
culturally conditioned attitudes to commerce, and that these vary from one soci-
ety to another. We have seen, for instance, that the historical and cultural back-
grounds which influenced the development of commercial law in England and 
France, two neighbouring Western European jurisdictions, were quite different, 
27 A phrase coined by Anthony Dicks as the title for the MA course taught by the author.
28 See the Ottoman and Russian company law examples above.
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leading to legal differences. We have seen that Islam regards as sinful something 
on which the Western world has built its economy, resulting in the development 
of Islamic finance. And we have seen that divergent views about the role of com-
panies in society prevail in Denmark and the United Kingdom, informing aspects 
of their company law.
This is not to say that the link between cultural attitudes to commerce and the 
law is necessarily direct. In certain situations it can be: recall such examples as the 
lack of company law in the People’s Republic of China until 1994, Islamic finance, 
and some instances of unsuitability and lack of enforcement of legal transplants. 
But it can also be indirect. We have observed above instances of cultural attitudes 
to commerce influencing legal culture and the law (the Centros case, French secu-
rity law, the problems of sidelining, adaptation and isolation in legal transplants, 
and the problems associated with the harmonisation of ‘lawyers’ law’).
In addition, another cultural element, legal culture, must be taken into account. 
What seems like a purely technical regime to the lay person may have the force of 
culture for a lawyer working in that field.
So the instrumentalist view is wrong, as was our belligerent enquirer—who, by 
the way, did not return. Commercial law is historically and culturally conditioned.
Let us return to, and adapt, the formulation of the instrumentalist view. 
Commerce is in fact ‘close to people’s lives’, because it relates to such ‘rules of the 
game of economic struggle’ (Kennedy, 1991: 327) as the distribution of property 
among social groups, the concentration of power in society, the ‘set of prior 
choices about the role of the state and the private sector in responding to change’ 
(Mahoney, 2001: 504), and the morality of interactions between people. Therefore 
it is affected by cultural attitudes. Business people everywhere may just want to 
make money, but they are still people, who function in a culturally determined 
mentality. Since commercial law concerns the facilitation and regulation of com-
merce, it, too, may be affected by cultural attitudes (so long as the law reflects 
those attitudes). So a given commercial law regime may well not be a mere instru-
ment formulated to perform technical functions in a technical field.
It follows that, since cultural attitudes to commerce will differ from one society 
to another, local variations in commercial law which reflect those differences are not 
mere accidents, and may be difficult to change effectively. In particular it may be dif-
ficult to change them so as to make the law uniform across various types of society, 
and legal culture may prove to be a strong conservative force in this regard.
It also follows that comparative commercial law can be of considerable value 
for the advancement of comparative law knowledge and should be treated, by and 
large, in the same way as other comparative law topics. The subject has its idiosyn-
crasies, of course, but this is true of all areas. It is not inherently different.
One must be careful, though, not to generalise too broadly or exagger-
ate and, in addition to the cautious wording of the text above, several caveats 
should be made. The relationship between cultural attitudes to commerce and 
commercial law may be remote, complex, unexpected, and difficult to disentangle. 
For example, law and legal culture may reflect attitudes to commerce prevalent when 
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the law was developed, rather than those prevalent now, with the result that the main 
obstacle to change is not a general, but a legal, cultural attitude which may be over-
ridden (if there is sufficient political will, for example). One can see this in the case 
of the apparent aversion to universal security in French law, which did not prevent 
recent reforms allowing security over present and future assets (so long as the latter are 
adequately specified) and a security over stock. In other words, legal cultural attitudes 
relating to this regime were not as strong as they appeared, and were not effective as 
barriers to reform of the law.29 Furthermore, if the law is a transplant, cultural atti-
tudes underlying it may be of little or no relevance to the host society. And in some 
instances, for example where the group of people practising and using the law is quite 
homogenous (as in international financial law), the broader context may not be of 
great importance, and the law can be treated for most purposes as technical.
More generally, nothing herein should be taken as denying that significant 
commonalities of attitude towards commerce exist among societies, nor that simi-
larities in legal results exist among apparently different legal systems. Of course 
they do. Nor should anything herein be taken as denying that globalising forces 
have extended and deepened a significant number of such commonalities. Of 
course they have. But similar is not the same, and appearances can be deceptive.
To recap, using the words of William Allen, a former Chancellor of the 
Delaware Court of Chancery (writing of corporation law—the principle is the 
same for commercial law):
Every general field of law embraces materials from which analysis can unearth the deepest 
questions that our social life recurringly presents to us. In some fields of law such questions 
lie near the surface ... Other fields of law ... appear or are more technical, more narrowly 
‘legal’. In such fields, legal problems may seem less pregnant with potentialities and answers 
may seem ... less controversial. It is easy in such fields to lose sight of—indeed it may some-
times be difficult to ever catch a first glimpse of—the contestable philosophical or political pre-
suppositions that lie at their foundations, buried beneath the legal superstructure. Corporation 
law is such a field (Allen, 1993: 1395, emphasis added).
It also follows that the instrumentalist view can only give satisfactory results 
where there is a close commonality between cultural attitudes to commerce and 
legal cultures in the relevant societies. Witness the examples above, none of which 
can be adequately analysed using a solely rule-based approach. If such a close 
commonality does not exist, the instrumentalist view leads to poor service to 
clients, ineffective legislation and little used harmonised regimes. On the other 
hand, a contextual approach leads to numerous benefits: a consciousness of 
difference in the formulation, practice, interpretation and enforcement of the law; 
29 For the new pledge see Art 2333 of the Civil Code; for the new pledge of stock see Art L527 of 
the Commercial Code. A summary of the new law is set out at http://www.justice.gouv.fr/presse/
conf220306.htm. See generally, Le Nabasque and Adelle, 2005. On the other hand, attitudes found in 
legal culture may also persist, perhaps in a modified form, in general culture, which itself can be influ-
enced by legal culture. It is also noteworthy that the 2006 French security law reforms were effected by 
means of the adaptation of French law, not the wholesale import of, say, Art 9 of the UCC.
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a better understanding of law and lawyers from other jurisdictions; an outsider’s 
perspective on your own law; and an appreciation that the difficulties associated 
with legal transplants, harmonisation and the relationship between law and soci-
ety have the potential to apply just as much to commercial matters as to any other 
field. It also leads, one hopes, to better service to clients, more effective legislation 
and more successful harmonisation, for: ‘In order to be efficient, you must avoid 
being blocked in your own universe’ (Garnot, 1995: 351).
How should a contextual study be conducted? Only the briefest of discussions 
is possible here. Contextual does not mean ‘woolly’. Mastery of the legal techni-
calities is essential, as is a sound understanding of the history, general culture and 
legal cultures of the jurisdictions concerned and the relationship between them. 
One must also have a reasonable grasp of the essentials of comparative law meth-
odology, harmonisation theory and legal transplant theory, and do one’s best to 
acquire at least the fundamental notions of other relevant disciplines. The most 
essential tool, though, is an open and inquiring mind.
The contextual approach has its drawbacks. The acquisition of the necessary 
knowledge requires much time and effort. Materials may only be available in 
unfamiliar languages, difficult to find, or both. The factors which one should ide-
ally take into account are so numerous that one cannot be truly systematic, and 
one may well be superficial. It is easy to make mistakes, including, notably, those 
induced by subjectivity. Venturing into other, complex, disciplines runs the risk of 
amateurism, and those disciplines are full of controversies and debates, so clear-
cut answers are rarely, if ever, provided.30
In other words, the contextual approach is a counsel of perfection, an unattain-
able goal. On the other hand, although the outcomes will necessarily be imperfect, 
they will be much superior to those derived from the study of rules alone. And the 
journey towards them will be more interesting—dare one say more fun?
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
 1.  Does the literature on legal transplants give commercial lawyers the 
answers they need to solve the problems they encounter in today’s world?
 2.  You are taking part in the revision of the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance, 2004 (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf). 
What comparative law considerations will you need to bear in mind when 
undertaking this work?
 3.  ‘English commercial law was invented by the judges as a tool for the devel-
opment and continuation of the British Empire. French commercial law 
was the poor relation of the Civil Code.’ Discuss.
 4.  Does it really matter that the civilian law relating to the transfer of receiv-
ables requires notice to the debtor, given that the legislator has intervened 
in the most important areas?
30 Much of this paragraph comes from a lecture by Camilla Baasch Andersen.
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Administrative Law in a Comparative 
Perspective
JOHN BELL
KEY CONCEPTS
Administration; Administrative procedure; Discretionary powers; Duty to 
give a hearing; Duty to give reasons; Fundamental rights; Incompetence; 
Judicial Review; Legitimate expectations; Liability of the administra-
tion; Misuse of powers; Public body; Public Law and Private Law; 
Proportionality; Rule of law; Standards of good administration; State; 
Ultra vires.
I.  INTRODUCTION
A
dministrative law is about the institutions and powers of the executive 
branch of government and the controls exercised by law over them. The 
term ‘the administration’ has no specific meaning in many legal systems, 
but it is a convenient label to cover central and local government, as well as the 
variety of public bodies that may exist.
The main questions for any comparison of legal systems are:
 1.  What does each system include within its conception of ‘administrative 
law’?
 2.  Who is governed by ‘administrative law’? In particular, how are the rules 
of public law separated from those of private law?
 3. What powers does ‘the administration’ have?
 4.  What procedures does the administration have to adopt when making 
decisions?
 5. Who provides remedies against the administration?
 6. What judicial control is exercised over misuse of powers?
 7.  When is the administration liable for its actions and how is this liability 
different from that of a private individual?
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II.  WHAT IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW?
Rules on Powers or Rules on Remedies?
The label ‘administrative law’ is used in different ways in different legal sys-
tems. In continental European traditions, administrative law (droit adminis-
tratif, Verwaltungsrecht)1 is concerned with the powers and organisation of the 
executive organs of the state. The common law use of the term ‘administrative 
law’ is more synonymous with ‘administrative litigation’ (contentieux admin-
istrative, Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit), and even in the common law world the 
topic is often called ‘judicial review (of administrative action)’. ‘Administrative 
law’ is best used to identify a general body of principles that govern the organ-
isation, powers and procedures of the administration and the rules governing 
the remedies (judicial or otherwise) available for breaches of those principles. 
These remedies cover both the judicial review of the exercise of powers and 
administrative liability. 
What is Specific About Administrative Law Rules?
A second area of difficulty in comparison lies in the scope of administrative law. 
In one important sense, administrative law includes all the rules and principles 
that apply to the administration. But this usage would be unnecessarily broad. 
If the distinctive feature of administrative law is the organisation and exercise 
of public power, then our attention is focused more on aspects that involve the 
exercise of state authority or the organisation of public services, rather than on 
everything that a state body might do. There is no particular reason why the 
ordering of newspapers for the common room of city councillors or liability 
for an accident caused by the mayor’s official car should be governed by rules 
that are different from those governing similar activities in the lives of ordinary 
individuals. These situations are typically governed by the general law of the 
land. ‘Administrative law’ is therefore best confined to those rules and principles 
that apply in a distinctive manner to the organisation and actions of the state, its 
organs and other public bodies. Within the scope of this distinctive law, it is usual 
to distinguish between rules and principles of general application, and the special 
rules that apply either to a particular type of public body (eg local authorities) 
or to a particular sphere of activity (eg housing law or environmental law). This 
chapter is limited to the general principles of administrative law, and it does not 
cover special administrative law.
1 This chapter uses mainly English, French and German terminology. Although these are the major 
European traditions of administrative law, there are important differences between these particular 
legal systems and those that are closely related to them. When studying the relationship between any 
two particular legal systems, the reader will have to be aware of possible differences.
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III.  WHO IS GOVERNED BY ‘ADMINISTRATIVE LAW’?: 
PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE LAW
The general principles of administrative law apply to ‘the administration’ or the 
executive branch of government. But the difficulty is that there is usually no 
single institution which is called ‘the administration’. There are a variety of bodies 
through which governments act or through which public services are delivered. 
There are government departments, local government, public corporations or 
agencies. But, in addition, foundations and even private corporations or associa-
tions can be closely involved in delivering public services and may be given special 
powers. So are these also included as bodies regulated by administrative law?
In order to express the difference between the distinctive rules of administrative 
law and the general rules of law, legal systems typically distinguish between ‘public 
law’ and ‘private law’ to draw the boundary.2 The distinction between public law 
and private law is drawn either in terms of activity, focusing on the distinctive 
mission and values of public law, or in terms of the legal form of institutions, 
focusing either on certain organisations through which public power is exercised 
or services are delivered, or on the courts and tribunals through which redress for 
administrative wrongdoing is provided.
The French tradition (and that of the countries such as Spain and Italy that are 
connected to it) adopts an activity-based distinction between public and private 
law. It attributes a distinctive mission to public law. Public law is concerned with 
the common good, not private advantage, a view articulated by Ulpian (Digest 
1.1.1.2) in the 3rd century. The state is given special powers and is authorised 
to act only if it serves the public good. A good example would be the power of 
the state to expropriate private property for public utility upon the payment 
of compensation (Erasmus, 1990). A private person has to buy the property of 
another, and can only do so when that other person is willing to sell. The state 
can expropriate, even where the property owner objects. The public good justifies 
its special position. Another area would be emergency powers, where the state 
can detain or expel people or requisition their property against their consent in 
ways that are not permissible to a private individual.3 In both cases, the state is 
authorised to restrict the rights of individuals without their consent in order to 
promote the common good. The ‘common good’ is traditionally seen as the prod-
uct of national political decision-making processes. But in more recent times, the 
emphasis has been on the need for at least some minimum set of requirements 
that must be satisfied by a state claiming the ‘common good’ in order to satisfy 
international standards of human rights protection. 
Even this idea of a mission to promote the common good remains difficult to 
apply. One of the indicators for such a mission can be whether a body has been 
2 For an example, see CERAP, Le contrôle juridictionnel de l’Administration (Paris, Economica, 
1991).
3 See International Commission of Jurists, States of Emergency: their Impact on Human Rights 
(Geneva 1983). 
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given powers that exceed those of a private individual (as is clear in the case of 
expropriation). Where special powers are being exercised, then this needs special 
regulation. The public interest many not only authorise the state to interfere 
with the rights of private individuals, but may confer on the state special privi-
leges. This occurs, for example in the provision of public services, where a public 
provider is exempt from many of the restrictions of competition law in order to 
enable it to provide a service in the general interest. For example, European Union 
law has increasingly identified special rules relating to ‘services in the general 
interest’. These two criteria of public law find their expression in the European 
Union doctrine of ‘organ of the state’ for the purpose of direct effect. In Foster 
v British Gas plc4 the European Court of Justice held that a body is treated as an 
organ of the state, whatever its legal form, if it is providing a public service under 
the control of the state and has special powers for that purpose that go beyond 
those which exist in relations between individuals. 
Although the distinction between actions undertaken for the common good and 
those undertaken for private advantage is easy to state, it is hard to apply. In some 
situations, the administration is only one provider, among many, of social activities, 
for example sports facilities. If these happen to be run by the community through a 
local council, rather than by a private company, is there really any special social policy 
that makes this administrative activity different in character from that of the private 
sector? (see Flogaitis, 1986: chapter two) If the sports facility is run as part of a ‘fitness 
for all’ programme at subsidised prices, it is possible to argue that the activity is differ-
ent in character from a profit-making private leisure club. Different countries operate 
here in different ways. The English or Dutch traditions would now treat some public 
services, such as electricity, gas or transport, as essentially private activities with some 
limited public obligations for which the public pays. By contrast the French tradition 
would confer on these activities a special mission in the service of the public good, 
and would treat the operators as participating in this mission (Brown and Bell, 1998: 
131–4). The practical consequence of the difference in approach is that in France the 
relationship between the operator of the service and the government is essentially a 
matter of public law, and public law principles on contracts and liability apply. When 
exercising the powers conferred on a public service provider, the private operator is 
exercising public power. In the English tradition, the relationship is essentially of a 
commercial service provider operating within constraints of the government’s super-
visory power.
In the German tradition, the distinction between public law and private law is 
essentially a matter of whether the institution has the legal form of a public law 
organisation or a private law organisation. Different rules govern each category of 
organisation. The result is that, once an activity is transferred to the private sector, 
it ceases to be treated as a public law activity. As a result, it makes sense to present 
the system in terms of the powers of local authorities, schools, the police and so 
4 Case C–188/89 Foster v British Gas plc [1990] ECR I–3313 (ECJ).
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on, and to differentiate the way these can behave from the behaviour of private 
individuals and companies.
A different institutional approach relates to the courts which have jurisdiction over 
issues. The common law approach focuses on a distinction between public law rem-
edies and private law remedies, each of which is provided in a different way. Such a 
distinction does not clearly focus on the powers which certain bodies must have in the 
first place, but more on the remedies available when they misbehave. In part, the need 
for such remedies lies in the issue of standing. Only parties who have rights affected 
by a private contract or wrong can sue. In public law, a wider group of people are fre-
quently held to have a legitimate interest in a decision, even if no rights of theirs have 
been affected. [Even then this distinction is not as sharp as between systems that have 
distinct courts for dealing with the administration and those that deal with private 
and criminal law matters.] This is discussed in more detail below. 
Questions for Discussion
 1.  What does each system mean by the notion of ‘public law’ as opposed to 
private law? How far do the systems apply different rules because of the 
nature of the activity or simply because of the kind of organisation that is 
engaged in a particular activity?
 2.  What is the consequence of declaring an issue to be a matter of public law? 
Do special rules apply? Does the body undertaking the activity have spe-
cial powers and responsibilities? Will special remedies apply if something 
goes wrong?
IV.  THE ALLOCATION OF POWERS
Sources
The powers of the administration are derived either because of the character of 
its activity (inherent powers) or because specific powers have been attributed to 
it by the legislature. French and English laws recognise that certain powers ought 
to belong inherently to government, even in the absence of specific authorisation. 
In England, these are typically the prerogative powers of the Crown, eg to make 
war and sign treaties, to maintain public order, to grant honours and the like. A 
controversial example in recent times came when the Home Secretary provided 
weapons to a local police force without the approval of its immediate superior, 
the local police authority.5 Although there was no specific power, it was held that 
this was inherently a power of the Crown to regulate public order. The French 
Constitutional Council has likewise recognised the power of the government to 
regulate public order, eg in controlling hunting, even in the absence of specific 
legislative powers to this effect.6 In France, certain actions in the field of foreign 
5 Eg R v Home Secretary, ex p Northumbria Police Authority [1989] QB 26 (CA).
6 CC decision 87–149L, 20 February 1987, Rec 22. See also Bell, 1992: 288. 
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affairs, the deployment of armed forces and the grant of honours are recognised 
powers of the government, often now mentioned in the Constitution (Articles 15, 
16 and 30). 
A second group of inherent powers are recognised in relation to the organisa-
tion of the civil service. In addition, and unlike in England, the French recognise 
an inherent power to create and operate public services. There is debate whether 
the organisation of the civil service is a ‘prerogative’ in the strict sense, because the 
government appears to be acting no differently from a private business in orga-
nising its employees and internal activities. But the special protection typically 
offered by the law to public employees, and their responsibility to the public ser-
vice and not just to their political masters, marks civil servants out as distinct.7
A third activity that may be seen as inherent is the power to make contracts 
or to dispose of property. Again, these seem at first sight to be activities that any 
legal person might undertake. The public interest, however, imposes a distinctive 
approach to making such transactions—they are undertaken not in the self-interest 
of the organisation but to serve the public, and there are distinctive requirements of 
procedure to ensure the even-handed treatment of potential contractors.
Predominantly, the powers in question relate to the functions of the ‘night-
watchman state’—defence, internal public order, the internal organisation of the 
government service and contracts. In both England and France, such inherent 
powers have been largely, but not completely, overtaken by specific legislation. 
Nonetheless, Article 21 of the French Constitution of 1958 confers inherent pow-
ers on the Prime Minister to take measures to implement legislation passed by the 
Parliament and also grants inherent powers to legislate in areas not specifically 
identified by Article 34 of the Constitution as falling within the competence of 
Parliament.
The advantage of inherent powers is that the government can act on new policy 
in a speedy way. For example, in England, the creation of agencies within the 
civil service (the so-called ‘Next Steps Agencies’) to manage the delivery of public 
services in areas such as social security benefits was achieved without the need 
for legislation. But the privatisation of nationalised industries and the creation 
of new public sector organisations, such as NHS trusts, have required legislation. 
Similarly, French governments can act by decree to re-organise the structures of a 
public service such as education.
By contrast, German law is more modern in insisting that the administra-
tion only has those powers that have been attributed to it. This is a more com-
mon principle accepted in Europe that the administration needs to receive 
specific authorisation from the legislature for its activities. Its concept of the 
Gesetzesvorbehalt (authorisation by law) is contrasted with the idea of inherent 
powers of the administration found in French law and in the English Crown 
7 See CE 28 June 1918, Heyriès, Leb 651. See also Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the 
Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (HL).
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prerogative. Given the history of dictatorships in so many parts of Europe, the 
reluctance to allow the administration inherent powers is understandable. Article 
20 III of the Basic Law provides that officials are subordinated to the law. In addi-
tion, as Helmut Maurer states:
The principle of the rule of law requires that the legal relationships between the state 
and the citizen should be governed by general legislation, which not only determine 
administrative actions, but also make them foreseeable and calculable for the citizens 
(Maurer, 1994: 98).
Naturally, the law cannot prescribe everything, so the German courts have under-
stood the principle as requiring that the essential rules are laid down by statute. 
For example, in the operation of schools, the legislator cannot leave major mat-
ters to be decided by school administrations, such as the structure of secondary 
schools, requirements that pupils re-sit a year that they have not passed, or on sex 
education.8
Questions for Discussion
 1.  Where are the powers of the administration to be found in the systems you 
are studying?
 2.  Does the system adopt the fundamental principle that legislative powers 
must be authorised by legislation, or does it accept that there are some 
powers which require no specific authorisation?
 3.  Do the powers you are considering come from general legislation (eg laws 
on public procurement) or from specific legislation (eg laws on contracts 
in local government).
The Conception of ‘the State’
The function of the state determines the powers that a particular administration is 
given. Powers have to be interpreted in the light of the role the state is playing in 
society. Where there is what is termed the ‘nightwatchman state’, the administra-
tion has a limited role in society, confined to protecting internal and external order 
and basic rights of individuals. Through the 19th and 20th centuries, the state 
took on a much larger role in securing individual well-being. It created collective 
systems of health care, education, housing and social security. The task of ensur-
ing the basic infrastructure of a modern society has been the role of either local 
or central government through investment in the network utilities of electricity, 
gas, post and telecommunications. The welfare or transforming state had a major 
role in delivering necessary services and also in achieving economic change by the 
activities the state undertook. In this latter role, it often sought to control and own 
8 See BVerfGE 41, 251; BVerfGE 56, 155; BVerfGE 47, 46 and 194.
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the commanding heights of essential industries, such as coal and steel. Since the 
1980s, this model of the state has fallen into decline in Western Europe. It has not 
been thought that the state is good at running industrial activities or even many 
services in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Utilities have been privatised. 
The function of the state is increasingly focused on regulating the private market 
to ensure competition and to secure the availability of certain public services, by 
subsidy if necessary. The deficiencies in the free market are cured not by replacing 
it, as under nationalisation, but by establishing a framework of regulatory rules 
to ensure that the market benefits everyone. The place of governmental activity 
on the spectrum between the models of the welfare state and the regulatory state 
is determined differently in different countries within Europe, depending both 
on the political party in power and on the tradition of government activity. In 
Britain, the National Health Service has been a strongly centralised governmental 
activity funded by a national insurance scheme. In France and in Germany, the 
service is funded largely through private insurance, leading to a more fragmented 
and local pattern of healthcare. The government has less of a role in managing 
the system than in England. By contrast, the British railway system is much more 
privatised than that of France or Germany.
In interpreting powers in the nightwatchman state, there is an assumption that 
the state should interfere as little as possible with individual freedom of action. By 
contrast, in the welfare or transforming state, there is a need for a more benevo-
lent interpretation of the scope of administrative powers in order to ensure that 
there is sufficient scope to undertake the necessary action. Thus, in Germany, an 
explicit power to secure housing was held to include an implied power to provide 
subsidy to tenants.9 
The Devolved State
The constitutional attribution of powers between different levels of govern-
ment is critical. This is most commonly seen in federal countries where there 
is an explicit division of competence between national and regional govern-
ments. In some countries, the principle of subsidiarity governs the relation-
ship between the different levels. This is the case in Germany where the 
Federation only has competence in a number of specified areas and the Länder 
have residual competence. Subsidiarity ensures that decisions are left to the 
local level where possible. Such a principle does not apply to countries that 
have devolved power from the national level, such as the United Kingdom, 
Italy and Spain, where residual power lies with the national parliament and 
government. Even where subsidiarity is a principle relevant to the relationship 
between national and regional governments, it does not normally apply to the 
relationship between national and local governments.
9 BVerfGE 6, 282.
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The State within Supranational Organisations
The competence of the administration is not only controlled by national legis-
lation, but also by supranational rules, whether in the form of treaties such as 
the European Convention on Human Rights, or from the European Union. The 
sources of administrative law will thus not only be national, but supranational. 
On the whole, the inspiration for adapting national administrative law will come 
from the rulings of these supranational bodies, either courts or organisations. 
Thus, ideas for new ways of running the public sector frequently come from 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (www.oecd.org) 
based in Paris. Ideas for common standards of administrative law are developed 
by the Council of Europe or the European Union.
V.  ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
Even if institutions of government are often specific to a particular country, stan-
dards for administrative procedure often have much in common. The comparative 
study of administrative procedures is interesting not just for their content, but also 
for what this topic shows about the sources of administrative law in different juris-
dictions. In a number of countries, there are legal codes governing the procedure 
by which the administration makes decisions, starting in Austria with the General 
Law on Administrative Procedure of 21 July 1925 and in the United States with 
the Administrative Law Procedure Act 1946. Other examples include the German 
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz of 25 May 1976, the Italian law of administrative proce-
dure of 7 August 1990, and the Dutch general law on administration of 1992. Prior 
to these statutes, much of the general law was judge-made, though there were specific 
procedures laid down by statute in relation to specific activities, such as expropriation. 
In other systems, such as the English common law, that mix of judge-made principles 
and sector-specific rules still remains the case. In addition to these different national 
sources, there are broadly conceived transnational standards. Some of these transna-
tional standards are not legally binding, but exercise a general influence over the devel-
opment of the law in particular countries.10 Other standards are set by international 
treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, and are legally binding. 
Comparative law is interested not only in comparing the different national standards, 
but also in how national standards meet international standards.
Such procedural obligations are founded not only on ensuring the protection 
of the subject who is subordinated to the unilateral power of the administration, 
10 See Resolution R (77) 31 of the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe of 28 September 
1977, on the protection of the individual in relations with the state. Rights identified in this Resolution 
included the right of access to administrative documents, the right to legal advice and assistance in 
preparing a case before the administration, and the right to the reasons for the decision and to infor-
mation on rights of appeal. All these involve, in some way, the right to defend individual interests 
against the general interest.
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but also on ensuring accountability for its actions to the citizens of the state. Thus 
the duty to provide reasons not only provides transparency that can enable supe-
riors to exercise control, but also contributes to a better dialogue with citizens. 
A third reason would be the economy and efficiency of administrative decisions. 
Simplicity and comprehensibility in procedures may avoid excessive cost and 
improve the comprehensibility of decisions.
Comparison is undertaken at three levels. The first is a discussion of the general 
principles of administrative procedure. Some experienced commentators suggest 
that the diversity of the activities and purposes of administrative action is such 
that any attempt to develop uniform principles to govern its procedure is bound 
to fail, either because the duties would be too numerous and burdensome for 
many situations, or the rules would be so partial and incomplete as to provide 
inadequate supervision (see Torchia, 1993: 43). For example, the procedures 
appropriate for making decisions in schools may be inappropriate in dealing with 
immigration or planning. A single set of procedures for all these cases would be 
inappropriate. But others consider that there are common standards, grounded 
in ideas of fairness and in the need to simplify procedures for the citizen in her 
dealings with different facets of the administration.11 Most of the ‘principles of 
good administration’ developed in the European Union or the Council of Europe 
are focused on these general standards.
A second level of comparison would focus on the procedures of particular 
administrations or processes. An example would be planning inquiries. Clearly 
the difficulty here is establishing that the institutional context is sufficiently simi-
lar that the procedures followed can be compared in a useful manner.12 The use of 
public hearings as part of planning inquiries is different institutionally from the 
process by which objections to the grant of planning permission are handled in 
France, where public inquiries are restricted to the development of general plans. 
As a result, more planning objection cases end up in court in France. 
A third level would focus on particular procedural duties. Among the issues 
debated in recent years is the duty of decision-makers to provide reasons for their 
decisions and the access of the public to information (Birkinshaw, 2003: chapter six). 
In this context, it is also useful to understand the effect of the breach of a mandatory 
procedural requirement. In most systems, this gives rise to the nullity of a decision.
Duty to Give a Hearing
The duty to give a hearing is a basic principle of all administrative law systems, but it 
is expressed in different ways in different systems. The common law has a principle of 
natural justice that a person has to be heard before a disciplinary or similar decision 
11 See Konijnenbelt, 1993: 64.
12 See the warning of Loughlin, 1993: 44 at 57 about the importance of institutional context in 
deciding whether comparison is useful.
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is taken against him or her. French-related systems have within the droits de la défense, 
le principe du contradictoire, the right for the person to rebut arguments made against 
him or her, whether orally or in writing. The broad similarity of the basic principle 
nevertheless hides some basic assumptions. First, the form of hearing may differ. The 
common law model of natural justice starts from a judicial archetype of decision-
making, based on an oral hearing (hence audi alterem partem: ‘hear’ both sides). The 
French and German models start from a bureaucratic paradigm where even judicial 
decisions need not be taken after an oral hearing, so the right is really one to make 
representations. Secondly, continental European systems are clearer about the kinds of 
decision that require a hearing to be given to those affected. They distinguish between 
individual acts—measures affecting specified individuals—such as expropriation, 
and regulatory acts—measures of general application—such as legislation. Where the 
measure is individual, then those whose rights are specifically affected can expect to 
have a hearing. On the other hand, where the measure is of general application, such 
as a tax on all houses, the persons affected do not have a right to be heard specifically 
by the decision-maker. This difference is not as well articulated in the common law.
The Duty to Give Reasons/Transparency
At least before the Human Rights Act 1998, the duty to give reasons for decisions 
was not an established principle of the common law. Judges did not always have to 
give reasons, so administrators could not be required to do so. It was good practice, 
but not a legal requirement.13 By contrast, the principle formed part of French and 
German administrative law from an early date. The difference between these two 
approaches is less than might first appear. The English common law did impose the 
obligation on courts and administrators to given reasons to the Court of Queen’s 
Bench where a decision was challenged by way of case stated or by certiorari. In 
those cases, the High Court was inspecting the decision, and could expect the 
inferior court or administration to justify its decision. The problem was to show 
sufficient doubt about the legality of the decision so as to obtain leave to bring pro-
ceedings in the High Court in the first place. By contrast, the continental systems 
only required limited statements of reasons, often amounting to no more than giving 
the legal basis of the decision, rather than a justification of the formal reasons. 
As a result, all systems have needed the right to reasons to be supplemented by 
the right of access to administrative documents that may cast light on the context 
and reasons for the decision. Access to public documents has been a much more 
recent development in most administrative law systems and it has come through 
legislation, rather than judicially developed principles. The British Freedom 
of Information Act 2000 was much later than similar legislation in France or 
Germany. In Germany this is contained in the Administrative Procedure Law of 
13 R v Home Secretary, ex p Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 (HL).
298  John Bell
1976 and in France, in legislation of 1978. The English legislation has a number 
of specific categories of documents that are exempt from disclosure. The French 
and the Germans have general principles. Thus, in Germany the exclusions from 
disclosure cover the protection of confidential information or business secrecy or 
where there would be harm to the federal or Länder governments.
Standards of Good Administration
Operationally, the administration must conform to standards of good adminis-
tration, including efficiency. Standards of good administration are typically laid 
down as ideals of administrative practice, rather than legal standards. For example, 
the moves in the 1990s to treat the user of public services as a form of consumer 
spawned a series of administrative charters, which had no legally binding effect, 
but which sought to guarantee compensation for failures to meet certain basic 
standards of public service defined by the administration. In more recent times, 
the citizen’s right to good administration has been enshrined in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights Article 41 and in Article II-101 of the European Constitutional 
Treaty. A more detailed statement, the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour 
was voted on by the European Parliament on 6 September 2001. Many such 
norms, such as the Code, do not have legal value, but act as guiding standards, 
that may often form a background to the way in which lawyers and ombudsmen 
identify how the administration ought to behave, and how legal norms ought to 
be interpreted. A major area of comparison is administrative procedure, discussed 
below.
Questions for Discussion
 1.  Do the concepts used in different systems have the same basic meaning 
in terms of the way in which the administration must conduct itself? 
Test this out by asking how the rules would apply in certain specific 
situations.
 2.  Does it matter whether the rules on procedure are set out in the general 
principles typically articulated by judicial decisions or are set out in 
legislation?
 3.  Does the detailed style of common law statutes actually lead to significant 
differences in practice compared with the general principles set out in 
continental European statutes. Freedom of information legislation might 
be a good example.
VI.  INSTITUTIONS PROVIDING LEGAL REDRESS
There are significant differences between countries in the structure of judicial 
institutions. Most legal systems have specialist administrative courts to hear 
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matters concerning decisions of the administration. Thus the German, 
French, Italian and Swedish systems all have an administrative court structure 
that is separate from that of the private law courts. In other systems, such as 
the English, Scots, Irish, Spanish and Dutch, any special administrative court 
is a division within the general courts. Judges may specialise in administrative 
matters, but there is no separate administrative jurisdiction. The advantage 
of the former approach is that there are courts that are specialist in dealing 
with administrative law issues, and they can develop a set of principles that 
recognise the distinctiveness of the control of the administration. In particu-
lar, procedures can be simpler than those used in private litigation and judges 
can adopt a more pro-active role in requiring evidence to be produced by the 
administration. As a result, the citizen is assisted in assembling the evidence 
required to sustain a complaint. The disadvantage is that litigants may find it 
difficult to work out whether a particular matter belongs in the administra-
tive courts or in the private law courts. Even a system that has been in opera-
tion for over 200 years, such as that in France, still finds some 30 cases a year 
of conflicts of jurisdiction between the public and private law courts, that 
require resolution by a special court, the Tribunal des Conflits. 
Legal redress may not only be provided by the courts, but also by tribunals. 
Tribunals are typically staffed by a combination of lawyers and lay experts. Their 
procedure can be less formal than a court and there may be no need for legal 
representation. In dealing with small claims to social welfare benefits this may 
be easier for the litigant and offer greater expertise in the special social problems 
arising. In France, there are a number of commissions, such as that in dealing with 
refugees. It is often difficult to decide whether such bodies should be designated as 
courts or not. In European law, professional disciplinary bodies whose decisions 
are recognised by the state are treated as ‘courts’. The balance of cases between 
courts and tribunals varies a lot between legal systems.
The Swedish system of independent administrative redress through the 
Ombudsman has been followed by many European states. The ombudsman 
offers an independent investigation of complaints which requires little evi-
dence gathering by the complainant. The ombudsman takes steps to find out 
from the administration what happened. This process resolves a large number 
of disputes. All the same, it typically suffers from the disadvantage that the 
recommendations resulting from an investigation are not binding on the 
administration. 
The German system requires that an individual seek redress through the 
administration before bringing a case in the courts. This Widerspruch request 
enables the administration to deal with mistakes before a court case has started. 
It is normal in the French system also to require that a complainant request that 
the administration withdraws its decision and can only bring an action where the 
administration refuses or (commonly) when it fails to respond within a legally 
specified time. English law achieves something similar through the Pre-Action 
Protocols in civil procedure.
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Questions for Discussion
 1.  (Where do citizens normally find redress against administrative decisions)—
in the courts, through tribunals, or through the Ombudsman? You might look 
at statistics in annual reports of the courts or the Ombudsman to find out.
 2.  What are the differences between bringing an action in the administrative 
courts and bringing an action in the ordinary civil courts? Examine the 
differences in procedure. Are the differences to the advantage of the citizen 
making a complaint?
VII.  THE JUDICIAL CONTROL OF POWERS
The Basis
In many legal systems, there is no code or statute that authorises the courts to 
control the legality of administrative action or defines the grounds on which 
this is done. Accordingly, there is much debate in various countries about the 
constitutional foundation of judicial review of the administration. For some, it 
is simply a matter of enforcing the wishes of the legislature. For others, there are 
more fundamental values that justify a restrictive interpretation of the powers of 
the administration.
Rule of Law
Although the term ‘rule of law’ is frequently used to express a fundamental value 
of any liberal political system, there are different understandings of this idea 
among different legal systems. Within the common law tradition, the English-
language expression ‘rule of law’ embraces a number of understandings. In some 
contexts, it merely refers to conformity to law—an administrative act is autho-
rised by a higher norm. In the view of AV Dicey, the rule of law emphasised the 
absence of privileges for the administration, and, in his view, the subordination of 
the administration to the ordinary law of the land (Dicey, 1959: chapter twelve).14 
For him, that entailed the subordination of the administration ultimately to the 
ordinary courts. In modern times, the idea of compliance with human rights 
has gained strength and was part of the Delhi declaration of the International 
Commission of Jurists in 1959. The French conception of l’état de droit expresses 
the idea that all public power is limited by the legal rules which it is bound to 
respect. It offers the control of power through law. The law is administered, 
especially by the Conseil d’Etat as adviser and judge. But such an expression does 
not contain substantive content, and it certainly does not entail that the ordinary 
judges have powers over the administration. In French, the English conception is 
14 This view he held despite the fact that the Crown at that time enjoyed immunity from actions 
in the court.
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often translated as ‘le règne du droit’ in that the law (conceived in the broad sense 
of legal values) prevails over the administration. The German-language concept 
of the Rechtsstaat has the idea that the administration is given power by the law 
and is constrained by it.15 The principle applies to all the administration without 
immunities. The concept is usually understood to include rights of defence against 
the administration. The German expansion of this into the ‘sozialer Rechtsstaat’ 
involves a number of substantive rights and social justice. To a great extent, the 
scope of notions such as ‘the rule of law’ depends on how far the term is allowed 
to spread to embrace other constitutional values. The divergence in uses of the 
terminology and the absence of an exact equivalent in the different languages 
provides much potential for confusion. All the same, these different terms convey 
some common liberal messages—that the administration is not free to act as it 
deems to be right in terms of efficiency or to achieve political goals. The admin-
istration has to remain within the constraints laid down by law.
Fundamental Rights
Many constitutions, particularly those drafted since 1945, contain enumerations 
of fundamental rights. These set out further values that the administration must 
respect and, in some cases, actively promote. A number of types of comparative 
study have been undertaken to assess the impact of this process. Some simply set 
in parallel the impact of a specific human rights instrument on national laws. For 
example, this has been done in relation to the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950. Some studies have simply shown how 
the Convention has operated at national level. Others, however, have tried to com-
pare the extent of the impact and discuss the reasons for the way it has worked in 
the different legal systems (eg Gearty, 1997). The concern of such studies is often 
the outcomes of compliance and an assessment of how far individual legal systems 
fall short of what the Convention requires. There is less attention to the reasons 
why national systems absorb such international standards in different ways. The 
work of Philip Alston (Alston, 1999), however, has been innovative in examining 
the processes of introducing fundamental values. The use of bills of rights as legal 
instruments raises issues of how far the enactment of a legal text has an impact 
on the way in which the legal system works and what is required to ensure that 
a culture of respect for fundamental values is embedded. Although the answers 
to such questions require some legal sociology, some clues can be found in the 
extent to which the legal system has adapted to the new culture of rights. Bills of 
rights are often copied from other constitutions, so there is scope to study legal 
transplants in this area and to assess how far the embedding of new ideas depends 
on the legal professions and traditions of the receiving country.
15 The concept was coined by von Mohl in 1832. See Stolleis, 1992: 173. 
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16 See, eg BVerwGE 62, 11 (imprisonment of war criminal Hess).
17 See CE Ass 17 February 1995, Marie, Leb 85. See also R v Deputy Governor of Parkurst Prison, ex 
parte Leech [1992] 1 AC 58 (HL).
18 See abuse of discretion below.
Comparison can be undertaken as to how far administrative law reflects certain 
fundamental values. Many of these values are included in notions of a fair proce-
dure. The influence of fundamental rights is a theme in many general studies of 
administrative law in Europe (see Schwarze, 1996). Much of the comparison of 
fundamental rights occurs in the discussion of influences of international treaties 
on national law and this applies well outside Europe, though many of the issues 
are similar. 
Reviewable and Non-reviewable Decisions
In the past, there were two types of decision that were typically excluded from the 
purview of judicial review. On the one hand, acts of state were matters of high policy 
with which judges should not interfere.16 On the other hand, internal acts within the 
administration were seen as being on too low a level for judges to be occupied con-
sidering them. In line with the requirement of access to legal redress under Article 6 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, these limitations have been reduced. 
While very high-level policies such as a declaration of war or the signature of a treaty 
do remain excluded, other decisions that would be treated as acts of state, such as 
the issue of passports, are now subjected to review. More significantly, the exclusion 
of internal acts of the administration has been almost eradicated. A good example 
is prison discipline, which used to be treated as merely a matter of the internal 
regulation of the public service, but is now seen very much as a reviewable matter.17
Grounds of Review
The broad grounds of review accepted by most legal systems would cover lack 
of competence (ultra vires in the strict sense) and procedural irregularity, both 
of which are external to the decision in that the body making it had no power to 
make it or should have only done so after following certain mandatory procedural 
steps. On examining the content and justifications given for the decision, it may 
be apparent that the decision was taken on the basis of an error of law or following 
a misuse of discretion. 
Lack of Competence
As has been noted in the section on powers, the administration has powers either 
inherently as the executive branch of government or attributed to it by Parliament. 
Every decision requires a legal basis from one of these sources. Sometimes the 
administration may try to overstep its powers because it seeks to achieve a policy 
objective in the short term,18 in which case, there is no power to take any decision 
on that subject.
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Procedural Irregularity
Legislation may prescribe a particular procedure for a decision to be taken. For 
example, the decision on a planning application may require prior notice to 
neighbours in a prescribed form. Failure to conform may lead to the invalidity 
of the decision. Where there is no specific prescribed procedure, then the admin-
istration will be required to respect general principles of administrative proce-
dure. As has been said, in some countries these are contained in statute, whereas 
in other countries, such as England or the European Union, the principles are 
unwritten—the so-called principles of natural justice.
Control over Discretion
Courts do not hear an appeal on the merits of decisions, but they do scrutinise 
the justifications to see that the legally relevant considerations have been taken 
into account. A decision that is taken for a different reason would be unlawful 
as it involves an error of law19 Countries differ in the intensity with which they 
scrutinise administrative decisions. In Germany and France, it is normal to dis-
tinguish between decisions where there is strict scrutiny of decisions and those 
where there is a strong deference to the judgement of the executive. The English 
common law is not usually as explicit in this regard and tends to be less willing to 
review discretionary decisions.
Strict scrutiny is applied to decisions that affect fundamental rights. Even where the 
administration enjoys a wide discretion, a decision that infringes a fundamental right 
will need a particularly strong justification. For example, German courts struck down 
a decision to dismiss a policeman which was made on the ground that he breached an 
order not to marry his pregnant fiancée.20 The right to marry should not be restrained 
except for a very serious reason, which did not exist in this case. Equally, a decision to 
prevent the exercise of freedom of speech can only be restricted where the administra-
tion is able to demonstrate an immediate and serious threat to public order.21 Such 
considerations have not been as strong in the British tradition, where considerations 
of national security or public order have often prevailed over the protection of funda-
mental rights.22 It might be argued that the British courts have become less reluctant 
to intervene in administrative decisions, even where national security is at stake, since 
the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998.23
19 See eg CE 4 July 1924, Beaugé, Leb 641 (public order powers cannot be used for financial gain). 
See also R v Foreign Secretary, ex parte World Development Movement [1995] 1 All ER 611(CA) (devel-
opment aid powers cannot be used to provide counterpart funding for arms sales).
20 See BVerf GE 14, 21; BVerfGE 30, 29. Similarly unlawful was a decision to expel a foreigner with-
out taking into account that he had married a German national and had a child at school in Germany: 
BVerfGE 35, 382.
21 CE 19 May 1933, Benjamin, Leb 541.
22 See R v Home Secretary, ex parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696 (HL); and R v Home Secretary, ex parte 
Cheblak [1991] 2 All ER 319 (CA)
23 See A v Home Secretary [2005] UKHL 71.
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By contrast, decisions that involve complex, practical judgements involving 
competing public interests are only subjected to limited scrutiny. For example, 
judges in most countries would not consider it appropriate to question decisions 
on the siting of a nuclear power station, or professional judgements about exami-
nation or appraisal or promotions.24
The issue for a comparative lawyer is the extent to which particular decisions 
are subjected to strict or weak scrutiny in the different jurisdictions studied. The 
traditional English law approach has been to apply a test of Wednesbury unrea-
sonableness to decisions where there has been no error of law. This permits the 
court to quash a decision where it is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority 
could have come to it.25 This formulation is more restrictive than the French or 
European Union test of a ‘manifest error in evaluation’ which denotes simply a 
serious error of judgement by the administration. The administration enjoys a 
margin of appreciation in the application of a legal concept or category, but it 
must not exceed that margin.
Many of the most successful works in comparative law have limited their 
focus to these specific grounds of review in different jurisdictions. The pur-
pose of such studies has been to understand the differences between national 
conceptions of administrative justice. A good example is the notion of ‘propor-
tionality’. The term has migrated from German administrative law to become 
a principle recognised in most jurisdictions. (It began as a principle to control 
the exercise of police powers that interfered with basic rights, but has come to 
be applied to a wider range of decisions.) It has three components: a require-
ment that administrative action be necessary; that it be properly directed to 
the objective being pursued; and that the burdens imposed on individuals do 
not seriously outweigh the benefits to the community as a whole (ie they are 
not ‘disproportionate’ in a narrow sense). Much comparison has been under-
taken with the object of clarifying how far there is a real difference between 
this (often foreign) concept and longer established concepts used in domestic 
law, such as erreur manifeste d’appréciation or unreasonableness. The most 
successful studies of this kind is by Aldo Sandulli, who examines the way in 
which the term is used in the different jurisdictions and the extent to which 
it represents a difference in the scope of review from traditional terms. In his 
survey of legal developments in the European Union, France, Germany, Italy 
and the United Kingdom, he notes that all countries accept the principle of 
preventing the administration making excessive use of its descretionary pow-
ers, but they take diverging views on the extent to which judges should impose 
constraints on the exercise of such powers. National approaches to the control 
24 See CE 4 May 1978, Département de la Savoie, AJDA 1979, 38; R v Environment Secretary ex parte 
Greenpeace [1994] 4 All ER 352 (QBD); and BVerfGE, 53, 30 on nuclear installations. See CE 9 June 
1978, Lebon, Leb 245 on career judgements.
25 Associated Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (HL).
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over the administration reflected different views about the scope for judges to 
limit the freedom of the administration, especially in the field of discretionary 
power (Sandulli, 1998: 37–134; also see Ellis, 1999). The German approach 
is more stringent than the English, reflecting a greater role for the courts in 
controlling the administration. Familiarity with the use of this standard in the 
exercise of European Union law competences and in applying the European 
Convention on Human Rights made many countries more receptive to the 
concept of proportionality. It was difficult to have one standard applied to 
purely domestic cases and another applied in European cases. All the same, 
he notes that the concept of ‘proportionality’ is used with differing degrees of 
deference depending on whether a court is controlling a legislative action or 
the action of the administration. Such work requires considerable attention to 
the detail of the different systems and how particular issues are handled. 
Legitimate Expectations
An area of divergence in the terminology used by legal systems occurs with the 
extent to which they will control the exercise of discretion not to protect fun-
damental rights, but to protect the legitimate expectations that have grown up 
as a result of assurances by or actions of the administration in the past. If the 
administration has been given a discretion, it is in order that it might review the 
needs of the public interest from time to time and have the flexibility to revise its 
decisions. At the same time, statements made or past actions through which the 
administration has already exercised its discretion may give rise to expectations 
that these will guide its decisions in the future. German law and European Union 
law use the term ‘legitimate expectation’ to describe the interest that the citizen 
has in discretion continuing to be exercised in the way previously announced. But 
the administration’s duty to keep exercising its discretion requires it to reflect on 
contemporary needs of the public interest. Accordingly, the idea of a legitimate 
expectation does not prevent the administration reconsidering a decision, but 
merely requires it to take account of the interest in question before changing the-
policy and the impact of the new policy on established practices. French law does 
not use the concept of ‘legitimate expectation’ in this context, preferring the duty 
to respect legal certainty (see Schønberg, 2001). 
Indeterminate Concepts
The intensity of review to which administrative decisions are subject can be 
illustrated best by cases involving what the Germans call ‘indeterminate concepts’, 
legal terms that are not defined in the empowering legislation. Does the admin-
istration have unfettered power to determine the meaning of these concepts? 
For example, German legislation empowered the administration to prohibit the 
sale of books and magazines that were ‘dangerous to young people’. The authori-
ties considered that the magazine, Stern, was dangerous, and it was banned. The 
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decision was annulled on the ground that it interfered disproportionately with the 
freedom of information of adult readers.26 The interference with an individual 
right encouraged the court to apply a test of strict scrutiny and the concept of 
proportionality in order to protect it. 
Works examining the development of common European standards of admin-
istrative law typically focus on the grounds of review as illustrating the values by 
which the administration is meant to abide. These values are then used by the 
European courts as benchmarks to judge the conduct of a transnational adminis-
tration such as the European Union (Hartley, 1998: chapter four). In turn, these 
standards, developed as general principles recognised by the Member States, are 
then used to judge the actions of particular Member States. There is thus a two-
way circulation of ideas.
Abuse of Discretion
However wide a discretionary power, it must be used for the purpose granted by 
the legislator or for which it exists. If the power is used for an extraneous purpose 
then that administrative decision is unlawful. An extraneous purpose may well 
be personal animosity to the citizen affected or it may be some personal gain by 
the decision-maker.27 An abuse of discretion may occur where a power is used to 
achieve an objective in the public interest distinct from that which was envisaged 
when it was granted.28 
Questions for Discussion
 1.  What concepts are used in the systems you are studying to identify the 
different grounds of review mentioned in this section?
 2.  How far are the courts in your systems willing to scrutinise the exercise 
of discretion by the administration? Does this willingness depend on 
whether fundamental rights are at issue or not?
 3.  If a term such as ‘proportionality’ or protection of ‘legitimate expectation’ 
is used in your systems, are they used in the same way? If the term is not 
used, are equivalent terms used or does the difference in terminology 
reflect a difference in policy?
VIII.  LIABILITY OF THE ADMINISTRATION
The liability of the administration provides an example of an area in which the 
distinctiveness of administrative law will vary from system to system. One focus of 
26 BVerwGE 39, 197. See also BVerfGE 83, 30, where the ban on a work of literature was held to be 
disproportionate; CE 17 April 1985, Les Editions des Archers, Leb 100.
27 See CE 23 July 1909, Fabrègue Leb 727; CE 14 March 1934, Rault, Leb 337; and R v Port Talbot BC, 
ex parte Jones [1988] 2 All ER 207 (QBD).
28 Compare R v Home Secretary, ex parte Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513 (HL).
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analysis would be the values and the basis of liability. Some systems have adopted the 
view that the liability of the administration should be the same as that for private 
individuals. Typically, a French writer would argue, however, that the specificity of 
governmental liability is to be found in the balance that has to be struck between 
protecting the interests of the citizen and preserving the ability of the administration 
to act in the public interest (eg Guettier, 1993: 97). Some take the view that specific 
individuals who suffer disproportionately from actions taken in the public interest 
should be compensated on a very different basis to those harmed by the actions 
of private individuals. At the same time, the risks taken in the public interest may 
justify a greater caution in terms of the compensation of harms suffered. A public 
body undertaking a risky activity should not be deterred by the danger that it will 
have to compensate those who suffer harm as a result. An example would be police 
actions taken to deal with a sudden threat to public order. While it is useful to look 
at the general principles and structures of the liability of the administration, there 
are advantages in taking particular themes in order to gain focus. Other comparisons 
have focused on the outcomes in this area, but it is necessary to go beyond examining 
merely on the results of particular actual or hypothetical cases. Basil Markesinis and 
his colleagues make this clear through a comparative study of five fact situations in 
different countries. They set the decision in a legal and socio-economic context to 
assess its meaning and importance (Markesinis, Auby, Coester-Waltjen and Deakin, 
1999: 107). In addition, attention to individual cases needs to go beyond the rea-
sons given by judges in order to analyse them in terms of the underpinning ideas. 
In particular, there is the question of whether the principles setting out the basis of 
compensation are the same. 
Although concepts may vary somewhat from one system to another, it is use-
ful to talk in terms of five general foundations of a right to compensation from a 
public authority. The first concept is fault. We have a moral responsibility to make 
good the harm that has been caused by our neglect or wrongdoing. A key issue 
is how fault is established. In common law systems, fault involves the breach of a 
duty of care. In other systems, fault simply means a failure by a public authority to 
conduct itself in a way that can be reasonably expected.29 Such a standard would 
be close to the failure of the administration to perform its mission. It is commonly 
found that the mere breach of a legal norm does not automatically give rise to lia-
bility; that the fault of the administration is judged by objective criteria looking at 
the knowledge of the administration, rather than of the individual administrator; 
and that liability will arise where there has been a breach of an individual right 
or a materially protected legal position relative to the administration (a kind of 
‘legitimate interest’). In the past, many systems have insisted on proof of serious 
29 See Principle 1 of the Council of Europe Recommendation R (84) 15 on Public Liability, adopted 
by the Council on 18 September 1984:
Reparation should be ensured for damage caused by an act due to a failure of a public authority 
to conduct itself in a way which can reasonably be expected from it in relation to the injured 
 person.
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fault (faute lourde) where the administration has a particularly difficult task, such 
as in policing. But this is declining in most countries.
The second concept is that of risk. Even without fault, if a body has created a 
situation of risk of harm for its own purposes (or for the community which we 
serve), then there are grounds for holding it responsible. The idea of sharing bene-
fits and burdens is well acknowledged. In economic terms, a body must internalise 
the costs of the operation, rather than externalising them to other people.
Both of these justifications apply equally to public and private persons. But 
there is a further set of justifications which apply more specifically to public 
authorities, and which are acknowledged with greater or lesser clarity in the dif-
ferent systems. Roger Errera explains that equality before public burdens justifies 
French public law liability, both in areas of fault and risk (Errera, 1986). This is 
based on Article 13 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man 1789 under which all 
have to contribute to public expenses, and from which is deduced the principle 
that no one can be expected to contribute an excessive amount for the public 
good. German lawyers talk about the idea of special sacrifice (Sonderopfer) in such 
circumstances. Now, this principle is easy to understand where there is a planned 
risk created for the public benefit, but where there is an unplanned consequence, 
such as a prisoner on parole committing a bank robbery,30 then this idea of 
internalising consequences is less clearly a matter of responsibility. Where there 
is an expropriation, we are already moving from a notion of liability to social 
justice. The classic Couitéas decision31 shows a kind of expropriation, where the 
authorities refused to remove squatters from private land, because this would 
upset local public order. One person was suffering for the benefit of the commu-
nity and received compensation on the basis of the liability of public authorities 
for an inequality before public burdens. But is this really justified by a notion of 
liability, ie taking responsibility for one’s actions and the harm they cause, or is it 
a matter of social solidarity—that social burdens, however created, should not be 
unequally borne? 
Social solidarity offers an alternative basis for requiring the state to pay com-
pensation to those who suffer injury. The French Constitution proclaims the 
solidarity of all in the face of national calamities. The moral idea is based on the 
view that, if we find ourselves as part of a community, that situation of mutual 
dependence generates duties of solidarity. It could be argued that social solidar-
ity is not an appropriate basis for liability, but rather a principle of social justice 
that could justify a redistribution of resources based on compassion, rather than 
entitlement.32 We are not lone actors, as the private law model of liberty would 
suggest. Our obligations do not arise simply from our voluntary choice, but 
also from the social position we occupy. The argument is founded on an idea of 
30 CE Sect, 29 April 1987, Banque populaire de Strasbourg, AJDA 1987, 488.
31 CE 30 November 1923, Leb 789.
32 See Fairgrieve, Andenas and Bell, 2002: xix–xxii and references therein.
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social justice. Solidarity with those who suffer provides a special justification for 
compensating for injuries resulting from industrial and social diseases, but also 
from major risks in the field of medicine. For example, many countries provide 
compensation to children who suffer adverse reactions from vaccinations. The 
mechanisms are often some form of an insurance fund. But the justifications 
differ between countries. For example, in France compensation was originally 
justified on the basis that the vaccination was an activity undertaken in the public 
interest. The risk incurred was a disproportionate burden on a few individu-
als, and so the community ought to pay. The argument is one of fairness in the 
apportionment of burdens. The English Vaccine Damage Act 1979 is based more 
on compassion, rather than an argument of social justice. The ability of society to 
shoulder the burden—its deeper pocket—is more in evidence, rather than a sense 
that society is benefiting from an activity and so should, in fairness, share the 
burdens. Compassion is a commendable virtue, but not a matter of moral duty. It 
is a work of superrogation. 
A fifth and connected justification is that the state is simply best placed as the 
organiser of compensation. Given its information and resources, it can manage 
the provision of compensation in the most efficient manner. The issue is well 
illustrated by the case of technological risks and disasters. After a particular 
disaster at a chemical plant in Toulouse, a French law was passed in 2003 under 
which the compensation of victims is secured by a guarantee fund which will pay 
out if a person does not have appropriate insurance cover. This is an instance of 
society arranging some form of collective protection against risks which are not 
obvious to most people, but where the state can be expected to undertake a risk 
assessment. The privileged position of the state to make provision for a major pol-
lution incident justifies giving the state a responsibility. This is a way of socialising 
risk not so much out of solidarity as through a process of identifying the best-
informed organiser of compensation.
The different justifications in this area relate to different conceptions of the 
role of liability law, as opposed to the law on compensation. We can  legitimately 
conceive of an argument that justifies the compensation of the victim  without 
imputing liability to any individual. The court process is appropriate for 
identifying blame either individual or institutional, and this function is often 
cathartic for the victims and their families, but this role of the law is often 
parallel to administrative liability. In France, in the 1980s and 1990s findings of 
criminal liability against public officials provided a strongly expressive  mechanism 
to achieve this end. It has subsequently been much reduced by reforms of 
criminal liability which impose this on public officials only in cases of clear 
fault (see Article 121-3 of the Code pénal). English public administration tends 
to use other mechanisms for dealing with blame. Political accountability and 
administrative responsibility are sufficient. Whereas fault and risk are 
clear instances of liability, I would argue that the situations of solidarity, 
 compassion and organisation are best seen as instances of publicly-established 
compensation.
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Questions for Discussion
 1.  On what basis is the administration liable in the systems that you are 
studying? Is it just liability for fault or for serious fault (recklessness)? Is 
there liability for risk?
 2.  Is the administration liable on the same basis as a private individual? In 
what way does the liability of the administration differ in procedural or 
substantive terms?
 3.  How far is compensation sought through the courts and how far are there 
special compensation schemes for particular kinds of injury or activity? 
Do these have the same justification as liability through the courts?
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Comparative Law in Constitutional 
Contexts
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KEY CONCEPTS
Administrative law; Autochthonous; Checks and balances; Civil liberties; 
Comparative politics; Constitution (flexible/rigid); Constitution  (codified/
uncodified); Constitution (controlled/uncontrolled); Constitutional 
accountability; Constitutional amendment; Constitutional  conventions; 
Constitutional court; Constitutional monarchy; Constitutionalism; 
Contracting state; Devolution; Federal; Good governance; Judicial [or 
 constitutional] supremacy (Marbury v Madison principle); Liberal  democratic; 
Local government; Ombudsman; Parliamentary sovereignty; Referendum; 
Rule of law; Separation of powers; State; Totalitarian; Watchdog bodies.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Just as there are many challenges for constitution-makers, there are many challenges for students of comparative constitutional law in the 21st century. Not only does this subject have little history, less theory and relatively few 
pieces of outstanding literature, but the problems it now faces—and which are 
of very great importance to the world at large—are immense and very pressing. 
At the same time this very situation offers the hope that critique and imagina-
tion can, in the age we conceive of as being that of good governance and global 
justice, go some way towards correcting the often oppressive and sometimes 
incompetent behaviour of governments. The prize to be won is a major contribu-
tion to a happy, fair and stable future for the broad majority of humanity under 
enlightened government nationally and internationally. The price of failure is an 
increased chance of conflict, poverty and fragmentation affecting everyone. What 
this chapter therefore aims to do is to explore the nature and tasks of comparative 
constitutional law in the contemporary world.
* The authors would like to thank Joana Thackeray, Tom Ginsburg, Mark Sidel, Lucio Pegoraro, 
Justin Frosini and Ben Berger for their encouragement and helpful comments.
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The reformation of comparative law in the last 10 years or so has been remark-
able in many ways, not least in its re-awakening of comparative constitutional law 
(Harding, 2000; Harding, 2002; and Leyland, 2002). It scarcely needs to be argued 
now, as opposed to a few years ago, that comparing constitutions is a useful and 
respectable activity. Nonetheless, in this discussion we will rehearse the arguments 
and circumstances that led to this conclusion. Next, in Part II of the chapter, we 
ask what constitutions are, and consider what they are for. In Part III attention 
is directed to reviewing the discipline of comparative constitutional law, with a 
view to understanding how it relates to comparative law in general, and how it 
differs from comparative politics. Part IV examines the practice of comparative 
constitutional law, attempting to answer the question of what practical purposes 
 comparative constitutional law serves, for example in the contexts of  constitution-
making processes and human rights adjudication. In Part V we inquire further into 
the question, how we might begin to classify and analyse constitutions. Allowing 
for the fact that constitutions may appear similar in form but may, in practice, 
function very differently, is there a framework of analysis that can be applied to 
organise constitutions according to their principal characteristics? Additionally, 
to what extent might constitutions be analysed by constructing a series of ideal 
types against which more detailed comparison can be attempted? While not 
recommending a particular methodology of comparative constitutionalism, at a 
practical level, we proceed to identify a set of issues that nearly always have to be 
addressed by researchers and commentators in this field. In Part VI we discuss 
some strategies that might be adopted for teaching comparative  constitutional 
law. Finally, in Part VII we set out our conclusions and pose one very important 
question for the future.
II.  WHAT ARE CONSTITUTIONS AND WHAT DO THEY DO?
Before addressing the nature, purposes and methods of comparative 
constitutional law, we need first to ask: What actually are constitutions and what 
do they do?
What are Constitutions?
The answer to this question may not be as simple as it appears. According to most 
formal definitions the constitution of any state embodies a higher form of law 
antecedent to government.1 The text of a constitution sets out the institutional 
framework, particularly how the organs of the state are intended to interrelate 
with each other and the ways in which power is to be divided between them. In 
1 The antecedence of the constitution to government, developed by writers such as Tom Paine in 
the 18th century and Henry David Thoreau in the 19th century, is now taken for granted in most 
societies.
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addition, the constitution includes a statement of individual and collective rights 
and sometimes also duties of citizens and/or duties of the state in relation to eco-
nomic and social questions.2 In practical terms, there is no difficulty accessing the 
text of most ‘constitutions of the world’ on the internet.3 However, the problem 
with a definition which prioritises the text is that it provides only a formalistic 
answer. Such a response underplays the importance of conventions or other 
informal rules associated with the constitution. More seriously, this approach 
would appear to deny that any society without a constitutional text has a constitu-
tion at all: it would, for example, preclude modern ‘constitutional’ states such as 
Israel, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (where the constitution is said to be 
‘unwritten’) from having a constitution at all.
Having said this, for those nations with a formal, codified constitution, in one 
sense the constitution itself is always what is stated in the text. Unless it has been 
amended, the text attempts to freeze or anchor the particular aspirations which 
were influential at the moment of its inception and crystallised in it. Obviously, 
then, the text has special significance because it was drafted with the purpose of 
entrenching particular principles. It will therefore always be highly relevant to 
start by examining the text and the implications of the text (Pegoraro, 2001: 115 
ff). Indeed, it may be useful to be able to identify and compare the surface struc-
ture and characteristics revealed by examining the text, and it may be possible to 
infer that elements of constitutional design are often related to, or even borrowed 
from, other constitutions (Henkin and Rosenthal, 1990; Beer, 1992; and Harding, 
2004).
As an example of this process, we can compare the constitutions of the United 
States and Nigeria (Fallon, 2004: Ewelukwa, 1993). Despite having very different 
histories and traditions there are clear parallels between the two. As well as being 
relatively large nations in population and size they share obvious constitutional 
characteristics. For example, they have in common a strict separation of powers 
with executive power at national level vested in a President elected separately 
from the legislature. The Supreme Court in each jurisdiction has the last word on 
constitutional questions, and both constitutions describe systems of symmetrical 
federalism with the upper house of the national legislature containing an equal 
number of elected representatives of each of the states. More crucially, however, 
any comparative analysis exposes significant differences. For instance, the powers 
of the US Supreme Court were implied under the Marbury v Madison principle,4 
and not, as in Nigeria, explicitly stated in the constitution itself.5 Nigeria has a 
full statement of individual human rights, based on the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which are very different in extent and conception from the first 
2 Some constitutions, eg the Irish Republic and India, contain extensive ‘directive principles of 
state policy’.
3 See websites cited below in the Bibliography and Further Reading section.
4 Marbury v Madison 1 Cranch 137 (1803). See Vile, 1976. This case asserted that the courts have 
the power of judicial review of legislation.
5 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, Art 1.
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10 amendments to the United States Constitution.6 Also, the USA has a secular 
state, while the Nigerian constitution recognises the special role of Islamic law in 
its northern states.7
There are of course fundamental problems associated with formal definition 
and comparison at the level of description. If constitutions were mere texts, we 
would be simply concerned with listing written rules, paying no attention to the 
various norms that take the form of practices, customs, interpretations, case law, 
conventions and the ways in which these change over time. interpretive contexts, 
notably literary, doctrinal, political, economic, social, historical and cultural.
If it is correct that both constitutional law and constitutional systems depend 
 importantly on popular understandings and the political-social environment, then the 
work of  constitutional law and comparative constitutional law cannot carry forward 
in intellectual isolation from the work of other disciplines of political science, cultural 
anthropology, the cognitive sciences, or economics (Jackson and Tushnet, 1999: xviii).
In short, a given constitutional text, although essential to the study of constitu-
tional law, will only describe ‘the constitution’ in a very limited sense. For example, 
even where provisions seek to safeguard individual, social or economic rights, the 
document itself will not prescribe the method for attaining such goals, nor will 
it address in any detail the crucial normative dimension which was intended to 
underpin the constitution, and which itself may take on an evolving significance 
over time.8 Rather, the text refers the analyst back to the prevailing ideas at the 
time of drafting or amendment.
It has been asserted that ‘the facts are stronger than constitutions’ (Duguit, 
1970), in the sense that the analyst must address questions associated with practi-
cal implementation, peering forwards and looking at the progressive application 
of the constitution and its associated rules. A crucial distinction may be drawn 
between the constitution (namely what is stated in the text), and the manner of its 
implementation, which is explained here in terms of ‘constitutionalism’.9
Any given constitution may appear to display close textual similarities with 
another selected example. However, each constitution will invariably acquire and 
display strong ‘autochthonous’ characteristics as the constitutional form stretches 
with its application in response to local conditions, much in the way unyielding 
leather shoes adapt their shape to accommodate the feet of the wearer. By ‘autoch-
thonous’ we mean ‘home-grown’ or ‘intimately related to the local context’. It is in 
fact relatively easy to identify such features of a given constitution, to the extent 
that one can read a constitution sometimes as an autobiography of the nation.10 
6 Ibid, ch IV.
7 Ibid, Arts 275–2799.
8 See below for the discussion of the relevance in this context of ‘constitutionalism’.
9 This is further elaborated upon below.
10 Many provisions of the Constitution of South Africa 1996 and the Constitution of East Timor 
2002 (for example, the fundamental rights provisions) may be explained in terms of the need to 
 prevent the recurrence of human rights abuses.
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Autochthonous elements may also relate intimately to traditional institutions or 
religion.11
Constitutions then, to conclude, are texts, but are also more than texts. 
They can include potentially all of the aforementioned issues and their study 
might involve an understanding of any combination of the above interpretive 
 contexts.
What then do Constitutions actually do?
There are some tasks that all constitutions seek to perform. A constitution will 
set out the way in which the principal institutions come into being and are to 
operate, and how their powers are limited. For example, constitutions generally 
establish the cycle of elections, parliamentary representation, and government 
formation. And they will normally, although by no means always, lay down the 
fundamental rights of individuals and groups. In addition, constitutions may 
have many other facets, including declaring the national ideology and govern-
mental  objectives; defining the conditions under which organisations, both state 
and  non-state, as well as the political system itself, are to operate.
It is important to recognise that the power-allocation function, which is central 
to every constitution, is achieved in different ways. The constitution will provide 
some kind of separation or balancing of powers between state institutions and 
bodies. By this we mean that a constitution, to be worth the name, principally has 
to define the executive, legislative and judicial powers and how they relate to each 
other. Again we find that a traditional term—the ‘separation of powers’—is inade-
quate. Some constitutions clearly embody ‘separate’ powers, but others ‘fuse’ pow-
ers, or at least do not completely separate them. The United States Constitution 
is often cited as a classic example of the former, because it was formulated on the 
basis of a relatively strict separation of powers, with the President, representing 
the executive branch, kept distinct from, but accountable to, the legislative branch 
in the form of Congress, and both branches being accountable to the judiciary. 
Here, powers were separated in order to provide checks and balances. In France, 
by contrast, the idea of separation of powers—in its original form at least—was 
to give analytically different functions to the executive, legislature and the judi-
ciary, so that each function was performed without trespassing on the preserve of 
the others. In the British, Italian and German Constitutions, however, ministers 
representing the executive branch are members of their respective Parliaments 
and—in theory at least—accountable to Parliament. Most constitutions in some 
important ways provide for the definition of the content of, and the counter-
 balancing of, the three powers, which is now often linked to the concept of checks 
and balances rather than simply a strict separation of functions. Furthermore, in 
11 Some constitutions make provision for ancient institutions predating the constitution itself, eg 
the Great Council of Chiefs in Fiji, in the Constitution of Fiji, ch 8.
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order to achieve any meaningful separation of powers, independent methods of 
appointment and funding will need to be linked to any such constitutional provi-
sions. For example, this will be crucial in relation to judicial appointments and 
appointments to a constitutional court.12
Moreover, power-allocation may also be multi-dimensional in that, in systems 
with strong forms of federal, devolved or regional government,13 the constitution 
determines14 the relationship between the central government structures and 
those operating at the periphery. It is especially true of many federal constitu-
tions that they deal with very detailed questions of federal-state powers and rela-
tions and are therefore complex. More generally we find that some constitutions 
provide a bare minimum of prescription, while others go into quite laborious 
detail. It is obviously an advantage of a brief constitution, such as that of the 
United States, that it hardly ever needs to be amended, and a disadvantage of a 
longer one, such as that of Malaysia, that it requires frequent amendment.15 On 
the other hand a brief constitution is often vaguer and more open to abusive 
interpretation.16
Another conventional answer to the question of what constitutions do is that 
they provide for the definition of state institutions, and the relationship between 
the state and the individual. However, this answer is both unexceptional to the 
point of being unhelpful, and inaccurate to the point of being misleading. In fact 
constitutions tend to define only some institutions of state, and define only some 
aspects of the relationship between the state and the individual. These tasks are 
completed, usually very imperfectly, by the ordinary law or the practice of govern-
ment. It has been pointed out that the state as a distinct apparatus of government 
was only formally recognised as institutionally significant during the period fol-
lowing the French revolution, as a more sophisticated notion of the separation of 
powers began to develop (Allison, 2000: 48). 
The state came to be conceptualised as a distinct apparatus of government per-
forming functions at a step removed from the King or the executive authority, thus 
giving rise to modern conceptions of the separation of powers. Although setting 
out institutional arrangements is pivotal to the organisation of the state, constitu-
tions, or the body of laws relating to the state, rarely define the state itself: in fact 
terms such as ‘the people’, ‘the government’, ‘the Crown’, and ‘the executive power’ 
are commonly employed in preference to ‘the state’. However, in many nations 
12 For the role of constitutional courts, see below.
13 The United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, Nigeria, Pakistan, Mexico and India are notable 
examples of symmetrical federalism. Malaysia has an asymmetrical, two-tiered, federal system. The 
United Kingdom, like Spain and Italy, has (asymmetrical) devolution of powers (to Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland).
14 In the United Kingdom, which lacks a codified constitution, devolution was introduced in 1998, 
following referenda, by means of special Acts of Parliament.
15 As at January 2006 the Federal Constitution of Malaysia had, since its inception in 1957, been the 
subject of 48 amending Acts embodying 650 individual amendments.
16 Eg the Constitution of the Republic Indonesia 1945, especially before amendments were enacted 
in 1999–2004.
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the task of designing effective mechanisms for constitutional accountability has 
been rendered more complex because the contemporary state has been radically 
reconfigured as part of a trend towards some type of ‘contracting state’ (Harlow 
and Rawlings, 1997: 129). Such an agenda attempts to reduce the size of the state 
apparatus, including the civil service, federal, regional and local government, by 
delivering public services through contracting out to the private sector, and also 
by the privatisation of formerly state-run industries. This model of the state sees 
the state as ‘steering’ rather than ‘rowing’. The objective is to improve the efficiency 
of delivery of such services to the citizen by its exposure to market forces (Harden, 
1992). The result of these initiatives is that the business sector is increasingly 
drawn into the practice of government. The process of contract-making, through 
which private companies assume the task of service delivery, greatly expands the 
interface between the state and the private sector, blurring any public/private law 
distinction. Such developments also increase the potential for conflicts of interest 
to arise. In consequence, with increasingly complex overlapping of powers and 
functions, understanding the relationship between the state and the private sector 
becomes one of the great contemporary challenges of comparative constitutional 
law. Any such discussion may not only need to address evolving ideas of the state 
in developed nations, but also consider parallel issues of exposure to market forces 
in regard to processes of democratisation in developing and transitional states 
(see, eg Morison and Livingstone, 1995: 51, 54 ff; and Held, 1995).
In this part we have observed that a principal task of constitutions is to define 
and organise the various institutions of what is called ‘the state’.
The Special Status of Constitutions
A constitution will normally also contain some statement as to the status of the 
constitution itself and the method or methods for amending it. In the major-
ity of cases the constitution proclaims itself to be the supreme law and any law 
which is inconsistent with the constitution is invalid. The question of uncon-
stitutionality of laws is almost universally given to the courts to determine, 
with the result that judicial review of legislation becomes a highly significant 
feature of the constitution. There are, however, cases where the provisions of 
the constitution are not intended to be legally enforceable in the courts. One 
might have expected that in this situation some other body such as the legisla-
ture would be given the right to determine the constitutional validity of laws. 
While this is, in effect, the position in constitutions that embody parliamen-
tary, as opposed to constitutional, supremacy, in most cases of the ‘unenforce-
able constitution’ the provisions of the constitution remain merely statements 
of principle which are implemented, if at all, through the political process. It 
is common to regard constitutional provisions of this kind as ‘nugatory’ or 
even ‘irrelevant’. In fact in many instances such statements of principle provide 
ground rules for organising the state in much the same way as ‘enforceable’ 
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provisions, and are regarded as important political principles which may be 
countermanded only by overwhelming considerations.17
With regard to constitutional supremacy there is some variation amongst 
 con stitutions. Some operate this principle prospectively, prohibiting inconsistent 
legislation being passed after the constitution comes into force, while  others also 
operate retrospectively, prohibiting all inconsistent legislation, even that passed 
prior to the constitution. Much may depend here on the circumstances in which the 
constitution was drafted and came into effect. If the constitution was designed to 
guarantee the maintenance of the status quo, or to provide for orderly development 
over a period of time, it will usually operate prospectively; but if it was designed to 
be revolutionary it will usually operate retrospectively as well as prospectively.
In addition some constitutions vest the power of judicial review of constitu-
tionality in a special court—such as a ‘constitutional court’ (Ginsburg, 2003)—
designed for the purpose, while others vest this power in the ordinary courts. Some 
consequences will follow from this: If there is a special court, it is to be expected 
that the ordinary courts will have power to refer to that court any constitutional 
issues which arise in the course of litigation. From this it will usually follow that the 
special court has power to determine the issues and return the matter to the court 
that referred it, which alone will have power to exercise jurisdiction over the case 
itself and award a remedy in accordance with the determination of the special 
court. Typically, there will be several other avenues whereby constitutional issues 
can be put before the special court, perhaps by members of the legislature or by 
specific office-holders such as the Prime Minister or the President.
Amending Constitutions: Rigid/Flexible
The power to amend the constitution is an extremely important power which 
determines the degree to which the constitution itself is entrenched. Most 
constitutions provide for some special method or methods of amendment. 
Indeed, those that do not display this characteristic cannot claim to embrace 
the principle of constitutional supremacy.18 This special method is usually a 
requirement for a much greater majority (as opposed to a simple majority) in 
the legislature, which distinguishes the constitutional amendment procedure 
from the procedure for amending ordinary legislation, for example, a two-thirds 
majority of the members of each house, upper and lower, voting separately, as in 
India;19 or a two-thirds majority in Parliament and six Provinces in the National 
Council of Provinces, in South Africa.20 Some constitutions go further, requiring 
17 Eg in Vietnam considerable debate in 2000–01 centred on an unenforceable constitutional 
 provision for free primary education: Sidel, 2002.
18 The Privy Council has created a distinction between ‘controlled’ and ‘uncontrolled’ constitutions: 
McCawley v The King [1920] AC 691 (PC).
19 Constitution of India, Art 368 (in the ordinary case).
20 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 74.
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a  referendum,21 sometimes involving also a requirement that the amendment be 
supported by a special majority of electors or regions of the country, or a provi-
sion designed to ensure that there is a ‘cooling-off ’ period between the introduc-
tion of an amendment bill and its passing, to avoid hasty amendments and create 
the opportunity for public debate.22
The terms ‘rigid’ and ‘flexible’ are often used to denote a constitution that is 
difficult or easy to amend (Bryce, 1905). However, the rigidity and flexibility of a 
constitution in practice involves much more than a consideration of the amend-
ment procedure. A constitution such as that of the United Kingdom is in theory 
flexible, but has in practice proved somewhat rigid, evolving only slowly over time 
(although the flurry of reforms since 1997 seems to belie this tendency); whereas 
the Constitution of Brazil has been amended many times despite being, in theory 
at least, somewhat rigid.23 The United States Constitution, on the other hand, is 
rigid both in theory and in practice. The operation of party politics (for example 
in a dominant-party system) or public opinion generally (for example, in refer-
enda) will affect the extent of flexibility or rigidity. Whether a constitution should 
be rigid or flexible depends on how the constitution-building process is conceived 
by the constitution-makers. A new constitution can be regarded as absolutely fun-
damental and unchanging law, or it can be regarded as merely a work in progress, 
leaving much to be resolved by continuing debate. In a few cases24 the constitution 
contains provisions which are expressed to be unalterable in any circumstances. 
It is also not unusual for a constitution to provide different methods of amend-
ment according to the importance of the provision to be amended.25 In India the 
Supreme Court has held that a bill for amending the constitution may not destroy 
the basic structure or essential features of the constitution.26
Apart from the amendment procedure, there are other less obvious ways in 
which constitutions may change. As indicated above, judicial decisions, conven-
tions, constitutional or legislative practice and government policies may change 
over time and may affect significantly the nature of the constitutional order. 
The significance of these methods of effecting constitutional change may well 
be affected by the extent to which the formal amendment procedure is easily 
invoked. The complexity and the tight or open texture of the words used will also 
be a factor inviting or resisting change.
To summarise: a constitution also establishes the extent to which it may be 
changed, and its effect on prior or subsequent law-making.
21 Eg, the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland, Art 46.
22 Eg, the Constitution of Australia, at Art 128, requires a Bill amending the Constitution, after 
being passed by both houses of Parliament, to be submitted within 2–6 months to a referendum. The 
 amendment is law only if supported by a majority of electors as well as a majority of electors in each 
State.
23 Constitution of Brazil, Art 60, to which there were 33 amendments between 1992 and 2000. The 
Constitution of India had been amended 93 times since 1950 as at January 2006.
24 Eg, Brazil, Germany, Italy, Namibia and Norway.
25 The Federal Constitution of Malaysia specifies four different methods: Art 159.
26 Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225.
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III.  COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Having described constitutions and their functions, as the objects of comparative 
constitutional law, let us now ask what the subject itself is, how it differs from 
comparative politics and how it relates to comparative law in general.
Relationship to Comparative Politics
It is immediately apparent that the relationship between comparative politics and 
comparative constitutional law has been somewhat problematical because the lat-
ter differs from but overlaps with the former. Comparative constitutional law is the 
branch of comparative law that studies constitutions as legal phenomena. On the 
other hand, comparative politics compares political systems as social phenomena, 
and has to take account of constitutions to the extent that they define the space 
in which and the terms on which the political system operates. Further, compara-
tive constitutional law has to take account of political science to the extent that it 
explains, in part at least, the context in which the constitution operates. The two 
disciplines are therefore different in terms of their main focus but each is very 
important for informing the work of the other (Finer, 1974; and Harding, 2002). 
Moreover, it is worth recognising that a centrally relevant question for constitu-
tional lawyers concerns what might be termed ‘fitness for purpose’. At one level 
the analyst will be inquiring into whether the constitution has been conceived 
so that it sets out an adequate institutional framework in any particular national 
context. At another level, the issue of ‘fitness for purpose’ involves an assessment 
of the effectiveness of the detailed provisions which have been included as part of 
a constitution. The focus will often be on evaluating institutional design in terms 
of the adequacy of accountability mechanisms and the degree of transparency 
that is present. In principle, there is an assumption that robust constitutional 
ground rules can at least contribute to containing or defining the political process. 
However, as we note in the discussion of constitutionalism that follows, consti-
tutional design will not, in itself, guarantee good practice, good governance or 
adherence to a wider constitutional morality.
In summary, no sharp distinction can be made with comparative politics. 
However, it might be suggested that comparative constitutional law tends to focus 
on the conception of the legal and institutional framework of government and 
the evolution of the institutions of government rather than concentrating on the 
contestation of power and the actual exercise of power by politicians and other 
constitutional actors.
Constitutions and Constitutionalism
We have established then that comparative constitutional law is the branch of 
comparative law which studies constitutional law as a set of legal phenomena, 
in the sense that constitutional law is ‘conceived as a structure of rules and 
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 principles which provides the foundation of the political order’ (Loughlin, 
2002: 193). Rather than merely looking at the political process itself, it deals 
with how law shapes and limits the conduct of politics. However, as we have 
set out above, this task is not simply a question of textual analysis, since there 
is invariably a gulf between the formal constitution and the manner in which 
government is actually conducted—in other words, between the constitution 
and what can be termed ‘constitutionalism’. In general, it might be suggested 
that constitutions only seek to embed a given set of fundamental principles as 
part of the prevailing system of government. Constitutionalism, on the other 
hand, may be said to embody a normative dimension. Here, the constitution 
not only anchors and enforces certain principles, but also represents a clear 
set of values. Many constitutions will set out liberal democratic principles of 
some kind; others, like Eastern European constitutions of the past, may be 
based on principles of socialist ownership or, like that of Iran, seek to embody 
the religious nature of the state. Any commitment in the codified text towards 
general enfranchisement, democratisation and economic redistribution has 
to be assessed against the prevailing conditions of governance.27 It has been 
recognised that
when the idea that political power resides in the people is transformed into practice, it 
becomes a dynamic and liberating force, but also potentially dangerous and destructive 
(Loughlin, 2002: 111).
Achieving the objective of substantial conformity with the rules is the real chal-
lenge. Indeed, as one well known commentator, referring to developments in 
Western Europe, puts it:
The fundamental notion of the Rechtsstaat or the rule of law was … not conceived out 
of the blue and introduced without resistance. It was, in fact, the fruit of political conflict 
and scholarly disputes stretching over many centuries (Van Caenegem, 1995: 17).
In developing a response to such dangers, constitutionalism has been construed 
in a way that often suggests that any exercise of political power will be bounded 
by a system of higher order rules which will:
determine the validity of legislative and executive action by prescribing the procedure 
according to which it must be performed or by delimiting its permissible content. The 
rules may be at one extreme (as in the UK) mere conventional norms and at the other, 
directions or prohibitions set down in a basic constitutional instrument, disregard of 
which may be pronounced ineffectual by a court of law. Constitutionalism becomes 
a living reality to the extent that these rules curb arbitrariness of discretion and are 
in fact observed by the wielders of political power, and to the extent that within the 
 forbidden zones upon which authority may not trespass, there is significant room for 
the  enjoyment of individual liberty (De Smith, 1962).
27 ‘Constitutional mechanism has no value or efficiency itself, independently of the moral and social 
forces which support it or put it in motion’ (Boutmy, 1891: x).
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The emphasis in the above statement explaining constitutionalism is not simply 
on procedure and rules, but on achieving conformity with the intention behind 
the rules. Apart from its positive aspects, namely dealing with the generation and 
organisation of power, a constitution may be taken to comprise a series of devices 
designed to curb discretionary or unlimited power. In many instances it seeks 
to establish different forms of accountability (Harlow, 2002: chapter one), not 
simply through a system of freely elected government, but by placing restrictions 
on the power of the majority. This accountability is reliant on transparency, and 
it is acted out in a number of familiar ways:28 an obligation for the government 
to be responsible to the elected Parliament; legal limits established by the courts 
on the exercise of public power; formal financial accountability in public affairs; 
accountability through contractual agreement where public services are provided 
by private organisations; and, additionally, accountability through the interven-
tion of specialist constitutional oversight bodies such as those designed as part 
of the recent constitutions in South Africa and Thailand (Hatchard, Ndulo and 
Slinn, 2004; and Leyland, 2006). Moreover, the constitution also results in further 
ground rules in the form of laws, codes of practice and conventions being adopted 
to ensure fair play at every level. But we would argue that an equally significant 
characteristic of constitutionalism is a degree of self-imposed restraint which 
operates beyond the text of the constitution and its attendant rules, especially on 
the part of political actors and state officials. The point to stress here is that all 
nations have a constitution of some kind, but constitutionalism is only established 
in the true sense where political behaviour is actually contained within certain 
boundaries. In addition, the rules need to embody a defensible constitutional 
morality which accords with principles of good governance29; but the constitution 
also represents a sufficiently widely accepted political settlement. Finally, in defin-
ing constitutionalism we have recognised that there must be a general adherence 
at all levels to the constitutional rules and the wider body of law and conventions 
associated with them.
The Relationship to Comparative Law Generally
Traditionally comparative law has been concerned with private law comparison 
and, at a more general level, with the comparison of legal traditions or legal fami-
lies. Comparative constitutional law used to be considered an aspect of compara-
tive politics or political theory, and incapable of being subjected to the doctrinal 
rigour of comparative law due to the great differences which existed in political 
systems (Kahn-Freund, 1974). Since the end of the cold war, however, there has 
28 For a discussion of the development of such mechanisms in the United Kingdom see Oliver, 
2003: chs 9–12.
29 For a discussion of ‘good governance’ from a global perspective see Botchway, 2001.
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been an enormous increase in democratisation. Although there are still great dif-
ferences in political systems and cultures, the main objectives of constitutional law 
have become more broadly similar than previously, due to the dominant inter-
national agendas of ‘good governance’, ‘human rights’, ‘international trade’, and 
‘sustainable development’, all of which have had significant impacts on constitu-
tions. In addition, the same process has tended to blur the distinction between the 
public and private sectors and therefore between constitutional and private law, 
as indicated above.
In truth, however, the amnesia of comparative law with regard to constitutional 
law was never justified. It was founded upon a number of things which are ques-
tionable. First, it assumed that comparison is only valid in the case of units of 
comparison that are similar, whereas in fact the relevance of similarity depends on 
the precise purpose of the comparison: sometimes we can learn more from differ-
ence than from similarity. Secondly, there were clearly many political systems and 
constitutions that were in fact significantly similar. Thirdly, it omitted to realise 
that many of the staple ‘problems’ of comparative law involve both public and pri-
vate law questions, and therefore comparison involved moving smoothly in and 
out of constitutional and private law. Salient examples of this are labour law, envi-
ronmental law, and industrial regulation. Fourthly, it failed to realise that even in 
the context of private law the political structure is highly significant. Consider, for 
example, contemporary ‘constitutional’ debates concerning same-sex marriage.
Despite what is said above about the recent rapprochement between com-
parative law and comparative constitutional law, it would be a mistake to think 
that the latter did not exist prior to the end of the cold war. Indeed, the recent 
reformation of comparative law has involved a merging of two, largely separate, 
traditions. Montesquieu, famously, engaged in comparative constitutional law 
in comparing the English and French constitutions (neither of which was at the 
time written). But one can find origins of the subject in Aristotle’s Politics and 
Constitution of Athens (the latter, part of a grand survey of Greek city-states’ con-
stitutions). Another strand of intellectual history is the tendency of philosophers, 
from Plato through Cicero and Sir Thomas More to Thomas Paine and John 
Rawls, to theorise about the ideal republic or the ideal kingdom based on rational 
speculative inquiry, or reading the mind of God, or, in some cases, socio-legal 
inquiry. This tradition is relevant in that it sometimes involved assessing con-
stitutional experience and imagining a better society. Undoubtedly the French 
and American revolutions had a galvanising effect on the subject, in that the 
promulgation of written documents embodying instruments of government or 
‘the rights of man’ became an increasingly common phenomenon. Comparative 
constitutional law was undoubtedly relevant to the making of the United States 
Constitution, and without doubt the United States and French Constitutions 
informed constitutional reform processes over many parts of the world, notably 
in Latin America and Europe. The revolutions across Europe in 1848 created 
many opportunities for reconsideration of the ‘good constitution’ along com-
parative lines. These revolutions tried but generally failed to establish new, more 
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democratic constitutions, but the experience provided a basis for future constitu-
tional development through the 19th and 20th centuries. However, this trend was 
interrupted by the advent of communism and fascism, both of which believed 
in absolutist and highly authoritarian government. The comparative habit in 
constitution-making was thus established but a comparative constitutional law 
literature with its own classical texts and theoretical structure was distinctly lack-
ing. Even now the practice of comparative constitutional law greatly exceeds in 
extent its theoretical literature. Nevertheless, since the early 1990s there has been 
a proliferation of comparative constitutional law literature, due to the creation 
of many reform projects, good governance programmes, teaching programmes, 
chairs and research centres devoted to the subject. All these have added signifi-
cantly to the literature.30 In summary, comparative constitutional lawyers have 
not yet (although there are some notable exceptions) provided us with a sophis-
ticated and well-tried methodology, nor with a literature which examines in a 
comparative and analytical way the constitutions or constitutional systems of the 
world.31 This is true not only of the newly established or reformed constitutions 
but even sometimes of well-established constitutions.
IV.  THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
We now proceed to examine the practical applications of comparative 
constitutional law. Here we identify constitution-making, constitutional reform, 
and constitutional adjudication.
Constitution-making
Over the span of modern history one can discern four waves of constitution- making. 
The first wave occurred in the 18th century with the constitutions of the 
American states and the United States and French constitutions, together with 
the constitutions of those states that immediately followed these. These constitu-
tions were very basic by modern standards and emphasised the ‘rights of man’ and 
popular assent to government. 
The second wave occurred between the mid-19th and early 20th centuries, 
when the liberalisation and democratisation process commenced with the 1848 
revolutions in Europe gradually worked itself out in modern constitutional forms. 
These constitutions were more concerned with the concepts of political represen-
tation, citizenship and equality before the law. They emphasised the legislature as 
the forum in which the exercise of power could be scrutinised, and the expansion 
of the franchise (Van Caenegem, 1995). 
30 See Bibliography and Further Reading.
31 Hart Publishing is producing a series entitled ‘Constitutional Systems of the World’ from 2007: see 
eg Leyland (2007).
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The third wave took place in the decades immediately following the Second 
World War, as colonial empires were disbanded and war-ravaged countries were 
occupied or recovered from occupation or instability. This process continued 
from the 1940s to the 1970s. The independence constitutions tended to copy 
the European and United States constitutions, depending on the identity of 
the colonial power, usually with some traditional elements. These constitutions 
were not often successful and many lasted for only a short period of time before 
being  distorted beyond recognition by amendments or torn up by military or 
 authoritarian leaders.
The fourth wave commenced in the mid-late 1980s, when increasing democ-
ratisation and globalisation, and the resolution of local conflicts, all assisted by 
the end of the cold war and the exercise of ‘people-power’,32 propelled forward 
through the 1990s and 2000s the concept of a liberal and just state, based on free 
and fair elections, and operating with a sophisticated array of good-governance 
mechanisms. At the present time the process of constitution-making still goes 
on in some post-conflict states,33 but by and large we are witnessing a period of 
implementation and consolidation as the detailed working of the new constitu-
tions and their complex apparatus involving election commissions, constitutional 
courts and anti-corruption agencies—is being examined and adjusted. Unlike in 
previous generations, during this period the ordinary people have been prepared 
to protest unconstitutional actions and demand that the constitution operate 
fairly and transparently. ‘People power’ is a significant feature of fourth-wave 
constitutionalism. It is, however, at best a double-edged sword and not a substi-
tute—except where there is no alternative—to constitutional government under 
the rule of law.
The development of constitutional experience has benefited considerably 
from the proliferation of models since the limited examples available to Indian, 
German, Italian and Japanese constitution-makers in the 1940s. Constitutions are 
no longer taken from the peg, but are tailored with some precision and consider-
ation of global experience as well as local needs and practicalities. The constitu-
tion-making process has also been considerably democratised, which opens up 
both the careful consideration of diverse solutions and the accommodation of 
different views. The comparative dimension is now so ingrained that it is hard 
to imagine any constitution-building effort without it. Recent notable examples 
of states where comparative experience has proved significant are South Africa, 
Namibia, Cambodia, Thailand and Kenya.34 The European Union is also an 
32 People-power was seen first in the Philippines in the ‘EDSA’ revolution, which led to the fall of 
President Marcos in 1986.
33 Eg, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Rwanda, East Timor, Somalia.
34 To take one example, in devising a electoral system based on some form of proportional represen-
tation it may be desirable to exclude from the legislature very small Political parties with extreme and 
highly divisive views, which might also hold the balance of power. Here, the German electoral rule that 
excludes from the legislature those parties with less than 5% of the total votes cast has proved useful.
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interesting but slightly different example, in that constitution-making has had to 
draw on the experience of member states rather than foreign states in an effort 
to meld together different constitutional experiences. In the cases of Kenya and 
the European Union the constitutional drafts have at the time of writing been 
rejected in referenda, but as with the 1848 constitutions this does not mean that 
the ideas they incorporate are dead. Comparative constitutional law can of course 
be equally instructive where constitutional reforms falling short of a new con-
stitution are contemplated. International organisations concerned with issues of 
access to justice or sustainable development also use comparative constitutional 
law to construct international projects and draft international treaties. There is 
also increasing interest in the concept of ‘world constitutionalism’ embracing 
international organisations (Macdonald and Johnston, 2005).
Human Rights Adjudication
As signatories to the European Convention of Human Rights, which is an inter-
national treaty formulated in 1951 to prevent a repetition of the rights abuses of 
the Second World War, most European nations have incorporated the Convention 
into their domestic law.35 However, more generally, in recent years increasing use 
has also been made of comparative constitutional law in constitutional litigation, 
particularly in human rights cases. This process involves judges looking at cases 
from a variety of jurisdictions that have considered the same question as that 
before the court. While previously this process was fairly common, it did not 
generally or necessarily result in the adoption of foreign case law: in fact it often 
resulted in its rejection. What is new is the extent to which courts look at cases 
from a wide variety of jurisdictions, not just those with the same constitutional 
tradition; the extent to which they are prepared to follow these cases; and the 
extent to which they are willing (or in the case of South Africa obliged36) to use 
international legal norms. Some comparative constitutional law scholars have 
even gone so far as to suggest that we are witnessing the emergence of a new 
 common law or ius commune of human rights (McCrudden, 2002).37
We conclude this part with an assertion that comparative constitutional law has 
never been more important in practice than at the present time.
V.  SPECIFIC ISSUES
In this part first we consider a question analogous to that relating to legal ‘families’ 
in the field of macro-comparison of legal traditions: Are there some general cat-
egories or families of constitutions, ie is there a taxonomy of constitutions? Can 
35 This was achieved recently in the United Kingdom by way of the Human Rights Act 1998.
36 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 38.
37 See also ch 16 of this Handbook.
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constitutions be further classified by developing the idea of ‘ideal types’? Secondly, 
we mention some of the practical hurdles that need to be overcome in under-
taking the task of in-depth comparative analysis and we propose a pragmatic 
approach to overcoming many of the challenges faced by researchers in the field. 
Categorisation
In attempting to analyse a topic of enormous range and complexity there is a 
natural inclination to organise the subject-matter into more specific categories. 
For example, at least at a descriptive level, it is possible to identify obvious char-
acteristics which can be selected and which may be indicative of broad types at 
a surface level. Kenneth Wheare divided constitutions into written/unwritten; 
flexible/rigid; unitary/federal; separated/fused powers; and republican/monarchi-
cal (Wheare, 1964). One could also add presidential/parliamentary; controlled/
uncontrolled; one-party/multi-party; secular/religious; constitutional court/ 
legislative sovereignty; bicameral/unicameral; and justiciable/non-justiciable. 
This type of categorisation may be a useful way of identifying characteristics at a 
superficial level, and therefore of understanding something about the broad type 
of constitution being investigated, but it is of limited utility in that it does not look 
beneath the surface or provide anything approaching a comprehensive guide to a 
particular constitution.
Ideal Types
We might, moreover, consider whether the taxonomy of constitutions can be 
further refined. For example, Max Weber’s conception of the ‘ideal typical’ has 
offered a widely tested method of analysis which could be applied to constitutions 
(Leyland, 2002: 221 ff; and Loughlin, 1992: 59). The first stage is the construction 
of certain elements of reality into logically precise, controlled and unambiguous 
conceptions, which are removed from historical reality (Gerth and Wright Mills, 
1967: 59); and the second stage involves 
the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally 
absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-
sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Cotterrell, 1984: 
159, 166).
Although constitutions are usually complex formulations, it can be argued that 
certain features can be identified and stressed according to broad types. An 
approach which provides extreme and pure models will allow the analyst to con-
sider that the ‘real meat of history’ falls somewhere between these extreme types. 
In other words, as will be apparent from the discussion below, after the analyst has 
been able to construct a given range of diverse examples, each exhibiting a series 
of clear characteristics, it is then possible to examine the actual cases (particular 
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national constitutions) to see how closely they resemble the ‘ideal’ constitutional 
types that have been identified.
By way of example, viewed from the standpoint of their origins, a substantial 
number of constitutions are variations on what we might term the ‘Westminster’, 
‘Paris’, ‘Washington’, or ‘Socialist Party State’ model (each of which might be 
developed into an ‘ideal type’). On gaining independence from the United 
Kingdom the former colonies that became Commonwealth states usually retained 
a ‘Westminster’ parliamentary system which—as with the Westminster (UK) par-
liament itself—fuses the legislative and executive branches; has a permanent pro-
fessional civil service; and operates within a legal system based on the common 
law. Many of these states, until relatively recently, relied on the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council in London as their final court of appeal, which had also the 
function of interpreting the constitution. Equally, some former French colonies 
have a colonial constitutional legacy which has influenced constitutional develop-
ment in Africa.38 French influence is discernible in other ways too. For example, 
the relatively brief period of Napoleonic conquest at the beginning of the 19th 
century left behind a legal code which was adopted with surprisingly little changes 
across much of Europe, and influenced legal development and hence public law in 
many states of Africa, Asia, and (via its Spanish and Portuguese offspring) Latin 
America. The United States Constitution has survived largely intact for over 200 
years and many of its features have been widely disseminated, especially in 19th 
century Latin American states, which, inspired by American revolutionary ideals, 
wrested their independence from Spain. The United States Constitution has the 
attraction of being extremely concise but it was also ‘state of the art’ when it was 
conceived, as it was based on a clearly delineated separation of powers between 
the executive, legislative and judicial organs of the state. At the same time, it 
was symmetrical in conception and involved a uniform distribution of powers 
between the federal government and each state government. Not only is each 
State treated the same but also the state institutions of Governor, legislature and 
supreme court precisely mirror the President, Congress and Supreme Court at the 
level of the federal government. Finally, the enormous political influence of the 
Soviet Union on client states and other socialist regimes following the end of 
the Second World War resulted in single-party socialist dictatorships. These have 
disappeared from Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, 
but the residue of Soviet socialist models remains in the constitutions of North 
Korea, Vietnam, Cuba and the People’s Republic of China (which have since been 
amended to reflect varying degrees of economic change from socialist ownership 
to a market economy). Apart from observing that a considerable number of con-
stitutions incorporate religious features (eg Islam and shari’a law) it is difficult to 
propose additional distinct ideal types.
In the absence of a rigorous taxonomy for analysing constitutions, describing 
a constitution according to its conformity or lack of conformity with a classical 
38 Eg, in the Ivory Coast, Algeria and Togo.
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model appears to have some utility, even if it leaves much detail to be explained 
or excepted.
Methodology
In approaching comparative constitutional analysis, while stopping well short 
of developing or advocating a particular methodology, it is possible to identify 
certain questions which nearly always need answering. For instance, it is interest-
ing here to speculate whether there is a universal language of constitutional ter-
minology, allowing for common assumptions to do with constitutional features. 
Even here we must maintain a degree of caution in how terms are used and what 
their implications might be. We have just noted that typologies are often useful. 
However, at all times it is crucial to deal with issues of terminology, ensuring that 
words have been correctly understood and avoiding simplistic translations which 
might lead to misunderstandings. In this regard it is necessary to remember that 
general and legal expressions, in any language, are often very, or just subtly, differ-
ent,39 and that we should look for actual, as opposed to linguistic, equivalents. 
Moreover, the comparative dimension, consisting of references to  foreign 
constitutional systems, is often prompted directly by the subject-matter 
under consideration.40 The comparative task is mainly interpretive, but to inter-
pret a constitution in a particular way is to explicitly or implicitly distinguish it 
from, or liken it to, other constitutions. Indeed, we have already explained above 
that it is not possible to understand the law, the constitution, and the institu-
tions of any nation without understanding the context in which they come into 
being. Equally, it is important to grasp how institutions are perceived by a range 
of  opinion within the nation under consideration, and also how these institu-
tions operate or have operated in practice. In terms of an overall approach, it is 
recognised that a researcher might be loosely guided by a method that explicitly 
takes account of the aforementioned questions of terminology, language and 
context. However, we believe that such comparative work, particularly, if it is 
empirically based, will have to include a pragmatic dimension. The task of getting 
genuinely to grips with other constitutions will also be an active process involving 
discussion and debate with locally-based academic colleagues, legal practitioners, 
 government officials and politicians. 
To conclude, comparative constitutional law is, in our view, a wide-ranging dis-
course about constitutions and their interpretation which takes place at a different 
level to any purely national discourse. At the same time any academic discussion 
has to take account of the local constitutional context.
39 Think of the ordinary and technical meanings of ‘bill’ in English; the difference between ‘droit’ 
and ‘loi’ in French; and the different meanings of ‘cabinet’ in English and French.
40 For example, a discussion of administrative courts in Thailand, which were an important feature 
of the 1997 Constitution, reveals that the entire system was consciously modelled on the French 
Conseil D’Etat: Leyland, 2006.
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VI.  THE TEACHING AND THE STUDYING OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
We now address briefly the teaching and the studying of comparative 
constitutional law.
Comparative constitutional law as a subject taught in universities has become 
much more common in recent years. Very many law schools world-wide now 
offer something resembling a course of this kind. Most of these are concerned 
with the comparison of major western constitutional traditions such as those of 
the United States, Britain, France, and Germany (see eg Cappelletti and Cohen, 
1979). Those countries having a constitution influenced by one or more of these 
traditions will naturally emphasise it in comparative teaching. In recent years the 
scope of comparison in such courses has become manifestly wider, and constitu-
tions other than those of Europe and North America are often addressed, notably 
those of India, South Africa and Japan. Apart from considerations of prestige of 
the constitutions studied, the accessibility of materials is a major factor in the 
choice of countries. The fact that all constitutions (and even historic texts) are 
now available on the Internet provides for ease of comparison of texts. What is 
much more difficult to find is thematic analyses of constitutional systems which 
explain and evaluate such texts.
Given the complexity of constitutional systems and the time constraints faced in 
organising courses, it may not prove practical to compare entire constitutional sys-
tems. However, comparative discussion can be very illuminating in regard to partic-
ular constitutional features. For example, it may be useful to consider to what degree 
specified constitutions display the characteristics of a federal system by comparing 
the respective provisions relating to the distribution of competences, law-making 
capacity, and tax-raising powers. The constitutional role of the courts in relation to 
constitutional review is another specific aspect which might be compared.
For teachers and students of such courses the purposes of comparative con-
stitutional law are fairly clear, and reflect the purposes of any comparative law 
course. These include gaining insight into other constitutional systems and the 
nature of the societies in question, and also reflecting on one’s own constitution 
in light of comparative experience.
Comparative law offers the law student a whole new dimension: from it he can learn to 
respect the special legal cultures of other people, he will understand his own law better, 
he can develop critical standards which might lead to its improvement, and he will learn 
how rules of law are conditioned by social facts and what different forms they can take 
(Zweigert and Kötz, 1998: 21).
VII.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
This collection of essays might be regarded as a response to the paucity of aca-
demic texts which systematically address comparative law issues. The barriers 
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to teaching a demanding subject have included limitations on the availability of 
comparative expertise and lack of appropriate publications. At one level the avail-
ability of web-based sources, books such as this one, and books which address 
national constitutions, coupled with the launch of new journals, are essential to 
support the wider dissemination of the subject.
In this discussion many important characteristics of comparative constitutional 
law have been identified. Indeed, the classic purpose of studying constitutions 
from a comparative perspective is to define by comparative examination what is 
meant by the term ‘constitution’ in more than one nation and to explore the role 
of the constitution in the political process, but the task only partly involves the 
identification and understanding of structural characteristics as part of consti-
tutional design. At some level functional parallels will inevitably be encountered 
between constitutions. That is because there is a common set of tasks that have to 
be performed by all constitutions. At the same time, there has been much cross-
fertilisation and borrowing between constitutions, but the comparatist needs to 
interpret any set of national rules in a particular national context. Moreover, in 
explaining the task before us we have drawn a crucial distinction between consti-
tutions as texts and constitutionalism, which seeks to gaze beyond the text to the 
evaluation of practice according to a range of criteria. 
We wish to end the discussion by highlighting an important issue which com-
parative constitutional law will have to address in future—sometimes referred to 
as the ‘convergence/divergence’ debate. As with some other areas of comparative 
legal study, especially commercial and business law, many of those who study 
and write about comparative constitutional law appear to think, or perhaps just 
assume, that constitutional law is converging towards certain liberal-democratic 
principles, and that this is an inevitable consequence of the globalisation of 
democracy and human rights. One can also imagine a system of ‘world consti-
tutionalism’ (indeed some might argue this already exists) based on the same 
principles. For example, it is possible to point at one level to cross-currents in 
academic thought, particularly as mentioned in the field of the constitutional 
‘oughts’ relating to the protection of human rights, encouraged by mass com-
munications and travel, but also, at another political level by the influence of 
the United Nations, the Word Bank, and the United States, where there has been 
more emphasis on the rather nebulous concept of ‘good governance’ (referred to 
above). Our own view is that while certain contemporary global trends do in fact 
encourage elements of convergence, and there is plenty of evidence of this taking 
place, it does not follow that constitutions will all eventually look the same or 
that they should look the same. And of course, when it comes to constitutional 
practice strong divergences do remain in the implementation of human rights 
principles and other constitutional features. Moreover, globalisation has within 
it tendencies which are both conducive and non-conducive to the promotion of 
constitutional government. While good governance, the rule of law and judiciali-
sation have become highly prominent objectives of the international community, 
participative democracy and social justice, which are also crucial elements of 
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relatively successful constitutions, are often contradicted by these limited objec-
tives. In addition, political cultures and public law traditions are still very diverse, 
and a measure of what Patrick Glenn, in relation to legal traditions generally, 
calls ‘sustainable diversity’ (Glenn, 2003) may well be preferable to a bland one-
size-fits-all constitution. This, however, is a problem which hopefully will be 
addressed, amongst others, by the readers of this chapter. 
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
The following questions are intended to provide guidance in the use of this chapter 
in comparative law teaching.
 1.  How might the distinction between ‘the text’ and ‘the constitution’ be best 
expressed?
 2.  Is it possible to provide in a constitutional text a definition of the state, 
and what purposes might such a definition serve?
 3.  Consider examples of ‘cross-over’ between public law and private law, and 
whether crossing this line involves a different approach being taken to 
comparison.
 4.  With regard to the ‘separation of powers’, are there other ‘powers’ that 
should be provided for and included in the ‘counter-balancing’ of 
 powers?
 5.  You are asked to design a project to consider the creation of a Constitutional 
Court for the (fictitious) Central Asian Republic of Burkhistan. What 
would be the main problems you would address in considering this 
 question? How would comparative constitutional law impact on them?
APPENDIX I: PROJECT
This exercise is intended to give students first hand experience of studying con-
stitutions comparatively. It requires students to look at constitutions in their 
original form and interpret the information contained therein in the light of their 
knowledge of constitutional principles. 
Two contrasting constitutions are selected (see Bibliography and further reading 
section for relevant websites):
One from List A: India, Pakistan, People’s Republic of China, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, South Africa, Nigeria, Brazil.
One from List B: Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Norway, Sweden.
Cross-references to the constitution of the country in which the subject is being 
studied are welcomed, but the two selected constitutions should be the main focus 
of the exercise. 
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There are two tasks: 
(1)  Decide to what extent each of the chosen constitutions includes a separation 
of powers between the executive branch and the judicial branch.
To respond, students will need first to define the ‘separation of powers’ and 
then consider the way in which this principle operates within the context of the 
selected constitution, with particular emphasis on the safeguards that have been 
incorporated. It may be best to concentrate on analysing certain specific aspects 
to illustrate the point.
(2)  Contrast and evaluate the procedures by which the selected constitutions can 
be amended.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
T
his chapter’s principal argument can be summarised succinctly. 
Comparative law, it will be argued, is capable of making unique and indis-
pensable contributions to the realisation of international criminal justice. 
Expressed in such deceptively simple terms, however, neither the significance nor 
the complexity of this contention is readily apparent. 
Scholars express divergent opinions on the meaning, merits and distinctive 
methods of ‘Comparative Law’ as a discipline (see, eg Zweigert and Kötz, 1998; 
Ewald, 1995; Legrand, 1996; and Frankenberg, 1985). Perceptions of the value 
of Comparative Law for international criminal justice will necessarily be condi-
tioned by the stringency of one’s aspirations for comparative scholarship, and also 
(it must follow) by the capacity of Comparative Law’s disciplinary resources—
theoretical, methodological and empirical—to satisfy the expectations placed 
upon it. Anybody willing to contemplate a relatively inclusive concept of 
Comparative Law will almost inevitably discover more extensive uses for com-
parative legal method in the theory and practice of international criminal justice 
than those who insist on more restrictive definitions.
Part I of this chapter investigates the concept and substantive content of 
international criminal justice. A flexible approach to disciplinary taxonomy is 
* I am grateful to Rob Cryer and to the editors for helpful feedback on previous drafts. 
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maintained, in preference to stipulative definitions, by conceptualising a sequence 
of ‘concentric circles’ of international criminal justice. The significance of the 
events, institutions and practices in question will hopefully become self-evident as 
the discussion proceeds. Part II then takes up the chapter’s central proposition, by 
exploring six different ways in which Comparative Law’s contributions to inter-
national criminal justice should be regarded, in the aggregate, as both unique and 
indispensable. The discussion’s overriding objective is to promote more explicit, 
systematic, and methodologically astute recourse to comparative legal method in 
the theory and practice of international criminal justice.
II.  SEVEN CONCENTRIC CIRCLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The very idea of international criminal justice is controversial to its core. Georg 
Schwarzenberger’s mid-century evaluation is emblematic of the sceptical tradi-
tion:  
[I]n the present state of world society international criminal law in any true sense does 
not exist ... [T]he real swords of war and justice are still ‘annexed to the Sovereign Power’. 
In such a situation an international criminal law that is meant to be applied to the world 
powers is a contradiction in terms (Schwarzenberger, 1950: 263 at 295).
Theorists of a Realist persuasion insist that Superpowers, if not all sovereign 
states, are de facto above the law. What hope, then, for legality—to say nothing 
of justice—within the anarchical world of power politics? Thinkers in the benign 
tradition of Immanuel Kant (1970 [1795]) who speak of international justice 
and perpetual peace are dismissed as idealistic dreamers. ‘In the real world’ (an 
appropriation of the concept of reality that can only be admired for its audac-
ity), international diplomacy essentially involves outwitting foreigners in the 
single-minded pursuit of the national interest. This is best achieved by mutually-
advantageous compromise, but ultimately rests on coercion, including, for the 
recalcitrant, resort to armed force—that is, less euphemistically, to guns and 
bombs. The ‘law’ of these relations is the law of the jungle. And if one still wishes 
to speak of justice in such environments, it is the ‘justice’ of Socrates’ interlocutor 
Thrasymachus1 or the lesson of the Peloponnesian War transmitted to posterity by 
Thucydides:
right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong 
do what they can and the weak suffer what they must (quoted in Reichberg, Syse and 
Begby, 2006: 13).
1 In Plato’s dialogue, Thrasymachus bluntly informs Socrates,
 in all cities the same thing is just, namely what is good for the ruling authority. This, I take it, is 
where the power lies, and the result is, for anyone who looks at it in the right way, that the same 
thing is just everywhere—what is good for the stronger (Plato, 2000: 16).  
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Two-and-a-half thousand years later, the Realist school of law and international 
relations remains hale and hearty (see Dunne and Schmidt, 2005), predicting a 
looming ‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington, 1996). But developments since the 
Berlin Wall came down in 1989 have made it much harder to maintain an unre-
mittingly Schwarzenbergerian scepticism about international penal regulation. To 
establish the institutional reality of modern international criminal law, it is only 
necessary to point to the remarkable innovations which have occurred over the 
last decade-and-a-half in international criminal adjudication. This section will 
describe and critically evaluate these unprecedented institutional developments, 
having first reviewed some basic conceptual distinctions.
International criminal law is not to be equated with international criminal 
justice. This is merely an extrapolation to the international context of a familiar 
dichotomy. Institutionally valid (positive) law is patently capable of perpetrat-
ing injustice, sometimes extravagantly. Nazi racial purity laws, depriving Jews 
of their property, homes, livelihoods, liberty and ultimately their lives, were in 
this sense only an extreme example of a perfectly general phenomenon (Fraser, 
2005). Conversely, however, justice is impossible without law—at least in com-
plex modern societies in which legal duties are far from exhausted by simple, 
morally-intuitive prohibitions (‘thou shall not kill’; ‘thou shall not steal’, etc). 
One can fairly be held responsible (that is, answerable morally or legally) only 
for deliberate rule-breaking or culpable neglect of duty through recklessness 
or ignorance. For morally-justifiable legal liability, these criteria presuppose 
general, prospective, publicised, clear, accessible and determinate criminal pro-
hibitions, allowing citizens to order their conduct and affairs without fear of 
arbitrary penalisation. This is the kernel of the demand for justice under the rule 
of law. 
Taken at its narrowest, ‘international criminal law’ might refer to the corpus 
of legal rules defining international crimes and procedures. Understood more 
broadly, ‘international criminal law’ might encompass, in addition to positive 
legal norms, the institutions—courts, tribunals, treaty regimes, international 
organisations, etc—created to implement, apply and develop international crimi-
nal laws. This rules-plus-institutions conception of international criminal law is 
frequently encountered in a rapidly expanding scholarly literature (eg Cassese, 
2003; and Bantekas and Nash, 2003). A third, very different possibility is to regard 
international criminal law—or International Criminal Law (ICrimL)—as a fledg-
ling academic discipline constituted by a distinctive set of norms, institutions, 
concepts, ideals, questions, issues, problems and challenges for further scholarly 
examination through research, teaching, analysis and critical commentary, and 
theoretical reflection. In a similar vein, International Criminal Justice (ICrimJ) 
might be regarded as a still broader academic discipline, integrating ICrimL within 
an overarching interdisciplinary enterprise also incorporating philosophical, his-
torical, political and international relations, sociological, anthropological and 
criminological perspectives. ICrimJ, in this conception, is more methodologi cally 
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diverse and correspondingly less preoccupied with the institutional features of 
international criminal law (in either its first or second senses), than ICrimL. These 
contrasting approaches in reality overlap and intersect in various complex and 
significant ways.2 
Beyond these basic conceptual clarifications, there is no settled or agreed defi-
nition of international criminal law, still less of the more emphatically normative 
concept of international criminal justice. The following survey begins with the 
incontestable core of international criminal justice institutions and works out, 
through a sequence of concentric and interactive jurisdictional circles, to the pro-
gressively more debateable periphery.
The initial point of departure for any contemporary discussion of international 
criminal law must be the International Criminal Court (ICC),3 created by a mul-
tilateral treaty agreed at Rome in 1998 (see Cassese, Gaeta and Jones, 2002). The 
ICC became fully operational on 1 July 2002, having secured the requisite 60 rati-
fications.4 By November 2005 there were 100 fully-ratified States Parties, although 
significant absentees still include China, Russia and the United States—all of 
which, of course, enjoy permanent vetoes on the United Nations Security Council, 
underwritten by irresistible economic leverage, diplomatic influence, and military 
might. The ICC is invested with, exclusively prospective,5 jurisdiction over four 
groups of substantive crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
the ‘crime of aggression’ (unjustified resort to armed conflict).6 Under Article 12 
of its Rome Statute, the ICC’s jurisdiction is essentially7 limited to international 
crimes committed on the territory of a State Party or by one of its nationals. 
In conjunction with Article 98, this limitation allows countries which remain 
opposed to the ICC—notably the United States (see Dietz, 2004; and Wedgwood, 
2001)—to extort agreements from individual ICC members promising never 
to surrender the non-signatory’s nationals to the ICC. Though it is sometimes 
referred to colloquially as the ‘World Court’, the scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction is 
therefore plainly less than globally comprehensive.
At the heart of the ICC’s institutional structure is the ‘principle of complemen-
tarity’. It is not envisaged that every jurisdictionally competent allegation of inter-
national criminality, including even genocide, will automatically be referred to the 
ICC after July 2002. Instead, the ICC is intended to assert jurisdiction ‘over the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’ in a 
2 One form of intersection worth emphasising is the potential for ICrimL and ICrimJ, qua aca-
demic disciplines, to influence the design, implementation and future prospects of international 
criminal law and justice in their normative and institutional manifestations. That is to say, scholarly 
discourse already permeates the theory and practice of international criminal justice. 
3 See www.icc-cpi.int/.
4 ICC Statute, Art 126.
5 ICC Statute, Art 11.
6 ICC Statute, Arts 5–8.
7 In addition, the United Nations Security Council may refer situations to the ICC involving non-
Party States: ICC Statute Arts 12(2) and 13(b). 
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manner which is ‘complementary to national criminal jurisdictions’.8 In practice, 
this means that the ICC will normally allow national criminal processes to take 
their course, unless the ICC Prosecutor judges that the relevant state ‘is unwill-
ing or unable genuinely to carry out the ... prosecution’.9 In accordance with the 
principle of complementarity, therefore, domestic criminal courts are intended to 
be the primary agents of international criminal justice, with the ICC as supervisor 
and ultimate failsafe.
Although the ICC has yet to complete its first fully-fledged criminal trial, 
substantial preliminary steps have been taken to make inquiries, gather evidence, 
and execute arrest warrants.10 Article 13 of the ICC Statute provides that ‘a situa-
tion’ suspected of involving crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction may be referred 
to the Prosecutor by a State Party or by the United Nations Security Council, or 
alternatively, may be investigated on the Prosecutor’s own initiative. Four inves-
tigations of suspicious ‘situations’ are currently on-going, concerning civil war 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the guerrilla activities of the 
‘Lord’s Resistance Army’ in Uganda, allegations of genocide in the Darfur region 
of Sudan, and war crimes in the Central African Republic.
The ICC is the focus of future hopes and aspirations for international criminal 
justice. A second circle of institutional activity, with a more tangible record of on-
going achievement, comprises two ad hoc criminal tribunals created by the United 
Nations Security Council. Having previously been employed to authorise military 
intervention in Korea, Kuwait/Iraq and Somalia, the Security Council’s Chapter 
VII enforcement powers were applied to the novel task of establishing judicial 
organs.11 The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1999—normally abbreviated to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)12—was cre-
ated in 1993 to deal with allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity 
(including ‘ethnic cleansing’) arising from the break-up of Yugoslavia and the 
descent of the Balkans into a series of vicious civil wars in the early 1990s (see 
Bass, 2000: chapter 6). With this precedent established, the Security Council’s 
second juridical experiment followed promptly in 1994. The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),13 situated in Arusha, Tanzania, was 
the United Nations’ belated response to genocide in the Great Lakes region of 
Africa. Certainly 800,000 people, perhaps a million or more, were systematically 
slaughtered in just 100 days following the premeditated assassination of Rwandan 
President Juvenal Habyarimana in April 1994. Civil strife in Rwanda has a long, 
8 ICC Statute, Preamble.
9 ICC Statute, Art 17.
10 Report on the Activities of the Court  ICC-ASP/4/16.
11 Ch VII concerns ‘action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of 
aggression’.
12 See www.un.org/icty/.
13 See www.ictr.org/.
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colonial and post-colonial history, but the immediate conflagration targeted 
members of the minority Tutsi population, who were hunted out and brutally 
massacred (along with moderate Hutu sympathisers) by members of the Hutu 
majority. Unarmed Tutsi civilians—men, women, children and babies—were 
murdered on sight in bestial orgies of violence by machete-wielding gangs of their 
erstwhile Hutu neighbours. Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire, the commander 
of the small UN peacekeeping force stationed in Kigali during 1993–94, declared 
that in the midst of the Rwandan genocide,
I shook hands with the devil. I have seen him, I have smelled him and I have touched 
him. I know the devil exists ... We were not in a war of victors and vanquished. We were 
in the middle of a slaughterhouse (Dallaire, 2004: xviii, 281). 
Both the ICTY and the ICTR were tasked with exacting mandates. The immedi-
ate objective of bringing to justice those responsible for genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity was conceived as part of an all-encompassing interna-
tional agenda, extending to: establishing an unassailable historical record of events; 
satisfying victims’ grievances (which if left to fester unattended might easily precip-
itate self-help revenge-taking and further cycles of inter-ethnic conflict); deterring 
future international criminality by clearly signalling an end to the ‘culture of impu-
nity’ (cf Bassiouni, 2000) by which the worst international criminals—especially 
deposed heads of state and other political and military leaders—have generally 
eluded legal accountability without having to answer for their crimes; promoting 
reconciliation between former adversaries; facilitating national political, social and 
economic reconstruction in war-torn regions; instilling respect for human rights 
and the rule of law; and helping to create the conditions for stable democratic 
government—all with the (additional) ulterior purpose of contributing to the res-
toration and maintenance of international peace and security. The extent to which 
such broadly-drawn, ambitious and potentially conflicting objectives have been, 
or ever could be, accomplished by international criminal trials of any description 
seems destined to be a topic of interminable debate and controversy.
More tangible achievements can be registered in the shorter-term. By 31 July 
2005,14 the ICTY had completed 20 trials involving 39 accused, 36 of whom were 
convicted on at least some counts whilst the remaining three were acquitted. A 
further 18 accused had pleaded guilty. Thirty four trials, many of them involving 
multiple defendants, remained on foot, and a further 50 indicted accused were 
awaiting trial. The ICTY now has three separate Trial Chambers, allowing six 
trials to be conducted simultaneously (each Chamber running two trials apiece, 
alternating between morning and afternoon sessions). The scale of these judicial 
operations, which are without precedent in the history of international criminal 
adjudication, helps to contextualise in a more favourable light the ICTY’s well-
publicised embarrassment of presiding over the abortive prosecution of former 
14 See the ICTY’s Twelfth Annual Report to the United Nations General Assembly and Security 
Council, A/60/267—S/2005/532, 17 August 2005.
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Yugoslavian president Slobodan Milosevic.15 Insisting on representing himself in 
court, Milosevic took every opportunity to disrupt proceedings by denouncing his 
prosecution as a show trial and attempting to subpoena Western politicians—Bill 
Clinton16 and Tony Blair17 amongst them—as witnesses for the defence. The trial 
dragged on for over four years and ran to almost 50,000 pages of transcript, until, 
in progressively failing health, Milosevic’s heart finally gave out and (according 
to preferred penal theology) he either prematurely reaped his just reward or in 
extremis frustrated justice.18 It speaks volumes for the international community’s 
sincerity of purpose that Milosevic, as a former head of state, was put on trial 
at all, but neither advocates nor critics of international criminal trials can be 
satisfied with what ultimately transpired. Another long-standing bone of conten-
tion concerns the obstructive attitude of certain successor Balkan states towards 
tracking down and surrendering to the Tribunal fugitives believed to be located 
in their territories. Although co-operation with the ICTY has, generally speaking, 
improved over time, several notorious indictees remain at large, apparently with 
the connivance of governmental authorities. As Judge Theodor Meron, former 
President of the ICTY, summarised the position in his 2005 Annual Report:
The failure to arrest high-level accused, such as [former Republika Srpska President] 
Radovan Karadžic, [Bosnian Serb General] Ratko Mladic and [Croatian Commander] 
Ante Gotovina, despite several resolutions of the Security Council, is of grave concern 
for the proper administration of justice. Repeated appeals to the Governments and 
entities in the region and the international community to pursue and arrest them have 
so far not borne results ... To achieve the Tribunal’s mandate of contributing to the 
maintenance of peace and stability in the region it is imperative that those fugitives are 
given their day in court in The Hague ... Ten years after the genocide in Srebrenica, the 
Tribunal is continuing in its quest for justice, truth, peace and reconciliation.19
The ICTR, meanwhile, began its first trial in January 1997, and by June 2006 
had rendered 22 judgments relating to 28 accused. These proceedings produced 
25 convictions and three acquittals. Jean Kambanda, former Prime Minister of 
Rwanda, claims the dubious distinction of being the first statesman ever to be 
convicted (he pleaded guilty to genocide)20 of the ultimate international crime 
15 Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic (IT–02–54).
16 ‘“If someone commits a horrific murder in Britain, do you attribute it to Tony Blair?” Slobodan 
Milosevic shamelessly used his war crimes tribunal this week to blame everyone but himself ’: P 
Sherwell, Sunday Telegraph, 17 February 2002.
17 See Decision on Assigned Counsel Application for Interview and Testimony of Tony Blair and 
Gerhard Schröder, ICTY Trial Chamber, 9 December 2005.
18 Judge Robinson’s summation is exquisitely laconic:
 ‘The Chamber has been advised of the death of the accused, Slobodan Milosevic. We express our 
regret at his passing. We also regret that his untimely death has deprived not only him but indeed 
all interested parties of a judgement upon the allegations in the indictment. His death terminates 
these proceedings’ (Transcript p 49191, 14 March 2006).
19 See the ICTY’s Twelfth Annual Report to the United Nations General Assembly and Security 
Council, A/60/267—S/2005/532, 17 August 2005, paras 182, 257, 258.
20 V Brittain, ‘Rwanda’s former PM admits role in Genocide’, The Guardian, 2 May 1998.
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(cf Friedrichs, 2000). In June 2006 the ICTR was conducting a further 11 on-
going trials involving 27 defendants. Another 14 accused were awaiting trial in 
the Tribunal’s detention facility in Arusha, and a further 18 indictees remained at 
large. This modest total of indicted individuals pales in comparison, however, to 
the overall numbers of perpetrators and collaborators in the Rwandan genocide. 
Over 130,000 suspects were initially detained, and many more—perhaps as many 
as a million people—were directly implicated in one way or another. Genocide in 
Rwanda was experienced alike by victims, perpetrators and bystanders as a viru-
lent cultural virus which saturated the entire social fabric and infected every pore 
of the body politic. The sheer impossibility of prosecuting every perpetrator, at 
the ICTR or anywhere else (Rwanda’s own depleted criminal justice infrastructure 
was manifestly unequal to the task), posed acute problems of selection. Jurists and 
administrators were forced to improvise imaginative alternatives to traditional 
penal process in their endeavour to promote justice, peace, security and reconcili-
ation without backsliding into impunity (Drumbl, 2000a).21
The ICTR’s general strategy has been to ‘concentrate on the prosecution of 
those persons who bear the greatest responsibility for the tragic events which 
occurred in Rwanda’,22 whilst diverting lesser offenders to national prosecutions 
or indigenous ‘gacaca’ mediation processes. This bifurcated approach, reserving 
international prosecution for the very worst or most high-profile offenders, has 
become a familiar pattern in international criminal adjudication.
The ad hoc Tribunals were never intended to be permanent institutions. Both 
the ICTY and the ICTR have formulated ‘completion strategies’, according to 
which all trials should be finalised by 2008, and appeal hearings (which are plenti-
ful in these cases) concluded by 2010. By this time, outstanding work should have 
been transferred to local courts and prosecutors, and the ICC will henceforth be 
on-hand to assert jurisdiction if fresh atrocities should occur. A prominent place 
in the unfolding history of international criminal justice is already assured to the 
ad hoc Tribunals. Confounding Schwarzenbergerian sceptics, they have broken 
the spell of perpetrator-impunity in the most emphatic terms, by demonstrat-
ing that there is something that can be done by the international community 
in response to genocide, crimes against humanity and other massive, state-
sponsored violations of fundamental human rights during civil wars or by tyran-
nical governments abusing their own people. Almost irrespective of the local 
merits and scope for replication of the Tribunals’ activities, the practical enforce-
ment of international criminal law can no longer be dismissed peremptorily, as 
the fantasy of idealists or logical self-contradiction. 
As a template for the ICC, bequeathing personnel and experience as well as doc-
trinal innovation, the legacy of the ad hoc Tribunals will be subsumed into the core 
of international criminal justice. In the meantime, the ICTY and the ICTR have 
21 Cf D Gough, ‘Mass jail release haunts Rwanda’, The Guardian, 19 October 1998.
22 ICTR The Tribunal at a Glance—Fact Sheet No 1, para 15. See www.ictr.org/.
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stimulated the proliferation of a third concentric circle of international criminal 
tribunals, known as ‘internationalised’ or ‘hybrid’ courts (Romano, Nollkaemper 
and Kleffner, 2004). Whilst precise legal arrangements differ, these tribunals share 
the characteristic of being neither fully international, like the ICC and the ad 
hoc Tribunals, nor exclusively domestic in character. Instead, they blend features 
of municipal and international criminal proceedings in more or less unique 
combinations, tailored to particular circumstances. At one end of the spectrum, 
lobbying by international organisations might have been instrumental in creat-
ing a tribunal, whilst on-going international support—financial, administrative, 
legal, political and military—may condition its institutional design, operational 
protocols and future prospects. The Special Court for Sierra Leone, fashioned by 
treaty between the government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations, fits this 
pattern of major international sponsorship (see Cryer, 2001). Similar partnerships 
between post-conflict states and the international community have precipitated 
internationalised criminal tribunals in East Timor, Kosovo and Cambodia as an 
integral part of national processes of victim reparation, social reconciliation and 
political reconstruction. Towards the other end of the spectrum are predomi-
nantly national legal proceedings underpinned by international support and good 
will. For example, the Iraqi High Tribunal, established in the wake of the 2003 
Gulf War to try Saddam Hussein and his henchmen for atrocities perpetrated 
against the Iraqi people, is, strictly speaking, a creature of Iraqi domestic law, but 
clearly would never have existed without United States-led military intervention 
to topple Saddam’s Ba’athist regime and subsequent facilitation by the occupation 
Iraqi Provisional Authority. Indeed, it has been said that the
Tribunal’s origins doom its legitimacy, not merely because it appears to be yet another 
instance of the Hegemon applying to others what it refuses to apply to itself ... but 
because it suits US policy goals—including to undermine the ICC (Alvarez, 2004: 319 
at 326–7).
The Scottish criminal court temporarily convened in the Netherlands to try two 
Libyan nationals suspected of having planted the terrorist bomb which brought 
down Pam Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie in 1988 (Murphy, 2001), is another 
illustration of the exotic legal combinations to be found at the domestic end of 
modern ‘internationalised’ criminal tribunals.23
A fourth ‘concentric circle’ of international criminal justice strains the geomet-
ric metaphor, because it takes us back in time as well as further from the core. The 
International Military Tribunal (IMT) ‘for the just and prompt trial and punish-
ment of the major war criminals of the European Axis’,24 located in Nuremberg 
during 1945–46, is often regarded as the fons et origo of modern international 
23 For international interest in the Lockerbie trial, see eg Security Council Res 1192/98, welcoming 
the initiative and calling on all United Nations members to co-operate with it.
24 IMT (London) Charter, Art 1. Materials relating to the IMT, including a full trial transcript, can 
be found on Yale Law School’s excellent Avalon Project website: www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt.
htm.
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criminal proceedings.25 It set a remarkable historical precedent, in subjecting to 
formal trial and judicial punishment—rather than summary execution, as many 
contemporaries would have preferred—the most prominent politicians, military 
leaders, ideologues and civil administrators in Hitler’s Nazi government, includ-
ing Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering. The Nuremberg trial in total produced 
18 convictions of individuals,26 three acquittals and 12 sentences of death (which 
Goering sensationally pre-empted by committing suicide hours before his planned 
execution: see Persico, 1994). The iconic significance of the ‘legacy of Nuremberg’ 
is still hotly debated (for contrasting views, see eg Taylor, 1992; Eckhardt, 1996; 
Falk, 1999; King, 1998; and Washington, 2003). Passing over more detailed criti-
cisms and objections, there is broad agreement that the IMT did not conduct a 
truly international criminal process. As a joint-venture of the four principal 
victorious powers (Britain, France, Russia and the United States), it was more in 
the nature of military justice imposed by the Allies as the de facto government of 
occupied Germany (see Cassese, 2003: 332–3). The ‘Nuremberg Principles’, which 
were subsequently endorsed by a fledgling United Nations,27 have nonetheless 
continued to exert a major influence on the development of international crimi-
nal law. Nuremberg pioneered the notion of individual criminal responsibility 
for international crimes which has subsequently been consolidated by the ad hoc 
Tribunals and the ICC.
Our fifth concentric circle might be termed ‘transnational criminal law’ (cf 
Boister, 2003). It embraces various forms of international co-operation, co-
ordination and mutual judicial assistance in penal affairs, sometimes involving 
relatively modest bilateral agreements between two or more states but often 
founded upon major multilateral treaties or ‘conventions’ under the sponsor-
ship of the United Nations or some other competent international organisation 
such as the Council of Europe (CoE).28 Paradigmatic are the so-called ‘suppres-
sion conventions’: international agreements by which signatory states promise 
to enact national criminal laws to combat particular conduct of international 
concern. Suppression conventions have addressed, amongst other topics, torture, 
apartheid, drug-trafficking, environmental degradation, and international terror-
ism (see Bantekas and Nash, 2003: chapters 3–5; and Sunga, 1997: chapters 2–3). 
Transnational criminal law, broadly conceived, also includes extradition agree-
ments, transborder mutual assistance in criminal investigations and prosecu-
tions, and even state-sponsored abductions of suspects on foreign soil and other, 
more prosaic types of informal co-operation between national police forces, 
25 Much less is said, or even remembered, about the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 
established in Tokyo between 1946 and 1948 to try alleged Japanese war criminals (Clark, 1997). For 
various legal and political reasons, the Tokyo Tribunal is not regarded as a particularly happy prec-
edent for international criminal proceedings.
26 Several corporate entities were also prosecuted, including, the SS, the Gestapo and the Leadership 
Corps of the Nazi Party, in order to facilitate subsequent prosecutions of their members.
27 United Nations General Assembly Res 95(I), 11 December 1946.
28 See www.coe.int/.
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prosecutors and judiciaries. These arrangements do not, by and large, impose 
legal duties directly on ordinary citizens or public officials, and for this reason 
some commentators would exclude them from the core concept of international 
criminal law (eg Broomhall, 2004: chapter 1). It can be objected that transnational 
criminal law is not genuinely supra-national in conception or effect. We may 
grant that suppression conventions technically specify ‘crimes under international 
law’ rather than international crimes stricto sensu. However, this is no reason to 
downplay the obvious affinities between transnational criminal law and other 
norms of international criminal justice in constructing a reasonably comprehen-
sive and inclusive disciplinary taxonomy.
Until recent times, the application of international criminal law was virtually 
the exclusive preserve of national criminal courts and military tribunals. This is a 
sixth concentric circle of international criminal process. Post-Second World War 
trials of Nazis and traitorous collaborators were mostly conducted by national 
courts (Marschik, 1997), and with some notable milestones along the way—
including the trial of the Holocaust’s senior bureaucrat Adolf Eichmann by the 
Israeli courts in 1961 (Douglas, 2001: Part 2; and Arendt, 1994 [1963])—national 
prosecutions have continued right up to the present day (Hirsch, 2001).29 Erstwhile 
Latin American premiers, such as ex-Chilean dictator Pinochet (Webber, 1999), 
have also found themselves arraigned before national courts on charges of torture, 
murder, ‘disappearances’ and other systematic human rights violations. Moreover, 
even where fully international or hybridised criminal tribunals are established to 
prosecute the worst offenders, the bulk of the relevant caseload is always carried 
by domestic criminal courts and military courts martial. This was the experience 
in post-war Germany, in the Balkans and in Rwanda, and it will continue to be 
the pattern under the ICC’s jurisdictional regime of complementarity. Treating 
national criminal proceedings as the sixth ‘concentric circle’ of international 
criminal justice might therefore be regarded as inappropriately marginalising, 
since national courts arguably populate the core.
The seventh, and final, ‘concentric circle’ of international criminal justice is 
more aptly conceptualised as a chord running through the entire enterprise. 
For it comprises scholars’ and researchers’ contributions to the broader ‘ICrimJ’ 
project, conceived programmatically as an emerging new academic discipline. In 
a nutshell, ICrimJ epitomises interdisciplinarity. Some of its specifically legal and 
jurisprudential complexities have already been touched upon, and will be elabo-
rated further in Part II, where the significance of socio-legal and criminological 
contributions to ICrimJ will also become apparent. There is enormous scope for 
Criminology to enrich the theory and practice of ICrimJ (Roberts and McMillan, 
2003; and Drumbl, 2003). Criminology has developed the methodological tools 
for investigating both the nature of international ‘crime’ and the variety of 
29 See also D Fuchs: ‘Nazi war criminal escapes Costa Brava police search’, The Guardian 17 October 
2005; and I Traynor, ‘Nazi sentenced to 10 years in Germany’s “Last war crimes trial”’, The Guardian 
21 May 1999.
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informal and official responses it provokes. Formal trial and punishment on the 
traditional model is only one amongst several potential responses to international 
criminality, which may also include—for example—‘restorative justice’ processes 
and indigenous dispute resolution (Drumbl, 2000b; and Alvarez, 1999). 
The overlapping disciplines of Politics and International Relations (IR) frame 
the immediate geo-political and strategic context for concrete developments in 
international criminal justice, and thus also naturally figured in the preceding 
discussion. Since armed conflict has typically been the precursor, as well as the 
subject-matter, of international criminal trials, a role for sociologies of the military, 
and of waging war and making peace, is also implied by this disciplinary taxonomy. 
History (for these purposes incorporating Holocaust Studies) must inevitably 
infuse a subject on which the Second World War and the bloodstained annals of 
aggressive war, genocide and state-sponsored atrocity cast a long shadow. 
Last but not least, Philosophy is always indispensable to serious theoretical 
enquiry, importing refined generic skills of logical reasoning, taxonomy and con-
ceptual analysis, supplemented by more substantive ethical reflections on justice, 
authority, government, retribution, the nature of evil, wrongdoing, rights, human 
dignity, personal autonomy, punishment, responsibility, and moral culpability. 
These topics figure prominently amongst other pressing issues and questions 
demanding practical answers from the advocates, architects and practitioners of 
international criminal justice.
III.  COMPARATIVE LAW’S UNIQUE AND INDISPENSABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
Having developed a sophisticated conceptualisation of international criminal 
justice, we may now explore Comparative Law’s distinctive contributions, organ-
ised under six broad headings: institutional design; legislation; jurisprudence; 
operational policy-making and mutual judicial assistance; legal harmonisation; 
and research, analysis and critical evaluation. Since conceptual definition is para-
mount, not every example will be regarded by every reader as legitimate. Different 
examples might have been substituted, and those actually chosen could have 
been developed at much greater length. This flexible approach is calculated to 
persuade even conceptual sticklers that Comparative Law, however conservatively 
conceived, is capable of making some unique and essential contributions to inter-
national criminal justice, however narrowly defined. Readers who share my own 
preference for more inclusive conceptualisations should find that Comparative 
Law has much more to offer than conceptual minimalists perceive.
Designing the Institutional Frameworks of International Criminal Law
Modern domestic legal systems are grown, rather than deliberately made, norma-
tive orders (Allen, 1996: Part I), that is, slowly sedimented products of history, 
politics, jurisprudence and culture. International criminal tribunals, by contrast, 
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have no institutional history, politics, culture or legal tradition to call their own, 
at least until they become fully operational. International legal orders are made, 
not grown. Everything about them is either borrowed or tailor-made. For their 
planners and architects, international criminal tribunals present the unique chal-
lenge that their institutions and foundational legal instruments must be designed 
essentially from scratch. This, however, does not necessarily imply that the draw-
ing board is completely blank. We have already seen that the United Nations ad 
hoc Tribunals supplied an institutional model which was promptly adopted and 
adapted by various internationalised tribunals, and by the ICC. Historically, how-
ever, the primary source of ideas and inspiration for institutional and procedural 
models has been national criminal justice systems. In an ideal world, the architects 
of international criminal tribunals would draw upon the best examples of domes-
tic institutional design from around the globe, suitably modified for the special-
ist task in hand. And this, of course, is where Comparative Law should make its 
mark, not as the fountain of all wisdom, but as an indispensable contributor to an 
interdisciplinary conversation (also see Delmas-Marty, 2003).
At least since Nuremberg, questions of basic institutional design have been 
conceptualised in terms of the distinction between ‘adversarial’ and ‘inquisito-
rial’ procedures. Notwithstanding the problematic nature of that dichotomy (see 
Jackson, 2005; and Nijboer, 1993), it remains a useful starting point for analysis. 
Describing negotiations over the drafting of the IMT’s Charter, Telford Taylor 
remarks that
[p]erhaps the most intractable problem was the technical one of stating the respective 
functions and responsibilities of the Tribunal and the prosecution—a problem caused 
by the differences between Continental and Anglo-American criminal procedures 
(Taylor, 1992: 63).
Chief Prosecutor Robert H. Jackson apparently shared this assessment:
From the very beginning it has been apparent that our greatest problem is how to rec-
oncile two very different systems of procedure (quoted ibid: 64).
In the event, the Russians and the French were willing to let adversarial prefer-
ences prevail in order to placate the Americans, and ‘differences were resolved by 
compromises which were crude but proved workable’ (Taylor, ibid). Yet there was 
plainly much ignorance and suspicion of unfamiliar trial procedures on all sides. 
Even Taylor’s authoritative memoir, which is careful to acknowledge differences 
within as well as between the two procedural families, makes generalisations about 
‘Anglo-American practice’, which look suspect through English eyes.30 Greater 
30 According to Taylor, for example, it was ‘contrary to Anglo-American practice’ that defendants 
before the IMT ‘could also make an unsworn statement at the end of the trial’. However, criminal 
defendants in England and Wales did not generally become competent witnesses in their own defence 
until 1898, and the accused’s right to make an unsworn statement from the dock was maintained 
throughout most of the 20th century, until it was finally abolished by the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
(primarily to stop bombers and assassins of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) from using their crimi-
nal trial as a platform for making political speeches and denouncing the authority of British courts).
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comparative insight would help to distinguish those features of national criminal 
proceedings which are regarded as essential and more or less non-negotiable, 
from relatively ephemeral details attributable largely to historical accident or 
whimsical cultural preference. This exercise, if undertaken in a spirit of candour 
and co-operation, might ease the path to more acceptable compromises in the 
design of international criminal procedures.
In more recent history, the ICTY, ICTR and ICC have all combined charac-
teristic features of adversarial and inquisitorial process in novel and imaginative 
ways. Very roughly speaking, United Nations-sponsored international criminal 
trials have been modelled on common law adversarial proceedings (Cassese, 2003: 
chapter 20), whereas the pre-trial phases of international criminal investigations 
and prosecutions have drawn substantially on the continental inquisitorial tradi-
tion. Comparative understanding of how these processes work in their native set-
tings, and their capacity to withstand extrapolation to the international context, 
is surely no less important for successful institutional design than expertise in 
international law, diplomacy or international relations.
The inquisitorial caste of pre-trial international criminal process is personified 
in the figure of the prosecutor. In the ICC system, the Prosecutor ‘may initiate 
investigations proprio motu on the basis of information on crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court’, and to this end,
may seek additional information from States, organs of the United Nations, intergovern-
mental or non-governmental organizations, or other reliable sources ... and may receive 
written or oral testimony at the seat of the Court.31
The ICC Prosecutor must, however, obtain the authorisation of the Court’s Pre-
Trial Chamber in order to proceed with an investigation and prosecution.32 This 
institutional arrangement is modelled directly on continental criminal procedure 
codes. It is in marked contrast to the rigid separation between English police and 
prosecutors enshrined in the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, which has dictated 
a somewhat estranged relationship between police investigators and the Crown 
Prosecution Service in England and Wales.33 At the ICTY and ICTR, a succession 
of talented, energetic and personally well-respected prosecutors (Arbour, 1997; 
and Goldstone, 2000) has been instrumental in implementing the Tribunals’ man-
date (to the extent that it has been implemented) by doggedly pursuing fugitive 
indictees, amassing evidence of international crimes, preparing cases for trial, and 
cajoling or embarrassing reluctant national governments to fulfil their interna-
tional obligations by complying with the Tribunal’s requests for assistance.
31 ICC Statute, Art 15(1)–(2).
32 ICC Statute, Art 15(3).
33 Recent developments, culminating in a transfer of the initial power to charge suspects form police 
to prosecutors under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, are in the process of reducing this institutional dis-
tance (Brownlee, 2004). Whether closer contact will facilitate effective prosecution, or damage Crown 
prosecutors’ vaunted ‘independence’, remains to be seen.
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The tendency of international criminal trial proceedings to conform to a 
broadly adversarial format, with party-orchestrated presentation of evidence and 
oral examination of witnesses, is attributable to several factors. Looking beyond 
the United States’ disproportionate influence in all of these initiatives, the global 
human rights movement has left its mark. International human rights instru-
ments like the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
1948 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966 
contain various criminal process-related provisions—including the ‘right to a fair 
trial’, which is elaborated in considerable detail.34 Global human rights instru-
ments have been reinforced by regional organisations and treaties, such as the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In extending its activities into 
the sponsorship of international criminal trials, the United Nations has naturally 
been at pains to preserve its long-standing commitment to human rights.35 The 
ICTY, ICTR and ICC all consequently reproduce within their respective statutes 
a full suite of rights for suspects and the accused, including faithful translations 
of the ICCPR’s Article 14 right to a fair trial.36 Thus, every person facing criminal 
charges must be allowed to conduct their own defence, with the assistance of 
counsel if they prefer, and their entitlements shall include the right
to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance 
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses 
against him.37 
Anglo-American style examination-in-chief and cross-examination of party-
summoned witnesses are clearly contemplated, in preference to the dossier-based, 
judicially-directed factual inquiry characteristic of continental criminal trials. Yet 
these generalisations barely scratch the surface of some complex and imperfectly 
digested legal issues. Comparative investigation would reveal that oral examina-
tion of witnesses by the parties has been embraced enthusiastically (albeit not 
always entirely successfully) in several historically ‘inquisitorial’ legal systems (see 
Weigend, 2003; Siegel, 2006; and Vogler, 2005), at the same time as classically 
adversarial exclusionary rules of evidence have been relaxed (Roberts, 2006) and 
judges have assumed more directive case-management functions in common law 
jurisdictions (Duff, 2004). Traditional procedural dichotomies have shifted and 
blurred. Nor is JH Wigmore’s notorious boosterism for cross-examination as ‘the 
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth’ (Wigmore, 1974: vol 
5, para 1367) today unequivocally endorsed in the common law’s heartlands. Even 
if cross-examination worked flawlessly in England and Wales or New York, which 
many critics vehemently dispute (see Roberts and Zuckerman, 2004: 215–21), 
it would be foolhardy to assume that it can be replicated with equal success in 
34 UDHR, Arts 10 and 11; ICCPR, Art 14. For general discussion, see Bassiouni (1993).
35 The Preamble to the UN Charter reaffirms ‘faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small’.
36 ICTY Statute, Art 21; ICTR Statute, Art 20; and ICC Statute, Arts 66 and 67.
37 ICCPR, Art 14(3)(e).
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the multi-lingual, culturally diverse international courtrooms of The Hague or 
Arusha.38 Microscopic examination of proof-taking and evidence-testing at the 
domestic level is required to identify the comparative strengths and weaknesses 
of procedural mechanisms, and to assess their capacity for extrapolation to the 
international context. 
Comparative Law generates both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ contributions to the 
basic design of international criminal justice institutions and procedures, poten-
tially building into an indispensable reference-library of ‘do’s and don’t’s’. On the 
negative side, comparative analysis should help to dispel all-too-familiar carica-
tures of domestic legal systems as inflexibly static, exclusively parochial, ciphers of 
national mores. Ignorance of this kind is a crutch for nationalistic prejudice and 
an obstacle to successful international co-operation in penal affairs. Viewed more 
positively, Comparative Law supplies invaluable models, experience and juridical 
resources for robust institution-building at the international level.
Legislating Substantive International Criminal Law
International criminal law is sui generis, and one must avoid facile analogies to 
domestic criminal litigation (cf Tallgren, 2002: 561 at 572). This unique supra-
national enterprise should nonetheless be informed and enriched by comparative 
studies of municipal criminal law and process. The task of legislating substantive 
international criminal law exemplifies this duality.
Consider the four ‘core international crimes’, as specified by the ICC Statute. 
They comprise, first, genocide, which means (in summary) killing, seriously 
harming or interfering with human reproduction or childrearing ‘committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such’.39 Secondly, ‘crimes against humanity’ involve murder, extermi-
nation, enslavement, deportation, unlawful imprisonment, torture, rape, sexual 
slavery, discriminatory persecution, enforced disappearances, apartheid, or ‘other 
inhumane acts of a similar character’ when ‘committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack’.40 Thirdly, ‘war crimes’ are specified in elaborate detail. They include generic 
criminal violations such as murder, rape and assault; breaches of military ethics 
like hostage-taking, mistreating surrendered combatants or POWs, or declaring 
‘no quarter’; and discrete prohibitions of illegal weaponry (eg poison gas or dum-
dum bullets) and forbidden tactics (eg bombardment of non-military targets or 
deployment of ‘human shields’). Finally, fourth, the ‘crime of aggression’ concerns 
unjustified resort to warfare, in unprovoked armed attack or military conquest, 
38 Cross-examination of Goering at the Nuremberg IMT backfired for somewhat different reasons: 
Jackson’s preparation was flawed and the former Reichsmarschall was adept at political point-scoring 
(Johnson and Hinderaker, 2002).
39 ICC Statute, Art 6.
40 ICC Statute, Art 7.
International Criminal Justice  355
for example. Aggression violates the cardinal principle of state sovereignty, which 
is the legal and political foundation-stone of modern international relations. The 
ICC cannot assume jurisdiction over crimes of aggression unless and until the 
Assembly of States Parties reaches agreement on the meaning of ‘aggression’,41 
however, and this could be a long time coming.
The core crimes derive predominantly from International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL). Much of their substance is plainly far removed from the everyday concerns 
of criminal lawyers in domestic practice. To this extent, ‘ICrimL’ appears to be 
exactly what most of its exponents take it to be, a specialised branch of public 
international law (PIL). Yet two further considerations bring Comparative Law 
firmly back into focus. 
First, ICrimL does draw directly on domestic criminal laws, both in its defi-
nitions of generic crimes like murder, rape and assault, and also in its general 
principles of criminal liability. Article 30 of the ICC’s Rome Statute, for example, 
specifies that
a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent 
and knowledge
and the meaning of ‘intent’ is further defined. Articles 31 and 32 address such 
familiar topics as insanity, intoxication, self-defence, duress, and mistake of fact 
or law. Article 25 deals with accomplices, incitement and criminal attempts. Each 
of these definitional elements raises points of legislative drafting and underlying 
moral rationales on which domestic criminal legislation could shed important light. 
Comparative inquiry might ascertain not only points of convergence in national 
criminal laws—suggestive of international ‘best practice’ in criminalisation—but 
also distinctive domestic innovations potentially worthy of emulation at the inter-
national level. English criminal law, for example, has generated acres of judgments 
and commentary on the meaning of mens rea terms such as ‘intention’ (Ashworth, 
2006: 174–81; and Simester and Sullivan, 2003: 126–36, 334–8) and ‘knowledge’ 
(Shute, 2002) which might inform drafting choices in international criminal legisla-
tion. To cap it all, Article 21 of the ICC Statute expressly qualifies ‘general principles 
of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world’ as a 
formal, albeit tertiary,42 source of legal authority in proceedings before the ICC.
Moreover, traffic between international and domestic criminal legislation is a 
two-way street. Many States Parties to international treaties are obliged by their 
national constitutions to enact enabling legislation to give effect to international 
agreements in domestic law.43 Authentic interpretation is obviously essential for 
41 ICC Statute, Art 5(2).
42 The ICC’s primary law is the ICC Statute itself (plus ancillary materials), followed by applicable 
treaties and custom binding in public international law ‘including the established principles of the 
international law of armed conflict’.
43 See, eg the International Criminal Court Act 2001, giving effect in English law to the ICC 
Statute.
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faithful transposition. But if international norms are partly derived from the legisla-
tion, jurisprudence and legal commentary produced by a diversity of national legal 
cultures and traditions, working knowledge of these domestic origins must surely 
be advantageous for any government lawyer or judge attempting to interpret inter-
national legal instruments. The challenge of transposition therefore implies a sec-
ond reason why ICrimL cannot be relegated to a mere out-post of PIL, and another 
schedule of major works for comparative legal studies. For the reception of inter-
national criminal law into domestic legislation is only the first strand in a seamless 
web of normative migration, adaptation and reinvention in which comparative 
methodology assumes a central role. Straightforward enough, in conception if not 
in practice, at the macro level of legislation, these processes become infinitely more 
complex and variegated in the micro-dynamics of judicial practice.
Judicial Development of International Criminal Jurisprudence
National legal systems differ in the extent to which judicial law-making is formally 
acknowledged. Whether or not they embrace a formal system of precedent on the 
common law model, however, all appellate tribunals in mature legal systems con-
tribute to the development of domestic law through their judgments in contested 
cases. This quasi-legislative side of legal adjudication bears profound significance 
for international criminal justice, and for the role of Comparative Law as its 
handmaiden.
It is impossible for a criminal code of any description to anticipate and legislate 
comprehensively for every conceivable contingency. Legislators therefore sensi-
bly confine themselves to enacting general normative frameworks, leaving finer 
details to be supplied through judicial interpretation. Judicial contributions to 
international criminal law and procedure have been immense, not least because 
legislative materials prior to the enactment of the ICC Statute were remarkably 
sparse. The Nuremberg IMT’s London Charter contained just 30 succinct Articles, 
briefly elaborating the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, powers and procedure. Substantive 
legal doctrine and process had to be improvised by the judges, with the assistance 
of counsel, as the proceedings unfolded. The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR are 
noticeably more detailed in specifying the form of trial,44 suspects’ procedural 
rights45 and protections for victims and witnesses.46 But they inevitably remain 
silent on the technical minutiae of criminal law and process (see May and Wierda, 
1999). Indeed, there is a formal mechanism for the judges of the ICTY and 
ICTR to draft and update their own Rules of Procedure and Evidence.47 This is a 
44 ICTY Statute, Art 20; ICTR Statute, Art 19.
45 ICTY Statute, Art 21; ICTR Statute, Art 20.
46 ICTY Statute, Art 22; ICTR Statute, Art 21.
47 ICTY Statute, Art 15; ICTR Statute, Art 14. The ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence are in 
their 37th revision: IT/32/Rev 37 (April 2006); and the ICTR’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence had 
been amended 14 times to June 2005.
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delegated legislative function. In their more familiar adjudicative role, the judges 
of the ICTY and ICTR are credited with having contributed substantially to the 
doctrinal development of international criminal law and procedure through evi-
dentiary rulings and judgments in trials and appeals (see Cassese, 2003: Part II).
The centrality of comparative legal analysis to international criminal adju-
dication is guaranteed by multinational judiciaries. At Nuremberg, the IMT’s 
judges represented four different legal traditions, though the Anglophones were 
common law cousins and the Russians and French shared an ‘inquisitorial’ legal 
heritage. Fast-forward half a century, and the ICC’s 18 judges are drawn from 
100 States Parties.48 Consciously or otherwise, individual judges bring their 
national legal and cultural expectations, assumptions, preferences and prejudices 
(cf Merryman, 1988) into international courtrooms. A comparative approach is 
necessitated by the impetus in adjudication to debate national legal traditions. 
To be an effective member of a collegiate multinational bench, the international 
judge must gauge where his or her judicial colleagues are ‘coming from’, in terms 
of their legal background, training and professional cultural assumptions. How 
else can nationally-trained judges serving on international criminal tribunals 
hope to engineer appropriate compromises on points of disagreement, or garner 
support for their own preferred legal solution, or even just arrive at authentic and 
sustainable interpretations of international criminal law? 
In a fundamentally devolved system of law, the comparativism integral to the 
work of international criminal courts is magnified at the regional and domestic 
levels. Both the ICTY and the ICTR are currently transferring selected defendants 
for trial before national courts and building up local judicial capacity as part of 
their respective ‘completion strategies’. The ‘internationalised’ criminal tribunals 
are distinguished—from other forms of judicial process as well as from each 
other—precisely by their unique conjunctions of international and local laws. 
Referring generally to hybrid tribunals, Cassese observes:
Both the prosecution and the bench are of mixed composition and there you have this 
huge problem—to make sure that the local component, and the international compo-
nent, do cooperate, do understand each other, do work effectively in their pursuit of the 
common and shared goal of rendering justice (Cassese, 2004: 7).
And looking ahead, domestic courts in transitional or post-conflict societies will 
need to ensure that local prosecutions of international crimes are conducted 
in accordance with international due process, or risk intervention by the ICC 
Prosecutor asserting residual jurisdiction.49 At each of these junction-points 
where international and domestic laws converge, the quality of legal analysis 
and decision-making can only be enhanced by expertise in Comparative Law. 
To qualify as the international community’s agents in enforcing international 
48 The Court is currently comprised of judges from Brazil, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, 
Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Mali, South Africa, 
Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Kingdom.
49 ICC Statute, Art 17.
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penal law, domestic courts must strive for a co-ordinated, culturally-sensitive, 
‘cosmopolitan’ approach which is capable of being endorsed by the reasonable50 
majority of states, international organisations, NGOs, activists, and a 24-hour-
global-news-led international public opinion.
The synthetic integration of comparative legal method within international 
criminal adjudication is reinforced by the salience of international human rights 
law (IHRL) for international criminal justice. Although human rights courts do 
not directly receive appeals from domestic criminal convictions, they are empow-
ered to rule that a particular domestic criminal law or procedure, as applied to 
the accused in the instant case, is incompatible with respect for fundamental 
human rights. In this indirect fashion, international human rights courts exert 
tangible influence over the development and application of domestic criminal 
law and procedure—another facet of the contemporary internationalisation of 
municipal state law. Via the burgeoning jurisprudence of the Strasbourg-based 
European Court of Human Rights,51 for example, IHRL indirectly informs 
interpretations of ICrimL at the domestic level (reinforcing IHRL’s more overt 
presence in international treaties and their interpretational jurisprudence). Since 
comparative methodologies are already built-into European human rights adju-
dication (cf Carozza, 1998), this integral comparativism is automatically extended 
when human rights standards are subsumed within international criminal law. 
The interweaving circuits of jurisprudential influence and authority continue to 
expand, consolidate, and diversify exponentially and self-reflexively, as courts and 
tribunals with overlapping jurisdiction constantly revisit and rework their own 
and each other’s previous decisions into novel legal arguments.
Operational Policy-Making and Mutual Judicial Assistance
Lawyers have a tendency to focus on formal treaties, constitutions, statutes and 
precedent cases, and specialists in PIL are far from immune from this fascina-
tion with positive sources of law. At least since the 1970s, however, socio-legal 
scholars have insisted that law must be conceptualised as an interlocking set of 
institutionalised ‘social ordering practices’ (Lacey, 1994: 28) which simultaneously 
shape and are shaped by their juridical, cultural, social, political, economic and 
historical environments. The ‘law in the books’ must be augmented by investiga-
tions of the ‘law in action’. Having traditionally concentrated on national law and 
legal process, socio-legal scholars and criminologists have more recently branched 
out into the study of international crime and criminal justice (eg Morrison, 2006; 
Ruggiero, 2005; and Day and Vandiver, 2000). 
50 This equivocation implies something approximating Rawls’s idea of an ‘overlapping consensus’ 
around ‘reasonable pluralism’ (Rawls, 1996: see especially Lecture IV). International criminal justice 
could never be founded on universal consensus, if only because international criminals will rarely 
assent to their own punishment.
51 See www.echr.coe.int/echr.
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Socio-legal research has repeatedly demonstrated that officials’ conduct and 
decision-making are strongly influenced by a variety of ‘soft’ legal instruments 
and informal occupational routines or ‘working rules’, which tend to mediate—
where they do not eclipse entirely—the strict letter of the law (see, eg Hawkins, 
2002; Dixon, 1997; and McConville, Sanders and Leng, 1991). ‘Soft law’ sources 
and informal operational policy-making are no less significant for international 
criminal law and its enforcement than for domestic criminal process. PIL is 
awash with non-binding legal instruments and materials, such as United Nations 
General Assembly resolutions, International Law Commission (ILC) reports and 
working papers, multilateral draft conventions, accords, codes, guidelines and 
other indicia of ‘state practice’, a great many of which concern criminal justice 
issues (Bassiouni, 1994). The European Union’s expanding portfolio of activi-
ties in the field of Justice and Home Affairs is another energetic contributor of 
soft law instruments bearing on the formation and implementation of criminal 
justice policy in the 27 EU Member States, and beyond via the European Union’s 
‘external relations’ (foreign policy) agenda. The European Union, for example, 
is a major sponsor of the ICTY, and the Tribunal dangles the carrot of potential 
European Union membership to coax reluctant governments in Belgrade and 
Zagreb to comply with its requests for indictees to be arrested and transferred to 
The Hague. 
Frontline professionals’ decision-making and conduct is typically motivated by 
‘third-tier’ directives, such as police force orders, prosecutorial codes or military 
training manuals (which are not necessarily publicly available), rather than by 
primary legal rules or secondary delegated legislation. Sometimes ‘policy’ is not 
even written down; occasionally it is not written down on purpose. Unwritten 
operational policies occupy the shadow-lands of informal agreements, institu-
tionalised routines, shared professional understandings, and taken-for-granted 
cultural assumptions. A striking recent example is the highly controversial policy 
of ‘extraordinary rendition’ (Weissbrodt and Bergquist, 2006),52 whereby sus-
pected terrorists have allegedly been handed over by Western powers to friendly 
jurisdictions with brutal policing methods, in order to circumvent domestic legal 
restrictions on torture—a backhanded compliment to American civil liberties and 
European human rights law, which simultaneously exposes the inadequacies of 
regionally discrepant approaches to human rights protection.
Comparative Law is an essential practical resource at all levels and in all phases 
of formal and informal operational policy-making and mutual judicial assistance. 
Towards the more formal end of international judicial co-operation, for example, 
extradition proceedings require judges to undertake comparative assessments of 
the compatibility of criminal laws in the requesting and requested states. This is 
not necessarily a straightforward textual exercise: concepts, terminology, rules 
and doctrines encountered in domestic criminal legislation must be interpreted 
52 R Verkaik: ‘The Big Question: What is Extraordinary Rendition, and What is Britain’s Role in it?’, 
The Independent, 8 June 2006.
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holistically against the background of a distinctive national legal culture and 
tradition, itself dynamically responsive to social pressures and political events 
and increasingly moulded by extra-territorial normative influences, prominently 
including IHRL. Proceedings to extradite Senator Pinochet from the United 
Kingdom,53 for example, turned in part on a somewhat convoluted legal analy-
sis to ascertain whether internationally-proscribed torture had been a crime in 
English law at the material time (see Boister and Burchill, 1999). Likewise, trans-
border co-operation in police investigations must be informed by an appreciation 
of comparative criminal procedure, in order to satisfy proof-taking requirements 
and comply with evidentiary standards observed by the requesting state or tri-
bunal. Despite a notable modern trend towards convergence (Safferling, 2001; 
and Bradley, 1993), rules of criminal procedure and evidence still differ markedly 
across legal jurisdictions, both national and international. The English courts, for 
example, have deprecated informal collaboration between national police forces 
designed to circumvent the inadequacies of existing extradition arrangements 
by deceit.54 Israeli courts55 and the United States Supreme Court,56 on the other 
hand, do not regard even outright kidnapping as fatal to the successful prosecu-
tion and conviction of suspects identified and apprehended extra-judicially. Police 
officers of all ranks involved in international mutual judicial assistance need to be 
alive to these comparative legal distinctions.
Socio-legal studies of national criminal justice processes have frequently 
emphasised the ubiquity of operational discretion. From the informal ‘working 
rules’ of their occupational culture, police officers learn where to patrol or watch, 
the cues constituting ‘suspicious’ behaviour, which vehicles to stop and search, 
when to effect an arrest or, alternatively, settle for ‘having a quiet word’, when to 
interview a witness or suspect, how to handle informants, etc. Local variations 
in occupational culture virtually guarantee that comparative understanding will 
be a significant operational asset in co-ordinating transborder co-operation and 
international policing networks. Similar considerations apply to international co-
operation between prosecutors, defence lawyers, judges, penal administrators, and 
military personnel, and in every sphere of informal operational policy-making 
and mutual judicial assistance. For as President George W. Bush recently reflected: 
‘Not everybody thinks the exact same way we think. Different words mean differ-
ent things to different people’.57 
53 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty 
International and others intervening) (No 3) [2000] 1 AC 147 (HL).
54 See R v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42 (HL); see also R v 
Mullen (Nicholas Robert) (No 2) [2000] QB 520 (CA).
55 Attorney General of Israel v Eichmann (1961) 36 ILR 5 (Isr DC, Jerusalem); aff ’d, (1962) 36 ILR 
277 (Isr Sup Ct).
56 In US v Alvarez-Machain (1992) 504 US 655 112 S Ct 2188 a 6-3 majority of the United States 
Supreme Court held (per Rehnquist, CJ) that although it might be true that the
 respondent’s abduction was ‘shocking’... and ... in violation of ... international law ... The fact of respondent’s forc-
ible abduction does not therefore prohibit his trial in a court in the United States.
57 S Blumenthal: ‘A Pantomime President’, The Guardian, 18 July 2006.
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Harmonising National Criminal Laws
Legal harmonisation lies at the more ambitious pole of international co-operation
in criminal justice and penal affairs. Experience suggests that progress is best 
achieved by facilitating incremental assimilation of domestic criminal laws rather 
than by sweeping legislative schemes. Criminal law, in contrast to the law of com-
merce, property entitlements or even civil wrongs, tends to encapsulate a nation’s 
fundamental political, social, moral and religious commitments, which states will 
not readily compromise for the sake of international uniformity. Nonetheless, 
through a series of United Nations-sponsored ‘suppression conventions’, and 
in softer legal instruments such as minimum standards for the treatment of 
detainees and indicative codes of professional conduct for police, prosecutors 
and judges,58 a measure of convergence in domestic criminal law and practice has 
been promoted.
Gradual, piecemeal assimilation respects national sovereignty and acknowl-
edges the reality of international law as a devolved and potentially dysfunctional 
system. Even the ICC Statute, the most unified and comprehensive system of 
international criminal law ever implemented, still defers to national variation 
within the loose parameters of complementarity. On a broader view of ICrimL, 
it is possible to find further examples of harmonisation of national laws through 
vertical legal integration within the European Union (generally, see Baker, 1998; 
and Peers, 2000). First pillar EC law, including competition law enforced by penal 
fines, is binding in Member States and takes precedence over conflicting national 
law.59 Domestic criminal legislation infringing European Community rights may 
incur public liability to compensate affected parties.60 And the exercise of discre-
tionary powers by officials, including operational policy-making by senior police 
officers (Baker, 2000), must a fortiori be consistent with European Community 
prescriptions. 
Other developments are more ad hoc and uneven in their impact. The Corpus 
Juris (Delmas-Marty and Vervaele, 2000) was an ambitious attempt to design a 
European-style criminal ‘code’, comprising both substantive offence definitions 
and procedural rules, to regulate European Union fraud (see Kuhl, 1998). Like the 
ill-starred European Union Constitution (which also contains provisions affecting 
criminal law and process), efforts to implement the Corpus Juris currently appear 
to have stalled. However, related initiatives have been taken forward, notably 
the adoption of a pan-European Arrest Warrant.61 With mounting pressures for 
closer legal cooperation between Member States to combat fraud, illegal immigra-
tion, people trafficking, drug-smuggling, cross-border arms running, and—above 
58 See, eg http://www.uncjin.org/Standards/standards.html.
59 Costa v ENEL [1964] CMLR 425 (ECJ).
60 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd (No 5) [2000] 1 AC 524 (HL).
61 EC Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender 
Procedures between Member States came into force on 1 January 2004 in those eight Member States 
(including the United Kingdom) which had satisfied the agreed implementation criteria.
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all—international terrorism, the impetus towards integration and harmonisation 
of Member States’ domestic laws is bound to intensify. Although regional exam-
ples of harmonisation in ICrimL are by definition geographically restricted, the 
extent of legal integration in criminal justice and penal affairs already achieved by 
Western European powers is unparalleled around the globe.
Comparative Law and legal method are indispensable resources for projects of 
legal harmonisation (Delmas-Marty, 2003). Pre-existing national laws must be 
surveyed, collated and subjected to critical examination as essential preliminaries. 
The tantalising prospect of harmonisation has inspired Comparative Law since its 
formative years (Clark, 2001: Part VI), and contemporary developments in inter-
national criminal law, including the European Union initiatives just mentioned, 
retain a strong comparative ethos (see, eg van den Wyngaert, 2001). The uncertain 
fate of the Corpus Juris testifies to the political obstacles standing in the way of 
fully-fledged supra-national vertical integration in domestic criminal legislation, 
even amongst broadly similar, economically developed, geographically proximate, 
secularised western democracies. One size invariably does not fit all. Successful 
programmes of legal harmonisation need to work with the grain of national 
legal traditions, and even sometimes to accommodate their foibles—so long as 
local variations are substantially consistent with the overall scheme. Without 
rigorous planning incorporating comparative legal analysis, however, projects of 
legal harmonisation are almost guaranteed to fail, even with committed political 
sponsorship.
Research, Analysis and Critical Evaluation
We have been exploring Comparative Law’s contributions to international crimi-
nal justice predominantly from the perspectives of policymakers and practitioners 
(and policy-maker practitioners): legislators, government ministers, diplomats, 
civil servants, judges, lawyers, police, military commanders, armed services per-
sonnel, and the rest. Here we emphasise the scholarly component of ICrimJ, its 
seventh ‘concentric circle’. ICrimJ needs to develop a systematic research base 
underpinned by mature theoretical inquiries, and Comparative Law and legal 
studies should be in the vanguard of this trail-blazing intellectual endeavour.
Comparative legal studies contribute to ICrimJ on every (inter)disciplinary 
front. Comparative lawyers have applied their research methods and data to illu-
minate the fundamental character of law and legality (Twining, 2000; and Glenn, 
2004). A growing body of impressive work in the overlapping fields of compara-
tive criminology and comparative criminal justice studies is making a determined 
effort to push Criminology beyond its traditional state-based comfort-zone (eg 
Sheptycki and Wardak, 2005; and Nelken, 2000). Comparative analyses of legal 
institutions today figure in Politics and IR textbooks (eg Christiansen, 2005) and 
curricula. Comparative histories of criminal justice have been written (Godfrey, 
Emsley and Dunstall, 2003). The philosophy of punishment has been enriched 
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by comparative studies of criminal justice policy-making (Rutherford, 1996; and 
Garland, 2001; but cf Zedner, 2002), distinctive cultures of penality (Whitman, 
2003), and the legal regulation and practical realities of penal treatment (Lazarus, 
2004). 
Conventional disciplinary taxonomies are stretched beyond breaking point 
by these novel conjunctions. Is a comparative study of the evolution of criminal 
procedure (cf Vogler, 2005) ‘really’ Comparative Law, Legal History, Criminology, 
Criminal Justice, all of the foregoing, or none of the above? Does it matter? 
Howsoever characterised, comparative legal theory, method, and research are 
manifestly integral to theorising, researching, advocating and institutionalising 
international criminal justice. When Comparative Law’s contributions are not 
strictly unique, in the way of original empirical data or bona fide jurisprudential 
innovation, they nonetheless reinforce the multiple strands of ICrimJ’s incompa-
rably interdisciplinary constitution.
IV.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Any research project can usefully be broken down into three foundational ques-
tions, which may be conceptualised, meta-methodologically (ie specifying the 
method of method), as an ‘eternal triangle’ of intimately interrelated, mutu-
ally conditioning considerations. First, the ‘Question of Subject-Matter’ con-
cerns issues of taxonomy and conceptual definition. Secondly, the ‘Question of 
Motivation’ asks why the inquiry is worth undertaking and what one hopes to 
gain from it. Thirdly, the ‘Question of Method’ raises issues of methodological 
perspective and technique. The eternal triangle, in short, specifies the What?, 
Why? and How? of intellectual inquiry. To recap and conclude, let us apply this 
explanatory framework to the argument developed in this chapter.
To claim that Comparative Law is capable of making unique and indispensable 
contributions to international criminal justice might be regarded as puzzling on 
many levels. Most profoundly, neither ‘Comparative Law’ nor—still less—‘interna-
tional criminal justice’ are terms with settled or transparent conventional meanings. 
Much of this chapter was consequently given over to taxonomy and conceptual 
definition in an effort to clarify the ‘Question of Subject-Matter’. Comparative Law 
is plainly something to do with comparison and something to do with law, but it is 
not particularly illuminating to extend the label to all juridical comparisons of any 
description. Cross-jurisdictional comparisons between domestic national laws are 
the paradigm case. Yet the simple ‘compare and contrast’ model, conceptualising 
national legal systems as two discrete units of analysis, has been vastly complicated 
by modern law’s promiscuously cosmopolitan tendencies, facilitated and rein-
forced by growing experimentation in supra-national legal regulation. 
International criminal justice is controversial to its core. Many have denied 
its existence, and even scoffed at the suggestion. Rather than trying to formulate 
and defend a particular stipulative definition, this chapter explored the notion 
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of ‘international criminal justice’ through a series of seven ‘concentric circles’, 
starting with the core activities of international criminal tribunals and fanning 
out into the hinterlands of transnational legal co-operation, national trials of 
international criminality, and related—both visionary and parasitic—scholarly 
commentaries and research. Sceptics might say that appeals to international 
criminal justice are really just the latest disingenuous apologetics for national 
self-interest, international finance capital, neo-colonialism or Western cultural 
imperialism. What can no longer be claimed, however, is that international crimi-
nal trials are a logical impossibility, or that political and military leaders can bank 
on impunity for atrocities, or that nobody will ever be convicted of genocide, or 
that rape will never be taken seriously as a war crime, or that the international 
community will forever sit on the sidelines wringing its hands. The very exis-
tence of the ICC, building on the unprecedented achievements of the ICTY and 
ICTR, demonstrates that (for all their admitted weaknesses and deficiencies) 
recent institutional and normative developments in international criminal justice 
have major significance for legality, for justice, for world peace, and—it is no 
exaggeration—for the future of humanity on this earth.
The ‘Question of Motivation’ barely requires extended examination in the 
light of these remarks, and this chapter’s content. Why should one take an inter-
est in the Holocaust and post-Second World War trials of Nazi war criminals, 
or in endeavours to resolve ethnic conflict in the Balkans, or in internationally-
co-ordinated efforts to rescue the Great Lakes region of Africa from the fires of 
the Rwandan genocide—‘one of the defining events of the twentieth century’62? 
Why be concerned about the ICC Prosecutor’s investigations in northern Uganda 
and the Darfur region of Sudan, or the fate of child soldiers in Sierra Leone, or 
the outcome of the trial of Saddam by the Iraqi High Tribunal? To readers who 
already care passionately about promoting law, justice, human rights and human 
dignity at home and abroad, the answer will be all-too-painfully obvious. Those 
less secure in their convictions might profitably meditate on this epistemological 
and existential conundrum: what else could possibly matter, if these things don’t? 
Once upon a time, it might have been possible for governments virtually to ignore 
foreign affairs whilst concentrating on improving national well-being within 
secure frontiers. But those days of Splendid Isolationism are gone. Drugs barons, 
people-smugglers, white-slavers, black-market arms traders, political insurgents 
and suicide bombers testify with one voice to this implication of globalisation: 
there is no rigid distinction between national and international criminal justice, 
just as there can be no ‘domestic policy’ hermetically sealed off from ‘foreign 
policy’. There is only justice, and policy, in a global context, just as there is only a 
single human family to make this one world our home.
62 Human Rights Watch (2004) Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. 
www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/index.htm.
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If international criminal justice matters profoundly, and if Comparative Law 
might potentially make unique and indispensable contributions to its ultimate 
realisation, then this virtuous conjunction should be explored and explained, 
and its significance widely advertised. The strength of Comparative Law and legal 
scholarship lies in its distinctive methodologies, which brings us to the third point 
on the eternal triangle. How does Comparative Law contribute to international 
criminal justice? By extending comparative method, perspectives and insight into 
every phase and corner of international criminal justice policy-making and prac-
tice, including institutional design, legislation, adjudication, operational policy-
making and transborder co-operation in policing, mutual judicial assistance, legal 
harmonisation, and scholarly theorising, commentary and research. 
The precise nature and extent of Comparative Law’s overall contribution to 
international criminal justice turns on questions of conceptual definition. My own 
preference for broadly inclusive conceptualisations has the congenial implication 
of maximising Comparative Law’s potential in this respect. But those who prefer 
more orthodox conceptions of Comparative Law, or are disinclined to venture 
beyond the inner circles of international criminal law and practice, should still 
conclude, on the evidence of this chapter, that Comparative Law’s contributions 
to international criminal justice are potentially both indispensable and unique.
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
 1.  What distinguishes ‘international criminal law’ from ‘international crimi-
nal justice’? When, and why, are the differences important?
 2.  What, if anything, distinguishes international criminal justice from 
International Criminal Justice? Or international criminal law from 
International Criminal Law?
 3.  In what ways, and to what extent, can Comparative Law contribute to inter-
national criminal justice? (How are you defining ‘Comparative Law’? How 
does your definition of ‘Comparative Law’ affect your answer to the original 
question? Would you like to reconsider your definition of ‘Comparative Law’ 
in the light of its implications for the relationship between Comparative 
Law and international criminal justice? Why (not)?)
 4.  Is there any (interesting, non-trivial) sense in which international criminal 
law is not comparative?
 5.  Are there any significant aspects of international criminal justice that 
comparative legal method cannot explain, or important questions it 
cannot answer?
 6.  Is disciplinary taxonomy completely arbitrary? Is conceptual analysis just 
sterile logic-chopping? Why (not)?
 7.  What is the ‘eternal triangle’ of intellectual inquiry? Can you apply it to 
illuminate any other research topic or question mentioned in this book? 
Or any other research topic or question you can think of?
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I.  INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
D
ebates concerning the appropriate relationship between human 
rights interpretation and comparative legal methods have increased 
significantly in the past decade, and are by no means exhausted. This 
has occurred in part because of the increased citation by judges of ‘foreign’ legal 
materials, in particular judicial opinions, from jurisdictions that have no legal 
authority in the ‘receiving’ jurisdiction. Courts are playing an impressive role in 
the creation of what some see as a ‘common law of human rights’ or, in the context 
of Europe, ‘a ius commune of human rights’. How human rights interpretation 
develops by making extensive use of comparative law is an intriguing example of 
the utilisation of comparative law by courts. Debates about the appropriateness 
of this have proven useful in illuminating aspects of both comparative law and 
human rights interpretation.
There are several aspects of this development that mark it out from some 
earlier debates about the role of comparative methods in law. First, the issues 
in this chapter involve issues of high political controversy, particularly at 
a time when human rights issues are of considerable salience for political 
debates, such as how to cope with changing sexual mores and dealing with 
terrorism. In the past, comparative legal methods were more often used to 
* I am grateful to Rosalind Dixon, Veronika Fikfak, and Brian Flanagan for their comments on this 
chapter.
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deal with essentially private and commercial law issues; in the human rights 
context, the issues are public, often constitutional, law. Secondly, the debate 
about the appropriate use of the comparative method is often a reaction to 
judicially-driven use of comparisons, rather than academically-driven advo-
cacy of comparisons. We thus see human rights theory and comparative law 
theory struggling to make sense of relatively fast-moving judicial practice, 
rather than such theories giving rise to legal practice.
This chapter begins by sketching out several of the key concepts that these 
debates have involved. There are three sets of concepts that arise in the debate: 
one set arising in discussions of how we analyse human rights, another in how we 
think about the role and function of the comparative method, and a third in how 
the continuing debate about the legitimacy of judicial decision-making in human 
rights is conducted. We then turn to consider in more detail the issues that have 
arisen in the use by judges of comparisons in human rights interpretation.
Human Rights Concepts
The very concept of ‘human rights’ is contested. Sometimes a distinction is drawn 
between ‘human rights’ and ‘constitutional rights’, with the former referring to 
those rights that are legally required because of international legal obligations 
arising from treaties or custom, and the latter referring to rights that arise from 
national texts, such as Constitutions. For some, this distinction is crucial. The lat-
ter may accord rights to a smaller group of people than the former, for example 
the latter may accord rights only to citizens, whereas the former are unlikely to be 
so confined. Or international law may supply a basic standard that constitutional 
rights improve upon.
Whether this distinction is important points to another aspect of ‘human 
rights’ that is important for the purposes of this chapter. We need to distinguish 
between theories supporting human rights—including the general principles 
included in human rights—and their application in specific situations. There is 
much  apparent agreement on the general principles of human and constitutional 
rights (such as the need to protect people from torture, or discrimination). Most 
charters of rights, whether national or international, contain much the same list 
of rights. Does this suggest agreement also on theories supporting human rights? 
Not necessarily. There is little agreement on why individuals should be protected 
in these ways. (Several conflicting general theories are often put forward: Because 
to treat people in this way is contrary to their ‘dignity’ or their ‘autonomy’. Or 
because everyone is made in the image of God.) This lack of agreement on what 
theory or theories support human rights has some important implications, 
particularly because the way in which particular human rights are phrased in 
legal texts is often extremely general and thus subject to considerable interpreta-
tion when it comes to applying them in practice. What, exactly, do we mean by 
 ‘torture’? When, exactly, is ‘discrimination’ invidious? 
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There are several issues that arise from this need for interpretation of the 
general principles. One debate that arises is whether these various national and 
international texts, containing apparently common human rights principles, state 
a universal standard that is true across time and space. The universality of human 
rights is often thought to be central to conceptions of human rights. As Vicki 
Jackson has argued, referring to the United States,
[m]any of our constitutional rights and values—liberty, equal protection of the law, due 
process, freedom of expression—reflect not only specific decisions made in the United 
States, but also widely shared commitments of many Western democracies (Jackson, 
2004a; see also Jackson, 2004b).
Yet such claims have proven deeply controversial, with some arguing that the 
inclusion of common principles in these texts camouflages profound disagree-
ment on their application as well the theory supporting them. Lord Hoffmann, 
for example, has stated: 
[O]f course we share a common humanity ... Nevertheless ... the specific answers, the 
degree to which weight is given to one desirable objective rather than another, will be 
culturally determined. Different communities will, through their legislature and judges, 
adopt the answers which they think suit them. (Hoffman, 1999: 159).
All that is left is an empty shell of principle and when the principle comes to 
be applied, the appearance of commonality disappears, and human rights are 
exposed as culturally relative, deeply contingent on local politics and values. 
Despite claims to the contrary, the debate between universalism and cultural 
relativism refuses to go away, and it has considerable implications for the exercise 
of judicial comparativism. For those who support universalism, use of compari-
sons appears obvious—after all, it is the same principle that is being applied. For 
those who support cultural relativism, use of comparisons is pointless except to 
expose these differences—after all, it is a different principle that is being applied. 
The growth of regional legal systems complicates this debate somewhat, as one of 
their attractive aspects is that states that appear to share more common cultural 
and ethical roots can come together to establish human rights regimes that go 
beyond the state, but stop short of the global. This gives rise to the question as to 
whether regionally shared conceptions of human rights are emerging, for example, 
a European ius commune.
The debate between universalism and cultural relativism is related to, but dif-
ferent from, another debate that arises in the human rights context that is relevant 
to the use of comparisons. This is the issue of whether the obligations that human 
rights impose depend on the state for their existence or exist irrespective of state 
recognition. The issue is one of profound significance. Does an individual, who 
lives in a state that does not recognise human rights internationally or implement 
them in national law, still have such rights? Another way of putting the issue is in 
terms of the larger debate between natural law and positivism. This is, of course, 
an immensely complex jurisprudential debate, and any brief summary will fail to 
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deal adequately with its complexity. Put briefly, however, we can pose the issue as 
follows: Are human rights legal rights because they are incorporated into positive 
law, or are they legal rights irrespective of whether they have been incorporated 
into any particular legal system, because they are already included in what we 
consider foundational to any legal system?
Leaving these debates aside for the moment, we can identify another issue 
that arises. A principled interpretation of these grand principles often seems 
to call for agreement on why we are against torture, or discrimination, but 
this type of theoretical agreement is often absent. Judges deciding these cases 
are, therefore, faced with a difficulty. Yet they do, of course, make decisions 
on the basis of specific facts. Cass Sunstein has described the process of decid-
ing cases on their facts without necessarily agreeing on any particular theory 
supporting the decision as giving rise to ‘incompletely theorised’ agreements. 
Such agreements exist where individuals can agree on a specific result, even if 
they do not agree on the specific theory justifying that result (Sunstein, 1996). 
Some judges use comparative reasoning as part of the process of attempt-
ing to generate reasons justifying a particular result. Comparativism thus 
becomes a part of the process of reaching a more fully theorised (although 
still incomplete) agreement.
Concepts in Comparative Law Methodology
These key issues and concepts in human rights have some similarities with 
debates in comparative law. Thus, for example, there is a debate in comparative 
law theory between univeralism and pluralism. In the former camp are those who 
see the function of comparative law as being to explore what is common between 
legal jurisdictions; even sometimes going so far as to view comparative law as 
the basis for identifying the ‘best’ approach with the ultimate aim of securing its 
universal adoption. In the pluralist camp are those who see the function of the 
comparative method as being the identification of what is different between juris-
dictions, stressing the need for an understanding of local context and emphasising 
the truth that even when similar concepts are being used across jurisdictions, they 
may not necessarily play the same role in each. These debates in comparative law 
echo the debates in human rights between universalism and cultural relativism. 
The more ‘political’ and ‘constitutional’ the issue, the more comparative lawyers 
tended to move to the cultural relativist end of the spectrum.
In addition, however, there is a somewhat more recent debate within com-
parative law scholarship that is of considerable importance to our understand-
ing of judicial comparativism in human rights interpretation. This is the debate 
between functionalism and the dialogic method. Ruti Teitel has helpfully described 
 functionalism in comparative law scholarship as an approach that
treats comparative law as a technique of problem solving. The subject of comparative 
analysis is the legal problem, excised from its context (Teitel, 2004: 2570 at 2574).
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She goes on to characterise functionalism as considering ‘the relevant unit of 
analysis’ not as ‘a geographic entity, such as a country or region, but ... rather the 
problem and its legal solution’ (ibid). She identifies Rudolph von Jhering as clearly 
representing this functionalist approach when he wrote: 
The reception of foreign legal institutions is not a matter of nationality, but of usefulness 
and need. No one bothers to fetch a thing from afar when he has one as good or better at 
home, but only a fool would refuse quinine just because it didn’t grow in his back garden 
(von Jhering, quoted in Zweigert and Kötz, 1998: 17).
Functionalism was the dominant approach to comparative law scholarship during 
the second half of the twentieth century and still retains an important influence 
in comparative law circles. It has been challenged in recent years, if not before, by 
those who see functionalism as too divorced from context. One response to this 
has been the development of a pluralist critique of functionalism, often from a 
critical perspective. 
Another response, however, has been to attempt to develop an approach that is an 
alternative to both functionalism and pluralism. Teitel, among others,1 contrasts a 
functionalist approach with a ‘dialogic’ method, which she sees as both more recent 
and responding to ‘the present context of a globalizing politics’ (Teitel, 2004: 2570 
at 2584). This theorises the comparative method ‘as a dynamic interpretive and dis-
cursive practice’ (ibid: at 2584–5). In the context of comparative constitutionalism in 
particular, 
the dialogical approach focuses on the processes of constitutional interpretation … 
Comparative exchange is not bound in path-dependent or hierarchic ways. Rather, it 
poses a comity-based ‘transjudicial’ enterprise—a decentered view of constitutional 
practices deriving from pluralist sources, with the possibility of ‘cross fertilization’ (ibid: 
at 2586).
Controversies Concerning ‘Judicial Review’
There is a third set of concepts that tend to arise in discussion of the phenom-
enon of judicial comparativism in human rights adjudication; those that are 
used in continuing debates concerning the legitimacy of ‘judicial review’. Since 
the Second World War, courts have increasingly been given (or taken on) a role 
in interpreting and applying constitutional rights, sometimes in specially created 
constitutional courts, sometimes in courts of general jurisdiction, and sometimes 
in administrative courts. Such adjudication usually involves the judiciary being 
1 Choudry, 1999: 819 at 838–9, contrasting dialogical comparison with universalistic and genea-
logical modes of comparison; Choudry, 2004: 50–52, contrasting dialogical with universalist and 
functionalist modes of comparison; L’Heureux-Dubé, 1998: 17, contrasting dialogical influence with 
‘reception’ of foreign law; Slaughter, 2003, describing dialogical modes of transnational influence. I am 
grateful to Rosalind Dixon for these references; see further Dixon, to be published 2007.
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asked to adjudicate on disputes that involve an allegation of a breach of a claimed 
right by the actions of a public body such as a Department of government, or 
by the  legislature itself. This jurisdiction is frequently called ‘judicial review’ of 
administrative acts or of legislation. It is controversial because it runs the risk 
of creating tension with other constitutional principles, such as the separation 
of powers. Where judicial review involves judges striking down legislation on 
the ground that it breaches constitutional rights, it is particularly controversial 
because it also involves a body of unelected judges calling into question the 
 decision of a democratically elected body, leading to the so-called ‘counter-
majoritarian difficulty’. This has led to a continuing debate about the legitimacy of 
judicial review, particularly of this strong type, and how far it is compatible with 
notions of democratic self- government. Part of that debate involves close scrutiny 
of what sources judges derive their conclusions from.
II.  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPARATIVE LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 GENERALLY
Depending on which approaches are taken to human rights, and which compara-
tive method is used, tensions may arise between comparative theorists and human 
rights practitioners. An emphasis on differences, in part to underscore diversity, 
gives rise to tensions with those human rights lawyers with universalist aspirations 
for human rights. 
Human rights practice is often driven by a strong moral or ethical dimension, and 
consequently a further potential for considerable tension between the two disciplines 
arises. For the human rights advocate the role of comparison is that of persuasion 
to an essentially moral position. Lawyers in the human rights context often use 
 comparison to legitimate their argument that a particular interpretation of an exist-
ing human rights norm should be adopted, or as part of the process of generating 
further norms. The use of comparison as part of the process of persuasion not infre-
quently gives rise to highly selective, often rather simplistic comparative arguments. 
For some modern comparatists, this must be intensely frustrating, as they attempt 
to generate increasingly sophisticated methodologies of comparison. Not only is the 
methodology of what might be called ‘persuasive comparativism’ apparently weak 
(cherry picking, weak evidence, overly formalistic assessment of what the law is), but 
several of these functions of comparison tend towards the older, universalist tenden-
cies of  com parative law scholarship that are now viewed critically by many modern 
 comparative law scholars.
Judicial Comparativism: Contrasts between Jurisdictions
We turn now to consider the more particular issue of the use of comparative 
methods by judges in human rights interpretation. The first point to note is 
that judicial comparativism in human rights adjudication is immensely variable 
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between jurisdictions, not least in so far as the citation of cases from other juris-
dictions is concerned. (It is likely that some jurisdictions that do not cite foreign 
judgments nevertheless refer to them in private research.) Thus, for example, 
there is a significant difference between the use of judicial comparativism in the 
United Kingdom (relatively high) and France (very low), and between the United 
States (relatively low) and South Africa (high). Secondly, the use of such material 
differs within jurisdictions across time, so we see a relative increase in the use of 
such material in recent years in several jurisdictions. (We might also see in the 
future a decline in the use of such material, for example in South Africa, depend-
ing on why such material is being used there, of course.) Thirdly, even in those 
jurisdictions in which the use of comparative material by judges is noticeable, 
such use is often greater with regard to some types of human rights claims, and 
less frequent with regard to other types of human rights claims. So, for example, 
in the United States, judicial comparativism has been particularly prominent in 
judging the constitutionality of the death penalty, but relatively little used in the 
context of equal protection claims. 
There is some controversy about what determines the degree of use of compar-
ative material by judges in human rights adjudication, and little consensus. Few 
jurisdictions have explored systematically the use of such material in their own 
jurisdiction, and little empirical work has been completed that attempts to explain 
the differences between jurisdictions or within jurisdictions in this respect. Nor 
has sustained empirical work been conducted that would explain why the use 
of such material is more politically and jurisprudentially controversial in some 
jurisdictions and not others.
Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights Interpretation: Some Further 
Distinctions
In those jurisdictions that do explicitly engage with ‘foreign’ legal material, we 
need to distinguish between different uses of such material, since only some of 
these uses are controversial. Judges use ‘foreign’ judicial decisions to determine 
the meaning of binding international law in their jurisdiction. Judges use ‘foreign’ 
judicial decisions to determine the meaning of terms in contracts that are to be 
interpreted according to the law of that other jurisdiction. Judges use ‘foreign’ 
judicial material to determine the law of other jurisdictions in conflicts of law 
disputes. None of these uses of foreign material is particularly controversial in 
theory.
Judges also use decisions of courts outside their jurisdiction when there is some 
relationship of authority between the two. So, for example, United Kingdom 
courts constantly refer to decisions of the European Court of Justice in interpret-
ing provisions of domestic law that implement European Community law. Even 
prior to the Human Rights Act 1998, which now requires judges to have regard 
to decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, English judges had regard 
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to decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in deciding what rights to 
accord under English law, in part because they knew that disappointed applicants 
could apply to have their complaints adjudicated under the European Convention 
on Human Rights, which the United Kingdom had ratified. Judges also frequently 
have regard to decisions of courts that they regard as sharing aspects of a com-
mon legal system, even where there is no issue of hierarchical authority in issue 
between them. So, courts in common law countries frequently have regard to 
decisions of ‘foreign’ courts in the interpretation of tort and contract. Again, none 
of these uses of foreign material is particularly controversial.
We are not primarily concerned with these uses of foreign material. Most 
controversy has arisen where other uses of ‘foreign’ material are involved, and it 
is with these that we shall be primarily concerned. But not even all these uses are 
controversial. There are four uses of this type that are frequently not sufficiently 
distinguished. The first is where a court in jurisdiction ‘X’ quotes from a court in 
jurisdiction ‘Y’ a particular phrase or way of describing an issue that appears to the 
judge particularly apposite or elegant. Some judges in some jurisdictions have had 
a way with words that is deemed by other judges to be particularly worth quoting. 
This can be termed the ‘rhetorical’ use of ‘foreign’ material and is akin to using 
quotations from Shakespeare or the Bible. The second is where a court in jurisdic-
tion ‘X’ cites ‘foreign’ material such as a judicial decision in jurisdiction ‘Y’ as part 
of the evidence to support an empirical conclusion that a particular approach is 
or is not workable in practice, or has particular unintended effects.2 The fact that 
it is a judicial opinion that is part of the evidence is, essentially, neither here nor 
there; it is merely a convenient source of the empirical information. 
For Judge Posner, however, the problem with using ‘foreign’ judicial opinions 
arises in a somewhat different class of case. He writes: 
Problems arise only when the foreign decision is believed to have some (even if quite 
attenuated) persuasive force in an American court merely by virtue of being the decision 
of a recognised legal tribunal. This occurs, in short, when it is treated as an authority, 
albeit not a controlling one ... even though the issue is purely local, such as whether 
abortion should be forbidden, or the execution of retarded murderers forbidden, or gay 
marriage allowed. (Posner, 2004)
It is for this reason that the third and fourth uses are the most controversial. Both 
involve the use of a judicial decision in jurisdiction ‘Y’, or some other legal norm, 
that is not legally binding in jurisdiction ‘X’ (such as an unratified human rights 
convention), as part of a judicial decision regarding what is the legal position in 
jurisdiction ‘X’. In both, the ‘foreign’ material is part of a normative argument, in 
a judicial context that is, in any event, often controversial. But there are significant 
differences within that general category. One use (our third approach) involves 
the citation of a ‘foreign’ material as establishing a reason (however attenuated) 
2 Compare the use of foreign material in Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702 at 730, 734 (1997) 
(Rehnquist, CJ).
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why a human rights claim against a governmental entity should not succeed. 
Another (our fourth approach), and probably the most controversial, involves the 
use of ‘foreign’ material in a similar context where it establishes a reason (however 
attenuated) why a rights claim should succeed. 
There are two critical aspects to the description of the problematic uses of 
foreign material in the previous paragraph. The first relates to the inclusion of 
non-binding international legal material as well as ‘foreign’ material such as a 
judgment of a foreign court. The important distinction that is drawn is between 
international law that is binding in the jurisdiction concerned, and international 
norms that are not binding in the jurisdiction concerned. Sometimes this distinc-
tion is not sufficiently recognised in discussions of the use of judicial comparativ-
ism, and the use of all international norms, whether binding in the jurisdiction or 
not, are treated as raising the same issues. This is unhelpful. Legally, there is a clear 
difference between the use of international legal material by the House of Lords 
in the A case,3 and the use of legal material by the plurality of the United States 
Supreme Court in Roper v Simmons.4 In the former case, the Lords disallowed the 
use of foreign torture evidence in administrative proceedings. The international 
material was used to establish what international law was binding on the United 
Kingdom, in order to ensure that the common law was interpreted in confor-
mity with the United Kingdom’s international commitments. In the  latter, as we 
shall see subsequently, the plurality of the United States Supreme Court used 
 international legal norms, which it explicitly accepted as non-binding, as part of a 
discussion about the current meaning of the Eighth Amendment.
The second point worth noting is that the distinction between the third and 
fourth types of judicial comparativism has attracted judicial attention. Scalia, J, 
dissenting in Roper draws attention to the distinction:
Foreign sources are cited today, not to underscore our ‘fidelity’ to the Constitution, our 
‘pride in its origins’, and ‘our own [American] heritage’. To the contrary, they are cited to 
set aside the centuries-old American practice’.5
The two types are worth separating, as Mary Anne Glendon has argued, because 
there is a
crucial difference between the legitimate use of foreign material as mere empirical 
 evidence that legislation has a rational basis, and its use to buttress the court’s own 
 decision to override legislation (Glendon, 2005).
She views the distinction as important because of the unhealthy effects of ‘judicial 
adventurism’. Where foreign material is used to uphold the democratic decision, 
those who believe the legislature got it wrong ‘can work to change the law through 
the ordinary democratic processes of persuasion and voting’(ibid). But where 
3 A (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 71, especially [27], [30], 
[33]–[35] (Lord Bingham).
4 Roper v Simmons 125 S Ct 1183 (2005).
5 Ibid, at 1229 (Scalia, J).
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constitutions are difficult to amend, the effect of a court upholding a rights claim 
against the democratic decision-maker is dramatic: 
[T]he court’s constitutional mistakes are exceedingly hard to correct. The unhealthy 
ripple effects of judicial adventurism are many: Legislatures are encouraged to punt 
controversial issues into the courts; political energy, lacking more constructive outlets, 
flows into litigation and the judicial selection process (ibid).
All this should lead courts to be more hesitant in using ‘foreign’ material to strike 
down legislation than to uphold it.
III.  EXAMPLES OF JUDICIAL COMPARATIVISM IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
 INTERPRETATION
There is now an extensive academic literature analysing the use of judicial 
 comparativism in several jurisdictions, and no attempt will be made here to try 
to give a comprehensive survey. Instead, four examples drawn from recent deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court will be used to illustrate several of the 
points made above. These recent examples are particularly interesting because 
they provide, in a specific interpretative context, an extensive exploration by the 
judges of what judicial comparativism involves, and its potential problems, in a 
way that few other jurisdictions have yet engaged in. Three of the cases involve 
the constitutionality of aspects of the death penalty (the acceptability of delays in 
carrying out the sentence, the use of capital punishment against juveniles, and its 
use against the ‘mentally retarded’). The fourth involves perhaps the most contro-
versial recent example of judicial comparativism; its use in a case striking down 
the criminalisation of sodomy between consenting adults.
In Knight v Florida,6 the court refused to stop an execution, rejecting an 
argument that delays in carrying out the sentence should be held to render the 
execution contrary to the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment. Breyer, J dissented, drawing on judicial decisions from foreign juris-
dictions, which were extensively considered. The structure of his argument is of 
importance. First, he stressed that he was only concerned with ‘courts that accept 
or assume the lawfulness of the death penalty’,7 thereby excluding courts in coun-
tries where the death penalty is not carried out. Taking this as the relevant set of 
comparators, he found that ‘a growing number’ of these courts ‘have held that 
lengthy delay in administering a lawful death penalty renders ultimate execution 
inhuman, degrading, or unusually cruel’.8 The Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council’s cases dealing with Jamaica were cited, as were decisions of the Supreme 
Court of India, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, and the European Court of 
6 Knight v Florida 120 S Ct 459 (1999).
7 Ibid, at 462 (Breyer, J).
8 Ibid. [TS close gap]
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Human Rights in Soering v United Kingdom,9 in which the court interpreted the 
European Convention on Human Rights as prohibiting the United Kingdom 
from extraditing a potential defendant to the Commonwealth of Virginia, in part 
because the delay that typically accompanied a death sentence there amounted 
to ‘cruel, inhuman, [or] degrading treatment or punishment’10 forbidden by the 
Convention. Secondly, Breyer, J acknowledged that ‘[n]ot all foreign authority 
reaches the same conclusion’,11 citing opinions from the Supreme Court of Canada 
and the United Nations Human Rights Committee that tended to go against the 
proposition he was supporting. Thirdly, the interpretation he advanced was not 
based on any supposed United States obligation in international law. Indeed, he 
noted how, after Soering, the United States Senate had insisted on reservations to 
various other human rights treaties to ensure that language similar to that of the 
European Convention on Human Rights did not
restrict or prohibit the United States from applying the death penalty consistent with 
the … Constitution, including any constitutional period of confinement prior to the 
imposition of the death penalty.12
Fourthly, Breyer, J recognised that ‘[o]bviously, this foreign authority does not 
bind us.’13 Quoting Scalia, J in an earlier case, he said ‘[a]fter all, we are interpret-
ing a “Constitution for the United States of America”’.14 In the context of this 
domestic constitutional interpretation, however, 
[T]his Court has long considered as relevant and informative the way in which foreign 
courts have applied standards roughly comparable to our own constitutional standards 
in roughly comparable circumstances. In doing so, the Court has found particularly 
instructive opinions of former Commonwealth nations insofar as those opinions reflect 
a legal tradition that also underlies our own Eighth Amendment.15
This, presumably, explains the choice of jurisdictions cited. In conclusion, 
then, Breyer, J’s position justifying this exercise of judicial comparativism was 
that
the foreign courts I have mentioned have considered roughly comparable questions 
under roughly comparable legal standards. Each court has held or assumed that those 
standards permit application of the death penalty itself. Consequently, I believe their 
views are useful even though not binding.16
9 Soering v United Kingdom—(1989) 11 EHRR 439.
10 Knight v Florida 120 S Ct 459 at 463 (Breyer, J).
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Thompson v Oklahoma 487 US 815, n4, 101 L Ed 2d 702, 108 S Ct 2687 (1988) (Scalia, J, 
 dissenting).
15 Knight v Florida 120 S Ct 459 at 463—4 (Breyer, J).
16 Ibid, at 464.
382  Christopher McCrudden
In Atkins v Virginia,17 the court decided that the imposition of the death 
penalty for crimes committed by ‘mentally retarded offenders’ was unconstitu-
tional. Stevens, J’s opinion for the court drew on ‘foreign’ material to help reach 
a  conclusion that
within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed 
by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.18
Along with other information, Stevens, J concluded that the degree of consistency 
of this trend together with evidence of what was occurring in legislatures in the 
United States
lends further support to our conclusion that there is a consensus [against imposition of 
the death penalty in such cases] among those who have addressed the issue.19
There are several differences to the approach that Breyer, J took in Knight v 
Florida. First, the foreign material was displayed much less prominently in Atkins 
v Virginia (it was confined to a footnote); it was dealt with much less extensively 
(it referred only to an amicus curiae brief containing the information); and it 
was much less specific, referring to the ‘world community’, rather than particular 
countries. In common with Breyer, J in Knight v Florida, however, Stevens, J also 
stressed that ‘these factors are by no means dispositive’.20
In the later case of Roper v Simmons,21 the Supreme Court held that the imposi-
tion of the death penalty on offenders under 18 was unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment. In his opinion for the court, Kennedy, J drew on ‘foreign’ 
material. As with Breyer, J in Knight v Florida and Stevens, J in Atkins v Virginia, 
he stressed that this material, apparently demonstrating
that the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official 
sanction to the juvenile death penalty,22
was used only to support a determination that such uses of capital punishment are 
unconstitutional under the United States Constitution, and that this information 
‘does not become controlling, for the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment 
remains our responsibility’. He stressed, too, that such information has relatively 
frequently been used by the court ‘as instructive for its interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments”’. 
Unlike in previous cases, however, Kennedy, J then referred to the provisions 
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.23 As he pointed 
17 Atkins v Virginia 563 US 304 (2002).
18 Ibid, at 316, n 21(Stevens, J).
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Roper v Simmons 125 S Ct 1183 (2005). [TS close space]
22 Ibid, at 1198 (Kennedy, J).
23 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November, 1989, 1577 UNTS 3, 28 ILM 
1448 (entered into force 2 September, 1990).
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out, the Convention, ‘contains an express prohibition on capital punishment for 
crimes committed by juveniles under 18’.24 The Convention had been ratified 
by ‘every country in the world ... save for the United States and Somalia’.25 No 
 ratifying country had entered a reservation to the provision prohibiting the execu-
tion of juvenile offenders. There were ‘parallel prohibitions’26 contained in other 
 significant international covenants some of which the United States had ratified, 
but with reservations protecting the use of the death penalty for juveniles:
[O]nly seven countries other than the United States have executed juvenile offend-
ers since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, and China. Since then each of these countries has either abolished capital 
 punishment for juveniles or made public disavowal of the practice.27
He concluded, on the basis of this information, that
it is fair to say that the United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face 
against the juvenile death penalty.28
This use of human rights conventions to demonstrate an international consensus 
against the juvenile death penalty is particularly noteworthy, given that some had 
not been ratified by the United States (the Convention on the Rights of the Child), 
and others which had been ratified had US reservations on the specific issue 
before the court. Kennedy, J also paid particular attention to the United Kingdom, 
whose experience was ‘instructive’ and of
particular relevance ... in light of the historic ties between our countries and in light of 
the Eighth Amendment’s own origins,
which he noted had been ‘modeled on a parallel provision’ in the English 
Declaration of Rights of 1689.29 Decades before it had abolished the death penalty 
entirely, ‘it recognized the disproportionate nature of the juvenile death penalty; 
and it abolished that penalty as a separate matter’.30 
No doubt anticipating an attack on his use of these sources, the relevant  section 
of his opinion ended with his reflection on the question whether the use of 
 ‘foreign’ material in some way undermined the independent role of the Court in 
interpreting the Constitution. He sought to dampen down concerns that it might. 
The ‘overwhelming weight of international opinion’ against the juvenile death 
penalty, ‘while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and signifi-
cant confirmation for our own conclusions’.31 The guarantees in the Constitution 
24 Art 37.
25 Roper v Simmons 125 S Ct 1183 at 1199 (Kennedy, J).
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Declaration of Rights, 1 W & M, ch 2,  para 10, in 3 English Statutes at Large 441 (1770).
30 Roper v Simmons 125 S Ct 1183 at 1199 (Kennedy, J).
31 Ibid, at 1200.
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are ‘original to the American experience’, ‘central to the American experience’, 
and ‘essential to our present-day self-definition and national identity’.32 It did not 
lessen
our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the 
express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply 
underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of freedom.33
As we shall see subsequently, there was a strong dissent in Roper v Simmons con-
cerning the use of ‘foreign’ material, as well as the substantive finding of unconsti-
tutionality. Although O’Connor, J also dissented on the issue of constitutionality, 
she made clear her general support for the use of ‘foreign’ material, although 
not the conclusions the majority drew from it. She disagreed with the conten-
tion, advanced by Scalia, J in dissent, that foreign and international law ‘have no 
place in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence’.34 In some areas of constitutional 
 interpretation, on the other hand, she agreed with Scalia, J that
American law is distinctive in many respects, not least where the specific provisions of 
our Constitution and the history of its exposition so dictate,
mentioning ‘distinctively American rules of law related to the Fourth Amendment 
and the Establishment Clause’.35 Over the course of nearly half a century, the court 
had, she said, ‘consistently referred to foreign and international law as relevant 
to its assessment of evolving standards of decency’.36 Unlike the majority, how-
ever, she saw the use of comparative material in the interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment as particularly appropriate, ‘reflect[ing its] special character’ which 
‘draws its meaning directly from the maturing values of civilized society’.37 The 
United States’ 
evolving understanding of human dignity certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor 
inherently at odds with, the values prevailing in other countries. On the contrary, we 
should not be surprised to find congruence between domestic and international values, 
especially where the international community has reached clear agreement ... that a 
particular form of punishment is inconsistent with fundamental human rights.38
The results of such an inquiry into these international values—and here she 
agrees with the majority—‘do not dictate the outcome of our Eighth Amendment 
inquiry’, but where ‘an international consensus of this nature’ exists, this ‘can serve 
to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American consensus’.39 
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid (emphasis added).
34 Roper v Simmons, 125 S Ct 1183 at 1215 (O’Connor, J).
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid, at 1215–16.
39 Ibid, at 1216.
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That is not the only role that she seems to envisage an inquiry into international 
consensus playing, since she also considered whether the international consensus 
would ‘confirm’ other arguments of principle that the majority advances. She 
concluded, however, that while such uses of international consensus would be 
appropriate, they were unconvincing in this particular case:
Because I do not believe that a genuine national consensus against the juvenile death 
penalty has yet developed, and because I do not believe the Court’s moral proportional-
ity argument justifies a categorical, age-based constitutional rule, I can assign no such 
confirmatory role to the international consensus described by the Court.40
Scalia, J in dissent asked, perhaps somewhat mischievously, ‘Why would foreign 
law not be relevant’ to the moral proportionality judgment?
If foreign law is powerful enough to supplant the judgment of the American people, surely it 
is powerful enough to change a personal assessment of moral proportionality.41
The (probably) most controversial use of ‘foreign’ material by the United States 
Supreme Court arose in Lawrence v Texas,42 in which the court held to be uncon-
stitutional under the Due Process Clause a state law that criminalised sodomy 
between consenting adults. There were two main uses of foreign material in this 
case. The material was used, first, to rebut an historical argument advanced in the 
earlier Bowers v Hardwick case,43 in which the Court had upheld similar laws. In 
Bowers, Chief Justice Burger (as he then was) had adopted the argument that the 
history of Western civilisation and Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards 
was consistent with the use of such legal restrictions. However, Kennedy, J’s opin-
ion for the majority in Lawrence v Texas argued that the
sweeping references ... to the history of Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian 
moral and ethical standards did not take account of other authorities pointing in an 
opposite direction.44
Two particular pieces of evidence pointing in that opposite direction were cited, 
the first being the report of the influential Wolfenden Committee in Britain, which 
recommended the repeal of laws punishing homosexual conduct in 1957.45 The 
United Kingdom Parliament enacted the substance of those recommendations 
10 years later (except with regard to Northern Ireland).46 The second piece of 
evidence used to rebut Burger, CJ’s historical argument was the jurisprudence of 
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid, at 1228 (Scalia, J).
42 Lawrence v Texas, 123 S Ct 2472 (2003).
43 Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186, 92 L Ed 2d 140, 106 S Ct 2841 (1986).
44 Lawrence v Texas, 123 S Ct 2472 at 2481 (Kennedy, J).
45 The Wolfenden Report: Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution 
(London, HMSO, 1957).
46 Sexual Offences Act 1967.
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47 Dudgeon v United Kingdom  (1981) 4 EHRR 149.
48 Lawrence v Texas, 123 S Ct 2472 at 2481 (Kennedy, J).
49 PG & JH v United Kingdom, App No 44787/98, (2001) 56 ECtHR 546, 25 September, 2001); 
Modinos v Cyprus, (1993) 16 EHRR 485; Norris v Ireland (1991) 13 EHRR 186.
50 Lawrence v Texas, 123 S Ct 2472 at 2483 (Kennedy, J).
51 Ibid.
the European Court of Human Rights. In Dudgeon v United Kingdom,47 an adult 
male resident in Northern Ireland stated that he was a practising homosexual 
who desired to engage in consensual homosexual conduct. The laws of Northern 
Ireland forbade him that right. He alleged that he had been questioned, his home 
had been searched, and he feared criminal prosecution. The European Court of 
Human Rights held that the laws proscribing the conduct were invalid under 
the European Convention on Human Rights. Referring specifically to Dudgeon, 
Kennedy, J said: 
Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was decided the European 
Court of Human Rights considered a case with parallels to Bowers and to today’s 
case ... Authoritative in all countries that are members of the Council of Europe (21 
nations then, 45 nations now), the decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers 
that the claim put forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization.48
The second use of ‘foreign’ materials in Lawrence v Texas was even more con-
troversial because it sought to ascribe to these materials an additional function. 
Kennedy, J clearly considered that the values that were relevant to interpreting 
the Due Process Clause in this case were values held in common with at least 
some other countries. To the extent that this was true, then, how other countries 
interpreted and applied those common values was relevant to the interpretation 
of the United States Constitution. In particular, it was relevant to ask whether 
the approach put forward in Bowers had gained acceptance among those holding 
these values in common. Citing two more named decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights that were decided after Bowers,49 Kennedy, J concluded:
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be 
noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. The 
European Court of Human Rights has followed not Bowers but its own decision in 
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.50
Citing an amicus curiae brief submitted to the court in Lawrence v Texas by Mary 
Robinson, the then United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, he 
noted that
[o]ther nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected 
right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.51
What use would be made of this evidence? Effectively, the use made was to raise 
a serious question as to whether the interest put forward by the government in 
this case to support the continued criminalisation of sodomy was convincing 
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enough to warrant upholding these criminal restrictions, given the strength of the 
competing right.
The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human 
freedom in many other countries. There has been no showing that in this country the 
governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate 
or urgent.52 
IV.  JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL CRITIQUES OF JUDICIAL COMPARATIVISM
There are several current arguments that have been used to support a conclu-
sion that using foreign sources is problematic. First, such use is thought to alter 
the balance between constraint and discretion that judges exercise in constitu-
tional rights interpretation. Judges in all jurisdictions are both empowered and 
constrained at the same time by a set of rules and accepted practices. The use of 
foreign legal material, it is said, alters that balance by giving more discretion to the 
judge than hitherto. John Roberts, currently the Chief Justice of the United States, 
said in his confirmation hearings before the United States Senate that,
relying on foreign precedent doesn’t confine judges. It doesn’t limit their discretion the 
way relying on domestic precedent does. Domestic precedent can confine and shape the 
discretion of the judges. Foreign law, you can find anything you want. If you don’t find it 
in the decisions of France or Italy, it’s in the decisions of Somalia or Japan or Indonesia 
or wherever.53
The assumption is, of course, that increased judicial discretion in exercising judi-
cial review is problematic, and this reflects, perhaps, a latent unease with judicial 
review as currently practised and a judgement that it should not be expanded.
A second argument also arises from general scepticism and unease with judi-
cial review and the counter-majoritarian difficulty that it gives rise to. There has 
been persistent criticism from sceptics that judicial review in some jurisdictions 
is ‘results driven’, meaning that judges decide the result they want to achieve and 
draw up reasons to support that conclusion, rather than letting the legal reason-
ing dictate the result, which is assumed to be the way proper judges behave. Some 
have seen legitimising judicial recourse to foreign material as giving yet another 
way that judges will be able to support the political choices that judges anyway 
wish to make. Thomas, J concurring in Knight v Florida, and arguing against 
Breyer, J’s references to foreign material on the effect of delays on the legitimacy 
of carrying out the death penalty, suggested that
the only reason why this material was resorted to was there was no support in the 
American constitutional tradition or in this Court’s precedent for the proposition that 
52 Ibid.
53 Confirmation hearing for United States Supreme Court of John Roberts as Chief Justice, 
September 2005.
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a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral procedures and 
then complain when his execution is delayed.54
Had there been
any such support in our own jurisprudence, it would be unnecessary for proponents 
of the claim to rely on the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of 
Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of India, or the Privy Council.55
Scalia, J dissenting in Roper v Simmons reiterated this view:
What these foreign sources ‘affirm’ rather than repudiate, is the Justices’ own notion 
of how the world ought to be, and their diktat that it shall be so henceforth in 
America.56
Judge Posner has argued extra-judicially that 
[j]udges are likely to cite foreign decisions for the same reason that they prefer 
quoting from a previous decision to stating a position anew: They are timid about 
speaking in their own voices lest they make legal justice seem too personal and 
discontinuous ... Citing foreign decisions is probably best understood as an effort, 
whether or not conscious, to further mystify the adjudicative process and disguise 
the political decisions that are the core, though not the entirety, of the Supreme 
Court’s output (Posner, 2004). 
This intuition is also reflected in the criticism of the way that judges choose 
which jurisdictions to have regard to as involving ‘cherry-picking’. Justice Scalia’s 
criticism of a court using foreign judicial opinions is of this type when he accuses 
it of simply ‘looking over the heads of the crowd and picking out its friends’.57 
Dissenting in Lawrence v Texas, he pointedly remarked on how the court’s discus-
sion of ‘these foreign views ... ignor[es], of course, the many countries that have 
retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy’.58 A somewhat different aspect of the 
charge of cherry-picking relates to the substantive issues concerning which the 
court is willing to look at comparative material. Dissenting in Roper v Simmons, 
Scalia, J pointed to the court’s willingness to invoke ‘foreign’ material in the death 
penalty context, but not in other areas such as abortion, or separation of church 
and state. 
The Court should either profess its willingness to reconsider all these matters in 
light of the views of foreigners, or else it should cease putting forth foreigners’ views 
as part of the reasoned basis of its decisions. To invoke alien law when it agrees with 
one’s own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but 
sophistry.59
54 Knight v Florida, 120 S Ct 459 at 460 (Thomas, J).
55 Ibid.
56 Roper v Simmons, 125 S Ct 1183 at 1229 (Scalia, J).
57 Roper v Simmons, 125 S Ct 1183 at 1223 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
58 Lawrence v Texas, 123 S Ct 2472 at 2495 (Scalia, J) (emphasis added).
59 Roper v Simmons, 125 S Ct 1183 at 1228 (Scalia, J).
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A third criticism arises more from scepticism about the idea of universal 
human rights generally than from scepticism about the use of judicial forums for 
interpreting them. This objection has several elements. The first is that any appar-
ent agreement that exists at the international level camouflages massive variations 
in actual practice. So, for example, Scalia, J, dissenting in Roper v Simmons, criti-
cised the majority as,
quite willing to believe that every foreign nation—of whatever tyrannical political 
makeup and with however subservient or incompetent a court system—in fact adheres 
to a rule of no death penalty for offenders under 18.60
A second aspect of this general scepticism is somewhat more sophisticated. It is 
that the way in which particular practices operate in particular countries is so tied 
in with other practices, that attempting to transplant the one without the others 
is to engage in bad comparative law. For Judge Posner, a significant problem with 
using foreign opinions,
is that they emerge from a complex socio-historico-politico-institutional background of 
which our judges, I respectfully suggest, are almost entirely ignorant (Posner, 2004).
This position is not far from viewing the rights protected in each nation as so 
context-specific, so culturally contingent as to render interpreting one’s nations 
set of constitutional rights in light of another’s fatuous. Not surprisingly, we find 
just such a view being expressed by Judge Posner. ‘To cite foreign law as authority’, 
he argues,
is to flirt with the discredited (I had thought) idea of a universal natural law; or to sup-
pose fantastically that the world’s judges constitute a single, elite community of wisdom 
and conscience(Posner, 2004).
Scalia, J, dissenting, in Atkins v Virginia, refers to the ‘practices of the “world com-
munity”, whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people’.61
The fourth criticism of the use of judicial comparativism relates to its effect 
in circumventing national democratic controls on the creation of law. Domestic 
judges in most jurisdictions are appointed by bodies that are legitimated by 
domestic legislation or by a domestic constitution, thus allowing for democratic 
input directly or indirectly into their appointment. For John Roberts, in his 
confirmation hearings, this raised a significant problem for the use of foreign 
judgments. ‘If we’re relying on a decision from a German judge about what our 
Constitution means’, he said,
no President accountable to the people appointed that judge and no Senate accountable 
to the people confirmed that judge. And yet he’s playing a role in shaping the law that 
binds the people in this country. I think that’s a concern that has to be addressed.62 
60 Ibid, at 1226.
61 Atkins v Virginia, 563 US 304 at 348 (Scalia, J) (emphasis added).
62 See above n 55.
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A similar concern arises in the context of references to world opinion more 
generally, or Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, or human 
rights treaties that have not been ratified. Here the problem is similar, that the 
constitutional mechanism that requires a democratic mechanism before domestic 
law is created is circumvented by judicial fiat. Scalia, J criticised the plurality’s use 
of foreign sources in Roper v Simmons as based on the premise ‘that American law 
should conform to the laws of the rest of the world’.63 He was particularly scath-
ing about the reference to unratified conventions or conventions which, though 
ratified, had relevant United States reservations. 
Unless the Court has added to its arsenal the power to join and ratify treaties on behalf 
of the United States, I cannot see how this evidence favors, rather than refutes, its 
position. That the Senate and the President … have declined to join and ratify treaties 
prohibiting execution of under-18 offenders can only suggest that our country has either 
not reached a national consensus on the question, or has reached a consensus contrary 
to what the Court announces.64
In Atkins v Virginia, Rehnquist, CJ regarded the ‘uncritical acceptance’ of foreign 
sources as ‘anti-democratic’65: 
The Court’s suggestion that these sources are relevant to the constitutional question ... 
in my view, is antithetical to considerations of federalism, which instruct that ‘any per-
manent prohibition upon all units of democratic government must [be apparent] in the 
operative acts (laws and the application of laws) that the people have approved’.66
Scalia, J’s criticism of the use of ‘foreign’ sources in Atkins also reflects this view 
when he argues that
where there is not first a settled consensus among our own people, the views of other 
nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be cannot be 
imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.67
It is this concern that also appears to be a significant part of the motivation 
behind the (so far unsuccessful) proposal in the United States Congress to enact a 
Constitutional Restoration Act, providing that,
[i]n interpreting and applying the Constitution of the United States, a court of the 
United States may not rely upon any constitution, law, administrative rule, Executive 
order, directive, policy, judicial decision, or any other action of any foreign state or 
international organization or agency, other than the constitutional law and English 
common law.68
63 Roper v Simmons, 125 S Ct 1183 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
64 Ibid, at 1226 (Scalia, J).
65 Atkins v Virginia, 563 US 304 at 322 (Rehnquist, CJ dissenting).
66 Ibid.
67 Atkins v Virginia 563 US 304 at n 4 (Scalia, J).
68 HR 3799, 108th Congress § 201 (2004). See also HR Res 568, 108th Congress (2004); HR Res 468, 
108th Congress (2003); Constitutional Preservation Resolution, HR Res 446, 108th Congress (2003).
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Finally, the critics of the use of such foreign material argue that the distinction 
that is made between judges using such ‘foreign’ material as helping to determine 
the case (which advocates of the use of foreign judgments say is not the case), and 
merely using such foreign material as relevant, and informative (which is how its 
use is often characterised, for example, by the majority in Roper v Simmons), is 
untenable. Scalia, J, dissenting in Roper, argued: 
The Court’s parting attempt to downplay the significance of its extensive discussion of 
foreign law is unconvincing. ‘Acknowledgment’ of foreign approval has no place in the 
legal opinion of this Court unless it is part of the basis for the Court’s judgment which is 
surely what it parades as today.69
In other words, supporters of the use of such material cannot have it both ways: 
either the material is determinative (which few would accept), or the material is 
irrelevant, in which case it should not be discussed.
V.  FUNCTIONALISM, NATURAL LAW, AND THE DIALOGIC METHOD
How do these examples of the phenomenon relate to the different approaches to 
comparativism discussed earlier? For Ruti Teitel,
[a] consensus appears to be forming regarding the relevance of foreign sources, at least 
within circumscribed parameters. The justification for comparativist analysis is couched 
largely in functionalist terms: as a basis for the resolution of specific constitutional 
issues, particularly in areas of unsettled law (Teitel, 2004: 2570 at 2589).
Indeed, much of the debate between supporters and opponents of the use of judicial 
comparativism, as discussed above, is couched in functionalist terms, with supporters 
arguing that ‘foreign’ legal material helps them find solutions to legal problems that 
are similar to, or can be illuminated by, approaches taken elsewhere. Opponents often 
contest the idea that such comparisons can be of use, in part because they contest the 
idea that the issues faced elsewhere are sufficiently similar that comparisons can ever 
be useful. Mary Ann Glendon has neatly summed up the debate on this issue: 
As the issue was framed recently in a debate between Justices Stephen Breyer and 
Antonin Scalia, it comes down to this: The former says that if a judge abroad has dealt 
with a similar problem, ‘Why don’t I read what he says if it’s similar enough? Maybe I’ll 
learn something.’ Yet the latter would exclude such material as wholly without bearing 
on the meaning of the Constitution; and quite apart from originalism, the different 
political, constitutional, procedural and cultural contexts in other nations drastically 
limit its relevance. Justice Breyer counters that the experience of others ‘may nonethe-
less cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal 
problem’ (Glendon, 2005).
Others, however, want to break out of the limits of a functionalist explanation 
for judicial comparativism in human rights adjudication. In an article published 
some time ago, I asked,
69 Roper v Simmons, 125 S Ct 1183 at 1229 (Scalia, J).
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Is there something specific to human rights that explains the apparently greater use of 
foreign case law in human rights cases?
I suggested (following Anne-Marie Slaughter (Slaughter, 1994) that judges may 
consider themselves to be engaging in a common enterprise worldwide and that 
to those who thought that, it would seem natural to engage in a judicial conversa-
tion with colleagues in other jurisdictions. The use of foreign judgments is one 
way in which conversation is continued. I rejected, however, the idea that these 
judges were engaged in ‘some form of new natural law’ enterprise (McCrudden, 
2000).
Paolo Carozza, in commenting on my article in the course of his own 
 discussion of the phenomenon in the context of United States capital punish-
ment  adjudication, agreed with the question I asked, but not my answer (Carozza, 
2003). Carozza identified the extensive use of the concept of ‘human dignity’ 
alongside the use of comparative judicial opinions. He agreed with my view that 
identified the judges’ ‘sense of sharing a common enterprise with judges in other 
jurisdictions’ as one principal explanation for the use of comparative material. 
He identified my explanation as ‘essentially functionalist, based in the shared 
task of seeking solutions to common problems’ but regarded such  functionalist 
 explanations as impoverished, since
there is more than functionalism present in the ethical premise of the value of human 
dignity so widely shared among the different courts involved in the transnational 
 jurisprudence of capital punishment (Carozza, 2003: 1031 at 1081).
He supported this argument with evidence that,
on many occasions we see judges specifically abstracting from and eschewing compari-
sons in the functional terms of ‘common solutions to common problems’ and speaking 
much more in terms of ‘common principles for a common humanity’. It is, more often 
than not, the judge who wants to avoid foreign influences who takes a functionalist 
approach focusing on the unique, pragmatic aspects of the problem at home (ibid).
Leaving aside whether my explanation was ‘functionalist’, Carozza’s critique is 
important in opening up a debate as to whether non-functionalist explanations 
of the phenomenon are more convincing. For Carozza, my ‘mistake’ was in too 
easily rejecting what I referred to as ‘some form of new natural law’. For Carozza, 
natural law involves accepting that,
moving from universal principles of justice (like basic human rights norms) to posi-
tive law involves the exercise of human reason in the contingent contexts of practical 
possibility, culture, history, and so forth. The concrete specification of the principles 
of natural law, therefore, necessarily admits a variety of reasonable solutions to most 
problems (ibid).
Viewed from this perspective, my contentions regarding what judges are actually 
saying that they do
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does not at all contradict the idea that there are some implicit natural law premises 
operative in the phenomenon of cross-judicial discourse on human rights (as distinct 
from other substantive areas of law) (Carozza: 1031 at 1082).
In the capital punishment cases, 
the tendency of courts ... to consistently place their appeal to foreign sources on the 
level of the shared premise of the fundamental value of human dignity is a paradig-
matic example of naturalist foundations at work. Despite differences in positive law, in 
historical and political context, in religious and cultural heritage, there is the common 
recognition of the worth of the human person as a fundamental principle to which the 
positive law should be accountable (ibid).
For Carozza, the ‘common enterprise’ that I identified is,
first and foremost, the working out of the practical implications, in differing concrete 
contexts, of human dignity for the rights to life and physical integrity (ibid: 1031 at 
1081–2). 
However, there is a third alternative that is neither functionalist nor based in 
natural law. We have seen that judges not infrequently seek to distinguish judg-
ments from other jurisdictions, explaining why they are not persuasive. Why? A 
possible explanation of this particular aspect of the phenomenon, and perhaps of 
the phenomenon as a whole, is provided by the dialogical method of comparativ-
ism discussed earlier. Anne-Marie Slaughter speaks of the emergence of a ‘global 
jurisprudence’, referring to
the existence of active dialogue among the world’s judges in the language of a common 
set of precedents on any particular issue. No one answer is the right one; the principles 
of pluralism and legitimate difference again prevail (Slaughter, 2003: 203).
She has noted a trend to ‘dialogue rather than monologue, and deliberation 
rather than gap-filling’. (ibid: 196) Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, a former member of 
the Canadian Supreme Court, has argued that ‘the process of international influ-
ence has changed from reception to dialogue’ (L’Heureux-Dubé, 1998: 17). Justice 
Ginsburg, of the United States Supreme Court has referred to the ‘value of com-
parative dialogue’ (Ginsburg, 2005: 578). Sujit Choudry has also set his discussion 
of the phenomenon within a model of dialogical interpretation (Choudry, 1999: 
851–75). 
There appears to be an identifiable move to use comparative approaches as 
one of the techniques of trying to reach ‘solutions’ to issues of human rights 
interpretation that are not the same in each jurisdiction, that are not imposed 
on a jurisdiction simply because another has adopted it, and that are not 
necessarily considered to be examples of emerging universal norms. The com-
parative method in this context often involves judges considering what occurs 
in other jurisdictions as well as their own in order to appreciate dimensions 
of the issue that might not otherwise have been as apparent. It is ‘dialogic’ 
because it involves each jurisdiction not only contributing to the bank of 
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experience that each other jurisdiction draws on, but also discussing this with 
those in other jurisdictions who are regarded as carrying out a similar inter-
pretative role. It is in the development of this dialogic method applied to the 
problem of incompletely theorised agreements in human rights that the most 
fruitful role for judicial comparativism may lie.
VI.  CONCLUSION
A more complete study of the complex phenomenon discussed in this chapter 
should examine particular issues I have identified more systematically. Essentially, 
I have identified some empirical questions (How far does it happen, and where?); 
a jurisprudential question (Can we identify criteria which help explain why it does 
or does not happen?); and a normative question (Is it legitimate?). None of these 
basic questions has yet been adequately answered. The empirical question requires 
more consistently gathered evidence than the somewhat anecdotal evidence drawn 
from the one jurisdiction presented here. The jurisprudential question requires a 
more thorough examination of how the phenomenon is illuminated by current 
debates on the theory of judicial interpretation, and emerging theories of com-
parative law. The normative question requires a closer study of the relationship 
between the phenomenon and the universality of human rights.
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
 1.  Do you agree with Justice Scalia’s criticism of a court using foreign judicial 
opinions when he accuses it of ‘looking over the heads of the crowd and 
picking out its friends’?
 2.  Do you agree with Mary Ann Glendon that there is a ‘crucial difference 
between the legitimate use of foreign material as mere empirical evidence 
that legislation has a rational basis, and its use to buttress the court’s own 
decision to override legislation’, when she contrasts the (inappropriate) use 
of foreign law by Justice Breyer in Lawrence v Texas, with the (appropriate) 
use of such law by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Washington v Glucksberg?
 3.  Do you agree with Judge Posner’s argument that: ‘citing foreign decisions 
is probably best understood as an effort, whether or not conscious, to 
further mystify the adjudicative process and disguise the political deci-
sions that are the core, though not the entirety, of the Supreme Court’s 
output.’?
 4.  Do you agree with John Roberts in his confirmation hearings that ‘relying 
on foreign precedent doesn’t confine judges. It doesn’t limit their discre-
tion the way relying on domestic precedent does. Domestic precedent can 
confine and shape the discretion of the judges. Foreign law, you can find 
anything you want’. 
 5. Is the use of foreign judicial opinions ‘undemocratic’? 
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 6.  Do you consider, with Judge Posner, that a significant problem with 
using foreign opinions, ‘is that they emerge from a complex socio-
 historico-politico-institutional background of which our judges, I 
respectfully suggest, are almost entirely ignorant’?
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND FURTHER READING
Allan, J and Huscroft, G (2006) ‘Constitutional Rights Coming Home to Roost? Rights 
Internationalism in American Courts’ 43 San Diego Law Review 1. 
Barak, A (2005) ‘Response to The Judge as Comparatist: Comparison in Public Law’ 80 
Tulane Law Review 195. 
Carozza, PG (2003) ‘“My Friend is a Stranger”: The Death Penalty and the Global Ius 
Commune of Human Rights’ 81 Texas Law Review 1031. 
Choudhry, S (1999) ‘Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of 
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation’ 74 Indiana Law Journal 819. 
—— (2004) ‘The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism’ 2 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 1.
Cleveland, SH (2006), ‘Our International Constitution’ 31 Yale Journal of International 
Law 1. 
Dixon, R (to be published) ‘Co-operative Constitutionalism and Constitutional 
Comparison: Traces of Dialogue?’.
Ginsburg, RB (2005) ‘“A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a 
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication’ 64 Cambridge Law Journal 575.
Ginsburg, RB (2006) ‘“A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a 
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, Constitutional Court of South 
Africa’, February 7, 2006, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_02-
07b-06.html
Glendon, M-A (2005) ‘Judicial Tourism: What’s wrong with the US Supreme Court citing 
foreign law’ The Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2005 http://www.opinionjournal.
com/editorial/feature.html?id=110007265
Harding, SK (2003) ‘Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review’ 28 Yale International Law 
Journal 409. 
Henkin, L (2001) ‘The International Judicial Dialogue: When Domestic Constitutional 
Courts Join the Conversation’ 114 Harvard Law Review 2049. 
L’Heureux-Dubé, C (1998) ‘The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the 
International Impact of the Rehnquist Court’ 34 Tulsa Law Journal 15.
Hoffmann, Lord (1999), ‘Human Rights and the House of Lords’ 62(2) Modern Law 
Review 159.
Jackson, VC (2002) ‘Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative 
Constitutional Experience’ 51 Duke Law Journal 223.
—— (2004a) ‘Comparative Constitutional Federalism and Transnational Judicial Discourse’ 
2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 91. 
—— (2004b) ‘Yes please, I’d love to talk with you: The court has learned from the rest of 
the world before. It should continue to do so’, Legal Affairs, July/August 2004. http://
www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_jackson_julaug04.msp--
—— (2005) ‘Foreword—Comment: Constitutional Comparisons, Convergence, Resistance, 
Engagement’ 119 Harvard Law Review 109. 
396  Christopher McCrudden
Jackson, VC and Tushnet, M (2002) Defining the Field of Comparative Constitutional Law 
(Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers).
—— (2006) Comparative Constitutional Law 2nd edn (New York, Foundation Press).
Jacobs, FG (2003)’Judicial Dialogue and the Cross-Fertilization of Legal Systems: The 
European Court of Justice’ 38 Texas International Law Journal 547. 
von Jhering, R (1955) Geist des römischen Rechs auf den Verschiedenen Stufen Seiner 
Entwicklung (Schwabe, 9th ed).
Jacobson, G (2003) ‘The Permeability of Constitutional Borders’ 82 Texas Law Review 
1763.
Kentridge, S (2005) ‘Comparative Law in Constitutional Adjudication: The South African 
Experience’ 80 Tulane Law Review 245. 
Kreimer, SF (1999) ‘Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the Process of 
Constitutional Borrowing’ 1 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 640. 
Larson, JL (2004) ‘Importing Constitutional Norms from a ‘Wider Civilization’: Lawrence 
and the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic 
Constitutional Interpretation’ 65 Ohio St Law Journal 1283.
Levinson, S (2004) ‘Looking Abroad When Interpreting the US Constitution: Some 
Reflections’ 39 Texas International Law Journal 353. 
McCrudden, C (2000) ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial 
Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 499. 
—— (2003) ‘Human Rights and Judicial Use of Comparative Law’ in E Örücü (ed), 
Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (London, UK National Committee of 
Comparative Law).
Markesinis, B and Fedtke, J (2005) ‘The Judge as Comparatist’ 80 Tulane Law Review 11. 
Örücü, E (ed) (2003) Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (London, UK National 
Committee of Comparative Law).
Posner, R (2004) ‘No thanks, we already have our own laws: The court should never view 
a foreign legal decision as a precedent in any way’, Legal Affairs, July/August 2004. http:
//www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.msp
Rosenfeld, M, Sajo, A, Baer, S and Dorsen, N (eds) (2003) Comparative Constitutionalism: 
Cases and Materials (New York, West Publishing Company). 
Saunders, C (2006) ‘The George P. Smith Lecture in International Law: The Use and Misuse 
of Comparative Constitutional Law’, 13 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 37. 
Slaughter, A-M (1994) ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’ 29 University of 
Richmond Law Review 99.
—— (2003) ‘A Global Community of Courts’ 44 Harvard International Law Journal 191.
Sunstein, CR (1996) Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (New York, Oxford University 
Press).
Teitel, R (2004) ‘Book Review: Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age’ 117 
Harvard Law Review 2570. 
Tushnet, M (1999) ‘The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law’ 108 Yale Law 
Journal 1225. 
Waldron, J (2005) ‘Foreword—Comment: Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’ 119 
Harvard Law Review 129. 
Young, EA (2005) ‘Foreword—Comment: Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem’ 110 
Harvard Law Review 148. 
Zweigert, K and Kötz, H (1998) Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd edn (trans) T Weir 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press).
Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights  397
Website connections:
Video archive and transcript of discussion on the constitutional relevance of foreign court 
decisions, between US Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer, 
American University Washington College of Law, 13 January, 2005 http://www.wcl.
american.edu/secle/founders/2005/050113.cfm
Confirmation hearings for US Supreme Court of John Roberts as Chief Justice, September 2005 
http://www.c-span.org/VideoArchives.asp?CatCodePairs=Current_Event,SCourt&Arc
hiveDays=365&Page=14 http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/13/politics/politicsspecial1/
roberts_textindex.html?ex=1152936000&en=c622ad6bd5a1f97f&ei=5070
Confirmation hearings for US Supreme Court of Judge Samuel Alito, January 2006 http://
www.c-span.org/homepage.asp?Cat=Current_Event&Code=SCourt&ShowVidNum=5
1&Rot_Cat_CD=SCourt&Rot_HT=&Rot_WD=&ShowVidDays=365&ShowVidDesc=
&ArchiveDays=365

17
Comparative Private Law in Practice: 
The Process of Law Reform
SJEF VAN ERP*
KEY CONCEPTS
Law reform projects; Economic regional and global integration; Project 
advising; Experts; Project preparation; Donor country; Receiver country; 
Legal transplants; Expert preparation; Consultation process; The role of 
interpreters; The training of judges; Legal traditions; A pragmatic approach 
to comparative law; ‘The adequate approach to comparative law’ 
I.  INTRODUCTION
U
ntil some 20 or 30 years ago, comparative law was seen as a rather exotic 
branch of the law. It was a subject that could be chosen at the end of one’s 
legal studies to learn of the remarkable ways in which foreign lawyers 
were educated and trained to think. Frequently, it also meant that one had to read 
legal materials in a foreign language. Comparative law was meant for those who 
were curious of mind. Perhaps a visiting foreign law professor might give a guest 
lecture in a foreign language on a topic one did not really understand, but, as a 
curious student, one still listened with great attention.
How the world has changed in such a short period! Comparative law, at least in 
Europe, has become one of the core subjects in the curricula of law faculties. In 
some law faculties comparative law is even at the heart of the law programme. The 
reasons behind this are the changing role and practical importance of knowledge 
in foreign legal systems. It is realised more and more that foreign law is not really 
so ‘foreign’ anymore. Within the European Union, to give but one example, grow-
ing intra-European trade has led to an increasing number of cases in which at 
least one of the parties is confronted with a different legal system to his/her own. 
* I would like to thank Mel Kenny and Patrick O’Callaghan, researchers at the Centre of European 
Law and Politics at the University of Bremen, for their critical comments on this chapter.
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Although in such a case the assistance of a lawyer from that foreign legal system 
will be necessary, that party (or his/her lawyer) still has to be able to understand 
at least the basics of what the foreign lawyer explains. Having studied comparative 
law facilitates the communication process.
This growing number of contacts with foreign law, provoked by economic 
regional and global integration, gives rise to an increasing need to harmonise or 
even unify certain legal areas to promote even more intensive trade. Legal diver-
sity is often seen as a source of unnecessary ‘transaction costs’, which should be 
avoided. More often than not, these harmonisation or unification attempts are 
being prepared by comparative legal studies to examine the various solutions to 
be found in relevant legal systems and evaluate these solutions in order to decide 
what would be the best approach. 
Next to the practical use of comparative law in such harmonisation and uni-
fication projects, comparative law became highly relevant when, after the fall of 
communism, countries that had so-called ‘socialist’ legal systems wanted funda-
mentally to change their economies. State-planned economies were to become 
free market economies. This meant that the law also had to change drastically. If 
the law had previously only allowed private ownership to a very limited degree 
and had declared that the means of production were in the hands of the state, 
the law had now to allow private ownership as a matter of principle. If trade 
had previously been in the hands of state-owned enterprises, which concluded 
administrative contracts between themselves within the framework of a central 
five-year plan, private companies now had to be allowed to contract freely on the 
basis of market conditions. It meant that the means of production and state enter-
prises had to be privatised. This had all to be done within a fairly short period, as 
the economies of most communist states at that time were close to bankruptcy. 
If, furthermore, a state had started negotiations with the European Union to 
become a new member, that state, as part of the accession process, had to adopt 
the European ‘acquis communautaire’, which is already an enormous endeavour 
in itself, even without the need to reform the national legal system drastically. In 
order to accelerate the law reform process accompanying the economic transition, 
foreign lawyers were asked to give advice as to how to change the law and how to 
adopt the ‘acquis communautaire’. This chapter discusses what role these lawyers 
played in the reform process and how comparative law was used as a practical 
tool.
Not only the law had to be changed, but also the way the law had to be admin-
istered and the way courts decided cases. First of all, the independence of the judi-
ciary had to be secured. Under communism, judges were not really independent. 
More than once I have heard from judges that a local secretary of the Communist 
Party called that judge to inform him/her that the Party would very much favour 
a particular outcome. Such ‘telephone justice’ was, of course, to be absolutely 
forbidden in a legal system firmly based on the rule of law. This meant that a 
fundamental change of mind and legal culture had to be achieved, otherwise the 
changes with regard to substantive law would not have the desired result. Here, 
Comparative Private Law in Practice  401
again, foreign lawyers, especially judges, were asked to give advice and organise 
training sessions.
In the following paragraphs I will discuss how, generally speaking, a law reform 
project proceeds. Topics to be discussed will include how lawyers get involved in 
these projects as advisors (frequently called ‘experts’), how they prepare them-
selves, how they give advice (written advice, oral presentations, discussions, com-
ments on legislative drafts) and how judges are trained to work as independent 
officials applying the law in a non-bureaucratic way.
II.  PROJECT PREPARATION: CHOICE OF EXPERTS
The initiative for a law reform project can be taken by either a particular coun-
try or by an organisation that is in need of advice—I will call such a country or 
organisation the ‘receiving country’ and ‘receiving organisation’—or it can be 
taken by a ‘donor’ country or organisation that feels it can be of assistance. Donors 
can be international organisations such as the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank and the United 
Nations Development Programme.1 Although the first three of these institutions 
are banks, they have been very much involved in law reform in order to create a 
legal environment in which a market economy can develop. A donor could also 
be a particular country (usually acting via its Ministry of Justice) or a national 
organisation from that country aiming to assist foreign law reform projects. 
Examples of the latter are the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ), the Dutch Center for International Legal Co-operation (CILC) and the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID).2 
Gradually, after contacts at the level of academics and civil servants have been 
restored, a development can be seen towards more direct cross-border contacts 
between lawyers. Once networks between lawyers have been created, it is easier 
for lawyers in the receiving country to approach a foreign colleague abroad more 
directly. However, when funding is required, the above-mentioned organisations 
will often be directly or indirectly involved.
As far as I know, most—not to say all—Central and Eastern European coun-
tries that have gone through a transition process from a planned to a market 
economy have requested at least some assistance during their processes of law 
reform. However, law reform projects are undertaken in various parts of the world 
and I would like to avoid the impression that what I am writing is limited to law 
reform in Europe. These law reform projects are certainly not always related to a 
1 For more information, see the respective websites of these financial institutions. European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development: http://www.ebrd.com/; Asian Development Bank:  http://www.
adb.org/About/default.asp; World Bank: http://www.worldbank.org/;  United Nations Development 
Programme: http://www.undp.org/.  
2 GTZ: http://www.gtz.de/en/index.htm; CILC: http://www.cilc.nl/; and USAID: http://www.usaid.
gov/.
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change of economic system. To give but one example: a country that wants to set 
up a land registry might seek the help of a state in which a well-functioning land 
registry system already exists.3 This chapter, however, will take as a starting point 
law reform within Europe as a result of the fall of communism. 
Depending upon the donor, either a tender procedure is followed, according 
to which organisations that intend to be involved in the project make an offer at 
a given price, or organisations are contacted directly. In both cases the organisa-
tions approach experts, either because the donor needs to be informed about the 
experts as part of the bidding process or because the organisation wants to be 
certain beforehand that it can fulfil its promises to give the required assistance. 
Experts are chosen basically on one ground: the person concerned must truly 
be an expert in his/her field of law. Although a national organisation generally 
prefers experts from its own country, sometimes experts from other countries are 
approached as well. This happens for example if an organisation in a common 
law jurisdiction, is asked to give advice to a country that belongs to the civil law. 
Furthermore, experts are preferred who have some basic knowledge of the legal 
system as it existed before the fall of communism. Especially during the first years 
after the fall of communism, knowledge about the old socialist legal systems was 
of great importance. In order to understand what had to be changed and how, 
the existing law had to be understood. Otherwise, a useful exchange of ideas with 
lawyers from the receiving country would be difficult. 
Let me give an example from private law. In socialist legal systems, private 
ownership was only allowed to a very limited degree. Ownership of houses or 
farm estates was curtailed to prevent accumulation of wealth in the hands of a 
few private parties (‘capitalists’). What was allowed depended upon the country. 
Consumer goods for private purposes were still recognised as private property, 
once they had been acquired (frequently after queuing). Trading in goods could 
only be done by state-owned enterprises, as the means of production and the 
goods produced were in the hands of the state. The various factories (numbered, 
such as: shoe factory 1) concluded administrative agreements among themselves 
in order to implement the economic five-year plan. Depending upon the coun-
try and upon the period, hardly any (or, sometimes, a measure of) freedom was 
allowed to the managers of these factories to implement the plan. In a market 
economy this had to change drastically. Markets had to be created, and this pre-
supposed the existence of private ownership and freedom of contract. Foreign 
experts had to be aware of the existing situation in order to understand lawyers 
who had been working in a socialist legal system, sometimes for their whole lives. 
Creating a market economy means the creation of choice and freedom, but it 
also means less protection provided by the state. This required a radical change 
of mentality, and the foreign expert had to understand this. Debates on draft civil 
3 See, eg the information on international projects on the website of the Dutch Land Registry: 
http://www.kadaster.nl/international-english/default.html.
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codes are, in such a situation, never purely technical discussions, as the new rules 
are the expression of a new economic model and a new, sometimes experienced 
as alien, mentality. For lawyers from the receiving state it was sometimes difficult 
to accept that foreign lawyers from the West could change from representations 
of the capitalist threat to colleagues in the search for legal solutions. Communism 
was still seen by some lawyers as the ideal society, in which everything would be 
shared by all, and where one worked according to one’s abilities and received 
according to one’s needs. From an outsider’s viewpoint this may sound unrealistic 
and it may be clear that the ideal was never reached, but the force of believing in 
ideals should not be underestimated. I need only remind the reader of the inspira-
tion which some still derive from the ‘American dream’ that you can start your life 
as a newspaper boy and end as the owner of a newspaper conglomerate.
 Not only does the expert need to understand the pre-existing law, or at least be 
willing to learn more about it, but the expert must also be able to at least under-
stand and speak English, preferably also German and/or French. In my experience 
English is the language most frequently used, followed by German. French is only 
used occasionally. It might seem that this gives an advantage to lawyers educated 
in, for example, the United Kingdom or the United States, but this need not 
necessarily have to be the case. The English legal language is intimately linked to 
the English common law and this might be highly problematic when discussing 
law reform in a civil law system. Law reform in civil law systems can be far more 
adequately discussed in a civil law language, such as French or German. That is 
why sometimes, although English is the main language, experts and lawyers from 
the receiving country discuss certain problems in German or French.
III.  EXPERT PREPARATION
After agreement has been reached between the donor and the organisation in 
charge of performing the contract, the experts are informed that they are, in turn, 
expected to perform their (in most cases informal) contracts with the organisation 
through whom they will offer their services to the receiving country. Generally the 
so-called ‘TOR’ (Terms of Reference) are agreed upon, in which the purpose of the 
project is laid down and the various work packages are defined, such as the number 
of expert meetings or seminars. The responsible project manager then organises a 
first meeting with the experts and is also in touch with the receiving country.
It is at this stage that the experts receive more information on the receiving 
country’s legal system. Legislation, if available in translation, is provided and it is 
discussed which additional legal texts should be translated to enable the experts to 
prepare themselves. All legal documents to be discussed (eg draft civil code, draft 
legislation) will have to translated into a language which the experts understand. 
If the lawyers of the receiving country do not speak English, German or French 
the meetings cannot take place without an interpreter. Two forms of interpre-
tation can be used: consecutive or simultaneous interpretation. Consecutive 
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translation means that after someone puts forward what he/she wants to say, 
that person then waits to allow the interpreter to translate into the language 
required. In case of simultaneous translation the interpreter translates what was 
said immediately. It will be clear that with consecutive translation much time is 
lost. If a presentation is scheduled for one hour, it in effect means half an hour. 
The translator can be someone from the country of the expert, who speaks his/her 
language, but frequently the interpreter comes from the receiving country and 
only speaks one foreign language, usually English. It can happen that the (draft) 
legal text to be discussed has been translated into a language that is understood by 
the expert (eg into German), whereas the interpreter can only translate between 
his/her national language and English or the other way around. This creates a 
situation which can be highly demanding for all the lawyers involved. It may even 
become more complicated when the experts want to discuss a particular point 
among themselves quickly and they choose to do this in their own language. The 
same happens when lawyers from the receiving country want to discuss a particu-
lar point among themselves in their own language. The linguistic process then 
becomes highly hazardous and so, consequently, the process of giving legal advice. 
It could mean—and this is an example from a situation I once found myself in—
that after a discussion by Dutch experts in Dutch on a draft civil code translated 
from the original language into German, the outcome of that discussion had to 
be explained to the interpreter in English, who would then have to translate this 
into the national language of the lawyers from the receiving country. When sev-
eral legal languages are involved (in my example, four) varying concepts are also 
involved and both the experts as well as lawyers from the receiving country (and, 
not to be forgotten, the interpreters!) must be aware of the pitfalls. 
IV.  THE PROCESS OF GIVING ADVICE
The actual consultation process can take place in several ways. It can be done in 
the form of conferences and seminars, with participants from legal practice, the 
academic legal world and the civil service involved. These conferences and semi-
nars are usually held in the receiving country, but sometimes in the donor country 
to allow lawyers from the receiving country to visit, for example, a Ministry of 
Justice or the Supreme Court. During these conferences and seminars presenta-
tions are made, followed by discussion. A different form, frequently used when 
the topic is to discuss legislative drafts (such as a civil code), is an expert meeting. 
During such a meeting a limited number of people attend—from the receiving 
country only those who are directly involved in the legislative process. The discus-
sions generally take place on the basis of a presentation by both the lawyers from 
the receiving country and the experts. This is then followed by a detailed discus-
sion of legislative texts. After the session, sometimes the discussion continues by 
e-mail. This can be done on the basis of a supplementary questionnaire or by 
answering individual questions.
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A difficult aspect of these meetings is the actual preparation, ie choice of top-
ics and access to documents. If, for example, a draft civil code is to be discussed 
the text should be available in translation long before the meeting. This is not 
always done. It may also be useful to have a translation of existing legislation. 
Furthermore, anyone who takes part in these meetings knows that black letter 
rules do not present the whole picture of the law. This means that questions 
have to be prepared on the impact of case law as well as legal and commercial 
practice. This has to be done by both the lawyers from the receiving country, 
and the experts. Particularly the experts, but frequently also the lawyers from 
the receiving country, are well-experienced comparative lawyers who under-
stand the risks of misunderstanding and know how to avoid these risks as far as 
possible.
V.  THE TRAINING OF JUDGES
After the law has been changed, a mentality change has to take place. Everyone 
involved in the law reform process realises this. A mentality change, however, 
does not happen overnight and it has to include all legal actors, particularly the 
judiciary. During the communist era courts were not independent in the way 
that they are considered to be independent in, for example, Western Europe and 
the United States. Courts were bureaucratic institutions under the control of the 
government. Reference can be made to the Russian ‘Prokuratura’ which controlled 
the courts. Once I was told that a government had exercised indirect pressure on 
a court by limiting the supply of coal to the courthouse during a winter period, 
thus creating an unworkable atmosphere. Under the rule of law, judges make 
up their own minds and they are no longer dependent upon circular letters or 
instructions from the government or the Communist Party. Freedom, however, 
brings with it responsibility. How should open-ended norms, such as ‘good faith’, 
be interpreted? 
In order to support judges in their endeavours to form a truly independent judi-
ciary, training sessions are organised to discuss the role of courts under the rule of 
law. Independence in this respect means that the judiciary dares to be creative and, 
if necessary, shape events, albeit within the limits set by the constitutional separa-
tion of powers and a system of checks and balances. The experts in these sessions 
are, of course, usually experienced judges from, eg, a donor country. 
The problems such as translation and preparation, discussed above, can also 
be seen here. Generally speaking, it can be said that the experts/judges involved 
either already have a strong comparative law interest or come with an open mind 
and are willing to understand their colleagues. What is interesting to note is that 
judges seem to be able to understand one another fairly quickly. Reading claims 
and defences, listening to oral argument, discussing a case in chambers, deciding 
a case and writing a judgment seems to provoke the same problems, but more 
importantly, the same attitude everywhere.
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VI.  CRITICAL EVALUATION
It will have become clear that the process of giving advice in a law reform pro-
ject demands a high level of awareness of possible misunderstandings. Lawyers 
involved in such projects generally develop an attitude that enables them to avoid 
problems as much as possible, although misunderstanding can never be excluded. 
Misunderstanding is not, however, characteristic only of law reform projects, 
but of human communication generally. What if, to avoid any misunderstand-
ing, these projects did not take place? An opportunity would have been missed 
to try to help lawyers from another legal system who had requested assistance. If 
all those involved realise the difficulties and also realise that misunderstandings 
might occur, the risks involved are brought back within acceptable limits. In my 
inaugural lecture I have called this the adequate approach to comparative law (van 
Erp, 1998).
What I consider to be of utmost importance is the expert’s knowledge (the per-
son should be a real ‘expert’ and not simply be called such because of his/her being 
a lawyer from the West), his/her legal, socio-cultural, economic and political aware-
ness and his/her integrity. As to integrity, funding could be a problem, although 
usually it is not. Funding can, of course, influence the aim of the law reform pro-
ject. If, to give but one example, a particular organisation deems it inevitable for 
future economic development that a particular legal model is adopted, this might 
be the explicit or implicit aim of the project. It is particularly this latter issue of 
implicit aims, which might be problematic for independent experts. In the case of 
explicit aims, an expert can decide to take part or not, depending upon whether 
he/she agrees with such an aim. It is, of course, completely different with regard 
to implicit aims. In the latter case, it might only become clear during the consulta-
tion process what the donor expects, and this might then create problems if the 
expert disagrees or if the lawyers from the receiving country are not prepared to 
follow the path chosen by the donor. Sometimes not even the donor realises that 
it had set its own implicit aims. It could, for example, very well be the case that the 
funding organisation is so convinced of the rationality and reasonableness of the 
solutions it favours that deviating opinions by experts—particularly if they come 
from the same country as the donor—come as an unexpected and unwelcome 
surprise. In my experience, the chance that this may happen arises especially when 
the donor organisation is established in a common law jurisdiction and the expert 
is a civil lawyer.
This aspect of law reform brings us to the economic and political side of the 
process. If a country adopts a model developed in another country, that is, a ‘legal 
transplant’, the donor country gains an advantage over the receiving country, as its 
own lawyers will then have better insight into the law of the receiving country than 
lawyers from the receiving country itself (see Watson, 1993). It would make doing 
business by eg companies from the donor country easier, as the law will be familiar 
and this might also be of advantage vis-à-vis competitors from other countries for 
whom that particular part of the law might not be so familiar. A receiving country 
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might experience this as a ‘take-over’ and for that reason reject the foreign solution. 
At the end of the day, it is the receiving country that decides what the new law will 
be. However, with regard to the adoption of the European ‘acquis communautaire’, 
the European Commission in Brussels can exercise decisive influence as to coun-
tries that intend to become Member States of the European Union. It is a condition 
for membership that the existing acquis is adopted.
A foreign expert must therefore realise what the aims of the law reform project 
are, what his/her expertise is and what one’s role is expected to be. In my experi-
ence, experts are especially highly valued who know their national legal system 
inside out both from a theoretical as well as a practical viewpoint, who have suf-
ficient comparative expertise to be able to explain different solutions chosen in 
different legal systems, and who know when to step back and accept that the final 
decision as to the new law is part of the political process in the receiving country. 
Comparative legal analysis is a way to counterbalance an expert’s own prejudices 
(in the sense of what in German is called ‘Vorverständnis’(‘preconception’)), 
meaning that one realises and becomes aware of one’s own cultural, social, eco-
nomic, political and even personal background and how it affects legal thinking. 
All these aspects of personality are an integral part of the way a person thinks and 
argues and are therefore relevant for one’s self-perception also as a lawyer. In my 
view, which I expressed in my inaugural lecture at the University of Maastricht in 
1998, comparative law is only possible in practice if it follows, what I called, the 
adequate method of comparative law. The comparative lawyer must constantly 
reflect upon his/her work within the context of the project in which he/she is 
involved. A law reform project demands a different approach than an in-depth 
academic article. If this pragmatic approach is used, useful results can be reached 
in practice. The possible post-modern death of comparative law, as would fol-
low from Pierre Legrand’s views on comparative law, is not likely to happen (cf 
Legrand, 1999; and Watson, 2000). Post-modern theory is trumped by practice.
As to the results of law reform projects, one has to be realistic and not ide-
alistic. Sometimes the direct influence of the advice given can be detected, but 
that does not mean that the new law in the receiving country really functions 
well or is applied at all. Introduction of the English-American trust in a civil law 
system might be the outcome of pressure from advisers inspired by a common 
law approach, but that does not mean that the legal system is able to incorporate 
a concept which is alien to that system. What happens is the same as can be seen 
with the transplant of an organ: it is rejected. What are the factors which favour 
the adoption of a foreign solution? First of all, if the solution comes from the same 
tradition (in Central and Eastern Europe, the civil law) it is easier to follow such a 
solution than one from a different tradition. Secondly, if the advice given is seen as 
objective information, based upon arguments pro and contra and presented from 
a comparative perspective without arguing from a purely nationalist perspec-
tive, the advice is more likely to be considered seriously or to be followed. This 
means that only making references to a particular national civil code, without 
referring also to other solutions and discussing developments at a European 
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level—such as the Lando Principles (Principles on European Contract Law) 
or the work concerning the European Common Frame of Reference aimed at 
giving a systematic overview of large parts of European private law—is counter-
productive.4 Thirdly, it should always be made clear that the expert is there to give 
advice and not to decide the matter. Fourthly, it is important that the receiving 
country takes the initiative for asking advice itself. Fifthly, advisers from a smaller 
jurisdiction have a certain advantage, because, if the donor organisation is also 
from that same country, it is less likely that the donor may have a hidden agenda 
with implicit (eg political) aims.
To conclude, it can be said that giving advice in a law reform project shows the 
strength of comparative law as a method, a way of thinking, and as a source of 
knowledge. Its influence is, first of all, intellectual, as it leads to reflection on legal 
solutions that might otherwise be considered to be self-evident. Comparative legal 
analysis can also influence judicial decision-making and the work of the legisla-
ture, but this influence is sometimes somewhat invisible, as it might be hidden in 
preparatory documents. As we have seen, comparative law can also contribute to 
the success of a law reform project. Nevertheless, also here the results of compara-
tive legal analysis may be less clear and difficult to define.
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
 1. What examples do you know of the practical use of comparative law?
 2. Give a description of a law reform project, discussing aims and results.
 3.  Give examples of legal transplants and evaluate whether these transplants 
have been successful.
 4. What are the essential characteristics of the socialist legal systems?
 5.  Why could it be said that the legal system of China is becoming a ‘mixed’ 
legal system?
 6.  The approach advocated in this chapter is a pragmatic approach to com-
parative law, limited by continuous self-reflection within the context of 
law reform projects. What do you think of this approach?
 7. How would you evaluate the role of ‘experts’ in law reform projects?
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Comparative Law in Practice: The Courts 
and the Legislator
ESI˙N ÖRÜCÜ
KEY CONCEPTS
Comparative law as a tool for law reform and legislation; For interpretation 
and construction by the courts; ‘Decorative’ use of; ‘Functional’ use of; As an 
‘auxiliary source of law’.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Developments of the law in this country cannot of course depend on a head-count 
of decisions and codes adopted in other countries around the world, often against a 
background of different rules and traditions. The law must be developed coherently, 
in accordance with principle, so as to serve, even-handedly, the ends of justice. If, how-
ever, a decision is given in this country which offends one’s basic sense of justice, and 
if consideration of international sources suggests that a different and more acceptable 
decision would be given in most other jurisdictions, whatever their legal tradition, this 
must prompt anxious review of the decision in question. In a shrinking world … there 
must be some virtue in uniformity of outcome whatever the diversity of approach in reach-
ing that outcome.1
Strongly though I support the study of comparative law, I hesitate to embark in 
an opinion such as this upon a comparison, however brief, with a civil law system, 
because experience has taught me how very difficult, and indeed potentially mis-
leading, such an exercise can be. Exceptionally however, in the present case, thanks 
to material published in our language by distinguished comparatists, German as 
well as English, we have direct access to publications which should sufficiently dispel 
our ignorance of German law and so by comparison illuminate our understanding of 
our own.2
1 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Servıces Ltd [2002] 3 All ER 305 (HL) at 334 (Lord Bingham).
2 White v Jones [1995] 1 All ER 691 (HL) at 705 (Lord Goff of Chieveley).
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I have not been referred to the law of any continental jurisdiction except 
Switzerland. It seems to me unlikely that in any system derived from the civil code, 
the law will differ in this respect from the position under Swiss law. It seems … that 
under Scottish law a creditor can contract out of or waive his right to set-off and if 
so, he can presumably validly agree that his debt be subordinated. I have set out the 
leading authorities in South Africa, The United States and Australia. It would, I think, 
be a matter of grave concern if, at a time when insolvency increasingly has international 
ramifications, it were to be found that English law alone refused to give effect to con-
tractual subordination.3
The discipline of comparative law does not aim at a poll of solutions adopted in dif-
ferent countries. It has the different and inestimable value of sharpening our focus on 
the weight of competing considerations.4 
Does the above indicate that comparative law merely facilitates the incorporation 
by judges of ‘holus bolus from some other system of law’,5 or does it indicate the 
way forward?
The first aim of this chapter is to look at the ‘practical’ and ‘functional’ use of 
comparative law by courts and to throw light on some of the following questions 
in detail: How far is foreign law referred to by courts? Are there more references 
to some particular jurisdictions and why? Do some courts present a different 
picture to others and why? In which areas are most of such references made? Do 
the courts resort to foreign law to correct and improve domestic law, to help the 
development of domestic law, to fill gaps in domestic law, clarify the law, seek 
support and guidance or bring about harmonisation? Apart from cases when 
there has to be a reference for reasons of conflict of laws or because a foreign 
law is applicable to the case, why are references made? Have membership of the 
European Community, the growing importance of international conventions 
and the growth of international commercial practice made any difference in this 
field? What are the limits of such use of comparisons? There is talk of the chang-
ing climate and a greater internationalisation in the approach of national courts 
(Bingham, 1992; and Koopmans, 1996). Is this the case? 
The second aim is to consider briefly the role of comparative law in legislative 
law reform.
Comparative law has been in use for centuries in efforts to develop the law in 
many areas and help ideas cross borders. One practical aspect of comparative 
law is its use as a tool of interpretation, another is as a tool of law reform. It now 
seems natural in the development of globalising law, to borrow from the interna-
tional for the national, and from one national for another national. Therefore the 
debate on the use or non-use of comparative experience remains theoretical when 
3 Re Maxwell Communications Corporation plc (NZ) [1994] 1 All ER 737 (Ch) at 754, 755
(Vinelott, J).
4 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board 2000 SC 1 (HL) at 15 where the ius commune case book on tort 
law was also considered (Lord Steyn).
5 McShannon v Rockware Glass Ltd [1978] AC 795 (HL) at 811 (Lord Diplock).
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viewed from the ground of what is actually taking place. However, the degree of, 
and the reasons for, the borrowing differ. In addition, the attitudes of legislators, 
academics, practising lawyers and judges to the use of foreign material also differ, 
all making use of this tool in their own ways. 
The term ‘comparative law’ is used in this chapter in its widest sense, to cover 
even passing reference to foreign law by a legislator, a court or a practising lawyer, 
and the use of a foreign solution or argument by a domestic judge as a guide to 
interpretation (see Örücü, 1999: 253). 
II.  COMPARATIVE LAW IN COURTS
Comparative law method is among the tools used by courts for the interpretation 
of national rules in conjunction with the usual methods of interpretation and 
construction. Although when there is unequivocal national law, foreign mate-
rial cannot be used to by-pass these rules, where the construction is doubtful or 
there is a gap, the judge acts as the legislator, and like a modern legislator, looks to 
comparative law for solutions. Comparative law can serve to confirm and support 
a result reached by a traditional route. The aim of any reference to foreign law by 
courts may be to promote a change at home, fill in a gap or discard an unsatisfac-
tory domestic solution—that is, the ‘functional use’ of foreign law. The aim may 
also be a ‘decorative use’ of foreign law in that an opinion in a developing area of 
law might appear to be out of date, unless reference were made to some recent 
progressive development elsewhere. There are also cases where a court, comparing 
different rules of foreign and domestic systems thoroughly, opts for one of these 
as the ‘better’ answer to the problem under consideration. However, a judge tries 
to avoid any suspicion that he has borrowed the law from a foreign system to fill 
in a gap. Of course, a judge may also be intellectually arrogant, nationalistic or 
genuinely believe that a foreign solution will not be of practical use.
Judges and counsel go through three phases in the process of using foreign law: 
discovering, understanding and applying. However, of what is found, what is to 
be used: the result or the reasoning? How far does this activity of borrowing go? 
Why are some judges in some jurisdictions more ready to use comparative law 
than others?6 What is the measure of success? If a sign of success is uniformity of 
treatment and values, does this lead to the creation of uniform socio-economic 
and cultural conditions?
Comparative Law in British Courts
Courts in Britain make extensive use of cases from other common law jurisdic-
tions. The question is: Has membership of the European Union affected the 
 number of cases in the UK where reference is made to a continental legal system 
6 For the use of comparative law by courts in general in 17 jurisdictions see the General Report 
submitted by Drobnig, 1999: 3–21. Also see contributions to Canivet, Andenas and Fairgrieve, 2004.
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or a rule of such when new areas of law are being built up or in cases where 
Common Law is not clear? Is there a trend in this direction as suggested by 
Bingham (Bingham, 1992)? 
To this end decisions rendered in 1972, 1982, 1992 were looked at in earlier 
research (Örücü, 1999) and in this chapter, 2002 has been added to that survey. This 
would be one way of approaching the topic. Another approach could be to inves-
tigate various areas of law. Are there more references to foreign law in negligence, 
contract and competition law for example, than in tax, divorce or adoption? 
Looking intensively at the period 2003–06 could also help to test the findings 
of the 10-yearly search, discover tendencies (if any) and make predictions, using 
both statistical and substantive information. One might also find the answer to 
the question: Have things changed in the last decade? 
There are certain practical considerations in the use of comparative law that 
must be stressed at the outset: Language skills; national insularity and/or pride; 
the enormous pressures under which judges and counsel work because of lack 
of time and volume of work; and an increasing awareness of expenditure on the 
part of clients. Of these, four distinct elements pertaining to the United Kingdom 
position must be separately considered.
One is language skills. English is a world language. There is rather little incentive 
to learn foreign languages in the United Kingdom. It is easier and more natural for 
a person unfamiliar with foreign languages to have access to common law materials 
(see Gutteridge, 1949: 44–5). 
The second element is the difficulties created by the rules on proof of foreign 
law, which is a question of fact, and must be pleaded and proved by expert evi-
dence. The court cannot take judicial notice of foreign law, though the judge may 
be perfectly aware of the existence of the foreign rule. In addition, in the absence 
of evidence, foreign law is presumed to be the same as domestic law. 7 For example, 
in Morrison v Panic Link Ltd it was held: 
If it was suggested that there was any difference between English law and Scots law in 
relation to the construction of this contract, it would be necessary for the defenders 
to aver what that difference was in the present action. They have made no such aver-
ments and accordingly it must be assumed that the English law is the same as Scots 
law as far as the construction of the contract is concerned.8
This means that an awareness and the use of foreign cases and foreign material 
by counsel are more important than a judge’s knowledge of them in reference to 
foreign law in a particular case. As Lord Mustill stated in Channel Tunnel Ltd v 
Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd:
It is perhaps just permissible to take notice that the contemporary Belgian Law of 
arbitration differs from the law of other European countries, but beyond this I would 
7 El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1993] 3 All ER 717(Ch) at 739 (Millet, J). However, in appeals 
before the House of Lords all questions of Scots, English and Northern Irish law are treated as matters 
of law within the judicial knowledge of their Lordships. 
8 Morrison v Panic Link Ltd 1993 SLT 602 (OH) at 604.
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certainly not be willing to go since, most remarkably, no evidence of Belgian law is 
before the court.9
The rules of foreign law are to be proved by the testimony of experts giving 
evidence. When there is a conflict in the evidence of the experts, the judge has 
to decide between them, so he may pursue his own inquiries into the sources of 
foreign law if he is equipped to do so, and draw his own conclusions. 
The third element has been summarised as: ‘Why bother with foreign cases 
when we have so much material of our own’ (Markesinis, 1990). This may not be 
solely a British attitude but as Lord Justice Bingham says of the period when he 
started practice,
it was an almost universal article of faith that English law and legal institutions were 
without peer in the world with very little to be usefully learned from others (save, on 
occasion, the High Court of Australia) (Bingham, 1992: 514).
This he characterises as the proud, confident and self-reliant spirit. Thus a judge’s 
mentality and his unwillingness to be guided by foreign experience may be an 
obstacle.
The fourth is an element more particular to the common law family than to 
others. It is the consciousness that common law is a whole. The unity of common 
law is a very real tie between the jurisdictions within the common law family, 
and the citing of decisions from another common law jurisdiction as authority 
is very frequent, though usually for the purpose of ‘help’ or ‘comfort’. When the 
aim is to improve national law, British courts often cite Canadian, Australian and 
New Zealand judgments, almost as if they were domestic judgments. Indeed, ‘It is 
manifestly desirable that the law on this subject should be the same in all common 
law jurisdictions’,10 and also that the law north and the south of the border should 
be the same or similar as far as possible. For example Lord Clyde opined in Smith 
v Bank of Scotland that
[i]n the present case we are dealing with an area of law whose development has for 
a long time been influenced by decisions on the other side of the border. I am not 
persuaded that there are any social or economic considerations which would justify a 
 difference in the law between the two jurisdictions in the particular point. 11
This element is also tied to the shared language, culture and appreciation of men-
tal constructs and consideration of uniformity of these jurisdictions. Lord Bridge 
stated in Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court:
Whatever differences there may be between the legal systems of South Africa, the United 
States, New Zealand and this country, many of the basic principles to which they seek to 
give effect stem from common roots.12
9 Channel Tunnel Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1993] 1 All ER 683 (HL) at 691.
10 Cheah v Equiticorp Finance Group Ltd [1991] 4 All ER 989 (PC) at 992 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
11 Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC 111 (HL) at 120 (Lord Clyde).
12 Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court [1993] 3 All ER 138 (HL) at 155 (Lord Bridge).
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Again, when there is no domestic authority to help them, courts do not hesitate 
to rely on other Commonwealth and common law authorities, for example by 
saying:
In the absence of any countervailing authority in English courts, I am of opinion that 
the principles to be derived from the foregoing sources should be accepted as valid in 
English law.13 
Even when there are domestic solutions but these prove to be unsatisfactory in 
dealing with contemporary problems, courts will refer to these same foreign 
Commonwealth and common law jurisdictions.14 In the last decade however, 
there have been a few significant cases where laws of legal systems from the 
 civilian tradition have been resorted to. 
One question is: Would the judge as interpreter be able to, or be entitled to, 
invoke a superior foreign solution? In fact, in the face of an unequivocal national 
enactment, foreign material cannot be used to by-pass those rules. However, 
when the construction is doubtful or there is a lacuna, the judge, as does the leg-
islator, sometimes takes his solutions from comparative law. Then the question is: 
‘How far can, or should, this go?’ Comparative law helps the courts to clarify and 
amplify the law, to throw light on domestic law and—used in conjunction with 
usual  methods—to confirm and support a result reached by a traditional route. 
But merely to juxtapose the laws of various jurisdictions without comment is 
not  comparative law, and to compare only parts of a solution could be not only 
unprofitable, but misleading. 
It is interesting however, to note that Lord Diplock, whose many judgments 
contain references to continental, especially French and German law, and 
American positions, did not seem to adhere to the ‘pious fiction’ that ‘the judge 
must avoid any suspicion that he has borrowed his law from a foreign system’, 
when he openly used Evans’s translation of Pothier in developing ‘primary and 
secondary obligations’ and ‘synallagmatic and unilateral’ contracts, saying, ‘I have 
borrowed it from French law and the Civil Code arts.1102—1103’.15
Roman law has also been frequently resorted to by judges of the Chancery 
Courts, and English commercial law is largely derived from foreign sources, 
partly by its descent from the lex mercatoria of the Middle Ages (see Gutteridge, 
1949: 38).16 
When judges use foreign judgments, this is more by way of testing the sound-
ness of their conclusions than in reliance on those decisions. Indeed, all judges 
cannot be expected to be comparatists, but it is their duty to consult those who are 
13 Martin v Watson [1995] 3 All ER 559 (HL) at 562, 566 (Lord Keith).
14 See eg, Mercedes-Benz AG v Leiduck [1996] 3 All ER 929 (PC); and, Attorney General for Hong 
Kong v Reid [1994] 1 All ER 1 (PC).
15 United Dominion Trust (Commercial) Ltd v Eagle Aircraft Services Ltd [1968] 1 WLR (HL). 
16 Note that in Scotland though from time to time there is reference directly to Roman law or 
institutional writers, this falls into ‘historical interpretation’ and not the ‘comparative’. See eg, Sharp v 
Thomson 1997 SLT (HL), where Lord Hope said: ‘Scots law, following Roman law, is unititular’.
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in a position to supply the information needed, which indicates the importance of 
partnership with the academic profession.
Let us now throw some empirical light on the above views related to this 
topic. 
Empirical Evidence
As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, judicial practice at the 10-yearly 
intervals since the United Kingdom joined the European Union, shows us that 
in 1972, there were 26 cases where foreign law was referred to. Of these, three 
were conflict cases, and three dealt with international conventions. There were 
12 references to continental law/civilian and 30 to common law/Commonwealth 
jurisdictions (USA–10; Australia–seven; Canada–two, New Zealand–three, and 
Scotland–three).
In 1982, 29 cases referred to foreign law. Of these, there were two conflict cases, 
three references to the European Court of Justice or European Commission, four 
to international conventions, four to continental or civilian systems, and 42 to 
common law/Commonwealth jurisdictions (United States–nine; Australia–six; 
Canada–seven; New Zealand–five; Scotland–none).
In 1992, there were 25 cases with references to foreign law: six were con-
flict cases, there were seven references to the ECJ or EC, four to international 
conventions, seven to continental or civilian jurisdictions and 33 to common 
law/Commonwealth jurisdictions (United States–nine; Australia–seven; Canada–
seven; New Zealand–two; Scotland–two).
In 2002, however, 121 cases referred to foreign law: five were conflict cases, 
16 references were to the ECJ or European Commission, 76 were to international 
conventions, mostly the European Convention on Human Rights and, seven to 
continental or civilian jurisdictions and 57 to common law/Commonwealth 
jurisdictions (United States–18, Australia–22, Canada–14, New Zealand–22, 
Scotland–16, South Africa–two, Ireland–three and India–one). This picture shows 
the changing balance of references.
When we look at the fields into which the above statistically analysed cases fall, 
we see a very wide and varied picture such as: Substitution, mergers; Company; 
Proper law of contract; Wills; Occupier, duty owed by occupier to trespasser; 
Causation, duty to take care, breach of duty; Duty to share holders; Vicarious lia-
bility; Gaming, lottery; Libel; Slander; Divorce, living apart, maintenance order; 
Marriage, validity; Division of matrimonial property; Income tax, double taxa-
tion; Stay of proceedings; Currency control, debt in foreign money; Contempt 
of court; Criminal evidence, hearsay; Carriers, loss or damage to goods; Trial, 
evidence in the absence of the jury; Extradition, committal; EC law, competition; 
Employment, equal pay, equal work; Constitutional law, long delay in executing 
of sentence; Sale of land, fraud; Limitation of action, public authorities; Shipping, 
carriage by sea; Gift, donatio mortis causa; Title to foreign copyright; Compulsory 
purchase; Right not to be hindered in the enjoyment of freedom of expression; 
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Minor, abduction; Custody; husband and wife, Divorce; Carriage of goods by air; 
Pre-trial, post judgment relief; Copyright, infringement; Forum non conveniens; 
Mental health, patient, recall to hospital; Refusal of medical treatment; Medical 
treatment, withdrawal of consent; Malicious falsehood, negligence; False impris-
onment, residual liberty; Blasphemy; Conspiracy; Abortion, medical negligence; 
Rape, marital exemption; Easement, right of way; Sunday trading, proportion-
ality; Judicial review; Drug trafficking; Insurance; Abuse of process; Solicitor, 
professional negligence; Tort, harassment; Arbitration; Fraud, will, succession, 
reduction; Loss of earnings, capacity; public interest, pyramid selling; Landlord 
and tenant, lease, irritancy; Employment, unfair dismissal, racial discrimination; 
Copyright, statutory interpretation; Administrative law, natural justice, unjusti-
fied enrichment; Bankruptcy, sequestration, evidence, sale of goods; Implied 
terms, agent and principal, Warsaw Convention; The Hague Convention; Brussels 
Convention.
When and How is Foreign Law Used?
Foreign law is used in cases where it is indicated. The first type of case here is 
conflict of laws. When conflict of laws points to foreign law or when the case has a 
foreign element such as recognition of a foreign divorce, any relevant foreign law 
will be referred to. As observed above, in such cases domestic law will preferably 
be used and foreign law will be assumed to be the same as domestic law unless 
evidence is brought to show otherwise,17 (as there is a presumption that law of 
another jurisdiction is the same as that of the forum where no proof or insufficient 
proof to the contrary is presented). In addition, often natural justice and public 
policy grounds may show that foreign judgments cannot be enforced,18 as the exis-
tence of prior orders from foreign courts is not significant; the principles should be 
acceptable to British courts.19 The courts also ask whether there are considerations 
of European law or comity. In many such cases European Court of Justice rulings 
serve as a guide.20 Usually the determination of applicable law depends on the pub-
lic interest of the forum in dispute, the parties’ access to foreign law materials, the 
clarity of choice of law rules and the nature of the foreign legal system involved.
However, British courts do have an internationalist attitude, nurtured by the 
doctrine of international comity, because of which they are reluctant to invoke 
public policy against the normally applicable foreign law. 
17 For instance, this was stated clearly in Bumper Development Corp Ltd v Commissioner of Police of 
the Metropolis[1991] 4 All ER 638 (CA). For a similar statement see El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc 
[1993] 3 All ER 717 (Ch).
18 This was the case in Adam v Cape Industries plc [1991] 1 All ER 929 (Ch).
19 Re F (minor) [1990] 3 All ER 97 (CA).
20 Good examples are Webb v Webb [1992] 1 All ER 17 (Ch); Union Transport Group plc v 
Continental Lines SA [1992] 1 All ER 161 (HL); Dresser UK Ltd v Falcongate Freight Management Ltd 
The Duke of Yare [1992] 2 All ER 450 (HL); and Johnson v Coventry Churchill International Ltd [1992] 
3 All ER 14 (QBD).
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The second type of case is where courts look at foreign law and an international 
convention concerned, to understand its application or for the sake of comity.21 
For instance, in Michael Galley Footwear Ltd (in liq) v Iaboni,22 Belgian, Dutch 
and German cases were looked at in order to understand the application of the 
Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road, in view of comity. In T 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Lord Lloyd said:
In a case concerning an international convention it is obviously desirable that decisions 
in different jurisdictions should, so far possible, be kept in line with each other.23
In Re A and another (minors) for example, Balcombe, J said: 
Since French and English are both official languages of the Hague Convention, we were 
referred also to the French version of art 13(a) … Since we are here concerned with the 
meaning of ‘acquiesced’ in an international convention to which many countries, not only 
those with a common law background, have adhered, it cannot be right to attempt to 
 construe ‘acquiesced’ by reference only to its possible meaning at common law or equity. 24
However, we should note the observation by Lord Hope in Herd v Clyde Helicopters 
Ltd, when he said:
[T]he fact that the jurisprudence in one country has adopted an interpretation of the 
Convention which supports counsel’s argument is not in itself a compelling reason for 
holding that we should follow the same approach in our interpretation.25
Before the Human Rights Act 1998, the use of the European Convention of 
Human Rights could be deployed for the purpose of the resolution of an ambigu-
ity in domestic primary or subordinate legislation.26 It was accepted that domestic 
law should develop alongside the European Convention on Human Rights, as 
stated by Lord Scarman in Home Office v Harman: 
We believe the true path forward is to ensure that our law develops in a way which is 
consistent with the obligations accepted by the UK in the European Convention and 
with the developments of the common law achieved in America … Of course, neither 
American law nor the convention can be decisive of this appeal. But both are power-
fully persuasive, the convention because its observance is an obligation of the United 
Kingdom, and American law because of its common law character. Each reinforces 
conclusions which we draw independently from our own legal principles.27
21 See, eg Hewitson v Hewitson [1995] 1 All ER 472 (CA).
22 Michael Galley Footwear Ltd (in liq) v Iaboni [1982] 2 All ER 200 (QBD).
23 T v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] 2 All ER 865 (HL) at 889 This was the 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951. Phillip, J said in Kinnear v Falconfilms NV:
   ‘In a convention case it would not be proper for the court to apply domestic rules to decline 
jurisdiction under 6(2) simply because the third party was domiciled abroad’ ([1994] 3 All 
ER 42 (QBD) at 50).
24 Re A and another (minors) [1992] 1 All ER 929 (CA).
25 Herd v Clyde Helicopters Ltd 1997 SC 86 (HL) at 102 (Lord Hope).
26 Rantzen v Mirror Group Newspapers (1986) [1993] 4 All ER 975 (CA) at 993 (Neill, J).
27 Home Office v Harman [1982] 1 All ER 532 (HL). For another such case see Re D and another 
(minors) [1995] 4 All ER 385 (HL) at 397. See also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex 
parte Wynne [1992] 2 All ER 315 (CA).
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In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte McQuillan, Sedley, J 
looked at the Convention through the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Community and said:
Once it is accepted that the standards articulated in the convention are standards 
which both march with those of the common law and inform the jurisprudence of 
the European Union, it becomes unreal and potentially unjust to continue to develop 
English public law without reference to them.28
The third type is when there is an involvement of European Community law. 
British courts look at cases in the European Court of Justice and via these to cases 
involving foreign systems of law, this being done within the scope of ECJ deci-
sions. The courts are keen to keep to meanings as defined by the ECJ, especially 
if the matter is not covered by domestic authority. ECJ decisions give guidance, 
and a judgment obtained in a Member State on a matter of European Community 
law has a special weight. For instance, Lord Goff remarked in Woolwich Building 
Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners (No 2)29:
I only comment that, at a time when Community law is becoming increasingly impor-
tant, it would be strange if the right of the citizen to recover overpaid charges were to be 
more restricted under domestic law than it is under Community law. 
Foreign law is also used in developing English law when there is no statutory law. 
When the area under scrutiny is one of common law, counsel introduces deci-
sions from other common law or Commonwealth jurisdictions. In United City 
Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada,30 for instance, it was pointed 
out that,
although there does not appear among English authorities any case in which this 
 exception has been applied, it is well established in the American cases. 
Judges use these decisions for ‘support’, ‘aid’ and ‘guidance’ or because they give 
‘comfort’. The decisions are referred to ‘with great respect’ as ‘powerful’, ‘persua-
sive’, ‘helpful’, ‘illuminating’ or ‘applicable’. This respect arises sometimes because 
the principle was first developed in the jurisdiction referred to. These decisions 
are sometimes preferred over domestic law,31 sometimes ‘accepted unreservedly’,32 
28 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte McQuillan [1995] 4 All ER 400 (QBD) 
at 422.
29 Woolwich Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners (No 2) [1992] 3 All ER 737 (HL) at 
764 (Lord Goff).
30 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1982] 2 All ER, 720 (HL).
31 For example, in interpreting the Copyright Act 1982, the view expressed by the High Court of 
Australia was preferred in Express Newspapers plc v News (UK) Ltd [1990] 3 All ER 376 (Ch). For 
another case, see Galoo Ltd (in liq) v Bright Grahame Murry (a firm) [1995] 1 All ER 16 (CA) at 26 
where Glidewell LJ says:
   ‘The answer in my judgment is supplied by the Australian decisions to which I was referred, 
which I hold to represent the law of England as well as of Australia, in relation to a breach of 
duty imposed on the defendant whether by contract or in tort’.
32 C v S (minor) [1990] 2 All ER 449 (CA).
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sometimes used to ‘clarify definitions’ and almost always for the furtherance of 
common law. In all cases, the courts tend to look at and extensively discuss devel-
oped Commonwealth jurisdictions such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand, 
and the common law jurisdiction of the United States of America as ‘authority’ 
and use them for ‘assistance’.33 
This being the area in which comparative method is most extensively used, it 
will be considered in further detail for the sake of clarity.
Common law jurisdictions provide unity and uniformity of common law. In 
one case the court followed American solutions to provide uniformity in the 
whole common law world as seen in Cheah v Equiticorp Finance Group Ltd.34 In 
another case,35 in the name of comity in common law, the Australian position 
was followed. 
When there is no modern decided English case36 as in Woolwich Building 
Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners (No 2)37 and Airedale NHS Trust v 
Bland,38 or English law has not moved on since, for instance, 1861, as in White 
v Jones,39 the courts search for a general principle by looking at other developed 
common law jurisdictions. 
When there is no direct English authority, other common law authorities are 
helpful and persuasive. For instance, in Martin v Watson, McCowan, LJ said:
I have found no English authority which is directly in point in the present case … In the 
Commonwealth: however, there have been a number of cases which posed similar prob-
lems … I find myself in complete agreement with these views (Australian, Canadian, 
New Zealand and American cases were looked at).40
Again in Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence, while looking into negligence and duty 
of care, Neill, LJ said:
It was accepted on behalf of the defendants that there was no direct English author-
ity to support the proposition that no duty of care in tort is owed by one soldier to 
another when engaging the enemy in battle conditions … I consider that an English 
court should approach this claim in the same way as the High Court of Australia in the 
Shaw Savill case.41
33 Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1990] 2 All ER 908 (HL).
34 [1991] 4 All ER 989 (PC).
35 Attorney General v Sport Newspapers Ltd, [1992] 1 All ER 503 (QBD).
36 For more such cases see: Ancell v McDermott [1993] 4 All ER 355 (CA); R v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, ex parte Bentley [1993] 4 All ER 442 (QBD); Coppee-Lavalin SA/NV v Ken-Ren 
Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd (in liq); Voest-Alpine AG v Ken-Ren Chemicals and Fertilisers Ltd [1994] 
2 All ER 449 (HL); Connaught Restaurants Ltd v Indoor Leisure Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 834 (CA); and T v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] 2 All ER 865 (HL).
37 Woolwich Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners (No 2) [1991] 4 All ER 577 (CA) and 
[1992] 3 All ER 737 (HL).
38 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 (HL). This case illustrates all the types of refer-
ences and relationships that exist between the legal systems in the common law world and therefore, 
is an all-rounded excellent example to study.
39 White v Jones [1993] 3 All ER 481 (CA).
40 Martin v Watson [1994] 2 All ER(CA) 606 at 627.
41 Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence [1996] 2 All ER 758 (CA) at 766, 770.
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When English common law is inadequate such as in Simmonds v Dobson,42 
Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd 43 and Khorasandjian v Bush,44 
again reference is made to other common law jurisdictions.45
To extend the law as in Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrate’s Court,46 or to 
move the law on, as in White v Jones,47 or in furtherance of common law in 
novel cases of negligence and damages, great weight is given to Australian, Irish, 
Canadian and United States cases such as in Burton v Islington Health Authority48 
and Jones v Wright.49 
When there is much to learn from imaginative legal developments from, for 
example, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States as in the case of 
White v Jones,50 English courts refer to such other common law jurisdictions. In 
this case, German, French and Dutch positions were also considered. 
When seeking to soften the impact of an English rule as in British Railways 
Board v Herrinton,51 it was pointed out that
there is a growing tendency of courts both in England and Scotland to try to soften the 
impact of the rule in Addie’s case. Australian authorities are even more persuasive and 
far reaching that those in this country.
When seeking support for the position of the English court developing the law 
and helping the judge to make up his mind, such as in the area of negligence 
and duty of care, Australia provided ‘inspiration’ as in Caparo Industries plc v 
Dickman.52 Lord Jauncey, in a case involving personal injury and nervous shock, 
looked at Scotland, Australia and the United States and said:
My Lords, as is so often the case, in the field of negligence valuable contributions to the 
discussion are to be found in judgments of the High Court of Australia.53
In Stoke-on-Trent City Council v B & Q plc; Norwich City Council v B & Q plc,54
dealing with proportionality, Canadian judgments were referred to in addition 
to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, to confirm the views of 
the judge. 
When we consider the Privy Council decisions, we see that on the whole the 
Privy Council prefers the English law’s understanding of rules. However, the Privy 
42 Simmonds v Dobson [1991] 4 All ER 25 (CA).
43 Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1992] 3 All ER 65 (CA).
44 Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] 3 All ER 669 (CA).
45 Other cases of interest are: Giles v Thompson [1993] 3 All ER 321 (HL); and Tinsley v Milligan 
[1993] 3 All ER 65 (HL).
46 Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrate’s Court [1993] 3 All ER 138 (HL).
47 White v Jones [1993] 3 All ER 481 (CA); [1995] 1 All ER, 691 (HL).
48 Burton v Islington Health Authority [1992] 3 All ER 833 (CA).
49 Jones v Wright [1991] 1 All ER 353 (QBD).
50 White v Jones [1993] 3 All ER 481 (CA); [1995] 1 All ER 691 (HL).
51 British Railways Board v Herrinton [1972] 1 All ER 749 (HL).
52 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 1 All ER 568 (HL).
53 Page v Smith [1995] 2 All ER 736 (HL) at 745.
54 Stoke-on-Trent City Council v B & Q plc, Norwich City Council v B & Q plc [1991] 4 All ER 
221. (Ch).
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Council gives special weight to the views of judges in the lower courts in those 
Commonwealth systems under its jurisdiction in so far as they reflect the advan-
tage of familiarity with prevailing local conditions. This is done with the proviso 
that the courts have used that advantage, as seen in Hector v Attorney General of 
Antigua and Barbuda.55 The Privy Council plays a crucial role in maintaining 
the harmony of the common law within the Commonwealth world, laying down 
paths for cross-fertilisation.56
As noted, British courts at times make use of continental law and the civil law 
tradition. Though continental law is usually mentioned only in passing by British 
courts when brought to their attention and is not normally used for support or 
guidance, in Antwerp United Diamonds BVBA v Air Europe for example, a Dutch 
and a Belgian case were presented to the Court of Appeal together with a case 
from the United States and another from British Columbia as foreign authority. 
There was no English decision on the question prior to the decision of the lower 
court in the present case. Hirst, LJ said: 
Of these by far the most significant decision, both by virtue of its high authority and 
by virtue of its close reasoning and analysis, is in my judgment Insurance Co of North 
America v Royal Dutch Airlines in the Supreme Court of the Netherlands … I find (this 
decision) very strongly persuasive ... even though it is not of course binding upon us or 
conclusive.57
Again, in Barclays Bank plc v Glasgow City Council and Kleinwort Benson plc v 
Glasgow City Council, where a question arose as to the meaning of a term taken 
from the Common Customs Tariff and used as part of German tax law, Lloyd, LJ 
said: ‘But there is precedent for the course we propose to take, provided by the 
German courts (case cited in—C–231/89)’.58
Woolwich Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners (No 2), is more typi-
cal where Lord Goff pointed out in his judgment:
An instructive example of this approach is to be found in German law, in which we find 
a general right of recovery … Such draconian time limits as these may be too strong a 
medicine for our taste; but the example of a general right of recovery subject to strict 
time limits imposed as a matter of policy is instructive for us 59
Another important example is the case of White v Jones, where the House of Lords 
dealt with negligence and duty of care in relation to solicitors. Lord Goff looked 
at the experiences in other countries in this developing area and stated that the 
question was
55 Hector v Attorney General of Antigua and Barbuda [1990] 2 All ER 103 (PC). 
56 See eg, Invercargıll City Council v Hamlin [1996] 2 WLR 367, where the Privy Council not only 
recognises but values difference: ‘a monolithic uniformity might be destructive of the individual 
development of a distinct common law system’, at 367 (Lord Lloyd Berwick).
57 Diamonds BVBA v Air Europe [1995] 3 All ER 424 (CA) at 428 (Hirst, LJ).
58 Barclays Bank plc v Glasgow City Council; Kleinwort Benson plc v Glasgow City Council [1994] 4 
All ER 865 (CA) at 889 (Lloyd, LJ). 
59 Woolwich Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners (No 2) [1992] 3 All ER 737 (HL) at 
761 (Lord Goff).
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much discussed, not only in this country and other common law countries, but also in 
some civil law countries, notably Germany.60
Pointing out also similar conclusions reached by French and Dutch courts, he 
extensively discussed all cases, civilian and common law, reserving extensive treat-
ment to German law, though his solution was based on tort and English authority. 
Again, in a case in relation to psychiatric damage, Greatorex v Greatorex,61 the 
High Court considered arguments derived from a German case.
More recently, in the Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Servıces Ltd case, not only deci-
sions and doctrine from the traditional sources such as Australia, Canada, the United 
States and Scotland were considered, but decisions and doctrine from Germany, 
France, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain and, Norway, and Roman Law were also 
extensively discussed, though again the end result relied on a common law case.62
However, most of the references to a continental system occur in cases where 
that foreign law is indicated in the dispute. Cases related to child abduction, extra-
dition, recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions, and double taxation are 
the types of cases where we see such references. For example, in G and H Montage 
GmbH v Irvani,63 English, German and Iranian laws were compared in relation to 
a signature placed on a bill. 
Yet, here there are problems. For example in Webb v Webb,64 Judge Paul Baker, 
QC, after stating that under the law of the European Community the French courts 
seem to have exclusive jurisdiction in the case, said that the conferment of exclusive 
jurisdiction could lead to great inconvenience for the parties and therefore there 
was sound reason for limiting it as far as possible. He even complained,
Article 16 is couched in the concepts of the civil law systems of the original mem-
ber states. It does not readily fit in with the system of legal and equitable interests in 
 property obtaining in England and Wales and in both parts of Ireland. 
However, in Dresser UK Ltd v Falcongate Freight Management Ltd, The Duke of 
Yare, Bingham, LJ opined: 
But procedural idiosyncrasy is not (like national costume or regional cuisine) to be 
nurtured for its own sake and in answering the question before us we must have regard 
to the realities of litigation in this country and the purpose of the convention, not to 
tradition, nomenclature or rules developed for other purposes. 65
In a few cases brief comments are made in general reference to continental or 
civilian tradition, to indicate the background and the origin of legal rules.66 Even 
Roman law and Justinian are occasionally mentioned when indicating sources of 
60 White v Jones [1995] 1 All ER 691 (HL) at 697 (Lord Goff).
61 Greatorex v Greatorex [2000] 1 WLR 1970 (QBD).
62 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Servıces Ltd [2002] 3 All ER 305 (HL).
63 G and H Montage GmbH v Irvani [1990] 2 All ER 225 (CA).
64 Webb v Webb [1992] 1 All ER 17 (Ch) at 25 (Baker, J).
65 [1992] 2 All ER 450 (CA) at 467 (Bingham, LJ).
66 See El Ajou v Dollar Holdings plc [1994] 2 All ER 705 where English law and German law are 
compared in the use of the term ‘directing mind’ derived originally from German law.
The Courts and the Legislator  425
laws, but not for help, such as in Sen v Headley, discussing gifts and donatio mortis 
causa, where Roman law was only cited as the origin of the concept: 
Although donationes mortis causa were taken from Roman law, it is only the first two 
requirements which now bear evidence of that ancestry. They are embodied in the 
definition given in Justinian’s Institutes (2 Just Inst,tit vii) which was adopted by Lord 
Loughborough LC in Tate v Hilbert (1793) 2 Ves III at 119 … We can therefore turn away 
from Roman law and give our whole attention to the English authorities.67
In The Funabaski Sycamore Steamship Co Ltd v Owners of the Steamship White 
Mountain68 Dunn, J said that the Admiralty Court always awarded interest on a 
limitation fund and then quoted from Lord Denning:
Court of Admiralty did not apply common law. It followed the civil law and gave interest 
on damages whenever the non-payment was due to the wrongful delay of the defendant. 
Ex mora the obligor; ex mora means ‘on account of the delay’. It is so stated in the Digest 
21.1.32(2).
How Far Can, and Do, Courts Go?
We see the following clauses used by judges when referring to foreign cases: ‘ample 
support’, ‘particularly useful’, ‘helpful’, ‘compatible with values of democratic soci-
eties’, ‘instructive’, ‘persuasive but not binding’, ‘of assistance’, ‘of interest’ and ‘gives 
comfort’. We also see that judges often turn to foreign jurisdictions in developing 
the law, in cases when the existing law is inadequate, or in extending the law, to 
achieve some uniformity within the ‘civilised’ world. This may also be done in 
order to soften the impact of a domestic rule. Judges may be confronted with 
novel issues. They may wish to depart from domestic understandings. Concepts of 
equality, morality and justice may demand new approaches. There may be insuf-
ficient domestic guidance on a matter. In such cases, comparative law is a valuable 
tool of interpretation.
To achieve improvement in the law and to create unity in all common law 
jurisdictions courts may depart from domestic law.69 In keeping with this, 
Commonwealth cases are sometimes treated as if they are English cases and cited 
as authority, as seen in R v Lord Chancellor’s Department70 and in Airedale NHS 
Trust v Bland.71
However, when domestic law is well established and satisfactory, the courts 
do not depart from it. When an area of English or Scottish law is covered by 
statute not by common law, a domestic judge cannot benefit directly from 
67 Sen v Headley [1991] 2 All ER 636 (CA) at 640. See also Faırchıld (2002) 3 All ER 305 at 378.
68 The Funabaski Sycamore Steamship Co Ltd v Owners of the Steamship White Mountain [1972] 2 
All ER 181 (Adm) at 183 (Dunn, J).
69 See Cheah v Equiticorp Finance Group Ltd [1991] 4 All ER 989 (PC); and Behzadi v Shafterbury 
Hotels Ltd [1991] 2 All ER 477 (CA); [1993] 3 All ER, 669 (CA).
70 R v Lord Chancellor’s Department [1992] 1 All ER 897 (QBD).
71 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 (HL).
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 foreign law, common law or otherwise. For instance, in Luc Thiet Thuan v R, 
Lord Goff said:
It must be unwise to impose uncritically upon an English statute an interpretation 
placed upon a statute from another jurisdictions, which is not expressed in the same 
words. Of course, there is a strong affinity between England and New Zealand law 
on this subject, reflecting their common origin; and anything which has fallen from 
North, J is regarded with great respect in this country, as it is in New Zealand. But their 
Lordships feel compelled to say that the wholesale adoption, without analysis of a sub-
stantial part of this obiter dictum, which covers a whole range of points on a notoriously 
difficult subject with particular reference to the New Zealand statute, is not a satisfactory 
approach to the interpretation of the objective test in provocation as recognised in the 
English statute. Each point must, in Hong Kong as in England, fall to be considered by 
reference to the words of the statute, their historical derivation from the common law, 
and the legislative setting (where relevant) at the time of enactment.72
However, when it is a matter of interpretation of a statutory obligation, 
judge-made law is important. Support and guidance is then sought from other 
common law jurisdictions. 
In Courts ‘Elsewhere’
According to Koopmans, national courts in many jurisdictions have been more 
interested in using the comparative method over the last 15 years or so than previ-
ously and the climate is changing especially when there is a lack of suitable prec-
edents (Koopmans, 1996). As well as the ties to cultural and historical influences 
and current role models and knowledge of the specific language of the models, 
there are further reasons why comparative law is used, such as: for prestige or 
for the quality of the legal rules to be exported and imported; efficiency; the role 
of the national elite; practical utility; cultural forces; imposition; and chance. 
Increased inter-system contact creates a receptive atmosphere whereby ideas cross 
borders and lead to convergence. In addition, reference to other jurisdictions may 
give broader legitimacy to judicial decisions. 
In the civilian tradition, we cannot easily detect comparative law at work in 
courts, where it is the advocate-general who writes the advisory opinion, carries 
out comparisons and makes a thorough analysis of foreign laws. Courts rarely 
discuss or refer to such material. In many cases, comparative work may have had 
an effect on the preliminary investigation but does not find an explicit place in 
the decision, although it may have inspired that decision. It can only be traced by 
the inductive reasoning of the researcher. 
The universal rule is that national courts apply national law unless they are 
required to do otherwise. However, in difficult cases, controversial new cases, in 
cases where no solution is available in national law, or where the applicable rule 
72 Luc Thiet Thuan v R [1996] 2 All ER 1033 (PC) at 1042–3 (Lord Goff).
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is not clear, courts resort to comparative reasoning. Increased contact leading to 
convergence in many areas of law has made it easier, more palatable and justifiable 
for courts to look at foreign law, whether it be to foreign court decisions or foreign 
doctrine. In some jurisdictions in the civilian tradition, such as the German and 
the Dutch, this trend is more easily traceable than in others, such as the French. In 
the United States courts seldom look at foreign law, though comparison between 
State laws is common practice.
It is worth noting that South Africa has the first Constitution setting out an 
explicit mandate for the courts to use comparative and international law in their 
human rights reasoning. In its interpretation section 39(1)(b) and (c), the 1996 
Constitution provides that a court, tribunal or forum ‘must consider International 
law’ and ‘may consider foreign law’ in interpreting the Bill of Rights, which is a 
tacit invitation to the judiciary to apply comparative law. In this context, extensive 
use is made of American, Australian, Canadian, Indian and German cases. The 
basic question to be asked is whether European and North American models are 
appropriate in areas of law where the aim is to correct past failures and respond 
to specific or unique home concerns. In such cases it is more appropriate to prefer 
cultural exceptionalism rather than comparativism. According to David Carey-
Miller, comparative law as used in human rights cases by South African courts 
can be classified as ‘illustrative’, ‘supplementary’, ‘elucidatory’ or ‘going to core 
substance’ (Carey-Miller, 2003). 
It is interesting to note that the European Court of Human Rights also makes 
‘reverse’ reference to national laws, establishing two-way traffic between inter-
national law and national laws in a comparative context. In fact, the European 
Convention itself derives from principles already recognised under the domestic 
laws of all democratic countries. We also see the European Court of Justice, as an 
active court in the use of comparative material, borrowing both from the laws 
of the Member States and international conventions and the decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights.
III.  COMPARATIVE LAW AND THE LEGISLATOR
The first interest in foreign law was in the area of legislation, and ‘comparative 
legislation’ was encouraged by the French-based Société de Législation Comparée, 
founded in 1869, although one could even go back to Roman times, as far back 
as the Twelve Tables (450 B.C.). All the continental codes drew inspiration from 
foreign law in their preparation. National legislatures have always used compara-
tive law in creating and reforming the law. This is usually done in the search for a 
better solution to the problem at hand. In fact, interest in using comparative law 
and looking ‘sideways’ to other legal systems in the process of law reform is an 
activity used earlier by legislatures than by courts.
Although in drafting statutes comparative reasoning plays a vital role, it is 
never possible to exactly measure the extent of the influence of comparative law 
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in the final statute, despite abundant reference to foreign law in the explanatory 
memoranda. For instance, in the United Kingdom, both the Law Commissions for 
England and Wales and for Scotland are under an obligation to look at foreign law 
in the preparation of new legislation. Section 3(1)(f) of the Law Commissions Act 
1965 states that the Law Commissions must
obtain such information as to the legal systems of other countries as appears to the 
Commissioners likely to facilitate the performance of any of their functions.
Laws of other common law jurisdictions and civilian countries are surveyed in 
reports and preliminary memoranda. However, it is not always possible to trace 
the outcome of this research in the Acts that follow. In the United States, in draft-
ing the Restatements of Law, the American Law Institute uses information gleaned 
from comparative law surveys, mostly inter-State, but inspiration is sometimes 
drawn even from European experience.
Today in many areas of law similar laws are being produced by European legis-
latures, mostly fulfilling the requirements of the European Directives. Little new 
legislation is enacted that does not involve some comparative research, as there 
are very few, if any, unique areas of law left to the creative forces of a single state. 
For instance, we see similar developments in the areas of social security law, envi-
ronmental law and environmental liability, company law, anti-terrorist legislation, 
same-sex relationships, adoption and euthanasia. 
There are, of course, wholesale imports such as the taking over of an entire civil 
code. This was the case in the earlier part of the last century for countries such 
as Turkey and Japan and later for East and Central European states entering the 
socialist sphere. 
IV. JUSTIFICATION OF COMPARATIVISM AND THE VERDICT
In Britain, the main judicial comparisons are between the members of the com-
mon law family, with courts making frequent reference to Commonwealth juris-
dictions and the United States. As new areas are being developed and as domestic 
law needs modernisation, there is a general increase in reference to foreign law. 
The major justification for reference to Australia, the United States and New 
Zealand, is the perceived unity of common law, which allows the use of decisions 
from other common law jurisdictions as if they are domestic authority. This usage 
and reference does not extend however, to statutory laws.
In theory, there is ample justification for referring to laws of the other Member 
States of the European Union, especially in comparing their attitudes to the inter-
pretation of European Community law. However, British cases do not reflect an 
‘integrationist’ approach with other Member States of the European Union except 
when the specificities of a case so demand. There does not seem to be the kind of 
cross-fertilisation between the Member States of the European Union as there is 
between the jurisdictions of the common law. This applies as much to Britain as 
it does to the legal systems of the civilian tradition.
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When comparisons are made between British law and other common law 
jurisdictions, this is essentially a ‘functional use’ of comparative law, whereas 
when civilian systems are considered, it reflects a ‘decorative use’ of compara-
tive law. In the first group, the British cases deal mostly with domestic law and 
domestic problems. In the second group, the cases fall mostly within a wider 
ambit, usually of European law or an international convention. Again, in the first 
group, foreign cases are either directly used or used to give guidance and support, 
reflecting the ‘integrationist’ approach in the common law world. In the second 
group, the moral and political considerations necessitate looking into the laws of 
the civilian states, especially if the case is related to European Community law or 
a convention, at which point we even see that
[t]here seems no doubt that, while national laws of contract differ, there is a general 
sense in which the word contract is understood by the signatories to the convention. 
English notions of consideration and privity must be discarded.73
Here certainly the ‘internationalism’ is manifest. As for seeking guidance or sup-
port from, or direct use of, civilian cases in preference to United Kingdom law or 
other common laws, the same cannot be said. As foreign law is a question of fact 
in common law, it is worth repeating once more that it is the counsel who must be 
convinced of the value and relevance of comparisons, and, since the judges rely on 
counsel, the concept of ‘in practice’ used in the title of this chapter must be taken 
to cover all actors of the law.
The crucial issue is whether comparativism is used for inspiration and as an 
interpretative tool, or to seek the legitimation of a foregone conclusion. Sometimes 
there is a real effort at a ‘common enterprise’ and sometimes a search for justifica-
tion for a domestic decision. For example, in discussing ‘compatibility’ with the 
European Convention on Human Rights as embodied in the 1998 Human Rights 
Act in the United Kingdom, judges are rapidly becoming conversant with human 
rights issues, and in this area comparativism is gaining weight, becoming second 
nature to judges and providing a valuable interpretative tool. As we assess this 
‘transjudicial communication’ (see Slaughter, 1994), the present chapter claims 
that the starting point should be a positive, welcoming approach.
Judges are ‘tuners’ of the law. While they adapt the law to the evolution of soci-
ety and create bridges between the law and the values of the society in which they 
live, they also build bridges between that society and other societies and universal 
values by means of comparativism. The basic values used are those of the judge’s 
own society but as integrated into a wider universe. This also provides a certain 
anchorage for domestic decisions. Obviously there is the added assumption in the 
Western world, that the basic values underpinning democratic societies are shared 
values. Comparisons reveal these shared values and therefore it is appropriate 
to use comparativism as an interpretative tool. However, it is not the technical 
aspects of the foreign solution that should be studied, but the legal, economic 
73 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Glasgow City Council [1996] 2 All ER 257 (CA) at 273.
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and cultural contexts within which similar cases are decided by judges of foreign 
jurisdictions. Here, integration can be created by comparative analysis, since look-
ing at things comparatively brings an incremental common perspective. This gives 
rise to a gradual ‘internalisation of common values’ by the courts of national legal 
systems. Practising lawyers should also take part in this process.
Comparativism feeds cross-fertilisation and cross-fertilisation encourages 
instrumentalisation and transposition of the received. In this way commonality is 
developed, albeit at a more abstract and higher level of principle than at the level 
of rules. Comparativism certainly broadens the spectrum of choice and provides 
inspiration to an activist judge. 
Comparative law is often treated today by courts and practitioners as ‘an auxil-
iary source of law’, ‘a subsidiary method of interpretation’. In addition, the courts 
of developing countries and newly-emerging democracies are looking to other 
legal systems considered ‘Western’ or ‘developed’ (see, eg Dupré, 2003). 
The most problematic and most important area of concern is related to legal 
rules of a purely domestic character. Here, references to foreign solutions are few, 
and their use is difficult to justify. The courts tend to look only at the content 
of the foreign rules rather than their context or effects—such references being 
rather short—with attention paid only to results and rarely to reasoning, and the 
courts proceed pragmatically. References are often over-simplistic. The selection 
of countries also seems random. Sometimes only certain groupings are used, 
problems of language and documentary access being the main obstacles. 
For lawyers, it is only necessary to bring foreign law to the attention of the 
courts, and for the courts to have sufficient knowledge to ask the foreign law 
expert the pertinent questions. Foreign law could only concern a lawyer if, for 
example, her client had a traffic accident in a foreign country, or the company she 
represents established a new branch in a foreign jurisdiction. Then, she could use 
the services of appropriate foreign lawyers in her international network. All she 
needs to do is to give the foreign expert the right instructions and ask the right 
questions. 
In the common law world the practising lawyer is, in essence, looking for for-
eign cases in order to ask the court to depart from an established precedent, and 
therefore is searching for solutions that are different from the domestic to further 
her cause. However, in many cases, a court uses foreign decisions to strengthen its 
hand in reaching what is in fact a foregone conclusion. So the practising lawyer 
and the judge will not always be working towards the same end and what aspect 
of the foreign law each will stress will not be the same.
What do we detect overall? The use of foreign law and foreign cases is selective 
and there is no logical approach to the choice. Neither is a specific methodology 
applied. In addition, the decision to use foreign judicial judgments remains largely 
in the realm of judicial discretion, and the exercise of this discretion may be due 
to many factors. We should also ask whether courts are properly equipped to carry 
out detailed comparative law surveys in every suitable case. Courts may make 
decisions on the basis of superficial or even misleading comparisons. Picking and 
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choosing is a grave danger. In any event, very often, the exact nature of foreign 
law influence may not be obvious from reading a case, and this not only in the 
civilian tradition either. 
It must also be admitted that comparativism may be used solely to further a 
particular cause, with the aim of having a particular ‘effect’ on a target audience. 
Judges would have reached the same conclusion without comparativism. It is also 
natural that courts want to claim full decisional autonomy.
The choices made by judges can be tied to cultural and historical influences, 
historical ties, a current role model, a legal system being fashionable at that par-
ticular time, or knowledge of a specific language by a group of lawyers. Choices 
may also be made because of the influence of European Community law or the 
European Convention on Human Rights, because there are similar circumstances 
to the case at hand and there is no applicable domestic law, or because the chang-
ing culture of judges through education and new technical developments makes 
access to foreign judgements easier. Obviously, there may also be misunderstand-
ings, errors—even deliberate errors.
In Europe, cross-breeding comes through the direct and indirect influence of 
the European Union, through the ‘better law’ filter applied by Community judges 
and the judges of the European Court of Human Rights; through the spreading of 
knowledge by academic writers; or through following a transplant deriving from 
an autonomous action by the courts. The cultural gap in the training of judges 
and lawyers and their use of foreign law remains, but a corpus of fundamental 
principles common to European orders is identifiable today. 
In the area of human rights, for instance, comparativism can provide the basis 
for an a historical development not specific to any one nation state’s history but 
to universal history. When established understandings are challenged in the name 
of this universalism, what should judges do? It has been said that ‘courts are talk-
ing to one another all over the world’ (Slaughter, 1994) as judges are involved in 
active international traffic. Research shows that courts of some jurisdictions are in 
constant conversation, while others are not. So, apart from the matter of why this 
is the case, an additional matter arises as to what are the frontiers of judicial com-
parison. It is possible to say that human rights case law is more likely to flourish if 
it is supported by the legitimacy of virtual unanimity amongst the judges.74 
When the law is well established and satisfactory, judges may see no need to 
look abroad. Where there is a legislative framework in an area under consider-
ation, judges may feel bound to follow the direction laid down for them by the 
legislature, even though they may know that there are other, and possible better, 
answers elsewhere. Many laws deal with problems of a national past and there-
fore, there may be no full correspondence between these and universal rules and 
standards. 
Our century will certainly witness new reciprocal influences and cross-
 fertilisation between legal systems within the Western legal tradition. These 
74 See ch 16 in this Handbook. 
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 reciprocal influences may prove extremely beneficial for the development of the 
law to meet the changing needs and demands of the people the law serves. For this 
we need imaginative and pro-active judges, informed and active counsel, creative 
academics, a flexible legal education, an enlightened legislature, a daring execu-
tive, Law Commissions with insight, and a good and fruitful balance between 
these. It is time to change the general belief that ‘other systems of jurisprudence 
are relevant only so far as they throw light on our law’ (Gutteridge, 1949: 39 ff ), 
though this in itself is a valuable starting point. 
Domestic courts must look forward, sideways, at each other and beyond. 
Comparativism must be at the heart of all judicial activity if law is to embody 
principles that are ‘universal’ rather than purely domestic or even ‘European’. 
When actors of the law, that is academics, legislators, judges and lawyers, adopt a 
pragmatic and progressive approach, then comparativism can provide the most 
effective tool for interlocking legal systems.
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
 1.  What do you regard as the ‘proper object’ of comparative law efforts by 
courts?
 2.  Comment on comparative law in courts as part of ‘necessary comparison’, 
in ‘legal rules with an international element’ and in ‘legal rules with a 
purely domestic character’.
 3.  Comment on the use of comparative law by courts for the purposes of 
abrogating existing national rules, of filling gaps and for decorative or 
ornamental purposes.
 4.  How can the use of cases and doctrine from foreign jurisdictions by 
domestic courts be justified?
 5.  Is it appropriate to use foreign solutions for domestic problems?
 6.  Do you think that the Fairchild case is an indication that the common law 
and civil law worlds are converging?
 7. Comment on the use of comparative law by the legislators. 
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A Project: Comparative Law in Action
ESI˙N ÖRÜCÜ
I.  INTRODUCTION
Many comparatists in Europe today are involved in harmonisation projects looking for ‘common cores’ or the ‘better law’.1 These proj-ects are geared towards either harmonisation of a particular area of 
law, such as contract law, family law or tort (delict) law, or unification of law by 
drawing up European codes in, for example, criminal law or contract law. Other 
comparatists are occupied in assisting the European Union to draw up Directives, 
Regulations or treaties. 
An overview of ongoing projects related to a number of fields of private law, 
for instance, shows us that most projects begin with questionnaires, though the 
questionnaires themselves are not standardised (see Hondius, 2003: 118-39). 
Some projects present the contributors, usually National Rapporteurs, with fac-
tual questions, while some create hypothetical cases and ask for solutions from the 
different legal systems involved in the project. Others present specific problems 
and try to find out how different systems would resolve them. 
For example, the Trento-Project, which seeks to broaden the scope of the 
Cornell Project (see Schlesinger, 1961) beyond contract law, has put the emphasis 
on contract, property and tort, with a number of sub-topics such as commercial 
trusts, mistake and fraud in contract law; security rights in moveable property; 
pure economic loss, enforceability of promises, good faith, and strict liability 
in tort law. This project relies on the factual approach, that is, ‘fact-based, in-
depth research’ methodology, or a ‘question and answer’ methodology, present-
ing a number of cases to national reporters and asking for solutions offered 
by their legal systems (see Bussani, 1998). Information is requested on all the 
relevant elements that affect the legal solutions to a given case, including policy 
1 Most of these projects are in a number of fields of private law and include the Lando Commission 
on European Contract Law that prepared the Principles of European Contract Law; UNIDROIT on 
a very similar project, the Principles for International Commercial Contracts; the Von Bar Study 
Group on the European Civil Code; Gandolfi’s Code of Contract Law; the Trento Common Core of 
European Private Law; the Spier and Koziol group dealing with causation among other things; the 
acquis  communautaire Group and the SECOLA, and the Commission on European Family Law.
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considerations, economic and social factors, social context and values, and the 
structure of the process.
Another example is the Commission on European Family Law, which has 
undertaken the academic activity of harmonising a number of areas of  family 
law such as divorce, maintenance, custody and parental responsibility. This 
Commission uses what it calls the ‘comparative research-based drafting of prin-
ciples’ as the process, having been inspired by the American Restatements. A team 
of specialists from 26 jurisdictions targets legislators who may be in the process 
of modernising their national family laws, the hope being to create a source of 
inspiration. In concert with this hope, both the ‘common core’ and the ‘better 
law’ approaches are adopted. They draft questionnaires employing the functional 
approach, draw up national reports reflecting both the law in the books and law 
in action, draft the Principles having chosen between the ‘common core’ and ‘bet-
ter law’ approaches and then publish these Principles. The drafters choose ‘the 
best’, ‘the more functional’ and the ‘most efficient’ rules, the touchstone being 
the modernisation of the law. The overall justification lies in the shared notions 
of human rights in Europe, with the additional emphasis on ‘increasing choice’. 
Thus the options are: the common core is found and selected as the best solution; 
the common core is found, but a better solution is selected; the common core is 
found, but the selection is left to national law; no common core is found and ‘a 
best solution’ is selected; and finally, no common core is found and the solution 
is left to national law. 
Comparatists involved in the above processes employ a comparative law meth-
odology, albeit based on the factual problem-oriented approach or the functional/
institutional approach, widely discussed in various chapters of this Handbook 
both at the theoretical and the practical levels.2 Most projects rely mainly on func-
tional equivalence. Projects comparing cases that have been decided on similar 
facts also compare solutions. A substantial number of projects do not consider 
general doctrine, different techniques, historical processes or different mentalité. 
The context of the rules is rarely analysed. The search is frequently for the ‘com-
mon core’, with similarities being treated as more important than differences. 
These projects may have specific short-term aims, but in the long run they are all 
trying to lay down a foundation for a common European law. 
Comparing cases, comparing problems, comparing solutions, seeking answers 
to hypothetical fact situations in an effort to discover similarities, working 
through functional equivalence—and where none can be found, suggesting a bet-
ter law—are among the shared characteristics of these projects, though the paths 
followed, the techniques used and the end products may look quite different.3 
Yet other comparatists are involved in assisting legal systems in their law 
reform efforts by providing advice on which model would best suit their situation 
2 See chs 2, 3, 10 and 11 in this Handbook for more information and especially a discussion on 
functional equivalence.
3 See, eg chs 10 and 11 in this Handbook.
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and system.4 These comparatists are working as advisers to foreign working 
groups or governments, aiding their efforts to import ‘modern’ or ‘efficient’ or 
‘European law-friendly’ changes into their substantive and procedural laws. 
On the 10th anniversary of the United Kingdom’s membership of the European 
Community, a research project was initiated to study the impact of membership 
of the European Community (now European Union) on practising lawyers in 
Scotland and The Netherlands, as a contribution to the study of the role of lawyers 
in the process of European integration. This was not a grand scale project such 
as those mentioned above. It was not ambitious. It did not aim to harmonise the 
law or produce general principles in a specific area of law. It was born out of the 
curious minds and experiences of a small group of academics. It illustrates there-
fore, a middle-sized piece of empirical research, which also involved testing the 
hypotheses which the members of the research team individually wanted to test.5 
The way the project was set up and carried out is presented here as an example 
of the use of comparative law methodology. It can be an initiation exercise for 
novices wanting to undertake comparative law research.6
II.  THE SETTING UP OF THE PROJECT
Composition of the Team
The project was undertaken by five people: a social psychologist, a lecturer in 
European Law, a legal practitioner and senior lecturer in European Law, a lecturer 
in Comparative Law, and a Professor of Comparative Law.7 Convenience, existing 
links of friendship and scholarship, and the nature of the project itself—which, by 
definition, was multi-disciplinary and multi-national—dictated the composition 
of the research team. The project demanded the knowledge and skills of a group 
of people drawn from diverse academic backgrounds. In addition to the involve-
ment of legally-trained researchers with experience in the relevant legal systems, 
in European law and comparative law, it required the contribution of a method-
ologist with expertise in the gathering and analysis of empirical data—skills that 
are lacking in present-day legal training. All the members of the team were work-
ing outside their traditional boundaries.
4 See, eg ch 17 in this Handbook.
5 The following sections of this chapter rely on excerpts from the published findings of the project. 
See Aitkenhead, Burrows, Jagtenberg and Örücü, 1988.
6 The project started in 1982 and the results were published in book form in 1988. Obviously it is 
not a recent work. It is presented here as a successful project using certain methods and strategies of 
comparative law. It should not be taken to imply that doing empirical research does not change over 
time and that its methods have not been refined in the intervening period.
7 Marilyn Aitkenhead—social psychologist lecturer at Loughborough University of Technology 
in Management Studies, Noreen Burrows—lecturer in European Law at the University of Glasgow, 
Douwe Gijlstra—legal practitioner in Amsterdam and senior lecturer in European Law at the Europa 
Institute of the University of Amsterdam, Rob Jagtenberg—lecturer in Comparative Law at Erasmus 
Universiteit, Rotterdam, and Esin Örücü—senior lecturer in Comparative Law at the University of 
Glasgow and Professor of Comparative Law at Erasmus Universiteit, Rotterdam.
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The Subject: The Personnel of the Law
The project centred on lawyers, an ‘umbrella’ term, which was taken to mean advo-
cates and solicitors in Scotland and advocaten and notarissen in The Netherlands. 
It was felt that the role of members of the legal profession, other than the judi-
ciary, was also crucial in the operation of a European legal system, as cases arrive 
at courts via the intermediary of lawyers. Their role and the importance of their 
active participation in furthering the process of European integration had so far 
been ignored. Therefore, the study was meant to examine how European law was 
put into operation in the municipal sphere by lawyers in private practice. Were 
they, for instance, ‘European minded’? Did they discount or misapply the rules 
made by the European Court of Justice? Did they contribute to the functioning 
of the Community? 
The assumption was that the legal profession exerts great influence on the 
legal and the political system. Another assumption underlying the study was 
that European integration could not advance significantly without the active 
 participation of the legal profession as a whole.8 
The Hypotheses to be Tested
It was decided to use a comparative approach so that similarities and differences 
could be assessed and their implications for European integration elucidated. 
Though the best strategy would have been to investigate in detail the legal practi-
tioners in each European Community Member State, limited resources precluded 
this, so two jurisdictions were opted for. Scotland and The Netherlands were cho-
sen for a variety of practical and theoretical reasons. The research team had good 
academic and professional contacts in both jurisdictions. This practical consider-
ation, which is always a good starting point, would not in itself justify the choice 
made however. The theoretical underpinnings were that the United Kingdom was 
a relatively new member of the European Community at the time of the research, 
whereas The Netherlands was a founding member. Therefore, lawyers in The 
Netherlands would have had longer experience and this might have impacted 
their attitudes, approaches, familiarity and use of European law. In addition, 
geographic and economic differences could also be factors contributing to any 
differences in the attitudes and behaviour of lawyers in the two jurisdictions. For 
instance, Scotland is on the periphery of Europe, trading to a large extent with 
England, whereas The Netherlands is more central and therefore in closer contact 
8 In this chapter the reader will find the bare bones of the research project, as the aim is to show 
how a project is conceived and set up, how a questionnaire is drawn up, what conceptual problems 
are encountered and what kind of hypotheses can be tested by questionnaires alone. The aim of this 
chapter is not to highlight socio-legal studies, discussions and the wide-ranging research on the legal 
profession. However, for the relationship of the legal profession to society at large and to their clients, 
their legal culture and factors influencing these issues see Aitkenhead, Burrows, Jagtenberg and Örücü, 
1988: chs 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7.
A Project: Comparative Law in Action  439
with other Member States. Moreover, The Netherlands is a civilian jurisdiction 
and Scotland, though a mixed jurisdiction, more akin to the common law. These 
hypotheses had to be tested. The survey would throw light on such issues via a 
carefully constructed questionnaire. Conversely, there were similarities too, such 
as historical links and similar geographical size. 
The research project started with hypotheses. The underlying anticipated outcomes 
were: (i) Dutch lawyers would perceive greater relevance of European Community 
law for their practices than their Scottish counterparts; (ii) as a consequence, legal 
education received by lawyers in The Netherlands would place greater emphasis on 
European law than did legal education in Scotland; (iii) as a further consequence, 
Dutch lawyers would be more aware of areas  of law where Community law would 
arise; (iv) the Dutch lawyers would come across problems relating to Community law 
more often; and (v) therefore, they would find ways of keeping up to date with devel-
opments in European law and adopt strategies for dealing with issues as they arose. 
Taking all these factors into account, it was expected that the Dutch lawyers would 
have more positive attitudes to European law and towards the Community in general 
(Aitkenhead, Burrows, Jagtenberg and Örücü, 1988: 16–17). In addition it was felt 
desirable to find the reason why a rather limited number of cases were referred from 
Scottish courts to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary hearing. Did issues 
related to the European Community law not arise? Or did the lawyers in Scotland 
fail to use European procedures for other reasons? For instance, in 1982 Dutch courts 
referred 21 cases, but the Scottish courts none.
It was obvious that only a crude assessment could be made, that the cause-effect 
linkages could not be readily determined, and therefore the results of the survey 
should not be read in isolation. Explanations from other sources were therefore 
sought when discussing the empirical results.
The Method
In this piece of research the comparative approach combined sociological analysis 
(through empirical observation of ‘how things are’ viewed within the frame of the 
survey) with comparative jurisprudence, or ‘how things ought to be’ according 
to the desired end—that is European integration. Comparative law was regarded 
both as an aspect of sociology of law and as a method of approaching the prob-
lem in hand. The study relied on expert knowledge in the areas of social science 
methodology, comparative law and European law; a vast amount of discussion 
and determination of hypotheses to be tested; a questionnaire reflecting the 
hypotheses; and finally, analysis of the findings.  
Schlesinger asked:
Should the classificatory scheme of one or the other national system be adopted? Or 
should one try to create a new system of classification by merging or compromising 
between some of the divergent categories found in the various systems? Or is it preferable 
to create a brand new set of categories for comparative purposes? (Schlesinger, 1961: 76).
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At the macro-level, neither the Scottish nor the Dutch legal system had any dif-
ficulty in meeting the requirements of a number of definitions of a legal system 
used. This was so despite the fact that Scotland is a sub-system within a politically 
unitary state. A link to independent statehood has never been a prerequisite for 
the existence of a legal system. Moreover, the independence of the Scottish legal 
system is guaranteed by the 1707 Act of Union.
Therefore, it could confidently be said that the systems were comparable, and 
there was no need to resort to any of the paths suggested by Schlesinger in the 
quotation above, although there were a number of differences and a number of 
similarities between the legal systems, and obviously each system also had its own 
distinct features.
At the micro-level, the first and crucial problem was to decide on the functional 
comparability of advocates and advocaten. These are homonymous expressions 
but are not precisely equivalent. The equivalence materialised only when advo-
cates and solicitors together and advocaten and notarissen together, were taken as 
the unit under survey. Here, the third path suggested in the above quotation by 
Schlesinger had to be followed. Thus, an ‘umbrella’ concept was to be created to 
cover both groups of actors, since synonyms and taxonomies were not suitable. 
Although the profession of a practising lawyer covers a wide spectrum of basic 
legal activities—ranging from litigation to non-contentious affairs, from court 
work to out of court assistance, from preparing documents to appearing in court, 
from training other professionals to giving moral advice—there is a difference in 
the way in which these activities are distributed between the specific professional 
groups. After studying what the existing institutions entailed, an umbrella con-
cept had to be created on the basis of aggregate functions of all groups, for use 
as a problem-solving technique, and a definition elaborated that did not involve 
concepts exclusive to one of the jurisdiction. This is still a functional definition 
but wider than the existing individual concepts. An assessment of overall compa-
rability was made of the four individual professions and since all institutions were 
sufficiently comparable, a meaningful umbrella concept ‘the lawyers in private 
practice’ could be ascertained to cover all.9 
At the start each group was analysed by looking into educational requirements; 
in-service training; professional organisation, conduct and discipline; partner-
ships; size of firm; function and scope of practice; relationship with the client; 
and relationship with the other branch of the profession. Certain factors such as 
the relative size of each distinct group, the size of practice and the case-loads cre-
ated quantitative problems despite the overall functional equivalence. These are 
inevitable differences and they were taken into account in analysing the results. 
For instance, advocates always deal with cases which have a counterpart in the 
9 This activity should also remind us of Zweigert and Kötz who advocate developing a special 
syntax and vocabulary, with concepts large enough to embrace the quite heterogeneous institutions 
which are functionally comparable—the higher concept being related to the function common to all 
(Zweigert and Kötz, 1998: 37–8). 
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case-loads of solicitors: these cases had to be counted twice when the case-loads 
of advocates and solicitors were added together. A similar relationship does not 
exist between advocaten and notarissen.
On the subject of areas of law to be covered in the questionnaire, that is, in the 
choice of concepts and categories or topics of law, again, functional equivalence 
was resorted to. Problems arose when it was realised that certain areas of law, 
such as law relating to transport or competition, had a narrower scope in Scottish 
law than in the Dutch. Therefore, direct translations or synonyms did not suffice. 
Here, the chosen path was the second one suggested by Schlesinger. This entailed a 
definitional effort from the outset of either redefining or delineating existing con-
cepts in order to communicate across the barriers. Functional equivalents were 
sought. The questionnaires in two languages, English and Dutch, were directed 
to two different groups. Hence there would be no advantage in creating universal 
concepts, which, for the purposes of the questionnaire, would add new problems 
rather than solving existing ones. Areas of law that performed the same tasks, that 
is, institutions that served the same function, were looked at. Care was taken to 
identify functions in terms of system-relevance. 
The Design of the Survey
It was decided that a large and representative group of lawyers should be 
approached in order to be reasonably certain that the results would reflect the 
characteristics of lawyers in both countries. Of all lawyers in private practice 
in the selected cities, a commercial centre, an industrial centre, a third major 
city and a rural area (Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen and Perth in Scotland; 
and Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague and Leeuwarden in The Netherlands 
respectively) one in four were chosen at random. These were taken from a care-
fully defined population—the law society or bar list of members—excluding 
those not in private practice. This is a fairly large sample, so a high degree of 
confidence in the results was achieved.
The survey method was to send questionnaires to this randomly-chosen sample 
of lawyers. A high response rate was also needed.10 Various precautions were taken 
to achieve this. The questionnaire was prepared so as to include questions that 
would throw light mainly on the frequency with which European Community 
law was encountered by lawyers; their education in European Community law; 
their knowledge of European Community law; and the attitude they had towards 
European Community law and the European Community. Additional issues such 
as whether they had studied comparative law during their degree course, the level 
to which they specialised in European Community law, and background infor-
mation as to their qualifications and experience were also sought. Furthermore, 
10 For the details of the survey methodology employed and the theoretical discussion related to 
hypothesis-testing and the choices, see Aitkenhead, Burrows, Jagtenberg and Örücü, 1988: 65–95.
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information was gathered as to the sex of the respondents, number of years in 
practice, and the size of their firms.11
The overall hypothesis that lawyers in The Netherlands are more involved with 
Community law was to be tested by posing appropriate questions. All the ques-
tions proposed by the members of the team had to be corrected or approved by 
the social scientist member of the team, to ensure that they were not leading ques-
tions. The strands of evidence obtained were not, however, directly concerned 
with the day-to-day activities of the lawyers. Additional hypotheses were related 
to issues surrounding the education of the lawyers and their attitude towards this 
education: Scottish lawyers were less well educated in European Community law 
than their Dutch counterparts. They therefore had more negative attitudes, and 
read fewer journals to keep themselves informed. 
The Questionnaire
The Construction
Since mail surveys are regarded as inferior to interviews, Dillman’s Total Design 
Method (TDM), a classic work on survey design and implementation (Dillman: 
1978), was followed step-by step in order to maximise the response rate. One of 
the assumptions of this procedure is that people’s behaviour is motivated by the 
benefits they expect to achieve from behaving in particular ways. The costs such as 
effort, time, incurring negative feelings of social disapproval and so on, have to be 
counterbalanced (exchange theory). The sample is more likely to respond to a mail 
survey, for instance, if they perceive the benefits of doing so.  Therefore, the cost of 
responding was minimised by including self-addressed envelopes. The rewards of 
responding were maximised by making the answering process easy, allowing them 
also to make comments and promising them that they would receive the results of 
the research, establishing trust that the reward would be delivered.12  Follow-up 
letters were also sent after one, four and seven weeks. A 70 per cent response rate 
was achieved in The Netherlands and an 80 per cent response rate in Scotland.  A 
third of the respondents wanted the results to be posted to them.
The Content
The questions from the Scottish version of the questionnaire are provided below. 
There were 23 questions, some with three optional answers to be circled, such as 
‘unimportant’, ‘important’ and ‘extremely important’; ‘not at all useful’, ‘useful’ 
and ‘extremely useful’; or ‘are sufficiently knowledgeable’, ‘are not sufficiently 
knowledgeable’ and ‘don’t know’. 
11 It was clear that the sample, like the legal profession at large, was predominantly male. Most had 
had several years in practice and very few had a post-graduate degree in law.
12 See for details of the aspects, recommendations and the rationale of our questionnaire construc-
tion and implementation Table 4.2, Aitkenhead, Burrows, Jagtenberg and Örücü, 1988: 73–6.
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Questions 1–4 were designed to ascertain the views of the respondents concerning 
the teaching of European Community Law (ECL).
 1.  How important do you feel it is for the legal profession that ECL is taught 
in Scottish Universities?
 2.  How useful do you feel it is for lawyers practising in Scotland today to have 
a good knowledge of ECL?
 3.  On the whole, do you think that lawyers practising in Scotland today are, 
or are not, sufficiently knowledgeable about ECL to recognise the legal 
implications raised by United Kingdom membership of the EC?
 4.  On the whole, do you think that members of the judiciary in Scotland 
today are, or are not, sufficiently knowledgeable about ECL to cope with 
the issues raised by United Kingdom membership of the EC?
Questions 5–8 concerned their education in law. 
 5.  When you were studying for your university degree(s) and for your profes-
sional qualification(s), which of the areas listed below did you study? How 
much consideration was given to EC aspects of each area? (The areas cited 
were agricultural law; taxation; criminal law; monopolies and mergers; 
company law; family law; immigration law; consumer protection/product 
liability; employee/employer relations; social security law; conveyancing; 
copyright, patents and trademarks; law relating to customs and excise; law 
relating to transport; wills; and evidence and procedure).
 6.  Have you studied any of the following aspects of ECL? (Institutional law; 
Judicial remedies; Substantive law; other).
 7.  Which of the following, if any, would you like to see made available to 
lawyers practising in Scotland today? (A basic course in ECL; A refresher 
course in ECL; Seminars in practical topics of ECL; other).
 8.  When you were studying to qualify as a lawyer, was consideration given to 
comparative law? (In no course; In some courses; In all courses; If in some 
courses, please specify).
The next six questions relate to finding out the effect of ECL on the working 
lives of lawyers.
 9.  In the course of your practice, in the last five years, have you had occasion 
to visit another country for professional reasons connected with ECL? 
For the purposes of this question, assume that Scotland and England are 
separate countries (Yes/No. If yes, specify the country and approximate 
number of visits).
10.  In which of the following areas might you expect there to be an aspect of 
ECL? (The list produced is the same as in question 5).
11.  For the year 1 January, 1982 to 1 January, 1983, please indicate in the col-
umns below the approximate number of cases you dealt with involving 
each of the areas of law listed; the approximate number of cases in each 
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area where an aspect of ECL was raised.  (The list produced is again the 
same as in question 5).
12.  In the year 1 January, 1982 to 1 January, 1983 which, if any, of the follow-
ing journals have you consulted: to keep yourself generally informed on 
ECL and/or, to obtain information relevant to specific cases you have dealt 
with where an aspect of ECL was involved? (11 journals were given and 
five additional slots were provided for others).
13.  If a client were to come to you with a case in which you suspect ECL was 
involved, how would you deal with such as case? (The list of courses of 
action was: (1) Deal with it yourself. (2) Deal with it in consultation with 
a specialist. (3) Send it to a specialist in another firm in the same city. (4) 
Send it to another firm in Scotland. (5) Send it to another firm in London. 
(6) Other, please specify).
14.  This question aims at finding the differences in working practices, if any, 
between cases where an aspect of ECL is raised and those where it is not. 
If you have never dealt with a case involving ECL, please go straight to 
question 15. In those cases you deal with yourself or in consultation with 
a specialist, in which an aspect of ECL is raised, do you find that: (1) You 
have to do more research. (2) You need more consultations with clients. 
(3) You need to travel outside Scotland. (4) You encounter language prob-
lems. (5) You have increased financial outlay. (6) None of these. (7) Other, 
please specify.
The next few questions are to ascertain the respondent’s opinion on ECL.
15.  Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following 
nine statements (Agree/disagree/no opinion are the options): (1) I would 
welcome moves to harmonise laws within the European Community. (2) 
I think it is easy to keep pace with developments in ECL. (3) In my view it 
is difficult to gain access to information regarding ECL. (4) In my opinion 
the relationship between ECL and domestic law is too complex. (5) I find 
it difficult to appreciate the merits of ECL because it is so different from 
my own domestic system. (6) I believe that European integration is a good 
thing for Scotland. (7) I would welcome moves to encourage free move-
ment of lawyers within the EC. (8) I fear that the influence of ECL will 
adversely affect the integrity of the Scottish legal system. (9) In my opinion 
ECL is more relevant to the legal profession in other EC countries than it 
is to the legal profession in Scotland.
16.  In proceedings in which an aspect of ECL is raised, the case is not always 
referred to the European Court of Justice. Why do you think this is so? 
(The options were: (1) Unacceptable additional delays may arise. (2) 
Unacceptable additional costs may be incurred. (3) Judges and tribunal 
chairmen prefer to decide issues on the basis of domestic law. (4) Don’t 
know. (5) Other.)
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17.  Fewer cases have gone to the European Court of Justice from Scotland than 
from The Netherlands. Why do you think this is so? (More than one option 
can be circled: (1) Scotland joined the EC later than the Netherlands. (2) 
ECL issues arise less often. (3) The bench is conservative. (4) There are anti-
European feelings amongst the legal profession. (5) The legal profession 
is not sufficiently knowledgeable about ECL. (6) There is no tradition of 
uniformity of interpretation in the UK. (7) Don’t know. (8) Other.)
Finally, some questions were about the respondents to help interpret the results 
of the survey:
18. How long have you been practising as a lawyer?
19. How many partners are there in your firm?
20. How many assistants are there in your firm?
21. How many trainees are there in your firm?
22.  Of which of the following are you a member? (The Scottish Lawyers 
European Group; The Solicitors European Group; The Young Lawyers 
European Group; The International Bar Association).
23.  Please specify your academic and professional qualification(s) with date(s). 
(Options were Degree(s), diploma(s), professional qualification(s)).
Are there any further comments you wish to make on the matters dealt with in this 
questionnaire? If so, please use this space for that purpose (a full page was left).
III.  THE RESULTS
There were three clear aims behind the project. The first was to examine the 
impact of membership of the European Community on the legal professions 
of the two jurisdictions. The second aim was educational. It was hoped that the 
distribution of questionnaires to a large sample of the legal profession would gen-
erate or stimulate their interest in European Community law (ECL), make them 
more aware of the possibilities it afforded, act as a gentle reminder that member-
ship of the Community has implications for them, and lead them to examine the 
gaps in their own knowledge. The third aim, also educational, was related to work 
done in the universities. Was legal education preparing prospective lawyers for 
practice and the needs of the day?
Considering these overall aims, it can be said that a great deal of information 
was obtained about the education of the lawyers sampled, their attitude to ECL, 
the frequency and nature of their work in ECL and any tendency to specialise 
in particular areas of law. In addition to increasing knowledge, the project had 
some success in improving university teaching, in that adjustments were made 
to teaching both European and Comparative Law in Glasgow University and in 
Erasmus Universiteit, Rotterdam. A joint study programme was initiated in 1986 
between these two universities specifically on the topic of the legal profession 
in European integration. The course was funded by the European Community 
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and entailed the exchange of students between the two countries, allowing them 
to work in legal practices in their host countries. The hope was that the results 
obtained from the survey would be useful in teaching future generations of stu-
dents to see themselves as part of a wider legal environment and to show them 
how they could critically evaluate their own contribution to the development of 
their legal cultures. 
However, some weaknesses of the questionnaire also became apparent, not least 
that it failed to address certain problems that were subsequently thought to be of 
importance. Furthermore, it is difficult to measure the degree of ‘consciousness 
raising’ that might have been achieved. Also, there is no guarantee that the results 
were read, although they were available for those interested. 
As to the particular hypotheses: it was predicted that Scottish lawyers would 
deal with fewer ECL cases than their Dutch counterparts. This prediction was 
strongly upheld in every area of law. It was clear that there was much greater 
involvement with ECL cases in The Netherlands than there was in Scotland. This 
finding was so overwhelmingly powerful that it could confidently be said that this 
reflected a real difference in the workloads (Aitkenhead, Burrows, Jagtenberg and 
Örücü, 1988: 82–4).
Another hypothesis was that a smaller proportion of lawyers in Scotland had 
studied ECL than was the case in The Netherlands.13 Here it was important to 
distinguish those who studied law before 1957 (the year the European Economic 
Community was founded) in The Netherlands and 1972 (the year the United 
Kingdom joined the European Economic Community) in Scotland. In addition, 
each area of law was examined separately. Once again the hypothesis was clearly 
supported.  In every area of law except immigration law, a higher proportion 
studied its European Community aspects in The Netherlands than in Scotland. 
However, it was also discovered that the education in ECL did not meet the needs 
of practising lawyers in either jurisdiction (Aitkenhead, Burrows, Jagtenberg and 
Örücü, 1988: 84–6 and 96–110).
The hypothesis that the Dutch lawyers would be more knowledgeable in ECL 
was derived by the investigators from their knowledge of those areas where ECL 
was involved most fully and those where it was hardly involved. The strategy 
adopted for assessing knowledge was a fairly crude one and therefore the results 
here were regarded as a tentative exploratory step. Omissions (failing to include 
a ‘relevant’ category) and commissions (inclusion of ‘irrelevant’ areas into the 
‘relevant’ category) were looked for. Less knowledgeable lawyers were expected to 
commit more such errors. This hypothesis was not successfully proven and here it 
was concluded that interviewing as a technique would be more useful, as possibly 
the questions asked were open to a number of interpretations. In the face of such 
difficulties, it was decided not to draw too many firm conclusions from the results 
gained (see Aitkenhead, Burrows, Jagtenberg and Örücü, 1988, 87–90).
13 See Table 4.5 in Aitkenhead, Burrows, Jagtenberg and Örücü, 1988: 85; and see also Aitkenhead, 
Burrows, Jagtenberg and Örücü, 1986.
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The most important hypothesis on trial was the one on attitudes. What was 
clear from the results was that, for every attitude statement, a higher proportion 
of the Dutch lawyers showed a positive attitude and for every statement except 
one (that relating to the difficulty of obtaining information about ECL) a lower 
proportion of Dutch lawyers showed a negative attitude. Thus the hypothesis was 
strongly supported (see Aitkenhead, Burrows, Jagtenberg and Örücü, 1988: 90–91 
and 111–27).
In the analysis, the results obtained from each hypothesis were also pitched to 
the others. Then some deviations were noted. For example, when the hypothesis 
that education and attitudes are linked was examined, it was found that although 
the Dutch sample had much more positive attitudes and more education in 
ECL than the Scottish sample, a direct test of the hypothesis within each sample 
revealed no relationship between the two whatsoever. Some explanations could 
be offered: It could be that legal education does not influence the way lawyers 
think about ECL and European integration. There may also be a problem with 
the size of the sample, caused by having too few lawyers who had had extensive 
training in ECL. Thus, the true nature of the relationship between education and 
attitudes was difficult to reveal. It is also possible that lack of exposure to ECL 
in practice may have more to contribute to attitudes than education. It might 
also be that the Scottish lawyers feel that their legal system is more under threat 
from ECL because, ever since the 1707 Act of Union with England, the Scottish 
legal system is a source of pride related to a feeling of independence, and thus 
something to be preserved and protected from outside influences. The Dutch 
have already been involved in other integration processes, such as within the 
Benelux.
The implications of the findings gave some cause for alarm for the process of 
European integration. It was clear from the findings that lawyers felt somewhat 
distant from the European legal system, they had difficulties in gaining access 
to information, they believed that the inter-relationship between ECL and their 
domestic law was too complex, and they found it difficult to keep pace with 
developments. For example, nearly half the lawyers in both countries thought 
that the reason why there were few referrals to the European Court of Justice 
was because unacceptable delays might arise, and nearly half in Scotland, and 
around a quarter in The Netherlands, thought that unacceptable additional 
costs might be an inhibiting factor. In both countries around 40 percent felt that 
judges and tribunal chairmen have a preference for deciding cases on the basis 
of domestic law. 
However, considering the conservatism of legal systems and lawyers who oper-
ate them, it might be argued that, given time, lawyers in all jurisdictions of the 
European Community would come to terms with the provisions of the ECL and 
eventually accept Brussels and Luxembourg as essential sources of law.
Two levels of problems were indicated by the study: those at an institutional 
level and those at a personal level. Problems at the institutional and personal lev-
els are, of course, related and can to some extent be explained by examining the 
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traditional patterns of the national legal systems. The study clearly demonstrated 
a certain lack of harmony between the aspirations of the European Community 
and rhetoric of European integration, and the experiences of lawyers in day-to-
day practice. Many explanations can be offered for this but would involve a great 
deal of speculation and cannot be offered with any certainty. It was felt that they 
should, however, be explored further to provide the full picture of how law and 
lawyers can contribute to the process of European integration. 
The subject has not lost its relevance today, and similar empirical and theo-
retical research should be carried out in the new Member States of the European 
Union. In this, the project discussed can be used as a starting point or as a tem-
plate, with refinements reflecting more recent developments in research tech-
niques and methods of in-context analysis. The problems are all the more acute 
since the European Union is enlarging with serious cultural implications and 
Community law is increasing in both importance and scope affecting major areas 
of domestic law today. In certain areas it is even taking the place of domestic law 
or is being superimposed on it or enmeshed with it. 
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
 1.  Select a topic and set up a hypothetical research project. Justify your choice 
of the topic, the legal systems, the membership of your research team, your 
research design and methodology. Formulate at least three hypotheses you 
would like to test and the results you expect, with reasons.
 2.  If you were approached by your government to carry out a piece of com-
parative law research to facilitate harmonisation of family law especially 
related to the area of do-it-yourself-divorce in the European Union, but 
also looking at the problem in a culturally wider context, what kind of 
methodology would you use? What kind of problems would you expect to 
come across? And how would you propose to solve these? 
 3.  ‘There is no standard comparative law methodology: the method depends 
on the researcher’s purpose’. Assess this statement with examples.
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